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Abstract 
Gal. 3:10-14 is still one of the most controversial and challenging passages in Paul's letters. 
The logic of Paul's rhetoric is that which mainly baffles. Study of this text has been 
hampered by an inadequate appreciation of the ranges of possible meanings, at all semantic 
levels. 
We seek to redress this lack in chapter 2. We survey the science of logic. We 
discover overlooked semantic possibilities for three key word-groups in Paul's rhetoric. 
AUatog and irionq could be "discourse" lexical concepts. By epya Paul very possibly 
intends "accomplishments" rather than "endeavour." Chapter 3 finds the indicated senses 
Paul's. Effectively multiplying our data via sociolinguistic cognizance that identical words 
may denote different "realities" for speaker and hearer, we discover that Paul's usage implies 
a three-fold working semantic hypothesis: For Paul "faith" believes in a covenantal condition 
besides itself, namely obedience (endeavour to fu l f i l God's commands); Paul is basically 
denying that justification depends upon any particular amount of accomplishment of God's 
commands; and the issue Paul is addressing is not that of the true means of justification, but 
that of the true meaning of ("righteousness" and thereby of) "justification" in the context of 
God's covenant. 
The remainder of the thesis confirms and elaborates this overall meaning for Gal. 
3:10-14. In verse 10 Paul points out that logically those who hold to the epya vdfwv theory 
of "justification" have circumstances which contradict that theory; thus he is arguing by a 
"circumstantial" ad hominem type of argument. In verses 11-12 he circumstantially 
undermines his opponents' "accomplishments" righteousness-criterion by its incompatibility 
with Hab. 2:4. In verses 13-14, the "rescue" works entirely by causa cognoscendi: it is not 
a means of propitiation or repayment, either for man or for God. Our findings support our 
hypothesis. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Gal. 3:10-14 constitutes a formidable exegetical challenge for Pauline scholars today. N . T. 
Wright (1992, 137) has called it "one of the most complicated and controverted passages in 
Paul."1 The Greek and typical English translation (NASB) of the passage read as follows: 2 
Gal. 3:10 
oooi yap e£ epyuv voiwv eloiv, biro 
Kardpav eloiv yiypaifTai yap on 
'EiriKotTapaToq iraq dq owe ep,\ievei 
Kaoiv wiq yeypawievoiq ev TCJ> 
J8I/3XUO TOV vofiov TOV iroirfaai UVTU. 
For as many as are of the works of the 
law are under a curse; for it is written, 
"Cursed is everyone who does not 
abide by all things written in the book 
of the law, to perform them." 
3:11 
on 6e ev vofix^ ovbelq biKaiovrai 
irapa TCJ) 0ecj> brfkov, on 'O binatoq 
ejc moTeoiq fjjaeTm* 
Now that no one is justified by the law 
before God is evident; for, "The 
righteous man shall live by faith." 
1. Cf. Dunn (1993c, 83); B. Longenecker (1998, 134). 
2. The Greek text is that of the United Bible Society's Greek New Testament, 3rd edition. Since 
there are no difficult or even semantically noteworthy text-critical problems in this passage, we 
will simply accept this text as our basis for exegesis. All English excerpts from the Bible are from 
the RSV unless otherwise noted. We present the NASB of the passage here so as to begin with as 
neutral and literal a translation as is available. In quotations generally, round brackets will be the 
original author's interpolations and square brackets will signify our own interpolations, unless 
otherwise indicated. 
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3:12 
6 be vbpoq OVK eanv e/c mareuq, 
aW 'O iroirjoaq avra ^rjaerm ev 
ciVToiq. 
However, the Law is not of faith; on 
the contrary, "He who practices them 
shall live by them." 
3:13 
Xpiarbq rjuctq e^rrybpaocv EK Tijq 
KctTapaq TOV vbfwv ytvofievoq vicep 
r)fiwv Karapa, on yeypairTai, 
'YL-niKaTupcnoq iraq b Kpefidnepoq 
em i-v\ov, 
Christ redeemed us from the curse of 
the Law, having become a curse for 
us—for it is written, "Cursed is every 
one who hangs on a tree"^-
3:14 
'Cva eiq ra edvr} rj evXoyia TOV 
'Appaan y&vryrai ev Xptar^ 'IrjaoD, 
iva TT)V eirayyeXicxv TOV nvEVnoiToq 
XaiSw/u.ec bia rfjq marewq. 
in order that in Christ Jesus the 
blessing of Abraham might come to the 
Gentiles, so that we might receive the 
promise of the Spirit through faith. 
1.1 A tour of the interpretations of G a l . 3:10-14 
A brief tour of the main answers given to the larger exegetical questions posed by the passage 
will help demonstrate both the lack of consensus on these questions and the lack of any 
reason to suppose that a consensus is currently forming. This tour wi l l not enter into 
extensive citations or interaction with commentators, which is reserved to later chapters; here 
we wish to indicate the passage's most glaring problems and the commonly offered solutions, 
as well as a few common but questionable assumptions. Since most hypotheses have been 
offered by commentators regarding only a part of the passage, and since the passage's overall 
logical/rhetorical structure and meaning involves many sub-issues, it will be convenient to 
segment this tour according to the three major parts of the passage: verse 10, verses 11-12, 
and verses 13-14. 
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1.1.1 Verse 10 
Many view this verse as the most difficult and contentious part of the passage;3 thus it 
occupies the longest part of our tour. Its main problem, according to most commentators, is 
the logic of the overall argument: in 10a Paul pronounces a curse on oaoi e£ epyuv i>6fwv 
("as many as are of the works of the Law," AT), which commentators most often (but 
without much argument) take to mean those who seek merit with God through keeping the 
Law; but in 10b, Paul cites a scripture (Deut. 27:26) which apparently curses those who do 
not keep the Law. Thus Paul's proof-text would seem to prove, i f anything, the exact 
opposite of what he appears to be arguing. What is going on? 
1.1.1.1 The traditional view: the Law as impossible to fu l f i l 
According to John Calvin, Paul "concludes boldly that all are cursed because all have been 
commanded to keep the law perfectly, and this is because, in the present corruption of our 
nature, the ability is wanting" (see Calvin 1965, 53). Thus Calvin supplies the argument an 
unstated premise (viz., that all fall short of keeping the Law perfectly), and also finds the 
argument's conclusion not in 10a, but in the additional unspoken proposition that therefore 
all are cursed (ibid.). Though this same unstated premise has been supposed by a great 
number of modern commentators,4 virtually all of these find, contrary to Calvin, that 10a is 
the argument's conclusion. Perhaps this is not very surprising, as Paul give every indication 
of wanting to prove 10a by 10b. Yet here Calvin brings out an important point: i f the 
3. E.g. Young 1998, 79. 
4. This interpretation has been held, for example, by J. B. Lightfoot (1890, 137-38), Franz Mussner 
(1974, 225f.), Ulrich Wilckens (1974), David Hill (1982, 197-98), Douglas Moo (1983, 97-99), 
Heikki Raisanen (1983, 94); Hans Hiibner (1984, 19, 38), Thomas Schreiner (1984; 1985; 1993, 
44-50), Ronald Fung (1988, 141-43), Stephen Westerholm (1988, 121), G. Walter Hansen 
(1989, 119, 244 nn. 109, 119; 1994, 93), Richard Longenecker (1990, 116-18), Moises Silva 
(1990, 159 n. 12), In-Gyu Hong (1993, 79-82, 133-41; 1994, 173-77), Jan Lambrecht (1994, 
282), Frank Thielman (1994, 124-27), Hans-Joachim Eckstein (1996, 129ff.), Colin Kruse 
(1996, 80-82), Leon Morris (1996, ad loc), and Bruce Longenecker (1998, 140-42). 
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unstated premise is that all fail to "keep the Law perfectly," then the argument proves not 
just that oaoL e£ epywv vofwv are under a curse, but that everyone is. And that creates 
tensions: in verses 9 and 13 Paul apparently means that at least some people are not under 
this curse. Furthermore, the idea that Paul's argument could assume the Law to be incapable 
of fulfilment, in a Jewish (if Christian) religious context, has come under increasingly heavy 
attack in recent decades, particularly since E. P. Sanders' 1977 monograph exposing Pauline 
scholarship's traditional misrepresentations of lst-c. Judaism.5 
1.1.1.2 Bultmann, Schlier, Bruce, Reinbold 
According to an alternative view, Paul's unstated assumption is not that the Law cannot be 
fulfilled. The latter notion may be true enough, but is beside the point: even i f man could 
fu l f i l the Law, the attempt itself would be sin, an arrogant attempt to gain merit before God, 
and therefore is cursed. This interpretation was held by Rudolf Bultmann (1951, 263f.) and 
Heinrich Schlier (1971, 132-33), and supported also by F. F. Bruce (1982b, 160). Recently 
Wolfgang Reinbold (2000) has defended it, noting that it avoids the criticisms of the 
traditional view which arise from Sanders' work on lst-century Judaism and that it seems 
more consonant with Paul's other writings about the Law. But some have noted that in 3:10 
this is quite contrary to what Paul explicitly says: the curse is not for doing the things of the 
Law, but for not doing them (e.g., Stanley 1990, 483-84; Schreiner 1993, 50-51). 
1.1.1.3 Bring, Fuller 
Ragnar Bring (1961, 120ff.) and Daniel P. Fuller (1975) have supported something rather 
like Bultmann's reading by claiming that Paul's argument is not with "the Law" as such, but 
only with the "works of the Law," by which term Paul refers to the lst-century Jews' 
legalistic distortion of the Law. The Law was not intended as a way of gaining merit before 
5. Krister Stendahl's work (see Stendahl 1976) was an important precursor to Sanders'. 
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God, says this hypothesis; but the Jews misused it as one. But even i f this reading escapes 
Bultmann's outright conflict with the text, it has not yet made clear why such "legalism" falls 
under the specific curse of Deut. 27:26 upon those who fail to "abide by" all things written 
in the Law. What constitutes this sort of "legalism/' and what leads to it, and in what way 
does it depart (as here it logically should) from "abiding by all things commanded" (3:10b)? 
The linguistic arguments for this meaning of epya vdfiov have been weak and few; nor has 
the objection been overcome, that the notion "works of the Law" would probably have had 
no evil connotation to a Jewish (or Jewish-influenced) audience, but quite the opposite.6 This 
explanation of 10a's curse-pronouncement falls short. 
1.1.1.4 Burton 
An interesting but usually misunderstood reading, somewhat similar to the preceding, is that 
of E. D. Burton (1921, 163-65). According to Burton Paul is not trying to prove this curse 
on oooi c£ epyiov vdfiov, but rather by inferring it he seeks to show invalid (as covenantal 
law) the passage (Deut. 27:26) from which it was inferred: the Law's verdicts 
are, for Paul, not judgments which reflect God's attitude now or at any time or 
under any circumstances, but those which the legalist must, to his own undoing, 
recognise as those of the law interpreted as he interprets it, and which on the 
basis of his legalism he must impute to God. . . . the assumption of the legalist 
that the law is the basis of the divine judgment involves the conclusion that all 
men are accursed, and [therefore] must be false (p. 165). 
As an improvement over the above reading, this one incorporates the "Law-misuse" idea into 
the very structure of the argument. But it draws in also the traditional unstated premise, "No 
one fulfils the Law perfectly." It therefore is subject to the criticisms arising from Sanders' 
work (see above). It also seems to conflict with verse 13: i f the curse pronounced by Deut. 
27:26 is wholly spurious, then from what "curse of the Law" did Christ "rescue us"? 
6. Fuller (1975, 35) notes this objection, but fails to handle it plausibly. 
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1.1.1.5 Stanley, Braswell, Ziesler, Bonneau, Williams, Witherington, Young 
The reading offered by C. D. Stanley (1990) and espoused by Joseph Braswell (1991, 
apparently independently of Stanley), John Ziesler (1992, ad loc), Normand Bonneau (1997, 
73-74), Sam Williams (1997), Ben Witherington (1998, ad loc), and Norman Young (1998) 
likewise denies that Paul sees the curse of 10a as actually, already pronounced upon oooi e£ 
epyav vdfwv. For the curse will come upon them only if they fail to "abide by all things 
written . . ."; it is not certain that they will do so, according to this reading. This 
uncertainty is evident in the indefinite pronoun oooi and in Paul's phrase "under a curse" in 
10a, allegedly less decisive than the notion "accursed" which appears in 10b. Thus in 10a 
Paul is allegedly warning against the threat which would accompany acceptance of the Law. 
But the indefiniteness introduced by oooi is as to the exact number of those who are "of the 
works of the Law," not as to whether these "abide by all things written . . ." As for the 
phrase "under a curse," it is doubtful that Paul would or could use it here to mean "under the 
possibility of curse." For one thing, the latter would entail the correlative possibility of 
blessing, in a lst-century Jewish context (assuming, as these commentators generally do, that 
the Law can be fulfi l led). 7 So the Galatians would have known already that curse is a 
possibility under the Torah; for they are contemplating observing the Torah in order to gain 
the blessing. Indeed, Paul's opponents must have themselves already used the curse-threat, 
but in order to prod the Galatians into keeping the Law; otherwise they would not have had 
leverage to "compel" the Galatians to be circumcised (6:12; cf. 4:17).8 Therefore the 
Galatians must have come to believe the Law was already binding, not just for Jews but for 
7. Cf. Wisdom 1998, 14. 
8. According to some commentators (e.g. Barrett 1985, 22ff.; Smiles 1998, 201-2), Deut. 27:26 and 
Lev. 18:5 were probably introduced into the debate by Paul's opponents. 
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Gentiles, or at least Gentile Christians.9 Thus in 3:10's phrase "under a curse" Paul's 
readers would find no suggestion of uncertainty about the Law's cursing "as many as are of 
works of the Law." On the contrary, the clear logical connection of 10a with 10b, signified 
by yap, would suggest to them the absolute certainty of lOa's curse upon oooi e£ epywv 
vdfiov. 
1.1.1.6 Sanders, McKnight, Smiles 
With the problems attaching to these five readings, it is not surprising that some 
commentators have suggested that logic was hardly uppermost in Paul's mind when writing 
3:10. According to E. P. Sanders (1983, 21-22), Paul 
wants a passage which says that the nomos brings a curse, and he cites the only 
one which does. . . . I think that what Paul says in his own words is the clue to 
what he took the proof-texts to mean. Thus in 3:10 Paul means that those who 
accept the Law are cursed. 
Scot McKnight (1995, 154-55) and Vincent Smiles (1998, 201-2) have also adopted 
essentially this approach (see also Martyn 1997a, 309). In effect, it tries to salvage 
Bultmann's explanation by claiming that the resulting contradiction between citation and 
conclusion does not matter; Paul was not paying attention to what his proof-text actually said. 
But Paul had no computer software by which he might search out every verse which had the 
terms "Law" and "cursed" and then unreflectingly paste one into his document! Rather, he 
was familiar with the texts themselves (including their meaning!), and relied upon that 
familiarity to choose his proof-text. To say Paul might not have noticed that the verse he 
cited as proof-text was the direct contradiction of the conclusion he drew from it, is almost to 
imply that Paul might have written this verse while asleep. This reading fails, therefore, to 
explain 3:10 plausibly. 
9. Likewise in Romans Paul's exposition of the Law's condemnation assumes that it falls on Gentile 
as well as Jew (Rom. 3:9-20). Note particularly Rom. 3:19, and its word virdbiKoq ("under 
judgment"), semantically and almost verbally parallel to Gal. 3:10's virb Kmapav ("under a 
curse"). 
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1.1.1.7 Noth, Caneday, Wright, Scott 
Another approach to the problem sets forward the notion, allegedly held by many lst-century 
Jews, that Israel was still under the covenantal curse which caused the Babylonian exile and 
Jewish dispersion among the nations, and that the exile and curse would not truly end until 
God came in divine intervention in history. Thus in quoting Deut. 27:26, Paul is referring 
not to individuals at all: "his point is not that individual Jews have all in fact sinned, but that 
Israel as a whole has failed to keep the perfect Torah . . . " (Wright 1992, 146). Those who 
adopt Israel's way of life, Paul argues, wil l therefore fall under the curse that still burdens 
Israel. Martin Noth (1966), Ardel Caneday (1989, 195), N . T. Wright (1992, 137-48), and 
James Scott (1993) have supported this general understanding of the verse.10 But besides the 
extreme difficulty or impossibility of discovering elsewhere in Paul's writings this theme of 
"Israel still in exile," 1 1 it is not at all clear what the disobedience of "Israel as a whole" has 
to do with the point Paul is making here: both his citation and his conclusion refer 
grammatically to individuals, not to some national collective (oaoi speaks of an indefinite 
number, of individuals). And the fact that as a nation Israel did not obey the Torah, does 
not imply that no individual who adopts the Torah will obey i t . 1 2 
1.1.1.8 Dunn, Cranford, Garlington, Wisdom 
James D. G. Dunn (1990b, 226-27; 1993a, 170-74), Michael Cranford (1994, 244-54), Don 
Garlington (1997), and Jeff Wisdom (1998) also argue that Paul does not have perfect 
obedience in mind in this verse. "The basic logic of the text is clear: all who are e£ epyoov 
vofiov are under a curse, because they fail to abide by everything that is written in the law" 
10. Scott Hafemann (1997, 342-45) follows James Scott here. 
11. A point made by James Dunn in a New Testament Postgraduate Seminar presentation at Durham 
University. 
12. Such an inference would be an instance of the logical "fallacy of division." 
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(Dunn 1990b, 226; emphasis in original). Thus the latter premise, though unstated, would 
have been clear to Paul's readers. The Jews considered their service under the Law, which 
service Paul calls "the works of the Law," to be focused in those things which distinguished 
and identified Jews as such, which things particularly comprise the ritual observances such as 
circumcision and dietary regulations. This had the undesirable result that the Jews were 
more restrictive and exclusivistic than could permit enactment of God's plan for the inclusion 
of the Gentiles, foretold in Genesis (cf. Gal. 3:8). Thus "to be of the works of the law is not 
the same as fulfil l ing the law, is less than what the law requires, and so falls under the law's 
own curse" (Cranford 1994, 249 n.22, quoting Dunn 1990b, 226). This interesting reading 
is arguably consistent with the dynamics of Jew-Gentile social relations. But it still seems 
hard-pressed to explain the logic of 3:10. I f those who are "of works of the Law" are 
demanding these things (such as circumcision and dietary observances) precisely because they 
are adherents of the Law and these things are commanded in the Law, how could Paul 
construe someone's insistence upon them as an instance of not "abiding by all things 
commanded in the Law"? In this case it appears, yet again, that Paul's proof-text says only 
the exact opposite of his conclusion. Thus none of the above expositions explains 
unproblematically the connection between 3:10a and 10b. 
1.1.2 Verses 11-12 
There is no such plethora of views concerning verses 11-12 or 13-14. But no real consensus 
seems to be coalescing regarding these verses either. Almost all commentators agree (but 
without much argumentation) that in 11-12 Paul is trying to show that one cannot be justified 
"by means of keeping the Law" (&v vb^, 11a). And most agree that l i b and 12a form the 
premises of a syllogism whose conclusion is 1 la. One might suppose that this narrows down 
the overall meaning for these commentators; but radical differences among them persist. For 
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example^ Paul's juxtaposing of two OT scriptures (Hab. 2:4 and Lev. 18:5), as i f the reader 
is supposed to see contradiction between them, has caused consternation and contention. Is 
Paul trying to resolve somehow the apparent textual conflict? 1 3 I f not, is he tacitly assuming 
some sort of redemptive-historical shift between differing dispensations or ages?14 I f so, 
what is the shift, and how does it relate to these cited verses? These questions continue to 
confound and divide commentators. But as we shall see, the problem may derive from 
assumptions about verses 11-12 that need questioning, such as the meaning of ev VOUQ 
mentioned above. 
1.1.3 Verses 13-14 
No less do verses 13-14 give rise to serious disagreements between interpreters. 
Disagreement here concerns primarily Paul's conception of the atonement and of how that 
brings blessings to the Gentiles. The most common view has been that Christ's death 
effected a substitutionary atonement: he suffered the Law's curse " in our stead,"15 thus 
propitiating the wrath of God or overcoming the cosmic forces of evil that threatened our 
eschatological blessing, or both (if indeed they are different), by the offering of himself. 1 6 
But it is somewhat difficult to understand, in this case, how for Paul the curse can have been 
removed only for certain people, since Christ's cosmic or God-propitiating victory is 
independent of individuals' responses to it. But i f the curse has instead been removed for all 
in this substitutionary fashion, or even only for all Jews, how is it that not even all Jews are 
blessed, as in verse 10 those who are "of works of the Law" (which includes primarily 
persons of Jewish heritage) are under this curse? 
13. So, notably, J . S. Vos (1992). 
14. So, notably, J . L . Martyn (1967; 1991; 1985; 1997a; 1997b). 
15. The prepositional phrase virep i)yiG>v is commonly taken to mean "in our stead," although it could 
mean simply "in our behalf." 
16. So Bring 1961, 144; Morris 1965, 56-59, 62-64; Raisanen 1983, 59-61; Fung 1988, 149-50; 
Cousar 1990, 55-56; R. Longenecker 1990, 121; many others. 
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Some exegetes have argued that this redemption from the Law's curse means some type 
of "redemption" from the mistaken notion that the Law is our way of salvation or that it has 
(or, still has) jurisdiction over us. The way Christ's death shows this about the Law is 
supposedly via Christ's vindication in his resurrection; the Law's curse upon him was clearly 
mistaken; therefore, the Law is an invalid judge of anyone.17 Yet even i f we grant that the 
curse which fell upon Christ himself was pronounced by the Law (which the text does not 
actually say), Paul says "redeemed from the curse of the Law," not "redeemed from a 
mistaken notion" about it. But i f we accept that the Law's curse on Christ was mistaken and 
thus without validity, what becomes of "the curse of the Law," from which we supposedly 
are "redeemed"? This reading faces a dilemma: either the Law's curse is valid and real, in 
which case we cannot be "redeemed" from it by being shown its invalidity; or else it is non-
binding and invalid, in which case there was no curse to redeem us from. 
1.2 Some observations on the state of the problem 
We have seen that today there is no exegetical consensus on any part of this passage. There 
are at least two ways one might react to this situation. One might decide that it is not 
worthwhile, at least at present, to pursue further exegesis of this passage. I f we had enough 
historical, linguistic, and lexical-semantic data to infer the passage's meaning, it would have 
been inferred by now, one might argue; the increasing lack of consensus simply suggests that 
we have an exegetical problem which for the moment defies solution. On the other hand, we 
might critically re-examine the sorts of exegetical procedure that have been followed in the 
study of this passage. Before we give in to exegetical despair, then, let us try following this 
latter train of thought a way. 
17. So, e.g., Burton 1921, 168-75; Duncan 1934, 101; Edwards 1972; Weder 1981; Beker 1984, 
185-86, 261. 
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It seems that in each part of the passage, scholars disagree mainly over the flow of 
Paul's reasoning and, in some cases, over whether it is a truly logical flow. But let us 
consider: what would it take to determine whether the rhetorical flow is truly logical? Would 
it not take a knowledge of the various ways in which one may argue in a "truly logical" 
manner, and then an applying of this knowledge to the passage, a seeing whether Paul's 
rhetoric accords with any of these known ways? That would seem requisite. And yet we 
very rarely find this sort of analysis in any exegesis of the passage. 
But such analysis is crucial not only for determining whether Paul is being logical, but 
also for understanding just what his logic is. For arguments are rarely spelled out fully; and 
as we have seen, there is general agreement that Paul is leaving out parts of his here. 
Therefore, in order to follow the intended argument, the reader must f i l l in its gaps by 
supplying its unstated parts. Yet in order to do that, one must already have guessed the 
intended flow of the argument. And i f one has only parts of the argument with which to 
work, one must have in mind a model or models of what are the valid, logical types of 
argument, before one can educatedly guess which of these models is that which the author is 
trying to follow. 
The usual omission of this type of analysis from exegesis of Gal. 3:10-14 implies that 
interpreters have either overlooked or not sufficiently understood certain known, relevant 
semantic possibilities. For the meaning of the passage includes not only the meanings of its 
words and of its sentences, but also any logical relations (e.g., "therefore") connecting those 
sentences. But i f known, relevant semantic possibilities have been overlooked or not 
sufficiently understood, the exegesis of the passage wil l not be as thorough or as cogently-
argued as it might have been given the available data. 
As we wil l see, however, not only at the level of the passage's logical flow have 
known semantic possibilities have been neglected or insufficiently understood. At the 
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proposition-level too, known semantic possibilities have been left unexamined and 
uncatalogued. Also there are certain key terms that Paul uses, whose known potential senses 
have been insufficiently considered, appreciated, and compared in exegesis of Galatians 3. 
These terms have a considerable amount of theological mass in present-day exegesis; their 
Pauline meanings are therefore frequently more assumed than demonstrated.18 Once again, 
the implication of such a state of affairs is that the exegesis of the passage has been less 
thorough and cogent than it could have been. 
18. Commonly the overall argument- or discourse-meaning is assumed first, then the proposition-
meanings accordingly, and, finally, the word-meanings are made to conform. But this approach 
inevitably locks the interpreter into an exegetical (or "hermeneutical") circle, a circular exegetical 
argument; for the only known objective way to validate written-discourse meanings is via the 
meanings of constituent propositions, and the only known objective way to justify the latter is via 
the meanings of constituent words (and of other signs such as gestures and punctuation points. 
We consider this "parts-whole" type of hermeneutical circle more fully in chap. 3.) 
Unfortunately this problem largely vitiates the noteworthy book on Romans 1-8 by John Moores 
(1995), one of the extremely rare works applying logic to Paul's writings in order to reconstruct 
his arguments (although Moores offers no helpful synopsis of the science of logic or of ways of 
arguing, but rather a summary of some topics in semiotics). Moores is interested mainly in Paul's 
rhetorical strategy, and to what extent and with what effect it depends on use of logic; so naturally 
the main concern of the book is with the discourse-, argument-level of Paul's meaning. But doing 
one's exegesis at this level initially is a procedure fraught with danger. Moores falsely assumes, 
and even claims, that we do not need to understand Paul's propositions in order to reconstruct his 
arguments. For example (p. 62), we need not know whether Paul affirms that justification is by 
faith alone; which assertion Moores overturns almost in the next breath by assuming sola fide in 
the reconstruction of Paul's argumentation ca. Rom. 3:19-20. 
Unsurprisingly, the propositions which Moores uses in reconstructing Paul's arguments seem 
only loosely based on Paul's actual statements, on which Moores focuses relatively little attention. 
It would be rather coincidental, then, if Moores' reconstructions shed considerable light on Paul's 
meaning in the passages where light is most in need. Nor do they. That represents no problem 
for Moores—in fact, quite the contrary: Moores' methodology allows him to commit to the 
supposedly helpful category "fuzzy logic" any word or statement which his exegesis (if 
unsuccessful!) concludes is unfathomable. (E.g., p. 150: "With [Paul's] exclusion of any . . . 
definition of human righteousness as law-obedience, it has become indefinable. It has acquired, 
however, infinite depth," which is something like, infinite existential angst in lieu of intelligible 
content.) But by offering no criterion of situations in which the category "fuzzy logic" is validly 
applicable (e.g., it is applicable to relative notions, such as "tall"), Moores leaves his reader 
wondering if it is really Paul's logic, or only Moores' analysis of it, that lacks the normal degree 
of definiteness and cogency. What we seem to need, rather than glib use of the category "fuzzy 
logic," is analysis that gives greater attention, first to the semantic possibilities at the word-level, 
then to those at the proposition-level, and finally to those at the argument- or discourse-level, all 
the while keeping the exegetical argument flowing in this direction lest it turn back on itself. 
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In short, there appear to be known, pertinent semantic possibilities for the passage 
which have not been sufficiently considered and fairly judged. The obstacle to understanding 
Gal. 3:10-14, therefore, may be less in the exegetical problem which it presents, than in us, 
its interpreters. Under current exegetical circumstances, a verdict of Paul's 
incomprehensibility in Gal. 3:10-14 would seem quite premature. The goal of the present 
thesis is to make a scientifically-grounded and thorough analysis and evaluation of the 
meaning of Paul's rhetoric, including its thrust and logical structure (if it has any), in Gal. 
3:10-14, and to do this by non-fallacious, non-circular exegesis. We consider how to avoid 
"hermeneutical circles" in chap. 3. We begin in chapter 2 by considering various commonly 
neglected semantic possibilities which are confirmed and clarified via two language-related 
sciences, logic and linguistic semantics, and which are pertinent to exegesis of the word-
meanings, propositions, and argumentation of Gal. 3:10-14. 
Chapter 2 
Some neglected semantic possibilities pertinent to Galatians 
We have seen that the meaning of Gal. 3:10-14 has not been adequately elucidated, nor has 
any consensus formed concerning it. One part of adequately elucidating the passage is to 
ascertain, as much as we can, the possible answers or at least possible types of answers 
available for the three levels of meaning presumably involved: word-meaning, proposition-
meaning, and argument- or discourse-meaning. Grasping the meaning of a passage entails 
grasping its meaning at all these levels (Cotterell and Turner 1989, 77-82). The word-
meanings we wil l survey in this chapter include the semantic potentials, some overlooked, of 
certain key terms in the passage. For proposition- and argument-meaning, we survey the 
forms and types; these are not widely understood. 
By proposition we mean not a sentence, but rather the meaning expressed by a sentence 
(Clark 1985, 30; Cotterell and Turner 1989, 78). Meanings of particular sentences depend 
not only on the proposition's type and form, but also on the meanings of its words and on 
their respective positions and roles in the proposition (e.g., subject vs. predicate). Likewise, 
discourse- or argument-meanings depend not only on the argument's or discourse's type 
and/or structure, but also on its propositions' meanings and on the propositions' respective 
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positions or roles in the discourse/argument. It would help us understand the impact, at other 
meaning-levels, of various choices for word-meanings, i f we understood already the potential 
types and forms of arguments and propositions. Accordingly we shall discuss argumentative 
discourse-types and proposition-types first, then the word-meanings. 
Besides various potential hypotheses about meanings, there are also some relevant 
methodological, hermeneutical matters that we should address because they are pertinent to 
the question of potential meanings. Specifically, we will bring in considerations from 
pragmatics and semantics. Such subjects, as also logic, are rich with resources for building 
exegetical arguments; our interest here wil l be primarily in the potential but neglected 
meaning-hypotheses they suggest. In this respect they each tend to pertain to a particular 
level of meaning; we shall therefore look at these in their proper place when considering 
proposition-meanings, discourse-meanings, or word-meanings. 
2.1 Possibilities with respect to argumentative and propositional forms and types 
Understanding the meaning of an argument involves understanding the logic of it. That 
understanding may be conscious or unconscious; but it can be conscious only i f one 
understands, abstractly, the type of argument used. Obviously then it is to the advantage of 
the exegete (i.e., the methodical interpreter)1 to have a more conscious rather than less 
conscious grasp of various argument-types. 
But one overvalued and rather abused exegetical tool is identification of the "rhetorical 
genre" of an ancient text. We say "overvalued" because it seems to have become, against its 
original intention, a sort of master-categorisation of types of argument, rather than simply an 
enumeration of some styles or genres of discourse native to various types of rhetorical 
1. Cf. Meyer 1994, 90. 
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situation.2 As a result, its use has, in our opinion, often been a good example of a bad 
inductive argument, an unfounded generalisation resulting in forced exegesis. Since this 
supposed hermeneutical tool has created an undue restriction in semantic hypotheses, whereas 
our present purpose is to expand our hypothesis-horizon as much as possible, it seems 
necessary to assess this tool's value at the outset. 
2.1.1 Rhetorical genre? 
Much recent attention has been given to the rhetorical aspects of Galatians, and particularly 
under what ancient rhetorical genre it might be classifiable. The "rhetorical criticism" of 
Galatians has been dominated by this issue.3 The matter of rhetorical genre is basically a 
matter of types of rhetorical (i.e., a speaker's) situation and audience (Hellholm 1994, 129-
30). The fact that Galatians was always a document, not a speech, throws a bit of cold water 
on the quest for its rhetorical genre. Moreover, the traditional categories of rhetorical genre 
are either too few or too broad to be exhaustive as true genre classifications: "Epideictic 
originally referred to demonstrations of merit or faults, but comes to include all oratory 
which is not deliberative or judicial; in late antiquity it is even used of other literary genres, 
2. It is remarkable how similar is recent discussion of New Testament "rhetorical genres," to the 
19th-century neo-classical genre theory popularised in biblical studies by Hermann Gunkel: "In 
the nineteenth century, genre theorists believed that genres were rigid and pure. Literary texts, it 
was felt, could be pigeonholed into their respective generic categories, and the genres themselves 
could be arranged into hierarchies. Gunkel imported this unfortunate understanding of genre into 
biblical studies, though such a neoclassical position was already obsolete in his own day. 
According to Gunkel, a particular text had one genre with a corresponding setting in life. 
Furthermore, so-called mixed genres (Mischgattungen) were considered late and corrupt" 
Longman (1987, 78-79). Almost all of this reminds one of current NT rhetorical criticism. But 
in fact, "such a position can be neither theoretically nor practically justified" (ibid., 79). 
3. However, also receiving some attention has been the question of epistolary genre. Walter 
Hansen's approach (1989), adopting the 'rebuke-request' letter genre, leads him to say the letter is 
a combination of forensic (1:6-4:11) and of deliberative (the remainder) rhetoric. It is reasonable 
to appeal to epistolary genres at some point in dealing with Galatians, if they are not forced on the 
text; but it is questionable whether such compound genre-classifying ("part forensic, part 
deliberative") is a help or further hindrance. But epistolary-genre considerations can be of some 
value for studying Paul's letters; see Longenecker 1990, ci-cix. 
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including forms of poetry, so that all writing is embraced in the field of rhetoric" (Kennedy 
1963, 10, emphasis ours). So either "epideictic" is a valid genre, in which case it is limited 
to discourses of praise and blame, or else it is a catch-all category for "everything other than 
forensic or deliberative," in which case we can hardly call it a genre. 
Therefore the hope was forlorn that the discovery of Galatians' rhetorical genre would 
shed a significant volume of light upon the epistle; rather, this hope was just as likely to 
result in Procrustean-bed exegesis, with a miraculous "finding" of the exact meaning 
anticipated by every rhetorical critic who adopts this approach.4 Let us briefly illustrate the 
difficulty here and the extreme potential for unfounded conclusions, by drawing on and 
critiquing some of the answers that have been given to the questions of the letter's rhetorical 
genre and "rational stasis" (i.e., the type of question addressed). 
Betz's (1979) rather trailblazing contention, that Galatians represents an apologetic 
letter in the "forensic" rhetorical genre, has come under increasing fire, especially for the 
forensic genre's inability to account for the parenetic section of the letter; also, Paul does not 
seem so defensive as he seems attacking.5 The other two rhetorical genres being the 
"deliberative" and the "epideictic" (originally demonstrative), the suggestion that Galatians is 
deliberative rhetoric (by Kennedy, Witherington, Stanley, and others) might initially seem 
soundest. But a simple observation will show how gratuitous such categorisations of 
Galatians can be. Often it is assumed that Galatians is deliberative rhetoric, because Paul is 
allegedly discussing what the Galatians should do (e.g., they should refrain from getting 
circumcised).6 But in a broader sense than is used by rhetoricians, "deliberation" is often 
4. This happens along the lines of the logical fallacy called "affirming the consequent," as follows: 
"If X is its true genre, then Galatians will surely make passable sense when read as an example of 
X; but (lo and behold) it does make passable sense when read in this way, therefore X is its true 
genre." 
5. Cf. Longenecker 1990, cxi; Witherington 1998, 37-38. 
6. For the traditional definition see, e.g., Kennedy 1984, 19; Smit 1989, 13; Stanley 1990, 491; 
Witherington 1998, 28. 
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about what is true or is just (e.g., whether the defendant is guilty, or which Law applies in a 
particular case). Indeed, action is always based on theory, and theory would have been 
"deliberated" at some point. And this latter sort of "deliberation" is at least as congenial to 
the data of Galatians 2-4 as is the former: the explicit points made there are often not about 
actions to take or to forgo, but rather about justification or about whether one is justified e£ 
epyuv pdfiov or <k mareug, about the Law's current jurisdiction (or lack thereof), and so on. 
Should we be satisfied, then, with the traditional notion of "deliberative" rhetoric, in 
categorising Galatians? I f so, at what cost? 
On the other hand, there is sometimes a subsidiary discussion of ancient rhetoric's 
"rational stasis" theory (i.e., categorising of the type of question being handled by a text) and 
its relevance to Galatians. I f this has any relevance (which is questionable), it seems entirely 
plausible that Paul is discussing the question of Jurisdiction (i.e., about which law has 
jurisdiction or about changing or invalidating the juristic procedure), rather than that of 
Definition (of an act committed; so Morland 1995, 122), Quality (of an act committed; so 
Betz 1979, 129; Martin 1995, 443), or Fact (of an alleged act; so Kennedy 1984, 145). The 
latter stases have to do with the nature or actuality of past deeds (Morland 1995, 120-21); 
whereas the Definition stasis would be a reasonable categorisation, for example, of a debate 
on the topic, "under which social-covenantal law-code one is to be judged" (e.g., the Law of 
Moses or the Law of Christ). The Definition stasis has apparently been ignored in 
discussions of the rational stasis of Galatians; every other possibility has been championed, 
yet none convincingly.7 
7. Morland jumps inexplicably to his conclusion, "Definition," after refuting and rejecting only the 
stasis of Fact; he also seems implicitly to consider and reject Betz's identification of the stasis as 
Quality (omitting any reasons), but does not consider Jurisdiction. Kennedy, who identifies 
Galatians as deliberative rhetoric, notes also (p. 147) that "Insofar as stasis theory can be applied 
to deliberative rhetoric, the stasis [in Galatians] is one of fact: Which gospel is true? What should 
the Galatians do?" But if the notion "stasis of fact" is to be interpreted so broadly as to 
comprehend the issue "what should be done and by whom" (ibid., 46) and the latter as including 
"what should be believed and by whom," it clearly can comprehend every matter ever deliberated 
or discussed. That would subvert the whole categorical scheme of "rational" stases. Kennedy 
does not explain his rejection of the Qualitative stasis for Galatians. We will take up the further 
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In studying epistles and documents where the rhetorical situation is well established, 
paying attention to generic approaches to such situations may shed light on a few otherwise 
obscure features of the text; but with an epistle like Galatians in which identifying the 
rhetorical situation is so central a part of the problem, the approach may well shed more 
confusion than light. Thus the search for any plausible "genre of Galatians" still depends, to 
a degree not often explicated, upon first determining the precise situation and issue Paul is 
handling, which in the case of Galatians at least (as we discuss in chap. 3) wi l l possibly 
remain uncertain until we are through, or nearly through, with extensive exegesis of the letter 
or of some major part of i t . 8 In short, rhetorical-genre-identification of Galatians should, i f 
used at all, be more the icing on the exegetical cake than a methodological underpinning of 
the whole exegesis, as has been wont to happen. In terms of a distinction R. Longenecker 
noted (1990, cix, citing M . Kessler), our own analysis will be, not along these lines of 
"diachronic" rhetorical criticism which "lays emphasis on the rhetorical forms in their 
historical context and seeks to trace out lines of genetic relations with other writings of the 
time," but rather along those of "synchronic" rhetorical criticism, which "examines the 
argument on its own, classifying its stages of development in terms of general, more 
universal modes of persuasion."9 
topic of Galatians' alleged "legal stasis" (i.e., what type of dispute over written documents it is) 
in the course of our exegesis, when interacting with Martyn, Betz, and J. S. Vos (among others) 
about the structure of the argument in 3:11-12. 
8. See Lonergan 1973, 160, 163-64. Cf. Longman 1987, 80: "The only way to identify the genre 
of a [biblical] text properly is to read it in the context of other, particularly biblical, literature and 
to note similarities between texts. Genre classification is a form of the hermeneutical circle in that 
it involves constant interaction between the particular text and the generalizing genre. The 
individual text can be grasped only through a knowledge of the whole. In short, genres can be 
elucidated only from the texts themselves." 
9. Cf. the methodological sympathies expressed in Longenecker 1990, cxiv; Dunn 1993a, 20; 
Morland 1995, 108-9; Silva 1996, 94-95. 
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2.1.2 Aristotle's classification of argument-types 
More exegetically useful, then, than some ancient writer's scheme of rhetorical genre, might 
be some ancient or modern classification of types of proofs. Here we should have a scheme 
of genuine universal significance for discourse in general. Aristotle injected the first heavy 
dose of argumentation theory into ancient rhetoric. It was also the most significant dose of 
it: his Rhetorica was seminal for later Greek rhetorical theorists (Kennedy 1963, 123, 272-
73). Furthermore, among historical figures he is foremost in developing and elaborating the 
field of logic. It is natural, therefore, to apply in the first instance to the theory he initially 
developed, in order to obtain for our exegesis of Paul at least a provisional, working 
typology of different sorts of arguments.10 But in doing so, we are looking primarily for any 
generally-valid system of classification, and not just for a system that was current in Paul's 
culture. 1 1 
The first distinction Aristotle makes between different types of proof (Ars Rhet., 1.2) 
is between those proofs based on certain or "axiomatic" premises (premises known with 
virtual certainty to be true, such as laws, precedents, trustworthy witnesses, contracts, 
records), and arguments based on premises only probably true. The first kind of proof he 
called "inartistic" or "inartificial" proofs, because the speaker did not need to create such 
proofs, he merely made use of them (although he should be as rhetorically persuasive as 
possible in his use of them). 1 2 The latter kind were called "artistic" or "artificial" because 
10. Cf. Kennedy 1984, 11. 
11. Cf. Longman 1987, 52: "We know that there is not universal generic similarity. New genres 
develop; old ones die out. In addition, certain cultures use some genres and neglect others. For 
example, in the ancient world there is nothing comparable to the modern novel. . . . Nevertheless, 
though a culture-free genre system does not exist, the native literary classification of each culture 
(or lack of such classification, . . .) need not be adopted uncritically in order to identify the genres 
of that culture." 
12. See Book I , chap. 15 for his detailed discussion of the "inartificial" type of proof. 
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the speaker in effect "invented" the proofs, rather than just using one already given as it 
were. 1 3 
Aristotle saw both "dialectic" (a dialogic, question-and-answer style of persuasion) and 
"rhetoric" (a basically monologic style) as generally arguing from premises that were 
opinions or probabilities rather than certainties (Kennedy 1963, 90, 96). Dialectic and 
rhetoric differ from each other, not only in style of argumentation, but also in the subjects 
they cover, as well as in the fact that "rhetoric may also make use of proof by ethos [rjOog] 
and pathos [7ra0oc]" (Kennedy 1963, 96; cf. Hellholm 1994, 129). Rhetorical proofs thus 
included three types according to Aristotle (Ars Rhet. 1.2): "The first depends upon the 
moral character of the speaker (rjdog), the second upon putting the hearer into a certain frame 
of mind (ita&oq), the third upon the speech itself (Kdyog), in so far as it proves (deucvvvai) or 
seems to prove (<j>aiveodoii dencvvvoti)."14 Thus the three types of artificial proof adhere 
respectively in the three factors involved in any rhetorical or persuasive situation: the speaker 
(or writer), the audience, and the discourse (Kennedy 1984, 15). 
The "ethical" proof uses the persuasiveness inherent in the prepossessing moral 
character (ethos) of the speaker, "since we have confidence in an orator who exhibits certain 
qualities, such as goodness, goodwill or both" (Ars Rhet. 1.8.6). The second type, the 
"pathetic" proof, appeals to and tries to stir up in the audience some particular likely 
emotion(s), value(s), and/or commitment(s) (pathos), such as fi l ial love, pity, reverence of 
the gods, respect for the aged (Kennedy 1963, 93). The third type, the "logical" proof, uses 
13. One should remember, when studying Aristotle's classifications and terminology, that he was 
originally much influenced by Plato's low view of "rhetoric" as being a science dedicated to 
proving whatever the speaker wanted to prove. Plato opposed to rhetoric the method of 
"dialectic," which was Socrates' dialogic method of finding truth. Perhaps this negative slant on 
"rhetoric" helps explain Aristotle's fundamental contrast between the "invention" of arguments, 
and the mere use of given, certain "proofs". Aristotle soon came to see rhetoric as a worthwhile 
study, however, which he defined as "the faculty of discovering in each case the available means 
of persuasion" (Ars Rhet. 1.2; see Kennedy 1963, 15-20). 
14. This quotation is from Hellholm 1994, 127. 
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either syllogistic or else inductive reasoning (logos), just as a "scientific" or "inartificial" 
proof does, and according to Aristotle is the most important and powerful type of proof, but 
had been neglected due to the previous rhetorical handbooks' greater interest in swaying 
audiences emotionally (Ars Rhet. 1.1; cf. Kennedy 1963, 88, 95-96). Aristotle knew it is 
unnecessary, for many sorts of syllogistic argument, that the premises be certainties: it is 
only crucial that the truth of the premises be acknowledged by the interlocutors, for the truth 
of the premises implies the truth of the conclusion (assuming the syllogism formally valid) 
and so the argument contains sufficient validity to achieve the intended effect as far as the 
interlocutors are concerned (Hellholm 1994, 121, 128). Syllogisms in a rhetorical proof are 
called "enthymemes" (evdvfirffia)15 and inductive rhetorical proofs are called "examples" 
(•Kupadeiyfwt). 
Thus we see that Aristotle categorised non-"dialectic" arguments in the following way: 
first were those based on scientifically known, axiomatic premises; then came the 
"rhetorical" ones, based on probable premises (including values), which probable arguments 
included the ethical, pathetic, and logical types. It should be noted that this categorisation 
pays primary attention to the epistemological status of the argument's contents, rather than to 
the argument's structure. As Aristotle acknowledged, there was no difference in structure 
between a scientific syllogism and a rhetorical one. 
For the purposes of an exegesis that may involve reconstructing unstated parts of 
arguments, however, the more significant differences between these several types of argument 
are those of structure; for it is structure that must be determined before the missing premises 
and/or conclusions can be supplied. Thus it would be better for us to think in terms of an 
15. This is the original rhetorical sense of enthymeme, a sense also found in most English dictionaries 
today. The sense we will use in the section on pragmatics, "an argument with suppressed 
(unstated) parts," is the sense in which later writers, misunderstanding Aristotle in Ars Rhet. 1.2, 
used the term, and in which logic textbooks still use it today. In the last century or so most 
rhetoricians have returned to Aristotle's usage (Kennedy 1963 , 97). 
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argument-categorisation like that suggested by David Hellholm (1994, 119 n.7, 1211, 127), 
which groups together the scientific and the rhetorical-logical arguments, under the rubric 
"logical" or "theoretical" (or "logical-theoretical"), and groups the ethical and pathetic 
arguments under the rubric "practical" or "pragmatic" (or "practical-pragmatic"). This 
scheme is clearly better at portraying the major structural differences between the various 
types of argument. The first kinds of argument, the "logical-theoretical," are about that 
which is the case, based on logical inference from acceptable premises; the others are about 
what one should do, based on one's values and the nature or results of various proposed 
actions. 
This gives us a good starting-point for argument classification. However, it omits the 
interesting and exegetically critical phenomenon of "enthymemes" (in the logic-textbook, 
post-Aristotelian sense), which are "logical-theoretical" arguments in which some intended 
propositions are left unstated. We should therefore try to comprehend the phenomenon of 
unstated-but-intended propositions as well. To understand why they happen, and how they 
are detected and interpreted, we should understand the rudiments of linguistic pragmatics, to 
which we turn next. 
2.1.3 Conveying unstated propositions (and other meanings): pragmatics 
As we have suggested, understanding of the meaning of an argument involves understanding 
the logic of it. But apart from this, control of argument-type is crucial also when it is 
necessary to reconstruct a partially-unstated argument. 
It is widely understood that exegesis functions properly only through sensitivity to 
context. When either the meaning of a word or the force or relevance of some proposition is 
vague, one looks to context to explain the matter. It is pragmatics that tells us how context 
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sheds light on such questions.16 According to pragmatics, certain principles guide both the 
including/omitting of information in a conversation or discourse, and the reader/hearer's 
supplying of this information from the context. Grice's "co-operative principle," and the 
four basic "maxims of conversation" he derives from it as guidelines, are in our opinion the 
preeminent formulation of these principles.1 7 Since these principles are so important and 
helpful for interpretation, we shall present them and then illustrate the way they function. 
The principle of cooperation is: 
make your contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by 
the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are 
engaged. 
The maxim of Quality is: 
try to make your contribution one that is true, specifically: 
(i) do not say what you believe to be false; 
(ii) do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence. 
The maxim of Quantity is: 
(i) make your contribution as informative as is required for the current 
purposes of the exchange; 
(ii) do not make your contribution more informative than is required. 
The maxim of Relevance is: 
make your contribution relevant. 
The maxim of Manner is: 
(i) avoid obscurity; 
(ii) avoid ambiguity; 
16. Whereas linguistics tends to study language as a synchronic system, pragmatics is concerned with 
studying how people make and understand actual utterances; it includes questions such as how 
presuppositions and other non-linguistic "context" impinge on the formulation and interpretation 
of utterances. Thus, the findings of pragmatics have direct and immense relevance for 
hermeneutics. Cf. Cotterell and Turner 1989, 18-19. 
17. See, e.g., Levinson 1983, 100-18; Grundy 1995, 36-52; Cotterell and Turner 1989, 260-64. 
Clark and Clark make the "principle of cooperation" only one of five principles that govern 
conversation (see Cotterell and Turner 1989, 259-66); but clearly their other four principles can 
be subsumed under the cooperation principle. 
A. H. Carver, 2000 §2.1.3 Page 35 
(iii) be brief; 
(iv) be orderly. 
These maxims have fundamental importance for how utterances are interpreted, 
because they explain how information that is not stated explicitly can nevertheless be 
communicated and understood. Grice's theory is not that "people follow these guidelines to 
the letter. Rather, in most ordinary kinds of talk these principles are oriented to, such that 
when talk does not proceed according to their specifications, hearers assume that, contrary to 
appearances, the principles are nevertheless being adhered to at some deeper level" (Levinson 
1983, 102). The maxims thus inform inferences in the hearer(s), about what the speaker 
really means; these inferences are called conversational implicatures, or just "implicatures." 
For example, a wife asks her husband, "Are the girls in yet?" and the husband replies, "The 
porch light is still on." Taken out of context, the reply may seem to be irrelevant to the 
question, and thus to have violated the maxim of Relevance. However, on further 
consideration, it is seen that the husband's response 
had an implicature which did not require to be expressed: 'The porch light is 
still on, the girls would have switched it off had they come in, and so I can say 
that they are not yet in.' The conversation principle that I should not include 
unnecessary information is observed and so are [the principle of cooperation and 
the maxim of Relevance]. (Cotterell and Turner 1989, 48) 
The information which was intended but left unstated was a readily-available part of the 
presupposition pool shared by speaker and hearer; so stating that information would actually 
have violated part (ii) of the maxim of Quantity. 
Thus, interpreting a statement is often not just a question of mechanically decoding 
what is explicitly stated, but also of drawing implicatures, "inferences based on both the 
content of what has been said and some specific assumptions about the co-operative nature of 
ordinary verbal interaction" (Levinson 1983, 104). When it appears that not enough 
information has been given, the unstated presupposition that actually supplies the lack is 
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sought. When there appears to be too much information supplied, one seeks for the hidden 
significance or the conclusion that one is to infer. When there appears to be irrelevant 
information supplied, one looks in the "non-linguistic" context for the unstated connection or 
relevance. Even in the case of equivocal or underdetermined utterances (e.g., the ambiguity 
often inherent in uses of the genitive case), the conversational maxims come into play: the 
hearer assumes there is enough information given (including that supplied through the 
context), and that the meaning is relevant to the conversation's purpose at this point, and in 
light of the context (including shared presuppositions) proceeds therefore to work out the 
likely intended meaning. 
These principles from pragmatics thus give a great deal of insight on why and how 
arguments are left with parts unstated, as well as assumptions based upon which the hearer is 
expected to infer the intended meaning. They are therefore important for reconstructing 
Paul's argument(s) in Gal. 3:10-14. We should assume, at least provisionally, that the writer 
is giving the original readers an adequate yet not superfluous amount of information to 
accomplish the communication, and that the information given is relevant to the 
communication intended. Arguments with unstated premises (called enthymemes)n are 
extremely common in human discourse, so much so that they are the rule rather than the 
exception; and according to logic textbooks, the reason for this is simply that which the 
Quantity maxim gives (Copi 1968, 193-95; Stebbing 1961, 84, 110): 
In most discussions, a large body of propositions can be presumed to be common 
knowledge. The majority of speakers and writers save themselves trouble by not 
18. As noted above, Aristotle used the term "enthymeme" to denote any "rhetorical syllogism." But 
in Ars Rhet. 1.2, he notes that "enthymemes" generally have fewer constituent parts than a 
primary or normal syllogism, since "if one of them is well known, it need not be stated, as the 
audience supplies it of its own accord." Some later rhetoricians mistakenly understood this 
passage to state a distinguishing characteristic of all rhetorical syllogisms (Kennedy 1963, 97); 
thus they shifted the sense of the term "enthymeme" to our sense, used still today in logic 
textbooks. Recent rhetorical-critical studies of the New Testament have tended to return to 
Aristotle's sense, which is unfortunate if it causes them to neglect the interesting and exegetically 
significant phenomenon of "enthymemes" in the suppressed-premise sense. 
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repeating well-known and perhaps trivially true propositions which their hearers 
or readers can perfectly well be expected to supply for themselves. (Copi 1968, 
194) 
Thus the unstated parts will be both available and identifiable from the (explicit or unstated) 
contexts, and generally will have a true relevance, that is, one of valid deductive logic. 1 9 
The relevance of what is stated wil l be identifiable to the reader because what is unstated in 
the argument will be only what is already available to the reader, from the presupposition 
pool, and because the speaker will give enough of the argument to make the argument-pattern 
of the unstated logic discernible, and the unstated parts thus identifiable. As Copi continues 
(1968, 194-95): 
Where a necessary premiss is missing, without that premiss the inference is 
invalid. But where the unexpected premiss is easily supplied, . . . one assumes 
that the maker of the argument did have more "in mind" than he stated 
explicitly. In most cases there is no difficulty in supplying the tacit premiss that 
the speaker intended but did not express. A cardinal principle in supplying 
suppressed premises is that the proposition must be one which the speaker can 
safely presume his hearers to accept as true. . . . 
In testing an enthymeme for validity, two steps are involved. The first is to 
supply the missing parts of the argument; the second is to test the resulting 
19. "Inductive logic" is a rather ambiguous term. Often, and unfortunately, it is taken to denote some 
deductively invalid arguments, generally arguments by analogy (of greater or lesser degree), 
which are used to infer generalisations from particular instances. (E.g., "All observed crows are 
black; therefore all crows everywhere are black.") But the persuasiveness of such arguments 
always depends upon the fact that if one were to include some particular undemonstrated, 
hypothetical premise (e.g., the inherent colour-genetic homegeneity of crows), which seems (to 
someone) a plausible explanation for the observed similarity between instances, then the argument 
would become deductively valid. Without such a hypothesis included as premise, such an 
argument would be neither valid nor persuasive (even though often this is overlooked). Thus, 
induction, more helpfully used, does not mean a way of arguing, different from deduction, but 
rather it is the issue, how to verify such an argument's explanatory premise (Cohen and Nagel 
1934, 276-77; on induction, see also ibid., 249-56, 273-88; cf. Stebbing 1961, 243-56). Of 
course, the cause such a premise cites is sometimes so unconnected to the similarities it alleges to 
explain, that it is not even plausible, much less verified. But when the explanatory premise is not 
only unstated but overlooked, the argument's remainder is often then mistakenly alleged to 
constitute a "proof," of some alleged "inductive" type, since the argument seems rather 
persuasive somehow. There is actually no "inductive" type of argumentation, as over against 
deductive ones, we would insist. Only formal, deductive logic ever persuades someone to accept 
some proposition on the basis of accepting other propositions; so deduction alone is 
argumentation, for logic-analytical purposes. 
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syllogism. I f one of the premisses is missing, it may be that only the addition of 
an implausible proposition as premiss will make the argument valid, while with 
any plausible proposition added the argument is invalid. Pointing this out is a 
legitimate criticism of an enthymematic argument. Of course, an even more 
crushing objection is to show that no additional premiss, no matter how 
implausible, can turn the enthymeme into a valid categorical syllogism. 
It should be observed that no new logical principles need be introduced in 
dealing with enthymemes. They are ultimately tested by the same methods that 
apply to standard-form categorical syllogisms. The difference between 
enthymemes and syllogisms is rhetorical rather than logical. 
So not just the propositions left unstated must be determined: any clues about the 
particular argumentative strategy or structure being pursued are significant, and in fact must 
be sought prior to any judgment identifying the argument's implicit content. The author 
therefore cannot leave an enthymeme ambiguous as to the type of argument that is implied; 
he or she must give enough information so that, in the context, the reader can discern any 
unstated but intended meanings, which necessarily involves giving independent control 
(explicit or implicit) over the type of argument being used. That is to say, it is the relevance 
of some proposition in the presupposition pool, that informs us that it was intended; but its 
perceived relevance in turn depends upon logic, and upon the type of (valid) argument 
intended. This shows us another reason, in addition to basic argument-cognition, why it is 
necessary to understand logic in order to understand particular arguments: Pragmatics says 
that exegesis is basically implicature; and here that implicature is based on elimination of 
hypotheses about the particular intended relevance of that information which is explicitly 
conveyed. But the effectiveness of hypothesis-elimination as a problem-solving method, 
presupposes that all feasible hypotheses have been collected. 
Thus, there is much of exegetical usefulness in the study of "logical-theoretical" types 
of argumentation. But these are not often studied today by biblical scholars; and in this 
century certain theories which we deem unfortunate have somewhat muddied the subject of 
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logic. Therefore, in the next two sub-sections of this section on arguments and propositions, 
we wil l briefly treat the matters from logic which are of most critical importance for the 
exegete, and thus of relevance for understanding Galatians. Because space is limited, the 
presentation must be very light on examples, more or less a bare outline of the topic. We 
wil l also pass by "informal fallacies," which are nevertheless of great interest; yet we should 
mention a most common one, the "fallacy of equivocation," that of using the identical key 
term in a different sense at another point in the same argument. (See argument-theory and 
logic textbooks and philosophical dictionaries for other informal fallacies.) In the discussion 
we wi l l treat types and forms, both of propositions and of arguments. Some of this material 
might seem rather abstract and detached from Galatians; but all of it is vitally relevant to its 
exegesis. Indeed, some of the most seemingly abstruse parts of this theory will prove to be 
of critical importance in our next chapter. 
2.1.4 Logos: basic concepts 
We should grasp some basic ideas and methods before we tackle the workings of formal 
logic. These basic matters include the meaning of "logic" and "implication," and the nature 
of argumentation. As it turns out, the basic matters are generally no less abstruse than the 
others, but probably more so, for they touch more closely upon basic philosophical areas 
such as epistemology (and thus have led to more controversy—e.g., what is the study of logic 
about?). Thus we wil l go through the deepest and most controversial waters at the beginning 
of our voyage across the river Logos. 
2.1.4.1 Implication, logic, causa essendi vs. causa cognoscendi 
Ironically, one of the most controversial areas of logic is perhaps the most basic: what do we 
mean by "implication"? Traditionally, it was taken to mean that the form of one proposition 
(or propositions) was related to the form of some other proposition, in such a way that 
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knowledge of the truth of the first proposition (or propositions) could be taken as adequate 
basis for knowing the truth of the second. "Implication" was thus a matter of propositional 
form and of "logic," the latter being understood as "the science of correct reasoning," that 
is, of valid inference or argumentation. "Logic" is still commonly taken this way; but the 
question is often raised, whether it has to do with "laws of thought." On the other hand, 
"implication" is often no longer seen as formal, in the post-Bertrand Russell era. 
Before tackling such matters, we must make a basic distinction that is often 
overlooked. That distinction is between "cause of (being or) happening" (causa essendi) and 
"cause of knowing" (causa cognoscendi). The first type of cause is ontological: it has to do 
with why something particular happened or happens; the second type is cognitional: it has to 
do with why or how we know this or that. 2 0 We may categorise questions as to which of 
these types of cause they deal with. Thus there are 
• Ontological ("metaphysical") questions 
• Cognition-of-ontological ("cognitional-theoretical") questions 
These two categories each have a significant sub-category, which are 
• Cognitional-ontological ("psychological") questions 
• Cognition-of-cognitional-ontological ("epistemological" or "objectivity issue") 
questions21 
In studying logic, we must begin by distinguishing these types of questions, in order 
even to grasp what logic is about. For logic is about questions of causa cognoscendi, and not 
of causa essendi. More specifically, it is not about "psychology" (the metaphysics or 
ontology of thinking). It is thus not about "the laws of thought," for example, although 
20. On this distinction and its pertinence for logic, see e.g. Bernard Lonergan 1990, 48-50, 119. The 
distinction is often ignored, probably because of the common assumption in cognitional study that 
consciousness, or self-awareness, is a sort of introspection, an inspection directed inward; in 
which case consciousness is observed rather than the observer. Lonergan has perhaps done more 
than anyone to destroy this assumption. 
21. These categories, but not the longer names, we have derived largely from a combination of 
passages in Lonergan (see Lonergan 1973, 25, 261; 1990, 177-78). 
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many have conceived logic in this way. Rather, it is a help for us in identifying valid 
deductions and avoiding errors in our reasoning.22 Indeed, more generally it is a help for us 
in clarifying, formulating, critiquing, and communicating (both to others and to ourselves) 
our thinking (including questions as well as answers). Copi (1968, 3) defines it thus: "The 
study of logic is the study of the methods and principles used in distinguishing correct from 
incorrect reasoning." Ultimately it is to help us answer the causa cognoscendi question, 
which can be expressed as "How do I/you know X?" 
This notion causa cognoscendi is also involved in the normal, everyday meaning of 
"implication." But since Bertrand Russell's work, many logic textbooks have, with Russell, 
identified this latter concept with his concept "material implication," which he distinguishes 
sharply from "formal implication." In a nutshell, "material implication" denotes cases in 
which every time some particular thing(s) is (are) so, then some other particular thing 
happens to be the case as well. In other words, one finds it true, at least in one's (or 
humanity's) experience, that every time A happens, B also happens. (One may, however, 
find tomorrow a case in which B fails to follow A. For nothing about the situation A 
necessarily requires B to happen; they simply do, as a matter of fact, occur together, at least 
in our experience.)23 
What this says, however, is not what people usually mean by "implication," but rather 
an enumeration of instances. A l l it implies is that in fact B is true every time A is true. 
Based on this definition of "implication," Russell was able to make the astonishing claim that 
22. Cf. Cohen and Nagel 1934, 13: "It is not the business of logic to describe what happens in one's 
mind as one discovers rigorous or determinate solutions to a problem. That is a factual question 
of psychology. Logic is relevant at every step only in determining whether what seems an 
implication between one proposition and another is indeed such. Logic may, therefore, be also 
defined as the science of implication, or of valid inference (based on such implication)." 
23. Cf. Copi (1968, 227), who accepts "material implication." Usually accompanying mis acceptance 
is the suggestion that there are several sorts of "implication"; for a useful critique, see Clark 
1985, 37-40. 
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"2 + 2 = 4" is implied by "Socrates is a man," for they are each always true. G. E. Moore 
called this claim an "enormous 'howler'" (Stebbing 1961, 224-25). Stebbing incisively 
comments (ibid., 224): 
Certainly it is true that either "Socrates is a triangle" is false or that "2 + 2 = 
4" is true, since, in fact, the first of these propositions is false and the second is 
true. But it seems clear that it cannot be maintained that "2 + 2 = 4" is a 
consequence of [the falsity of] "Socrates is a triangle." . . . The relation that 
holds between "This is red" and "This is coloured" is totally different from the 
relation that holds between [the falsity of] "Socrates is a triangle" and "2 + 2 = 
4". I f this be so, it seems unfortunate that the same word "implies" has been 
used to express both relations. Mr. Russell in defending his use of "implies" in 
a sense in which no one had ever used the word says, 'Provided our use of 
words is consistent it matters little how we define them' [Principles of 
Mathematics, § 38]. No doubt the principle of Humpty Dumpty has something 
to be said for it. But the use of a word already familiar in a certain sense to 
express a sense different from its original meaning and liable to be confused with 
it is apt to lead to unfortunate consequences. It is difficult not to slip back to the 
original meaning, and thus to perplex oneself and others with apparent 
paradoxes, and even to fall into obvious falsities. 
Indeed, it is only Russell's definition of "implication" that leads to such "paradoxes of 
implication," as they are generally called (Clark 1985, 34-35; Stebbing 1961, 194). These 
paradoxes, which post-Russell logic textbooks generally mention, include such surprising 
conclusions as, "any false proposition implies any true proposition . . . any false proposition 
implies any false proposition. Thus, any false proposition implies any proposition, true or 
false. . . . any true proposition implies any true proposition . . . any true proposition is 
implied by any false proposition. Thus, a true proposition is implied by any proposition, 
true or false. . . . the theorems italicized above are known as 'paradoxes of implication'. But 
. . . they are the inevitable consequences of the definition of implication in terms of negation 
and disjunction" (Stebbing 1961, 194). This last sentence refers to the more technical 
formulation of Russell's definition, namely that the proposition "A implies B " is defined by 
the proposition "Either not-A or B (and perhaps both) is in fact true." But there is a 
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legitimate question as to which of these propositions is actually defined by which; 
"equivalence" does not imply that each equivalent element validly defines the other.2 4 
Furthermore, there is a definite semantic difference between the second proposition and the 
meaning of the more commonly used formulation, "Either not-A or B (and perhaps both) 
must be true (in the nature of the case)." Since the "must" in the latter statement is best 
accounted for i f this formulation's meaning is to be defined in terms of "implication" and not 
vice versa, it becomes apparent that again, by departing from the usual and accepted 
meanings of logical relationships, Russell has merely come up with a system that is foreign, 
confusing, and misleading.25 
Moore proposed instead the definition of "implies" as "entails," by which he meant 
the following: what we mean by "p implies q" is that some proposition q follows from or is 
deducible from some proposition(s) p (Stebbing 1961, 222). This is more the normal sense 
of "implies"; but note also that here we have settled into the semantic realm, not of causa 
essendi, but of causa cognoscendi: for to say that one proposition is deducible from a second, 
is to say none other than if we know that the first proposition is true, we may then be sure 
that the second is also true. 
But i f this is what we mean by "implies," the question arises, "What is it, about one 
proposition or set of propositions, that makes us able to deduce another proposition from it?" 
And when this question is considered, as it is in the study of logic, the answer one finds is 
simply, "the relationship between the forms of the propositions."2 6 Thus, it is quite 
24. We discuss definitions below. 
25. Cf. Clark 1985, 86: "Since all important arguments (perhaps with the exception of pure 
mathematics) are expressed in ordinary English, a systematization of logic should stay as close to 
English as it can." 
26. This is true even for so-called inductive arguments (see above, n. 19, p. 37): that is, their 
only persuasiveness comes from formal implication, which implication, however, they suggest 
rather than illustrate. Thus, all "if-then" statements which have no clear formal-logical basis, and 
yet seem to be reasonable, generally seem so because they have some unstated conditions (in their 
antecedents) which would complete the formal-logical link. E.g., " i f I stick this blue litmus paper 
in acid, it will turn red" is a likely "if-then" statement, but only when we are assuming that "All 
blue litmus paper turns red when placed in acid" (Clark 1985, 37, and see 38-39). Later we will 
be able to see how a prepositional form(s) implies another. 
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legitimate to understand the meaning of "implication" as traditional logic does, that is, as 
"formal implication": when one proposition(s) implies another, this means we may "validly 
infer" the latter from the former; and "an inference is valid whenever the form of the 
conclusion is true every time the forms of the premises are" (Clark 1985, 35). 2 7 
2.1.4.2 Propositions, their types, and their possible logical relationships; symbolic logic; 
exclusive and exceptive hypothetical propositions 
Now that we know basically what "logic" and "implication" are, we may more profitably 
consider "propositions." By "proposition," we mean the logical meaning of a declarative 
sentence. "Logical meaning" wil l become clearer as we go along, especially when we talk 
about the categorical forms of (simple) propositions; however, we might just as well, though 
somewhat less precisely, call it simply the "meaning" of the sentence. 
There are "simple" propositions and there are "compound" propositions: simple ones 
do not have other propositions as elements; compound ones do have. Of compound 
propositions, there are four basic types: 
Hypothetical ( " I f A, then B"), 
Alternative ("Either A or B or both"), 
Conjunctive ("Both A and B") , and 
Disjunctive (i.e., the denial of a Conjunctive: "Not both A and B") . 
A terminological note: Alternation is sometimes called "weak disjunction" (or even, 
confusingly, "disjunction") and contrasted to "strong disjunction," which means a 
conjunction of the alternation and the disjunction of two propositions (i.e., "Either A or B 
but not both"; that is what computer science means by XOR, "exclusive or"). 
Compound propositions can be compounded to make even bigger compounds. This 
potential complexity makes it often advantageous to use a symbolic language to represent the 
27. Cf. Cohen and Nagel 1934, 8-13. 
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propositions and their relationships.28 In our version of symbolic logic, we will use < to 
represent implication (of the proposition to the right of the symbol, by the proposition or 
compound of propositions to the left): P < Q means " i f (we know that) P, (then we may be 
sure) that Q ." 2 9 This is any hypothetical proposition's form. We will use an accent' 
following a symbol or bracketed expression, to represent its negation: P' means "not P." 3 0 
As in Boolean algebra, we will use a + to represent alternation: P + Q means "either P or Q 
or both." 3 1 Also as in Boolean algebra, we will use a multiplication sign (here a dot) to 
represent conjunction: P • Q means "both P and Q"; so (P • Q)' means "not both P and Q," 
i.e. disjunction. 3 2 Finally, we will use a s to represent a logical equivalence of two 
propositions or other expressions involving any of the above symbols (i.e., = means each of 
them implies the other and thus is interchangeable with the other in any argument): P = Q 
means P is equivalent to Q. 
"Deduction," in the logical sense, is valid inference, and thus involves one proposition 
or set of propositions having causa cognoscendi, implicative force towards another. Let us 
list here the possible causa cognoscendi relations between propositions or their forms. There 
are seven ways only, in which some proposition or logical proposition-form P can be 
"logically related to" (i.e., can have deductive-logical, causa-cognoscendi bearing towards) 
another proposition or proposition-form Q (Cohen and Nagel 1934, 52-56; the ways are 
presented here in no particular order): 
28. Note that the sort of system we will present here is not the modern symbolic logic of Bertrand 
Russell and his followers; rather, it is simply another way of presenting traditional, "Aristotelian" 
logic, a way devised by George Boole. For a helpful discussion of some of the problems in 
Russell's symbolic logic, see Clark 1985, 85-90. 
29. Many symbolic logics use instead a symbol that looks like a U or horseshoe laid over so that its 
tines are pointing left. 
30. Some symbolic logics use instead a ~ before the expression. 
31. Many symbolic logics use instead some sort of V-shaped symbol, adopted because the Latin word 
meaning "alternation" or "weak disjunction" was vel. Unlike English with its ambiguous or, 
Latin had a distinct word, aut, for representing "strong disjunction." 
32. Some symbolic logics will represent conjunction simply by PQ. 
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1. P may be "irrelevant" to Q, or in other words "independent" of Q. Neither 
P nor P' implies anything about the "truth-value" of Q (i.e., about whether it is 
true or false). This relationship is "symmetricar: i f P is independent of Q, then 
likewise Q is independent of P. 
2. P may be "contrary" to Q. This means that P < Q', but P' would imply 
nothing about the truth-value of Q. Both P and Q may be simultaneously false, 
then, but only one can be true at a time. This is the same as "disjunction." 
This relationship is symmetrical also: i f P < Q', then Q < P'. 
3. P may be "subcontrary" to Q. This means that P' < Q, but P would not 
imply anything about the truth-value of Q. Both P and Q may be simultaneously 
true, then, but only one can be false at a time. This is the same as "alternation" 
("weak disjunction"). The relationship is likewise symmetrical: i f P' < Q, then 
Q' < P. 
4. P and Q may be "contradictories." This means that i f we know that P is 
true, we may infer that Q is false (i.e., P < Q'), and i f we know P is false, we 
may infer that Q is true (i.e., P' < Q). At least one of the propositions is true 
and one false. This relation is the same as "strong disjunction." Essentially a 
conjunction of the previous two relations, this one is likewise symmetrical. 
5. P may be "subimplicant," or "subaltern," to Q. This means simply that Q 
implies P (i.e., Q < P) but not necessarily vice versa. This relationship is 
nonsymmetrical (as we have already seen in our discussion of implication). 
6. P may be "superimplicant," or "superaltern" or "principal," to Q. This 
means simply that P implies Q (i.e., P < Q) but not necessarily vice versa. 
This relationship is nonsymmetrical. 
7. P and Q may be "equivalent." This means that P implies Q and vice versa 
(i.e., P s Q). This relationship is symmetrical: i f P s Q, then Q s P , I f two 
or more propositions or propositional forms are equivalent, they wil l be 
interchangeable in any part of any argument. Some expression-equivalences that 
logicians have adopted as theorems include the following: 
P • P" 
(P • Q)' s (P' + Q') • (P < Q') s= (Q < P') (disjunction) 
(P + Q)' . (P' • Q') 
(P' + Q) - (P < Q) 
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It may be noted that the seven logical relationships may be defined using only terms of 
implication and negation, and (in some cases) conjunction of other relationships. So basically 
we are still dealing with the fundamental facts of implication and how it manifests in real life. 
Note that in line with our rejection of B. Russell's meaning of "implication" (see above), we 
take alternation to mean, "Either A or B or both must be true" (not simply "are true in 
fact"), and disjunction to mean, "Not both A and B can be true." 3 3 Also, note that the 
"hypothetical" or "conditional" or "if-then" compound proposition, also sometimes called an 
"implicative" proposition, is really nothing more nor less than a statement of implication. 3 4 
Now, since an "if-then" statement is implicative, and since implication is causa 
cognoscendi, what an implicative statement really expresses is a relationship, not between 
facts in the external world, but between the respective knowledges of the truth of two 
propositions. In other words, " I f A, then B," really means, " I f (we know that) A, then (we 
may be sure that) B ." It is not necessary to state these ellipses every time, but the exegete 
should be aware that the logical relationships are not causa essendi but always causa 
cognoscendi. 
We should mention here one point which can be quite important for exegeting the 
logical meaning of an "if-then" (conditional) statement. When the word only gets thrown 
into it somewhere, discerning which part of the compound is actually the condition (or 
"antecedent" or "implicans") and which is the conditioned part (or "consequent" or 
"implicate") becomes more subtle. For example, consider the common statement-form, "C, 
33. The meanings we forego, however, are those usually employed in truth tables (which we ignore 
here), in computer science, and in modern, post-Russell symbolic logic. The symbolic-logicians' 
traditional desire to treat logic like mathematics gave a strong impetus to those meanings. 
(According to Clark 1985, 85, B. Russell's innovations in logic were a result flowing from 
Boole's symbolic logic. The latter is also of fundamental importance in computer science.) Even 
though adopting symbolic logic, however, we define alternation and disjunction in terms of (our 
meaning of) "implication" (and not vice versa; cf. above). 
34. Cf. Stebbing 1961, 106-7. 
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(but) only i / D " ; or, which is the same thing but with the "only" displaced, " I f D , only then 
(is it true that) C." The logical meaning of both of these statements is, " I f C, then D . " We 
may call these two forms exclusive hypothetical propositions. The common statement "C, if 
and only J / D , " is thus a conjunction of the two hypothetical propositions, " I f C, then D " and 
" I f D , then C." The phrase only because is to be understood as logically identical to only if: 
" I ' l l make up your bed, but only because you've got to leave earlier," is logically the same 
as, " I f (we know that) I will make up your bed, (we may be sure that) you must leave 
earlier." 
Then there are exceptive hypothetical propositions, which are a bit complicated. "A 
unless B" means "A except under the circumstances that B , " that is, (B < A ' ) ; but it also 
suggests that (A' < B). Thus it suggests that A and B are in "strong disjunction," that is, 
that either A or B must be true but not both are true. Finally, note that "A even if/though (or 
notwithstanding) B , " means A • (A < B ' ) ' , which = A • (B < A ' ) ' . 
Things can become confusing also when the stated verb is about knowing: " I f we know 
that A, then we can be sure that B , " probably means just what it says: " I f (we know that) A, 
then (we may be sure that) B." But what about the statement, " I f we know anything about 
logic, it can only be because we have studied it"? Here we must keep distinct the "knowing" 
stated and the "knowing" which is generally unstated in any hypothetical, or "implicative," 
statement and which is due to its causa cognoscendi nature (and which we may distinguish by 
putting it in parentheses). So this statement is logically (i.e., propositionally): " I f (we know 
that) we know anything about logic, (we may be sure that) we have studied i t . " 3 5 
2.1.4.3 The basic real-life argument-modes; pure hypothetical "syllogisms"; dilemmas; 
circumstantial ad hominem arguments 
35. Proficiency in identifying the "logical meaning" of propositions comes only with practice (i.e., if 
one is proficient, one has practiced!). 
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Hypothetical ("I f A, then B") propositions, also called "conditional" propositions, are of 
course ubiquitous. In fact, as we have seen, they are defined simply as statements of 
implication; therefore, any and every valid implication is in fact one bigger or smaller 
"hypothetical" proposition! It is clear that conditional statements are at the very heart of 
logic. However, we must see how other types of proposition work in arguments as well, so 
that we may analyse the latter. 
In fact, up to now we have not considered real arguments at all, but only 
implications.3 6 In what we may call "real-life" arguments (as opposed to those "arguments" 
of the type that merely illustrate implication in logic-textbooks), implications are not valued 
for themselves, but only for the indication of the truth of some proposition. But in order for 
any implication to substantiate the truth of its consequent, the truth of its antecedent must 
first be adequately substantiated. Thus we arrive at a basic fact not always explicated in logic 
textbooks: a real-life "argument" will contain not only what we may call an "implication-
part," but also what we may call a "belief-part." Even a straightforward implication such as 
" I f A, then B" wil l not exist by itself in a real-life argument; the truth of A must also be 
separately, even i f unstatedly, affirmed: "But (we do know) A; therefore (we may conclude) 
B." It may not be very often that both an implication-part and a belief-part wil l be explicitly 
stated; but they wil l both be intended, in any real-life argument, that is, one employed to 
persuade. 
The real-life argument we just used as illustration, is in fact one of the basic modes of 
real-life argumentation: it is called a hypothetical syllogism, or sometimes called a mixed 
hypothetical syllogism (i.e., containing both a hypothetical and a non-hypothetical "premise") 
as opposed to pure hypothetical syllogisms (which we shall examine later). Although these 
are called "hypothetical syllogisms," they are not just a particular mode of syllogism such as 
36. On the distinction, cf. Stebbing 1961, 106. 
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categorical syllogisms—indeed, they are not even helpfully called "syllogisms," even though 
the terminology started with Aristotle: 
Traditionally the syllogism has been treated as a form of argument, that is, as an 
attempt to demonstrate that a certain proposition (the conclusion) is true because 
some other propositions (the premisses) are true. This mode of treatment has the 
defect of obscuring the essential nature of syllogism, which is a form of 
implication. As such, it is not concerned with the truth, or falsity, of the 
conclusion, or of the premisses, but only with the validity of the reasoning, 
which depends upon the form alone. (Stebbing 1961, 82-83) 
Thus the use of that terminology in this case is awkward and potentially confusing, and 
ideally should have been reserved for what we are calling "formal logic" (from which 
category we have separated the current discussion, contra most logic textbooks). However, it 
is now too traditional to avoid; besides, there is no other likely term that means "hypothetical 
syllogism." 
But likewise, the application of the term premises to both the " I f A, then B" part and 
the "But (we do know) A" part, is unfortunate: for the "premises" of a categorical 
syllogism's "implication-part" include only the " I f A" of its overall conditional statement, 
and not even the "then B . " The latter is rather the "conclusion" in the implication-part (and, 
as we wil l see shortly, not even necessarily the "conclusion" of the belief-part). The use of 
this terminology for both types of so-called syllogism is thus hopelessly confusing, and must 
be avoided i f at all possible. It would be better, then, to leave the terms premises and 
conclusion completely out of any discussion of hypothetical syllogisms, and to speak only of, 
on the one hand, the "implication-part" (i.e., the conditional proposition, with its 
"antecedent" and "consequent"), and on the other hand, the "belief-part," including what we 
may call its "evidence-part" (here, "But [we do know] A " ) , from which the "belief-part" 
infers the truth of its other proposition, which we may call the "inference-part." That is, in a 
real-life argument, the belief-part infers its constituent inference-part based on its constituent 
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evidence-part, and according to the causa cognoscendi force of the argument's implication-
part (with its antecedent and its consequent). Note that the "evidence-part" must be either a 
simple or a conjunctive proposition; otherwise it could assert nothing about ontological 
reality. This new terminology may seem a bit confusing at first, but in the long run it would 
be less confusing than speaking of "premises" and a "conclusion" in the analyses both of 
mixed hypothetical syllogisms and of categorical syllogisms. 
Now, logic entails adopting and building upon some axioms. Generally, the basic 
axioms of a deductive system like logic or mathematics are not discovered until after quite a 
number of other principles have been discovered and their relationship has then become the 
object of inquiry. "The selection of the primitive propositions [i.e., the axioms] is not purely 
arbitrary. They must be both sufficient to yield the required results and mutually consistent. 
A set of primitive concepts and primitive propositions will be sufficient i f it is possible to 
define all the concepts and to demonstrate all the propositions that occur in the system in 
terms of these initial concepts and by means of these initial propositions" (Stebbing 1961, 
179). 
One of the axioms of logic is inevitably the "law of Non-contradiction": proposition A 
cannot be both true and false at the same time (and taken in the same sense). Another is what 
is called the "principle of Transposition": I f A implies B, then not-B implies not-A. We 
adopt this also as an axiom: it is certainly one that accounts for many of the principles we 
study in logic. And it immediately gives us a new twist on the standard mixed hypothetical 
syllogism: complementing its positive form 
I f A, then B; 
But A; therefore B. 
we have also a negative form: 
I f A, then B; 
But not B; therefore not A. 
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Indeed, in light of the fundamentality of so-called mixed hypothetical syllogisms, we can see 
that this negative form is not only another type of "syllogism," but a paradigm for a whole 
other class of valid arguments, viz., those designed ultimately to deny by denying (rather than 
to affirm by affirming) some proposition in the "implication-part" (the conditional statement). 
Logicians speak of various "modes" of arguing, giving them Latin names. The two modes 
displayed here are called ponendo ponens (literally, "affirming by that which is to be 
affirmed"), from the Latin verbponere meaning "to affirm," and tollendo tollens ("denying 
by that which is to be denied"), from the verb tollere meaning "to deny." Some logic 
textbooks refer to them merely as modus ponens and modus tollens; however, that fails to 
distinguish them from two other basic modes we will discuss shortly. 
Each of these first two modes has an invalid form, as well as its valid form given 
above. The invalid form of the first mode (ponendo ponens) is 
I f A, then B; 
But B; therefore A. 
This fallacy is informally called "affirming the consequent," for obvious reasons. It is a 
fallacy that occurs quite commonly; indeed it more or less exemplifies so-called inductive 
reasoning, and thus, unfortunately, many alleged scientific "proofs." 3 7 Being such a popular 
fallacy, it occurs quite often in exegetical arguments also; for example: " I f this overall 
paradigm for Galatians is the true one, then we wil l find that the individual passages are 
intelligible when read in this light; but indeed they are intelligible when read this way, 
therefore this must be the overall paradigm for Galatians." The fallacious form of the 
negative mode of mixed hypothetical syllogism (i.e., of tollendo tollens) is as follows: 
I f A, thenB; 
But not A; therefore not B. 
37. Cf. above, n. 19, p. 37. 
A. H . Carver, 2000 §2.1.4.3 Page 53 
As one might expect, this is informally called the fallacy of "denying the antecedent." While 
it seems rather less common than "affirming the consequent," one needs to recognise it as an 
invalid form of argument. 
These two modes, ponendo ponens and tollendo tollens, comprise all the basic modes 
which do not necessarily involve any type of proposition but simple ones and hypothetical 
ones. And as we have stated, every "real-life" deductive argument is actually a more or less 
complex mixed hypothetical syllogism, and thus one of these two modes; for a mixed 
hypothetical syllogism is nothing more nor less than any use, in "real l ife," of logical 
implication to demonstrate some truth. Thus these two forms are the most basic of the 
"basic": i f we were to take them broadly, allowing their antecedents and consequents to be 
other types of compound propositions (not just simple propositions), then any "real-life" 
argument could be said to be in one or the other of these modes. But logicians restrict these 
two modes to having simple antecedents and consequents, and then speak also of other 
"modes," involving other types of compound propositions such as alternative and disjunctive 
propositions. As it is important to understand these matters we must look at these other 
"basic" modes, understanding however that while they deserve to be called this, they are 
perhaps not quite as "basic" as the most basic of all, mixed hypothetical syllogisms, the 
paradigm of real-life arguments. 
As we have seen, alternation (or "either P or Q, maybe both," [P + Q]) can be 
defined simply as P' < Q. By the principle of Transposition this m Q' < P" = Q' < p. 
So, i f we know P + Q, we may also be sure that both P' < Q and Q' < P. Thus, i f our 
antecedent is an alternation ("either P or Q," P + Q), one valid move would be to deny 
either alternant (P or Q), in order to affirm the other; thus we get tollendo ponens ("affirming 
by that which is to be denied"), which is also known as an "alternative syllogism." And 
disjunction (or "not both P and Q," [P • Q]') can be defined simply as P < Q', which a 
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Q" < P' s Q < P'. So, i f we know (P • Q)', we may also be sure that both P < Q' and 
Q < P'. Thus, i f our antecedent is a disjunction ("not both P and Q," [P • Q]'), a valid 
move would be to affirm either disjunct (P or Q), in order to deny the other; thus we get 
ponendo tollens ("denying by that which is to be affirmed"), also known as a "disjunctive 
syllogism." And like the former two modes, each of these two in turn has its valid and 
invalid forms. The invalid move in an alternative syllogism would be to "affirm the 
alternant"; the invalid move in a disjunctive syllogism, on the other hand, would be to "deny 
the disjunct." 
Let us sum up the valid and invalid forms of the four basic modes we have covered: 
Valid moves Latin name of the mode Invalid moves 
Af f i rm the antecedent Ponendo ponens Deny the antecedent 
Deny the consequent Tollendo tollens Af f i rm the consequent 
Deny the alternant Tollendo ponens Af f i rm the alternant 
Af f i rm the disjunct Ponendo tollens Deny the disjunct 
Besides the Law of Contradiction and the principle of Transposition, another axiom of 
logic is the Transitivity of implication. 3 8 Thus when we string implications together, we get 
a new implication: for example, i f (A < B), and also (B < C), then it is also true that 
(A < C). Corresponding to this, there is a further type of argument, commonly called a 
"pure hypothetical syllogism." Simply put, this is an argument whose implication-part is 
actually a string of implications. Thus to call this a single "argument" can be misleading; 
although we may call it such, we need to recognise that it might better be called a "compound 
argument," that is, an argument relying upon a string of implications. 
Now, we have seen that there is a fourth type of compound proposition, the 
conjunction. I f the antecedent of some implication be a conjunction (e.g., [A • B] < C), then 
a real-life argument based on this implication would, in order to be valid, either affirm the 
38. Cf. Clark 1985, 44. 
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conjunction (A • B) in order to affirm the consequent (C), or else would deny the consequent 
in order to deny the conjunction. Each of these is a basic form of argument. The first is 
what we may legitimately call a syllogism. Since in this real-life argument the antecedent is a 
conjunction ("both A and B"), both conjoined propositions (or conjuncts) must be known as 
true in reality, in order for the conjunction to be known as true, and thus for the inference to 
be proven thereby. 
By the same token, only one of the conjuncts need be known as false in reality, in 
order for the conjunction to be known as false. So, i f one's purpose is to show a disjunction 
of A and B ("not both A and B , " [A • B] ' ) , one need only show that some proposition (C), 
implied by (A • B), is in fact false. We might call this a "destructive syllogism," on the 
pattern of the term "destructive dilemma" (see below). Logic textbooks generally ignore this 
type of argument, perhaps because it seldom occurs; nevertheless, it appears to be a basic 
mode of real-life argument. 
But logic textbooks very seldom ignore one closely related type of argument. Suppose 
one knows such a syllogistic implication (e.g., [A • B] < C); how might one disprove one 
particular conjunct, say A? Well, i f one has already proven the conjunction (A • B) false (by 
showing C false, as in the previous paragraph), one obviously has proven true the disjunction 
(A • B) ' . And we have already seen how to prove a disjunct false: one must show the other 
disjunct true. This two-step approach is how a reductio ad absurdum works. In short, one 
denies the consequent, but then affirms one conjunct of the conjunctive antecedent, in order 
to deny the other conjunct. It does not matter which particular conjunct one wants to deny, 
any more than it matters which disjunct one wants to deny in a disjunctive syllogism; for 
([P • Q] < R) - ([R' • Q] < P') - ([R' • P] < Q') 
The fact that the "second step" of a reductio ad absurdum is, in effect, a disjunctive 
syllogism, suggests there is a corresponding invalid form of the reductio ad absurdum, which 
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would be to deny the consequent but then to deny one conjunct in order to affirm the other 
conjunct. 
This seems to cover all the basic modes of argument; but we can see that others may be 
built f rom them. The more-complex one analysed most commonly is the dilemma. 
According to Copi (1968, 205) 
The dilemma, a common form of argument in ordinary language, is a legacy 
from older times when logic and rhetoric were more closely connected than they 
are today. From the strictly logical point of view, the dilemma is not of special 
interest or importance. But rhetorically, the dilemma is perhaps the most 
powerful instrument of persuasion ever devised. It is a devastating weapon in 
controversy. 
Cohen and Nagel (1934, 107) explain why one resorts to this type of real-life argument: 
"Dilemmatic reasoning is of special value in those cases where we are unable to assert the 
truth of any one of the antecedents or the falsity of any one of the consequents in a set of 
hypothetical propositions, but where we can assert alternatively their respective truth or 
falsity." That is, in the implication-part of this type of argument, one has not one but two 
hypothetical propositions, conjoined (i.e., they are both assumed to be valid implications). 
One knows that at least one of the antecedents is true, or else one knows that at least one of 
the consequents is false; but one does not know which one. So in the belief-part, one might 
affirm alternatively their antecedents in order to affirm alternatively their consequents (a 
"constructive dilemma"), or else one might deny alternatively their consequents in order to 
deny alternatively their antecedents (a "destructive dilemma"). If , in either case, the two 
final propositions which are (alternatively) affirmed or denied, happen to be identical, then 
that alternation boils down to one simpler proposition, since to affirm (P + P) affirms P. In 
this case the (constructive or destructive) dilemma is called "simple"; otherwise it is called 
"complex." 3 9 
39. On the dilemma, see Stebbing 1961, 107-8; Cohen and Nagel 1934, 105-9. 
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Although not a distinct "basic mode" of argument, one sort of argumentation needs 
discussing because of its unusual approach; this is the "circumstantial" ad hominem 
argument.40 Copi's examples are useful: 
Where two men are disputing, one may ignore the question of whether his own 
contention is true or false and seek instead to prove that his opponent ought to 
accept it because of his opponent's special circumstances. Thus i f one's 
adversary is a clergyman, one may argue that a certain contention must be 
accepted because its denial is incompatible with the Scriptures. . . . Or i f one's 
opponent is, say, a Republican, one may argue, not that a certain proposition is 
true, but that he ought to assent to it because it is implied by the tenets of his 
party. (Copi 1968, 62) 
This type must be distinguished from the fallacy called "abusive" ad hominem argument, in 
which the arguer tries to persuade the hearers that his opponent is not to be trusted, for some 
reason irrelevant to the issue under discussion (e.g., he is a convicted criminal and therefore 
supposedly cannot be believed). This "abusive" type of argument may seem quite close to a 
circumstantial type and may be (and has been) mistaken for it, whenever the former tries to 
prove the opponent guilty of inconsistency; for the circumstantial type is also trying to 
persuade that there is or could be inconsistency. But it is trying to persuade the hearers away 
from the theory, rather than away from some opponent. The inconsistency it indicates will 
be within the belief-system of those of its hearers who maintain or adopt the theory; it would 
be alleviated by their rejecting the theory, which is the arguer's hope. This circumstantial 
argument's approach has often caused it to be erroneously branded a fallacy; for, oddly, it 
neither affirms nor denies the truth of any proposition whose intent is ontological (i.e., it 
neither affirms nor denies anything about extra-cognitional reality). 
Walton (1992, 146) treats the circumstantial ad hominem as one type of what he calls 
"precedent slippery slope" arguments, which are "negative arguments from consequences." 
40. This argument is commonly, but unjustly, considered a fallacy. For one recent treatment which 
justifies this type of argument in some rhetorical situations, cf. Walton 1992, 137-46. 
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However, it is actually a logos-type argument: what distinguishes the circumstantial ad 
hominem from other "precedent slippery slope" arguments is that it suggests the disagreeable 
logical consequences (viz., the consequent inconsistency) of adopting a certain idea, rather 
than the practical consequences of adopting a certain course of action. That is, the 
unacceptable "consequences" warned against are constituted by an absurdity, an 
inconsistency in one's own position. 
However, the argument differs somewhat from other logos-type arguments. It might 
not directly affirm a contradiction: 
There is an important difference between a logical consistency and a 
circumstantial . . . inconsistency. A logical inconsistency is a well-defined set 
of propositions containing a contradiction. A circumstantial inconsistency 
depends on the presumption that certain personal actions or other personal 
circumstances suggest or make plausible that there may be a logical 
inconsistency inherent in an arguer's position. (Walton 1992, 143) 
The argument draws the hearers' attention to an incompatibility between some particular 
theory (or perhaps the denial of some particular theory) and some belief(s) suggested by the 
opponent's circumstances. Thus the argument itself has no stated "belief-part," but only an 
"implication-part" showing the inconsistency which, it is suggested, would be entailed in the 
hearers' holding the theory. In other words, the suggestion is that " i f the hearers' own 
circumstantially-suggested beliefs are true, the contested theory must be false." It is hoped 
that the hearers wil l then supply their own "belief-part," rejecting the theory on the basis of 
affirming their circumstantially-suggested belief. This makes the argument essentially a 
ponendo tollens (or "affirming the disjunct"). The implication-part of the argument may be 
stated as " i f (the circumstantial belief), then not (the contested theory)"; this is a 
"disjunction," logically equivalent to "not both (the circumstantial belief) and (the contested 
theory)." There is no stated belief-part, for no simple or conjunctive proposition (and thus 
no ontological situation) is affirmed by the arguer; only this "implication-part" of the 
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argument is affirmed. This oblique approach is necessary, for example, whenever the 
circumstantial premise(s) involved is not interpersonally, empirically demonstrable. 
The greatest rhetorical weakness of this type of argumentation is that it might not 
prevent the opponent's escaping the incompatibility either by rejecting the supposedly 
incompatible circumstances (e.g., leaving the Republican party rather than abiding by its 
tenets), or by denying the circumstances' applicability or their incompatibility, rather than by 
rejecting/denying the theory the arguer opposes. That is, the arguer's neglect of affirming 
anything about extra-mental reality leaves the hearer a loophole or two to escape through. 
Two of these loopholes, however, are minimised i f the arguer suggests that those 
circumstances are simply an aspect of being human. For then the hearer still might deny 
there is incompatibility between those circumstances and holding the opposed theory; but 
rejecting the circumstances (viz., "being human") and denying the circumstances' 
applicability are both now out of the question. 
And that crucial, third loophole can be eliminated quite strikingly i f the arguer can 
make manifest to the hearers that the theory-incompatible circumstances are involved in the 
very claiming, or ostensible knowledge, of the theory's truth. Then the hearer understands 
that even expounding, claiming, and following the theory manifests a human nature whose 
implications contradict the theory. 4 1 For example: A skeptical epistemology claims that one 
can be sure of nothing. Thus, knowing ostensibly the truth of a skeptical theory of 
epistemology suggests a circumstance (here, a psychological state) which contradicts the 
circumstances that the theory itself predicts. In short, one cannot claim knowledge of the 
41. We learned of this type of incompatibility partly from Clouser 1991, 72: "A theory must be 
compatible with any state or activity of the thinker without which it could not be produced [i.e. 
thought, held]." Clouser himself cites a number of Herman Dooyeweerd's works at this point. 
See also Bernard Lonergan's notion of "self-reversal" (e.g., Lonergan 1973, 16-17 and passim; 
Meyer 1994, 40-47). 
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theory without contradicting it. Thus the following is the basic logical form of the 
argument's implication-part: 
I f any human should claim or ostensibly know that A (the opposed theory), 
then it becomes clear that at least in his or her case, not A. 
A human's innate, natural circumstances, says the argument, suggest that one should hold a 
belief contrary to A. However, as suggested, the argument's success depends entirely on the 
hearers' agreeing with this implication; as with any circumstantial argument, they have to 
acknowledge that their circumstances (here, being human) do indeed suggest one should 
believe contra the theory, or the argument fails. Thus the arguer relies, in this case, on the 
hearers' anthropological/psychological suppositions. But then, i f the arguer had empirically 
verifiable premises to rely on, he or she would simply affirm them rather than take an 
oblique, circumstantial approach. 
Now because this particular type of circumstantial ad hominem argument speaks 
pivotally about holding a certain theory, and points out certain untoward implications of that 
holding (which implications contradict the opposed theory), we must be careful to 
differentiate from this type of argument all "practical" types of "precedent slippery slope" 
argument, which point out the disagreeable practical consequences of adopting a certain 
course of action. It may appear superficially to belong to this latter type, but one must 
discern whether the arguer's purpose is to warn of practical consequences or of logical 
inconsistency; i f the latter, the argument is indeed a logos-type, circumstantial argument. 
What may we glean from our discussion of the various basic argument-modes? To be 
aware of them is important; but also we may derive a simple scheme of argument-
categorisation that may be helpful in exegesis. We note that there are various means of 
making one's point: sometimes one's means is to deny, sometimes to affirm, sometimes both 
to affirm and to deny (in the case of a reductio ad absurdum). But in every case, the goal of 
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the argument is either to deny or to affirm some proposition that is in the implication-part. 
This affords us a simple two-way scheme of logos-argument classification; whenever we 
approach an argument to interpret it, a basic question to answer would be, "Is this argument 
intended ultimately to affirm, or else to deny, some proposition stated within it?" 
Our discussion so far may seem to have focused largely on compound propositions. 
Actually, our main interest has been the nature of implication and how it powers real-life 
arguments. In fact we have seen that alternation and disjunction, as well as mixed 
hypothetical syllogisms, may be defined simply in terms of negation and of implication; but 
conjunction cannot be reduced in this way. Thus all the arguments we have seen, in fact all 
real-life valid deductive arguments, boil down to implication (sometimes with some negation 
or conjunction or both), to affirmation or denial or both, and to inference (based on this 
affirmation/denial and in accordance with the implication). That which was wrong with the 
arguments we have called "invalid forms," was simply that their inference was only 
erroneously assumed to accord with the depended-upon implication-part. That "invalidity" is 
therefore not a matter of formal logic (i.e., the "nuts and bolts" of implication itself), but 
rather of how logic or implication itself is actually used. 
We have tried to elucidate the meaning and real-life use of implication, or formal 
logic, before we proceed to its analysis. One cannot understand what formal logic is, without 
seeing it in this framework. Logic or implication is a cognitional tool; but like any tool it 
does not really exist as such until someone recognises its value and employs it for some 
purpose. Logic is a tool for persuading others, or for persuading ourselves. But it cannot 
persuade until the one who is the target of the persuasion recognises and appreciates the 
causa cognoscendi force of the implication. 
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Like every tool, a causa cognoscendi tool has certain laws which constrain and rule its 
successful use. It is to these rules that we now turn. 
2.7.5 Logos: formal logic 
The rest of logic focuses on simple or conjunctive propositions, but not on any other type of 
compound propositions. This is because it is the implicative relationships between the forms 
of various simple propositions, and between those of simple and conjunctive propositions, 
that ultimately cause any proposition(s) to imply any other(s). Implication is formal; and to 
understand the way implication actually takes place, one must study the forms of simple and 
of conjunctive propositions and the logical relationships between these forms. 
We wil l not derive or prove all the implicative, deductive relationships between these 
various forms, which is done in logic textbooks; we will only list them so they will be 
available for exegetical work. While there is much to be gained by a study of their derivation 
(especially derivation via Euler's diagrams), and also by a study of examples of all sorts of 
implications, there is not space here to go into these. Thus the remainder of our journey 
across the river Logos can be relatively quick and easy. The things we wil l pick up are of 
relevance to exegesis in general, inasmuch as exegesis almost always entails understanding 
and interpreting, and quite often entails reconstructing, deductive arguments. 
2.1.5.1 The four "categorical forms" of simple propositions; exclusive and exceptive 
categorical propositions 
From the viewpoint of traditional or Aristotelian logic, there are four forms of simple 
declarative proposition. They are called "categorical forms," because they have to do with 
predication or categorisation (Clark 1985, 88-89); indeed, the categorisation is what propels 
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implication. 4 2 Two of the forms are "affirmative," and two are "negative." The forms are 
respectively designated by the vowel-letters A, I , E, and 0 . The first two letters are taken 
from the Latin term Affirmo, and the last two are from the term Nego; thus A and I are 
affirmative categorical forms, E and 0 negative. At this point, we should look at the forms 
themselves: 
A: Al l a is/are b. 
I : Some a is/are b 
E: No a is/are b. 
O: Some a is/are not b. 
The letters a and b represent the "terms" of the propositions, the "subject" and the 
"predicate" respectively. For example, "all dogs are canines"; "some teachers are nice"; 
"no excuses are acceptable." Any simple proposition, no matter what its verb, can be put 
into one of these forms: "Stars emit atomic particles" can be stated as, " A l l stars are things 
which emit atomic particles." 
What differentiates A from I , and E from O, is that A and E are "universal," whereas I 
and O are "particular." A "universal" statement says something about each member of the 
class a, whereas that which a "particular" proposition predicates of a may not be true of 
every member of a. That is, a universal proposition "distributes" its subject, it considers that 
class distributively (singly) rather than collectively. On the other hand, an affirmative 
proposition differs from a negative one in that a negative one distributes its predicate, an 
42. Although this is the traditional or Aristotelian approach to analysing propositions, since the mid-
19th century and the work of DeMorgan and Boole it has become clear that this is not the only 
possible approach, and sometimes not the best, since some propositions are more amenable to an 
approach that looks on propositions as relating things rather than as describing things. For 
example, "Boole is the father of symbolic logic" is more easily seen as relating Boole and 
symbolic logic, than as an attribution of some quality to Boole. Nevertheless, since "having 
attribute X" is ultimately a relation (between subject and attribute, or between subject and other 
things similar in some way X) , and since a particular relatedness to X is undeniably a quality, it is 
apparent that any proposition may be analysed by either approach (cf. Cohen and Nagel 1934, 48-
49). The propositions in Galatians 2 and 3 are generally better analysed with the traditional, 
categorical-formal approach, which we take here. 
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affirmative one does not. I f class a clearly contains only one member, then obviously a 
proposition about it will be a universal statement: for example, "Aristotle is not a triangle." 
Some modern textbooks, influenced by Bertrand Russell, claim that " A l l a is b" has to do 
with the class a, rather than its members; but this is erroneous, as can be seen from the fact 
that A (like E) distributes its subject: it means "Every a is b . " 4 3 For shorthand reference, we 
may refer to " A l l a is b" by the symbol A(ab), and so forth. 
As in the case of conditional propositions, categorical propositions can be tricky to 
translate into their logical meanings or categorical forms when the word "only" is thrown 
into them somewhere.44 When it is thrown in as the very beginning, " in general [such 
propositions] assert that the predicate applies exclusively to the subject named" (Copi 1968, 
184). For example, "Only ticket-holders wil l be admitted"; "None but the brave deserve the 
fair." These should be translated, respectively, " A l l those who wil l be admitted are ticket-
holders," and " A l l those who deserve the fair are brave." In other words, 
So-called exclusive propositions, beginning with "only" or "none but," translate 
into A propositions whose subject and predicate terms are the same, respectively, 
as the predicate and subject terms of the exclusive proposition. There are 
contexts in which "Only S is P" or "None but S's are P's" are intended to 
express not merely that " A l l P is S" but also to suggest either that " A l l S is P" 
or that "Some S is P." This is not always the case, however. Where context 
helps to determine meaning, attention must be paid to it, of course. But in the 
absence of such additional information, the suggested translations are adequate. 
(Copi 1968, 184) 
And, again as with hypothetical propositions, we should note the existence and 
meaning of exceptive categorical propositions.4 5 Here also, these propositions are a 
conjunction of two propositions. " A l l except students are required to leave" means not 
merely that " A l l nonstudents must leave," but also (generally) that "No students are required 
43. For a fuller critique, see Clark 1985, 85-90. 
44. Cf. Cohen and Nagel 1934, 37; Copi 1968, 184. 
45. On these see particularly Copi 1968, 185. 
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to leave." That is, it means both A(a'b) and E(ab), which is not equivalent to the former. 
Thus it really means a conjunction of these two propositions. 
2.1.5.2 The logical relationships between the forms; immediate implication; conversion and 
obversion; definitive vs. descriptive propositions 
We said that one proposition "implies" another whenever the form of the second is true every 
time the form of the first is true. Are there then particular logical relationships which 
regularly hold between these various categorical forms? Yes, and in fact it is a fairly 
straightforward matter (once you know how) to determine which forms are true every time 
which other ones are true. We wil l not go into all this derivation, for almost any logic 
textbook will do so. 4 6 Here we simply relate the findings. 
Recall that there were seven possible logical relations between propositions, and that 
they could all be boiled down to implication and negation, and (in some cases) conjunction of 
two other relationships. Let us consider now the four categorical propositions whose subject 
is a and whose predicate is b (A[ab], I[ab], 0[ab], and E[ab]). None of these four 
propositions is logically "independent" of another: the truth (or untruth) of any one of them 
does entail something about the truth (or untruth) of some other, or vice versa. Let us first 
consider what can be said in terms of implication without bringing in any proposition-
negations. We begin, in other words, with those propositional relations traditionally called 
46. We recommend Clark's lucid exposition (1985), unhindered as it is by any of B. Russell's 
fallacies concerning subalternation and "existential import," which errors however Clark ably 
critiques (on pp. 34-35, 37-40, 85-90): In short, like his idea "material implication," Russell's 
definition of "All a is/are b" to mean "class a is included in class b," does not comport with 
normal English usage and ends up leading to paradox and absurdity, and it yields a restricted 
system of formal logic which denies the validity of A(ab) < I(ab) and of E(ab) < O(ab). But 
"most modern logic textbooks do not analyze Russell's definition. Instead of fixing their attention 
on the formula as a translation of the English word all they try to explain the peculiar results by a 
discussion of 'existential import.' . . . Logic alone does not assert the existence or nonexistence of 
anything. It would seem therefore that we can dispense with existential import and preserve the 
validity of subalternation [A(ab) < I(ab) and E(ab) < O(ab)]" (ibid., 88-89). 
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"immediate implication"; that is, we relate every case, barring all negation, in which one 
categorical form immediately implies another categorical form. 
In the first place, every categorical form implies itself: I(ab) < I(ab). This gives us 
four valid but fairly useless implications. Note that this validity is necessary only i f we keep 
the subject and predicate in their respective positions. For example, it is not true that A(ab) 
< A(ba), or " A l l b is a." A change in the order of the terms in the premise(s) is called a 
change in figure. Since there are only two ways to order the terms a and b, and since 
immediate implication has only one premise (and one conclusion), immediate implication has 
only two figures. Thus we say that the implication AA (A implies A) is valid in the 1st 
figure (i.e., A[ab] < A[ab]), but invalid in the 2nd figure (i.e., [A(ba) < A(ab)]'). Or in an 
easier and standard notation: AA-1 is a valid implication, but AA-2 is invalid. 
There are two more "immediate implications" valid in the first figure. I f it is known 
that " A l l whales are mammals," it must be admitted that "Some whales are mammals." 
Likewise, i f "Nothing I have tried has worked," we may be sure that "Some things I have 
tried have not worked." Thus A I and EO are valid implications in the 1st figure. These 
two, and the four self-implications, are the only valid immediate implications in the 1st 
figure. There are even fewer in the 2nd figure: we retain four of these six, namely EE, I I , 
A I , and EO, but AA-2 and 00-2 are invalid. 
Thus there are several "immediate implications" between categorical forms, barring 
negations. That covers two of the seven types of logical relationship, "superalternation" and 
"subalternation." But we have already seen some "equivalents" among categorical forms as 
well. Since EE and I I are valid in the 2nd figure, and also have the same categorical form 
for both premise and conclusion, the subject and predicate of an E or I proposition are 
practically interchangeable: E(ab) < E(ba) and vice versa, and I(ab) < I(ba) and vice versa. 
Simple conversion consists in interchanging the subject and predicate of a proposition; E and 
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I are therefore said to be simply convertible, that is, their "simple converses" are always 
logically equivalent propositions. 
We have covered all the single-premised categorical implications that do not involve 
negation of propositions; thus we have exhausted the two logical relationships 
superimplication (or superalternation) and subimplication (subalternation). In order to find 
the rest of the logical relations holding between various categorical forms, we now admit 
proposition-negation also. Thus we bring in the logical relations of disjunction (or 
contrariety), alternation (subcontrariety), and "strong disjunction" (contradiction).47 
Allowing negation of propositions wil l also permit us to identify the remaining equivalences 
between categorical forms. 
In the 1st figure, we find that A and E are disjuncts (contraries): A < E' and E < A ' . 
On the other hand, we find that I and O are alternants (subcontraries): I ' < O and O' < I . 
Finally, we have two pairs of contradictories: A and O on the one hand, and E and I on the 
other. So i f A is true O is false, and i f A is false 0 is true; the same goes for E and I 
respectively. This gives us the lst-figure "immediate" (single-premised) implications 
involving negation of a proposition. 
Now i f we recall that E is defined by negating the predicate of A, so that E(ab') ("No a 
is non-b") = A(ab") ("Every A is not non-b"), and note that A(ab") s= A(ab), we may infer 
an equivalence between E(ab') and A(ab). The same holds for I and O: O(ab') = I(ab). 
Obversion consists in changing the quality (i.e., whether it is negative or positive) of a 
proposition while contradicting the predicate. Note then that obversion is valid for every 
categorical form, that is, it always produces a logically equivalent proposition. 
47. It will be remembered that disjunction (contrariety), and alternation between P and Q are defined, 
respectively, as P < Q' and P' < Q. Contradiction ("strong disjunction") is the conjunction of 
these two relations (i.e., [P < Q'] • [P' < Q]). All these relations are traditionally discussed in 
connection with a diagram called the "square of opposition"; see, e.g., Cohen and Nagel 1934, 
65-68; Stebbing 1961, 57-62; Clark 1985, 45-47. 
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We have found all the logically-related pairs of categorical forms, in the 1st figure. 
But also we have now found all the equivalences, regardless of figure, barring negation of 
subject or of predicate: for we have found that by simple conversion (interchange of subject 
and predicate, and thus the move from 1st to 2nd figure), one has valid implications in EE 
and I I , and for these only. Granted, allowing negation of the proposition's terms, as required 
in obversion, would open the door to many other equivalences as well. But these are all 
derived from successive applications of conversion and obversion or vice versa (Cohen and 
Nagel 1934, 59; Stebbing 1961, 65). 4 8 And the only reason we must admit the term-negation 
involved in obversion, is that we use obversion to define E from A, and O from I (Clark 
1985, 54). So, since our analysis so far has already assumed all four categorical forms, 
obversion actually adds nothing new. Therefore, since within our analysis we have 
comprehended implications involving not only proposition-negations but also obversion and 
thus, by extension, every valid term-negation, and have found all the legitimate moves in the 
2nd figure, we have found the basic logical building-blocks for every valid "immediate" 
(single-premised), "categorical" (simple-propositional) implication. 
Having discussed all the essential ways in which individual categorical forms 
(including their negations) are logically related, let us take note of a special type of exceptive 
categorical proposition, one we have just mentioned. The logical equivalence of the result of 
obversion, we suggested, derives merely from the fact that obversion is how we define 
negative forms (E and O) in terms of positive ones. In fact, the meaning of a definitive 
statement is a conjunctive proposition, since it always entails equivalence. Simple 
propositions predicate something of the subject, they say something about the subject, they 
48. For discussion of these possibilities and examination of some of them, see Cohen and Nagel 1934, 
59-63; Stebbing 1961, 62-68, 77. But note that by contrapositive Stebbing denotes the converse 
of the obverse, whereas Cohen and Nagel, as well as Clark (1985, 54-55), denote by it the 
obverse of the converse of the obverse (obtained more easily by contradicting and interchanging 
subject and predicate, which is valid for A and O: "All ponies are horses" is equivalent to "All 
non-horses are non-ponies"). 
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describe the subject. Definitive statements do not simply say something about the subject, 
they are intended also to mark out the subject from the rest of reality. Thus, they must not 
only include, they must exclude: they must identify any instance of the subject, not just 
describe it. One defines an expression by saying, in other and more numerous (and thus 
more informing) terms, what it is that the expression denotes. 
The symbol being defined is called the definiendum, and the symbol or group of 
symbols used to explain the meaning of the definiendum is called the deftniens. 
. . . The definiens is not the meaning of the definiendum, but another symbol or 
group of symbols which, according to the definition, has the same meaning as 
the definiendum. (Copi 1968, 97) 
Since both the definiendum and the definiens denote the same thing or type of thing, they are 
equivalent, logically interchangeable terms (Stebbing 1961, 421-25). 
It follows then, that a definitive statement cannot be just a simple A-type proposition; 
for i f it were, its subject and predicate would not be logically interchangeable. Thus, in 
logical terms, a definitive statement can only mean a conjunction, of A(ab) and A(ba): both 
these propositions are intended.49 It is therefore an "exceptive" proposition (see above).5 0 
In a definitive statement, then, the presence of the characteristic(s) stated in the 
definiens is enough to notify us of an instance of the thing(s) intended by the definiendum. 
In other words, with this definition the presence of such characteristic(s) is a "cause of (our) 
knowing" (i.e., causa cognoscendi) that here is an instance of the thing(s) intended by the 
definiendum, and vice versa. 
We have used the term definitive statement, rather than definition, because we wish to 
avoid any limiting of the idea to the normal idea of "definition," a defining by a genus and a 
49. Thus, to prove the falsehood of a definitive statement, it is necessary only to prove the falsehood 
of either one of its conjuncts; for (A' + B') = (A • B)'. 
50. That is, one might well define automobile by saying, "No things are 3- or 4-wheel motorised 
vehicles intended for personal travel on ordinary roads, except automobiles," which means both 
that every automobile is such a thing, and that every such thing is an automobile. 
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species (i.e., an "essential" characteristic).51 Strictly speaking, in order to define, a 
statement does not have to stipulate an essential distinguishing characteristics; it is sufficient 
that it stipulate some distinguishing characteristic(s). Another corollary of the fact that a 
definitive statement may omit the essential (i.e., most fundamental) distinguishing 
characteristic, is that any one definiendum may possibly have more than one valid definiens. 
And i f they are indeed all valid, they themselves will be logically equivalent/interchangeable; 
they all denote the same thing(s). 
Note the significance of this "definitive" type of statement to the exegete: it has a 
different meaning than a simple universal positive proposition, but it often bears no external 
sign of its different character. It is therefore up to the exegete to discern the presence of a 
definitive statement, and to know what is the difference in its ("logical") meaning. For 
example, there is one biblically-relevant class of statements which are always definitive: these 
are statements of the "terms" of a covenant, statements of what is required to be in right-
standing with respect to the covenantal agreement. Such statements do not intend to say 
merely that "all who (meet these conditions) are in 'right standing'"; nor do they intend to 
say merely that "all who are in 'right standing' (meet these conditions)"; rather, they intend 
to convey both these simpler propositions, conjunctively and at the same time. (We might 
conveniently call such pairs "covenantal converses.") But such is the nature of any 
criterion.52 
51. Cf. Stebbing 1961, 425: "It has been customary to give as the first rule [of definition] that 
definition must be per genus et differentiam. This, however, involves an unduly narrow 
conception of the nature of definition." 
52. Cf. Copi 1968, 105: "Those who attach the same meaning to a term use the same criterion for 
deciding of any object whether it is part of the term's extension [i.e., the collection or class of 
things which the term denotes]. Thus we have agreed to use the property of being a closed plane 
curve, all points of which are equidistant from a point within called the center as our criterion for 
deciding of any figure whether it is to be called a 'circle' or not." Criteria are thus definitions 
and vice versa. But contra Copi here, sometimes there can be more than one criterion of the same 
thing. 
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2.1.5.3 Categorical syllogisms; sorites and other polysyllogisms 
At the start of this sub-section on formal logic, we said that " i t is the implicative 
relationships between the forms of various simple propositions, and between those of simple 
and conjunctive propositions, that ultimately cause any concrete proposition(s) to imply any 
other(s)." Having seen the implicative relations between simple (categorical) propositions, 
let us now examine those between simple and conjunctive propositions. Once we have those 
relations in hand, we have the building-blocks of all varieties of implication. 
First recall what we said in the previous sub-sub-section about "figure": 
A change in the order of the terms in the premise(s) is called a change in figure. 
Since there are only two ways to order the terms a and b, and since immediate 
implication has only one premise, immediate implication has only two figures. 
Thus we say that the implication " A A " (A implies A) is valid in the 1st figure 
(i.e., A[ab] < A[ab]), but is invalid in the 2nd figure (i.e., [A(ba) < A(ab)]'). 
But in categorical syllogisms, the antecedent is conjunctive, that is, the antecedent is two 
categorical propositions taken conjunctively. As a result, there are not two but four figures. 
We can show why this is so, and what the figures are, once we have gotten hold of 
some terminology of categorical syllogisms. A premise is any categorical (simple) 
proposition included within the antecedent part of the implication. In valid single-premised 
("immediate") implication, we found that whatever "terms" (i.e., the subject and predicate) 
occurred in the premise, also occurred in the conclusion, though perhaps exchanging 
positions. In a categorical syllogism, the terms appearing in the conclusion appear also in the 
two premises, but one term in each premise. We call the subject of the conclusion the minor 
term, and the predicate of the conclusion the major term; accordingly the premise in which 
the minor term appears is the minor premise, and that in which the major term appears, the 
major premise. So there is a third term, one which appears in both premises. Unless this 
other term is identical in both premises, no formal (categorical) implication results. This 
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term, appearing only in the premises, is called the middle term. Standard notation puts the 
major premise first. I f then we write the minor term as a, the middle term as b, and the 
major term as c, we may express syllogisms according to the pattern of this example: A(ab) 
A(bc) < A(ac). ("Socrates is a man; all men are mortal; therefore Socrates is mortal.") 
Now, let us see why there are four figures. We may simply note in how many 
different positions the middle term can occur. As Clark (1985, 60) explains: "The middle 
term may be the subject of the major premise and the predicate of the minor—first figure; or 
the middle term may be the predicate of both premises—second figure; or it may be the 
subject of both—third figure; or it may be the predicate of the major and subject of the 
minor"—fourth figure. Therefore, to identify completely any particular categorical 
syllogism, we need only note the categorical forms of the major and minor premises and of 
the conclusion, and note the figure. Thus a standard notation for categorical syllogisms 
refers to them as EAE-1, EIO-3, 1AI-2, and so on. 
Since there are four different categorical forms, three possible places for them to 
appear in the syllogism (yielding 64 permutations), and four possible figures, there are 256 
possible "moods" or forms of categorical syllogism (Clark 1985, 60). Only 24 of them are 
valid (see ibid., 68); 6 valid moods are in each figure. We forego deriving them, but list 
them by figure, for later reference: 
1. 2. 3. 4. 
AAA AEE A A I A A I 
A A I AEO A l l AEE 
A l l AOO EAO AEO 
EAE EAE EIO EAO 
EAO EAO LAI EIO 
EIO EIO OAO LAI 
Having identified all the ways in which, barring any proposition-negations, a 
conjunctive premise can imply a simple conclusion, we may feel that we should now deal 
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with what happens when we allow proposition-negation. But in fact we need not do so. For 
what we have been calling proposition-negation is nothing but contradiction (Stebbing 1961, 
191); and we have already found that every contradicted categorical form is logically 
equivalent to some other, non-contradicted one (e.g., A ' = O, E' s= I ) . And we have 
already dealt with all term-negations through analysis of obversion (see above). So at this 
point we have encountered all the basic implication-forms which ultimately constitute any 
valid implication. 
There may be longer implications that are made of strings of categorical syllogisms, in 
which strings the conclusion of one is a premise of the next. Such strings are called 
poly syllogisms. Of special interest, because of its commonality, is the sorites, a 
polysyllogism with only its premises and the final conclusion stated, and arranged so that any 
two successive premises wil l contain a common term. 5 3 Within this type there are two 
standard ways to arrange the premises. Consider two purely theoretical examples (from 
Cohen and Nagel 1934, 94-95), both of which are syllogistic chains made up of linked 
instances of AAA-1 : 
Al l dictatorships are undemocratic. 
A l l undemocratic governments are unstable. 
Al l unstable governments are cruel. 
Al l cruel governments are objects of hate. 
Therefore, all dictatorships are objects of hate. 
Al l sacred things are protected by the state. 
Al l property is sacred. 
Al l trade monopolies are property. 
Al l steel industries are trade monopolies. 
Therefore, all steel industries are protected by the state. 
In the first form, called an Aristotelian sorites, a minor premise is stated first (contrary to the 
standard way of presenting categorical syllogisms), and the common terms appear first as a 
53. See Cohen and Nagel 1934, 94-95; Stebbing 1961, 109; Copi 1968, 196-98. 
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predicate and then as a subject. In the latter form, called a Goclenian sorites, a major 
premise is stated first, and common terms appear first as subject and then as predicate. The 
important thing to note is that in both forms the conclusion of the first two premises is 
unstated (and omitted above) but serves as one of the premises of the next link in the 
polysyllogistic chain. 
Thus the end of our investigation of formal logic brings us again face to face with the 
interesting and pervasive phenomenon of unstated yet intended meanings. This phenomenon 
is hardly more widely understood than is formal logic; yet both must be more or less 
consciously understood, in order to have the tools required for understanding an ancient 
writer's logical rhetoric no matter what type or shape of logical argument he has deployed. 
As pragmatics shows us, exegesis, or practically any kind of reading, involves eliminating, 
somehow, unfeasible hypotheses about the particular intended relevance of some information 
conveyed explicitly. Therefore with ancient writings, where the reader must be more 
methodical in order to extract the intended meaning, it is helpful or even necessary to have 
conscious understanding of the various possible relevances; our study of formal logic has 
given us this. 
But i f it is necessary to understand more or less consciously the various possible 
argument- or discourse-meanings in order to understand an argument, it is no less necessary 
to understand the various word-meanings possible for the words in the discourse; for the 
intended meaning of an argument depends on the intended meanings of its propositions, 
which in turn depends on the intended meanings of the words. To this level of meaning in 
Galatians, and to some overlooked or otherwise underappreciated semantic possibilities 
within it, we now turn. 
2.2 Neglected semantic potential in three key Pauline word-groups 
In this section we point out some known but underappreciated semantic potentials of certain 
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key words in Paul's Galatian rhetoric. These include the Greek terras for "righteous," 
"works," and "faith." We begin with "righteous" because one oversight concerning it tends 
to prejudice the interpretation of the other two terms. First however, let us indicate some 
basic considerations and terminology regarding words' "meanings." 
2.2.1 Lexical senses, denotation, and lexical "meanings" 
In lexical semantics we discuss, and consider the relations between, "word" (the phonological 
form), "concept" or "sense" (the mental activity or content), and the extra-linguistic thing or 
reality denoted by the word via the concept.54 Of course, one word may be used to stand for 
many different concepts (but not at the same time). What we mean by concept in this context 
is roughly the definition of the term's meaning, as one might find it in a dictionary (Cotterell 
and Turner 1989, 117). There is a second, broader sense of concept, which includes one's 
entire understanding of the thing or things denoted, including all its or their known 
characteristics, not just the defining ones. This sort of "concept" one might find elucidated 
in an encyclopaedia, rather than in a dictionary. 
Now, when we speak about some word's "meaning," we might be speaking just of its 
dictionary definition (its "lexical concept" or "lexical sense"), or else also about what part of 
reality it denotes. An example of the latter, broader sense of meaning is in a statement we 
cited previously, by Copi (1968, 97): 
The symbol being defined is called the deflniendum, and the symbol or group of 
symbols used to explain the meaning of the definiendum is called the deflniens. 
. . . The definiens is not the meaning of the definiendum, but another symbol or 
54. These represent the three corners of the traditional diagram called the "triangle of signification'' 
(see Lyons 1968, 404; Silva 1983, 103; Cotterell and Turner 1989, 116). A perhaps more 
adequate version, that of Klaus Heger and Kurt Baldinger, has four corners, thus allowing for a 
distinction between the activity of conceptualising and the concrete expression of the concept in a 
particular language (see Cotterell and Turner 1989, 117-18). As is usually the case in semantics, 
when we speak of "words" we will mean these "grammatical words" or "lexemes," that is, 
concrete, phonological implementations of concepts. 
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group of symbols which, according to the definition, has the same meaning as 
the definiendum. (Copi 1968, 97) 5 5 
Now it is true that in this important, broader sense of meaning, "the definiens [i.e. the 
definition] is not the meaning of the definiendum"; but in the narrower sense of meaning, 
that is precisely what the definiens is. When people ask about the "meaning" of some word, 
they usually are expecting a dictionary definition, not perhaps an "ostensive definition" (an 
indication by pointing of finger) or an article from an encyclopaedia. However, most or even 
all words also denote some part of extra-linguistic reality. 5 6 One's grasp of such a word's 
"meaning," in the broader sense, requires some knowledge also of the thing or attribute or 
type of thing which, via the word's lexical sense, it denotes (Cotterell and Turner 1989, 83). 
And one's grasp of the word's "meaning," in the narrower sense, requires some grasp of the 
thing(s) denoted by the words within its definition. So both of these senses of "meaning" are 
crucial. 
But it might seem that once one has ascertained the lexical sense (dictionary definition) 
of a word in a particular context, one will thereby also have determined the denotation of the 
word, i f any (and assuming that one grasps the meanings of the words which compose the 
definition). This is commonly the case, but it is not always so: sometimes the lexical sense's 
denotation is inherently dependent upon either the situational or the linguistic context. To 
see why this is so, let us consider a third type of "concept," which is called a discourse 
55. As we saw above, that a definition is for explaining the denotation of the word (as Copi implies 
here) opens up the scope for there to be more than one logically equivalent "definition" of a word 
(i.e., several definitions which denote the very same extra-linguistic reality). But as also noted 
earlier, here we are using "definition" in the broadest sense: usually "definition" means more 
narrowly "dictionary definition" or "lexical sense," of which theoretically there will be 
essentially only one for a particular word-meaning since it will be built around the "genus and 
species" and thus the "essential" defining qualities. 
56. Even "empty" words like conjunctions denote something, albeit this something is cognitional 
(e.g. some conjecture or some logical relationship between ideas or propositions; cf. Rand 1990, 
17, 37-38). It does not seem clear to the present author that any words denote nothing. It is 
sometimes the case, however, that the denotation remains unidentified even though the dictionary 
definition is known; on this phenomenon see below. 
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concept or discourse sense. This is a particular thing (or quality or event) or class of things 
to which some part of a discourse has made reference, and to which other parts of the 
discourse may then refer by shorter expressions. More precisely, we might define discourse 
concept as "that sort of idea represented by a word or expression denoting, yet not in itself 
identifying, some entity (or class of objects or quality or event) mentioned and identified 
elsewhere in the discourse or else given pragmatically" (i.e., 'situationally salient, and so 
already in the domain of discourse, the set of referents being talked about,' Levinson 1983, 
80 n. 12, cf. 67; on discourse concepts see Cotterell and Turner 1989, 123, 151-53, 164-
67). For example, a discourse might speak of "the bats that live in caves in Central 
America." It is then unnecessary for the discourse to repeat that whole phrase in every 
following sentence where it wishes to refer to these bats again; it may simply say (as we have 
just done) "these bats," or some similar short phrase. The latter, simpler phrase would not 
by itself serve to identify which bats were in view; but since it appears shortly after the fuller 
phrase, it is taken to refer to the same bats as does that fuller phrase. So the phrase the bats 
will carry more meaning than do the combined lexical senses of its component words. That 
meaning is the discourse concept which the phrase represents. 
It would even be possible to refer back to these bats now with a single word, them. 
Third-person pronouns represent discourse concepts. These lexical senses are examples of 
anaphoric senses; that is, they are lexical senses (definitions) which are also discourse 
concepts. They refer to some thing (or event or quality) or class of things (or events or 
qualities) which is/are referred to and also identified elsewhere—usually earlier—in the 
discourse (or pragmatically given in the "domain of discourse"; see above). The point is 
that, with this type of lexical sense, knowing the word's lexical sense by no means gives you 
its denotation: the identity of that which is denoted depends finally upon the linguistic 
context, and not merely upon the lexical sense itself. 
A. H . Carver, 2000 §2.2.1 Page 78 
There is another type of lexical sense which does not determine its own denotation: 
that is the deictic or indexical senses (e.g., "yesterday," "you," "here"; with these the 
situation, not the discourse itself, ultimately determines the denotation). But the study of 
deictic senses is well developed, whereas the study of anaphoric senses has been fairly 
limited, focusing largely on third-person pronouns. We suggest that there may be a number 
of other lexical senses with anaphoric character, and that anyone doing lexicography or 
exegesis should be alert for such senses. For example, one English dictionary (RHD) lists 
this as its second lexical sense of the word fair: 
2. legitimately sought, pursued, done, given, etc.; proper under the rules; a fair 
fight. 
We can readily see that "proper under the rules" is an anaphoric, discourse concept. "The 
rules" here expresses a notion that might be more fully expressed as "whichever set of rules 
pertains to the game or activity being undertaken within the purview of the current 
discourse." Thus, "proper under the rules" denotes some quality whose identity nevertheless 
cannot be known except through familiarity with the linguistic context (the discourse). 
Concretely, "proper under the rules" in the context of football, denotes a quality or qualities 
entirely different and distinct from that denoted by "proper under the rules" in the context of 
cricket. What is "fair," in cricket, may not be "fair" in football, and vice versa, even though 
the lexical sense is precisely the same in both cases. Thus one cannot know the denotation of 
this lexical sense of fair without first knowing the particular linguistic context in which it is 
being used (or maybe the larger "domain of discourse"); for the lexical sense itself refers 
(even i f implicitly) to "the discourse." 
Thus, when considered abstractly from any discourse such a lexical sense can have no 
definite denotation; thus its meaning remains unidentified and obscure. So those who must 
understand what some word means when used in such a sense, must be fully alert to the 
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peculiar, "discourse" nature of this sense, and to the fact that, therefore, knowing this lexical 
sense does not by itself give us the speaker's or writer's denotation. 
2.2.2 Neglected semantic potential in bUaioq and bwctioavvT) 
In this section we wish to point out that anaphoric or "discourse" lexical senses are often 
found with this group of semantically-related words. The characteristic is seldom rightly and 
fully reported but may well be important for understanding Galatians. In fact, it appears that 
the overlooking or lack of understanding of the anaphoric nature of some senses in this word-
group, spurred on by theological preconceptions, has led to chronic confusion in the 
discussion of these meanings. It is important to consider both Greek and Hebrew usages, for 
Paul wrote in Greek yet was doubtless immersed in the Hebrew scriptures.57 Let us consider 
first some Hellenistic Greek terms. 
Bo Reicke (1968, 38) has stated that "On the whole, etymological observations 
illustrate the fact that bUaioq and related words are not used to indicate any isolated quality 
such as blond or pale, but always imply a relation to some criterion." While this statement is 
rather misleading in that it couples the word's meaning to its etymology, according to what 
Reicke states here this word has an anaphoric (or "discourse") lexical sense. For its 
denotation is not identified definitely by the definition, but rather the criterion by which one 
knows whether something or someone is binotioq is found elsewhere, in the discourse (or at 
least in the "domain of discourse"). Although etymology does not necessarily determine the 
current lexical sense(s) of a term, it may be easier to notice the peculiar, anaphoric nature of 
this lexical sense, and to analyse the sense more fully, i f we conduct something of a historical 
survey of the use of 8Uaiog. Our aim, however, wil l be to understand the senses of the word 
that were still current and available at Paul's time. 
57. On the proper role of the MT and the L X X in interpretation of the NT, cf. Silva 1983, 65-68, 72. 
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Atfcmo? may have derived from the Greek verb deUvvfu., through the former's 
predecessor 6UTJ (TDNT, 2:179-80; Hil l 1967, 98-99). Be that as it may, 6uo? came to mean 
an "attitude," a "state," a "mode" or "manner"; the accusative binyv is used adverbially with 
the sense, "according to the mode or manner." Thus 6UTJ came to have the sense, 
"tradition" or "custom" or "that which is customary"; UKI\ iariv could mean " i t is 
customary" (TDNT, 2:180; Hil l 1967, 99). Although originally the sense may have been 
broadly "that which is indicated or customary," it soon developed also a narrower sense, 
"that which is indicated socially, that which is socially established or customary" (cf. Hil l 
1967, 99-100). That is, it began to have a common usage for specifically social custom: 
We may say therefore that 5'IKT) connotes the norm . . . for human conduct, 
chiefly for the conduct of men towards one another, and as such was logically 
regarded as 'right': that which is customary . . . is 'the right'. . . . A person 
whose conduct conforms to the standard 6IKTJ is SUmog: he does what is right, 
according to the traditions of society . . . (Hill 1967, 99; cf. TDNT, 2:182) 
Of course, what is "right" depends on whether one is speaking of persons or actions, and 
(especially i f the latter) on the particular action and its situation. Thus, so far we are 
encountering lexical senses that are in some way anaphoric. One might more fully define this 
social sense of "righteous" as " in accordance with whichever set of terms or rules pertains to 
that covenant or social system which is accepted and revered within the purview of the 
current discourse." It should not be surprising that this definition is so similar to the one we 
gave above for fair; after all, Greek-English lexicons commonly give "fair" as an English 
gloss for this sense of Btiaioq, and the sense of fair which we cited is clearly the one they 
have in mind. 5 8 
There developed from this broad social use of the two Greek terms some narrower 
social uses, focused on what is laid down in the society as law, sometimes as manifest in the 
58. Another sense of fair, "free from bias, dishonesty, or injustice," used of a judge, is a good 
translation-equivalent for what is probably the other main sense of bUaioq. It is not clear that not 
all the NT uses of dtiaioq could fall under one or the other of these two definitions. 
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decision in a certain legal case. Thus biicq apparently came to mean "law," "legal case," 
"judicial decision," "punishment," "case," "cause," "plea," "condemnation," and "fine." 
However, 5Uaiog stayed with its broader, social sense, sometimes contextually narrowed to 
"that which is according to the law." According to Burton, "it denotes conformity to a 
standard or norm (61*77) not conceived of as defined in the word itself" but determined fully 
by the context (Burton 1921, 460, emphasis ours). Thus the term's denotation is always 
determined by the context; in other words, it is a discourse lexical sense. 
Similar senses are also available using the Hebrew words which the bucai- cognates 
translate in the Septuagint: "Like the Greek bimioq the Hebrew words from the root |?*JS are 
(so far as the evidence enables us to judge) fundamentally forensic in sense, expressing 
agreement with a standard or norm, not conceived of as defined in the word itself" (Burton 
1921, 461). But they developed other senses as well. Scholars such as Reventlow (1992) 
and Olley (1987), following the lead of H. H. Schmid (1968), have emphasised "the wide 
range of contexts in which the word [sdq] is used" in the Ancient Near East: "law, wisdom, 
nature/fertility, war/victory, cult/sacrifice, kingship. These are brought together in kingship, 
instituted by God (or gods) for the well-being of all . . . Schmid describes s-d-k [sic] as being 
related to Weltordnung or 'cosmic ordering' which is expressed in given concrete situations" 
(Olley 1987, 308). Olley (p. 309) therefore suggests the senses "being right, putting right, 
ensuring order, bringing about harmony and what is right. . . Semitic emphasis is upon 
actions which bring about prosperity, benefit, equal rights for all subjects, including freedom 
from external oppression and deliverance from enemies. . . . In a broad sense then s-d-k 
signifies actions that bring about what is right and good for all or the state where this is so." 
Now, as we have seen, the use of "right" in the definition might usually indicate a discourse 
concept; for what is "right" depends on the particular situation or activity which is present 
A. H. Carver, 2000 § 2.2.2 Page 82 
within the purview of the current discourse (as also does what is "fair," in our example 
above). 
But it might not always indicate this, especially where the order of society is seen to be 
in some sort of static harmony with the cosmos. That would indicate rather a non-discourse 
lexical sense(s); for in this case the harmony in view seems to be determined by the 
(perceived) laws of the cosmos (which are presumably static more or less) rather than by the 
terms laid down by some partys' covenant (something dependent, apparently, only upon the 
wills of the parties involved, which wills might not be static). Where the social rules are 
considered given and static, therefore, one's concept of "righteousness" would less likely be 
formulated as a discourse notion. Thus the Hebrew terms (pTX cognates) could probably 
carry either discourse or non-discourse lexical senses, depending perhaps on whether the 
cosmos or else the partys' (or perhaps the suzerain's or deity's) will was seen by the speakers 
as determinative of the particular social "harmony." Granted, one's understanding of the 
deity's static-ness might change or vacillate, and so likewise also one's understanding and 
usage of these Hebrew words. But in situations where the paramount concern was about 
purity regulations and about upholding thereby the harmony of the cosmos, or similar 
notions, the lexical sense of "righteousness" would tend to be non-discourse. For example, 
it seems accurate to say that the main concerns of the Qumran community tended to be 
such.59 
What about the Greek usage in the LXX? "The bUaioq observes the laws. Hence 
6Uaiov is linked with VO/JUHOV" (TDNT, 2:182). Thus, since in Hebrew culture the Law of 
Moses was the preeminent "way established," perhaps one could argue that in the LXX 
bUmog retained permanently its narrower social sense "according to the law" (TVNT, 
2:185), even as the term vonog was adopted to mean "the Torah." Yet it is certainly possible 
59. Cf. Maier 1995. 
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that since vdfiog is, in Greek culture, simply the "laying down" of "that which is 
customary," 8Cicaio<; perhaps never really developed a narrower social sense of "lawful," but 
the normal discourse context has determined the broader sense's denotation as "according to 
the established law." 
At any rate, this and other cultural differences account for at least some differences in 
what social standard was looked to by the "righteousness" of Hebrews and Greeks 
respectively. The increasing secularisation of classical Greek society led to an increasing 
focus on the established civil law as the standard of social right and wrong, whereas for the 
Israelite the comprehensive range of the Law meant that all social duties and customs and 
mores were found within it. "Thus the fact that p"lX is always related to God and His law, 
rather than to social customs and institutions as such, or to abstract principles, gives a 
different color to its use; . . . for the Hebrew righteousness tends to be more inward, more 
humane, and more inclusive than for the Greek. . . . Where the Hebrew conception of 
righteousness differs from the popular Greek conception we may put it thus, that whereas for 
the Greek Sumoowrj is always being pulled over from the broad sense of 'righteousness' to 
the narrower sense of 'justice,' the pull in Hebrew is in the opposite direction" (Dodd 1935, 
44-45; cf. Jamison 1953). There were tendencies in Greek culture, particularly those 
deriving from Plato's writings, that tended to consider one's social obligations statically, and 
thus to develop a non-contextual sense(s) of Suaiog. But the LXX would tend to follow the 
Hebrew cultural streams here, due to its having been rooted in Jewish culture and its 
referring to the Law of God, as what is "established or laid down" in that cultural context. 
So then, we can see there were both discourse and non-discourse lexical senses of 
"righteousness"; and these were likely both still available by Paul's time. But a Hebrew's 
idea of it was perhaps more likely than a Greek's to be a contextual, discourse notion, except 
perhaps where considerations of such things as cosmic harmony and purity were paramount. 
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But having described broadly these two sorts of lexical sense of "righteousness," a 
clarification is still necessary: what we are noting here, by this discourse/non-discourse 
distinction, is not exactly what is commonly said in biblical scholarship about the sense(s) of 
"righteousness." It is usual in recent scholarship to say that the Hebrew notion of 
righteousness was "relational" rather than "ethical." This terminology has some potential for 
helpfulness, in that it would seem to point to a distinction between some discourse and non-
discourse senses. But this terminology has been rendered unhelpful, in our opinion, by the 
equivocations and general unclarity with which both characterisations have been used. We 
will pass over the question of how there could be any purely non-"ethical" significance to 
"living up to one's covenantal agreements"; but we must point out that the terms 
"relationship" and "relational" have been constantly used in an equivocal and misleading 
manner in this discussion, at least by most Protestant participants. Specifically, those terms 
start out meaning something like "the behaviour required of one according to the terms or 
demands of some particular accepted covenantal relationship. "60 But "relational" and 
"relationship" very soon start meaning also, and at the same time, a forensic declaration that 
one fulfils the required behaviour. Now, and paradoxically, it is the declaration and not the 
behaviour which constitutes one "righteous."61 But no one (not even M. Luther, E. 
Kasemann, or P. Stuhlmacher) suggests that there are two independently definable senses of 
"righteousness" here: the allegedly "forensic" sense of "righteous" always boil down to 
60. Cf. E . R. Achtemeier, IDB, 4:80, 81: "It becomes clear that j?1X is a concept of relationship and 
that he who is righteous has fulfilled the demands laid upon him by the relationship in which he 
stands. . . . The demands of righteousness changed with the relationship." This is clearly a 
contextual, "discourse" lexical sense. Cf. also Smiles 1998, 134. 
61. E.g., in the same IDB article (4:84): "Not only is he p'ns who fulfils the demands of the 
relationship in which he stands, . . . He also is righteous who has righteousness imputed to him. 
In this sense, righteousness is justification by God, a 'being-declared-righteous' by the Lord of the 
covenant (cf. Isa. 60:21)." The trouble is that Achtemeier's discussion, and others, proceed not 
as if they were discussing a second sense here, but rather as if they were discussing the only sense 
of the term. 
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God's calling someone "righteous" in the other sense, as a sort of proleptic declaration that 
they are (already) that which really they are not (yet) but shall be. (The long discussion of 
Paul's notion "the righteousness of God" has virtually overlooked the possibility of a purely 
discourse lexical sense of "righteousness.") Thus they are in effect equivocating on the term 
righteousness. The popular ploy that justification is "relational" (see Ziesler 1972, 8) simply 
conflates the same two definitions, using the words relation (and relational) in the place of 
righteousness (and righteous). Apparently these scholars are blithely conflating two senses of 
"righteous," and producing nothing but equivocation and semantic muddle. One can then fail 
to live up to the relationship's demands and yet be "righteous," merely by virtue of this 
declaration (that one has lived up to the relationship? or else that one is being declared to be 
declared to be . . . what?).62 
It seems seriously doubtful that any lst-century Jew would mean, by the same word 
and at the same time, that one is "righteous" and that one is not "righteous" but nevertheless 
is pronounced "righteous" (by a God who, according to the Hebrew scriptures, eschews false 
judgments!). Moreover, a declaration of something (whether true or untrue) must ipso facto 
be essentially a declaration of something besides itself, lest there be nothing "out there" for it 
to assert.63 A "declaration of itself" is a pure nonsense-"idea," and not likely a lst-century 
Jewish one. We are better off acknowledging that for most NT occurrences of the word we 
must, in considering the term's meaning, choose between a typical Jewish "discourse sense" 
of "righteous," a typical Jewish non-discourse sense, and a pair of Greek lexical senses more 
or less equivalent to those. Insufficiently appreciated has been the contextual (yet 
denotative!) nature of these discourse lexical senses. This lack has made it easier to fall into 
62. Peter Stuhlmacher (1986 espec.) has been one of the strongest supporters of this paradoxical 
position. 
63. Even "performative language" declares something besides itself, viz., the declared will of the 
declarer (see more on this phenomenon below, in chap. 4). 
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the theologically-driven semantic fallacy just indicated, in analysis of these senses, as well as 
to approach the text's interpretation presupposing a "relational" Pauline sense of 
"righteousness" and yet with a restricting, non-discourse preconception about the sense's 
denotation. 
2.2.3 A neglected possibility with respect to epya pdfiov 
There has been much discussion of what Paul means by epya vdfwv ("works of the Law"), a 
noun-phrase appearing in Gal. 3:10a and elsewhere in Galatians and Romans (Rom. 3:20, 
27-28; 4:2, 6 [both epya absolute]; 9:11 [likewise], 32; 11:6 [likewise]; Gal. 2:16; 3:2, 5, 
10). But there has been surprisingly little attention to some rather rudimentary exegetical 
matters, such as what are the senses of the terms involved, according to the standard lexica. 
"Epya vopov does appear, at least to some, to be some sort of conventional phrase, having 
some standard meaning; it may, therefore, be inaccessible to standard treatment. But not 
knowing beforehand whether this is the case, our approach to this phrase must be somewhat 
roundabout. Let us begin with some apparently underappreciated semantic points regarding 
almost all general "do"-concepts, including the term epyov. 
2.2.3.1 The common (if not universal) multivalency of "do"-words, including epyov 
One point that seems commonly ignored, in exegeting epya pofiov in Paul, is that verbs 
which are synonyms for the general notion of "doing" are, in many or most languages, 
multivalent. LN (1:469-70) has a helpful discussion of the lexical-semantic distinctions 
languages sometimes make between different levels or types of obedience: 
For terms involving 'disobedience' or 'transgression,' there are often a number 
of subtle distinctions reflecting several different types of contrasts. For 
example, there may be important distinctions between disobeying a person and 
disobeying a law or custom. A number of languages also make a clear 
distinction between intentional and unintentional disobedience or transgression. 
A further distinction may involve repeated activity or consistency of attitude . . . 
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Accordingly, in the choice of terms for various passages of Scripture it is 
extremely important to note the distinctive features of meaning; otherwise, much 
of the emphasis upon disobedience and transgression as stated in the Scriptures 
may be seriously distorted. 
LN is commenting here on the need for alertness to these potential semantic nuances in target 
languages, when translating the Scriptures; obviously, however, i f one is going to make the 
right choice of words with which to translate these terms from the Scriptures, one must also 
be alert to such semantic nuances in the words one is translating. LN maintains some of 
these semantic nuances for several of the New Testament's Greek terms from this domain; for 
example: 
aireideu); deireideia . . . unwillingness or refusal to comply with the demands of 
some authority . . . 
&irci0ifc . . . pertaining to being continuously disobedient. . . 
irapanovu; irapaKor) . . . to refuse to listen and hence to disobey . . . 
•Kctpctfiaivu; irapdi^aoig . . . to act contrary to established custom or law, with 
the implication of intent. . . 
•jrapaPdrtjg . . . a person who customarily breaks or disobeys the law . . . (LN, 
1:468-69). 
It becomes clear, then, that we might ask lexical-semantic questions before we pronounce on 
whether, for example, by abiding in all things written (Gal. 3:10b) Paul has in mind, say, 
perfect (i.e., sinless) fulfilment, or else something like the endeavour to accomplish what has 
been commanded. 
But what of more general terms for "doing"? Like obedience, any human action can 
generally be looked at from at least two different viewpoints: one may speak of action with 
reference to its accomplishment, or else as attempt, with reference to goals or values: "What 
is he doing?" "He's accomplishing so-and-so [or else trying to do such-and-such]." This is 
because human action is intentional behaviour, or at least it would be acknowledged as such 
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by most people; it is seen as action calculated to reach a particular goal, action with an end in 
view, which in general may or may not accomplish that end.64 
It is the particular contexts of general statements about doing which let us know which 
of these viewpoints is operative in a particular instance of a general term for human "doing." 
For example, a man in an office building points at a co-worker who is crawling down the 
hall, looking at the floor, and asks, "What is he doing?" Clearly, he does not want someone 
to tell him that the man is crawling down the hall, looking at the floor; what he is asking 
about is the purpose or goal of the man's action: "He's looking for his lost contact lens." 
Another man, the manager of a car-racing team, approaches a man with a stop-watch who has 
just timed a racer's lap, and asks, "What's he doing now?" The man is not asking about the 
racer's intentions; obviously the racer is trying to win the race. What the man wants to know 
is the racer's current accomplishment: "On that lap he averaged 160 miles per hour." 
Context can even have a similar influence on the understanding of verbs that are more 
specific: seeing a neighbour pointing a rifle across a field, someone asks, "Goodness me, 
what's he shooting?" The speaker would probably feel frustrated to receive the reply, "Oh, 
nothing quite yet." Obviously, what he or she wished to know was what the neighbour was 
attempting to shoot. 
Our point here is the need to be aware of and to address these semantic potentials. 
Furthermore, one must raise the neglected sociolinguistic matter of the context-implied 
logical relations between any clearly-made predications of "attempting" and 
"accomplishing": that is, in the presuppositions inhabiting a particular "social language" or 
worldview, is an attempt (of a particular sort perhaps) tantamount to an accomplishment? Or 
64. On the logic of human action, cf. Mises 1966, 11-29; Mises 1985, 1-25; Rothbard 1970, 1-2; 
Rothbard 1985; Kirzner 1976, 148-85. 
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is it, perhaps, explicitly made a subimplicant of accomplishment (i.e., are "accomplishments" 
a subclass included within the larger class "attempts")?65 
Furthermore, these potential senses are germane to any discussion of epyov, according 
to what we find in the standard lexical reference works on New Testament Greek. Hpyov 
represents virtually the exact same range of senses as the Hebrew n(Pj?73, which is 
remarkable in light of the Hebrew for "works of the Law" which appears in the Qumran 
document 4QMMT (see below and chap. 3). 6 6 It may mean either a business/pursuit/-
undertaking/enterprise, or "deed" in the sense of behaviour/doing, or work/labour, or 
achievement(s), something (or things or stuff) actually done/produced/made; and also like 
ntPJfla it may have a "weakened sense" of something like matter/thing (BAGD; GLNT; 
JDNT). Note that "business/undertaking" is more specifically "accomplishment/achievement 
that is either a normal occupation of some person, that is, a calling freely taken up, or else a 
calling or obligation laid on him or her by someone else." Therefore, we may say about 
epyov that which we shall note later about nfi?ya : the basic distinction in the various senses 
of the word is that between "attempt/endeavour" and "achievement/accomplishment." 
But too often in the exegesis of Paul's speech about "doing the (whole) Law" or 
"works of the Law," one particular concept of "do" or of "deed," namely obedience (i.e., 
endeavour to accomplish what is commanded), has been assumed to be what Paul intends, 
without consideration of any alternative possibility, or really even of the question. This 
widespread tendency calls for a bit of scrutiny. 
2.2.3.2 The nonanalytical, traditional interpretation of epya voyjov 
The usual interpretation these days, and in Protestant circles ever since the Reformation, is 
that in his statements on cpya voixov Paul is criticising any attempt to merit or win, by 
65. We discuss the sociolinguistic issue of multiple "social languages" below, in chapter 3. 
66. It is understandable, then, that TOSTO is almost always translated epyov in the LXX. 
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observation of the law's stipulations, the status of covenantal righteousness. In other words, 
epya voftav is observation/"keeping" of the law's stipulations. But we may note fairly 
quickly, on any survey of the various meanings proposed today for epya udfwv, that the 
authors proposing them often seem to have chosen (whether consciously or unconsciously) 
not to base their interpretations on what we may fairly characterise as the normal procedure 
for interpretation. That procedure, briefly stated, is to check the lexica for the various ways 
in which the words were used, check the grammars for the various possible meanings of the 
grammatical constructions involved (e.g., the genitive case), and make their selections in 
light of the linguistic and non-linguistic contexts of the utterance. For example, H. B. P. 
Mijoga's recent (1995) thesis on "The Pauline notion of 'deeds of the law'" generally treats 
the phrase as a whole, and gives little attention to the individual linguistic and semantic 
elements of which it is composed. Moreover, the long survey Mijoga conducts in an early 
chapter shows that lexical and grammatical considerations have historically played little role 
in the discussion. This certainly explains the cornucopia of readings of the phrase: if the 
interpreter is not to be restricted by the normal use of the phrase's linguistic elements, there 
seems no reason not to propose whatever may seem to fit the context. 
However, none of the suggested meanings is necessarily wrong merely because of 
being untied to normal linguistic-semantic strictures. After all, there are in language such 
things as phrases that do not mean, or at least are not intended to mean, exactly what they 
say. These are often called "idioms"; the French linguist de Saussure coined for them the 
term "ready-made utterances" ("locutions toutes faites"; Lyons 1968, 177). For example, 
"How do you do?" would not make much sense, were it analysed according to the 
grammatical rules of English and the semantic potential of the words it contains. Other 
phrases, such as "Rest in peace," could make sense on this sort of interpretation, but 
normally are not used with any such sense, but in a sense undiscernible by a "normal" 
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analysis of the linguistic elements of the utterance. All such expressions are "learned as 
unanalysable wholes . . . Their internal structure . . . is not accounted for by means of rules 
which specify the permissible combinations of words. . . . They are to be accounted for 
simply by listing them in the dictionary with an indication of the situations in which they are 
used and their meaning" (Lyons 1968, 177). Nor is it uncommon for "technical terms" or 
technical meanings of words to develop in particular segments of a culture or an economy; 
and "technical phrases" also may develop. These are very much like idioms, in that they are 
learned as wholes. 
It is very doubtful that many disputing about the meaning of e£ epyu>v vofiov have 
consciously considered it a "ready-made utterance" or "technical phrase," but that is how 
many are treating it by effectively denying any exegetical significance to the "normal" 
meanings of its linguistic-semantic elements, and paying attention only to what the phrase as 
a whole means. This raises the question: would it not be legitimate for us to treat the phrase 
this way? Obviously, we cannot simply decide that any phrase that anyone utters on any 
particular occasion is a "ready-made utterance": if we could, then language would be merely 
a series of sounds to which anyone could ascribe any significance they felt was appropriate in 
the context—but then of course the linguistic context would provide no real guidance, since it 
would be just as plastic as the utterance in question. Therefore we require some evidence 
that indicates the phrase is, given its context, being used in a "ready-made" sense. That 
evidence might take the form of some established standard or technical usage. In absence of 
any evidence for this it must, at the very least, be quite clear from the context and from our 
knowledge of the use of the terms and grammar involved that the sense of the phrase is 
opaque on any "normal" exegesis; that would suggest that there must have been some 
understood, idiomatic meaning of the phrase for the original readers, even if we ourselves are 
ignorant of it. 
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Or, if someone should suggest that Paul was coining a new technical phrase, we would 
say that there should then be some clear evidence, either in Paul's writings (especially 
Romans, written to a church he had never visited), or else in the grammatical and/or lexical-
semantic non-standard or non-analysable nature, of the phrase itself, that Paul was coining a 
"ready-made" phrase. In other words, given that this type of language is actually abnormal, 
it seems to us that the burden of proof must be on those who would proceed as if a particular 
phrase is, in a certain context, being used as some sort of "ready-made utterance," learned as 
a whole. 
Now, there appears to be no evidence, outside of Paul's epistles, that the phrase had 
some standardised idiomatic sense. And given the usage in 4QMMT (see below), and the 
presence of similar if not identical language in the OT, it is doubtful that Paul was coming 
some new "ready-made" phrase. Rather, it would seem that it is the particular contexts in 
which Paul puts this phrase, that have caused people to puzzle over its meaning and to 
ascribe imaginative senses to the phrase as a whole. That is to say, it would appear that 
people have struggled to make sense of the phrase epya vdfiov because of its opacity, at least 
to them, in the particular contexts in which Paul uses it, and have therefore treated it as a 
"ready-made" phrase. 
2.2.3.3 The Qumran use of "works of the Law": a technical phrase? 
The fact that Paul introduces it abruptly (Gal. 2:16; Rom. 3:20), however, indicates only that 
it was probably a conventional phrase in such contexts, and not that it was a technical phrase. 
And a look at the Qumran literature, the only other Jewish literature where equivalent 
phrases appear, gives no evidence that we have a technical phrase here. 
One can find in the OT and ancient Jewish literature plenty of references to "doing the 
Law" or "doers of the Law" and equivalent concepts, but of all ancient Jewish literature 
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(including the LXX), it is only in the Qumran literature that the phrase "works of the Law" 
appears as such (Mijoga 1995). Even there, the phrase appears only in two documents, and 
only in one of these is the occurrence undisputed. 
The text called 4QFlorilegium (or 4Q174) has the following sentence (DSSE, 353): 
He has commanded that a Sanctuary of men be built for Himself, that there they 
may send up, like the smoke of incense, the works of the Law [mm 'fryaj. 
"Deeds of the law" was the reading that J. M. Allegro gave to the last phrase in his original 
publication of the text; but this reading was later questioned by J. Strugnell, who suggested 
reading daleth instead of resh, yielding the phrase min ^ya or "deeds of thanksgiving." 
Yet, in the opinion of J. A. Fitzmyer (1993, 20), a glance at the plate of this Qumran 
manuscript shows that Allegro read the text correctly. Moreover, it is difficult to make much 
sense of the phrase, "deeds of thanksgiving," and the literary context does nothing to clarify 
it. On the other hand, the phrase "deeds of the Law" has no particular or innate opaqueness 
(albeit at least one of its words may possibly be taken in various senses), and it fits well the 
context, in which the new sanctuary (of men) shall not be polluted by uncleanness nor laid 
waste because of (the new) Israel's sin: if instead they do "the deeds of the Law," sin will 
not cause their destruction.67 
The sense "works of the Law" is, moreover, clearly meant by an equivalent wording 
in another Qumran text. That text is the one called 4QMMT (the abbreviated title "MMT" is 
short for the phrase, "mqst m'sy htwrh," or "some of the works of the Law"), a document 
contained in six fragmentary copies (4Q394-99) which nevertheless complement one another 
(Fitzmyer 1993, 21). The main extant sections are 1) a calendar, 2) a list of more than 
twenty halakot, and 3) a hortatory "epilogue" urging the proper observance of the Law. 
There is some doubt as to whether the calendar is to be considered one with the halakic 
67. Cf. the cogent argument of Mijoga (1995, 137ff.). 
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section, or whether it is simply something that ended up on the same scroll (DSSE, 181; 
Schiffman 1997); and in fact the halakic section never shows up on the same scroll-fragments 
as the epilogue, so it is not surprising that some have said these are from two different 
documents (Schiffman 1997; see, e.g., Eisenman and Wise 1992, 180ff.).6 8 However, the 
"epilogue" says that the author had written to the reader about 
some of the works of the Law which "ft aits'? UZWnw mwn 8^?yp mpD 
we consider for the good of you and of "py1?! 
your people 
whereas the halakic section introduces itself as being (quoted with gaps shown in brackets) 
some of our words [. . .] which are . . . nsp]a Dill? % . .] unan TTCpa 
s[ome of. . . the] works which w[e [ . . . U3n[3]K XP n^ya[n 
. • •] 
In view of the numerous points of parallel (underlined above) between these two segments, it 
is difficult to avoid the conclusion that it is the halakic section to which the "epilogue" 
refers; and that conclusion is at present the general consensus. Given this, it is of little 
matter for our purposes (though still debated) whether these two sections were part of the 
same letter or of successive letters. 
Of greater interest to us is the question whether the context in 4QMMT gives 
indication that the phrase is a technical phrase. In this regard, it is significant that the phrase 
fits quite smoothly in the context, giving no particular impression of opaqueness (although, 
again, there may still be disagreement over what sense of some word contained in it fits best 
in the context). It can make good sense in the context, interpreted as normal language.69 
Thus, it fails the test which is, for us in this situation, the fundamental test of whether this is 
68. Some of the translations and Hebrew quotations which follow are dependent on a handout sheet 
distributed by Lawrence Schiffman (see Schiffman 1997), entitled "MMT as reconstructed by 
Elisha Qimron and John Strugnell." The handout was copied from Qimron and Strugnell 1994; 
the latter's text and translation are also reprinted in Biblical Archaeology Review, vol. 20 (1994), 
no. 6, 56-61. 
69. Below, in chap. 3, we exegete the phrase as used in Qumran. 
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a technical phrase or idiom. Whether it was a rather "conventional" phrase, one used 
commonly in a particular context, is another question. Our point here is that there is no 
evidence that the phrase was learned and understood as a whole rather than by its 
grammatical and lexical semantic elements. 
In conclusion, the tendency to assume that epya popov means some variation on "endeavour 
to fulfil the Law's commands" ("legalistically" or not) is not justified. We must take into 
account the real possibility that by epya Paul speaks of completed deeds, that is, 
"accomplishments." 
2.2.4 Neglected semantic potential in marig and irioTcvoo 
An overlooking of semantic potential occurs with yet another significant term in Gal. 3:10-
14, iriong, and its closely-related verbal form morevco. Or rather, this neglect occurs with 
the concept "trust," which exegetes regularly involve in their discussions of maTiq. We 
believe that the notion "trust," as it is almost always conceived (both in English and in the 
NT), is a (lexical) discourse concept, and that this can be readily shown. If that is so, any 
lexical sense of manq or naTevw which involves the notion "trust" will also be a discourse 
concept, whose denotation will correspondingly depend on the particular discourse. But 
probably the discourse-sense character of these lexical senses will be seen more easily if we 
consider the idea "trust" first, but referring to NT texts, and then examine the uses of Kiariq. 
2.2.4.1 "Trust" as a discourse lexical concept 
Consider what one generally means by the notion "trust": it denotes a strong, motivating 
conviction of the reliability of some person or thing. But there are several points that are 
more implicit than explicit in that definition. For one thing, the notion "reliability" involves 
certain things. In general, there is no such notion as abstract "reliability" that exists on its 
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own, without reference to the goals and values of someone who trusts. Thus for example, if 
someone says, "My car is reliable," the meaning is probably not that it is reliable to die at 
every intersection, although that could conceivably be someone's idea of "reliability," but 
rather that it is reliable to start and run when called upon. For that is what, usually, one 
hopes one's car will do. If someone or something is "reliable," someone trusts the person or 
thing to do something, and something particular. But that something need not be the same 
for every person employing the same entity. Frank's wife may "trust" him to do different 
things than Frank's boss does. Someone using the electric cooker as a fan oven "trusts" it to 
do something different than does someone using it as a grill. So, that which the entity is 
relied upon to do depends upon the person(s) who is (are) doing the relying within the 
purview of the current discourse. 
Notice something else about this brief definition: trust is a "strong, motivating" 
conviction. It is not unusual for someone to explain the difference between "trust" and 
"belief" by pointing out that you would never attribute real "trust" to someone who claimed 
a belief in a certain chair's reliability to hold a person up, but who never went and sat on it. 
In short, the "trusting" presupposes not only belief, but a valuing highly the reliability 
believed in. This "valuing highly" implies that one wants and wills to make use of it, and 
wills this even in light of whatever costs and conditions apparently must be met in order to 
use it. We find this part of the word's meaning implicit in a number of NT passages: there is 
the suggestion that an alleged "faith" (trust in God) which does not motivate to action is not 
real faith (especially James 2:14-26; but see also Rom. 1:5; 16:26; Gal 5:6; Phil. 2:17; 
1 Thess. 1:3). 
Therefore this sense of trust could be more fully defined as "belief in the reliability of 
(something or someone) to perform some particular result (i.e., in some particular manner) 
that is desired and valued (even in view of whatever provisos or costs might seem to 
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condition such performance) by the one doing this believing within the purview of the current 
discourse." Our conclusion is that in general, both "reliability," and (therefore) "trust," 
which is defined in terms of it, are discourse lexical concepts. This may seem 
straightforward enough; but still we must relate the latter discourse concept to Paul, and to 
maTiq. Is there evidence that Paul himself could have used this term in a discourse lexical 
sense in Gal. 3:10-14? We can best consider this question via a survey of the attested uses 
of mariq. 
2.2.4.2 Survey of uses of manq 
Since we have been able to define initially and clearly this (discourse) lexical sense "trust" 
(unlike in the case of b'uaioq, "righteous"), there seems nothing particular to be gained by 
making a historical survey of the use of iriang.10 We shall instead take the approach of 
listing the uses supposedly available at Paul's time, commenting on the evidence for each. 
1. "trust" 
This sense is well-attested in Classical Greek (1DNT, 6:176-77; Burton 
1921, 475; Lindsay 1993). It is of course lacking in the LXX, due to 
the lack of a noun in Hebrew corresponding to the verbal sense "to 
trust" (as expressed in 1'BNn). Thus it appears somewhat sparsely in 
the Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha (Burton 1921, 478). However, 
Aramaic did eventually develop such a noun (nrflJJjPri), and this may 
help account for the common use of iriang with this sense in the NT, 
both within and without the Pauline corpus (Barr 1983 [1961], 202; 
Dodd 1935, 69-70). 
2. "belief, credence" 
This sense, closely connected with the first, is also widely attested in 
Classical Greek (Lindsay 1993). It differs from the first in that its 
object is any sort of proposition, not necessarily a hypothesis about the 
reliability of something; thus, "belief o f a person means believing his 
or her words. It appears about 20 times each in Philo and Josephus 
(Hay 1989, 463), but is hardly attested in the NT (but see 2 Thess. 
2:13). 
70. The most common and accepted senses were there early on (cf. Lightfoot 1890, 156-57). 
A. H. Carver, 2000 § 2.2.4.2 Page 98 
3. "faithfulness, reliability" 
This is sometimes called a "passive" sense, as opposed to the 
preceding "active senses." It is well-attested in Classical Greek and 
the LXX, and fairly well attested in the Apocrypha (Burton 1921, 475, 
478; cf. Lightfoot 1890, 156-57). It is lightly attested in the NT (see 
Matt. 23:23; Rom. 3:3; Gal. 5:22; Tit. 2:10), unless one take Paul's 
phrase man? Xpiarov as an example. 
4. "promise, pledge, assurance (of reliability), credibility, proof, evidence" 
This sense, closely related to the prior, is quite common in Classical 
Greek, and is the most common use in both Philo and Josephus (Hay 
1989, 463). However, the only clear and generally-recognised instance 
of this in the NT is Acts 17:31 (Burton 1921, 481; Hay 1989, 470). 
5. "a certain mystical apprehension of divine realities" 
This might be the best way of summing up Philo's use inspired by 
Greek philosophy (see TDNT, 6:201-2; Dodd 1935, 69, 199-200; 
Lindsay 1993, 60-62, 67-73; Lightfoot 1890, 159-61). It is, 
however, a relatively rare usage, even in Philo (Hay 1989, 463). It 
sees itionq as one of the highest "virtues." Like the Platonic notion of 
binaioovvr), it is not a discourse concept. 
6. "faith" 
This English word is generally used as a technical religious term; it 
derived etymologically from Latin fides, which term was pressed into 
service to translate mong in the Vulgate (Lightfoot 1890, 158). 
Unfortunately, like "righteousness," the notion "faith" is more often 
described than defined, and little light is shed upon the question 
whether there is actually a separate, religious sense of irCang. We will 
return to that question shortly. 
7. "the faith (Christianity)" 
In regard to this commonly alleged lexical sense, it should be noted 
that usually its referentiality (i.e., denotation of a particular entity or 
entities) is provided not paradigmatically (i.e., by the choice of this 
particular term), but syntagmatically (by combination of it with other 
words), by adding either the definite article or the numerical qualifier 
"one" or such. Conceivably, the combination might be a "technical 
phrase." But although there are signs of this development in the NT, 
we would agree with Burton (1921, 483n.), who denies any full-blown 
such usage in the NT. 
In regard to the idea of a special "religious" sense of tciang (see above, #6), one can 
hardly deny that there is one. In the New Testament it is the rule, not the exception, to use 
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mang (in the sense of "trust") absolutely, that is, without any mention of its object or of 
what it trusts the object to do. 7 1 This is so common that one cannot ignore the usage or treat 
it as merely a common use of ellipsis. It can be explained, however, as a semantic change 
due to frequent use of a particular ellipsis in a particular context: "[Semantic change through] 
ellipsis normally takes place when a term (headword) becomes closely associated with a 
qualifier. I f the qualifier is omitted, the headword preserves its syntactical function while 
adopting a new meaning" (Silva 1983, 82). The qualifier which would naturally be closely 
associated with "faith" in a lst-century Jewish context, is the phrase " in God." And one can 
clearly hear this implicit qualifier ringing through the NT's absolute use of manq. This is 
so in the Gospels and elsewhere in the NT as well as in Paul, even when the "faith" is 
apparently in Jesus: 
According to the synoptic gospels Jesus teaches men to believe in God and 
invites them to have faith in him, apparently assuming that the production of the 
one faith wi l l generate the other, and, indeed, expressly affirming that he that 
receives him receives him who sent him (Mk. 9 3 7 ) . The fourth gospel expresses 
the same thought more explicitly in terms of faith (12 4 4) and reiterates it in other 
forms. In the Epistle to the Hebrews Christians are exhorted to maintain their 
faith in Christ by O. T. examples of faith in God. . . . In the synoptic gospels 
. . . the conception of faith is simple and relatively elementary. On the one 
hand, it includes the idea of trust in God frequently expressed in O. T. by np2 
and in the L X X by ireiroiOa and eXirtfco, and, on the other hand, that of 
confidence in the willingness and ability of Jesus to do certain things, usually to 
heal sickness or rescue from danger, rarely to forgive sins. (Burton 1921, 484-
85) 
This is even more clearly so in the writings of Paul: 
In Rom. 4 1 6 b e/t maTeuiq 'A/3pad/i means "of an Abrahamic faith," i.e., 
possessing a faith which like that of Abraham was exercised outside of the 
r6gime of law. . . . [Paul] laid great stress upon the essential identity of such 
faith in God as existed in the O. T. period and the Christian type of faith. The 
doctrine of faith in Christ is defended by an appeal to the faith of Abraham, and 
71. Strangely, explicit attention is seldom given to this remarkable fact, in the studies of irianq. But 
Burton 1921 (481-84) gives an excellent synopsis of the syntax with which the word is used. 
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the permanence and continuity of the principle of faith as the determinative 
element of God's demand upon men urgently maintained. (Burton 1921, 484) 
We may explain this fact by characterising "faith in Jesus" as "faith in what God does 
through Jesus." There is even some indication in Galatians that Paul considered this the 
content of Abraham's faith (Lambrecht 1999). 
We may take it, then, that such a "religious" sense of manq did indeed develop in 1st-
century Judaism, and is the dominant use of mariq in the NT. This sense is simply, "trust in 
God" (#6 above). Its "direct object" is thus implicit in the definition; but what this "trust" 
expects God to do, including any provisos that may attach to that, is not, since "trust" is a 
discourse lexical concept (see above). Thus the concept "faith" also has contextual, 
discourse character. As a discourse concept, it gets its denotation from its context, every 
time it is used. 
In this chapter we have indicated various overlooked or ignored meanings, including on the 
one hand ranges of potential denotation, and on the other hand senses that might have been 
Paul's at the word-level, proposition-level, or argument-level of his discourse. We surveyed 
the various basic argument-meanings and proposition-meanings, and found MKCLIOQ and manq 
to be capable of context-dependent, "discourse" senses (which fact creates almost unlimited 
ranges of potential denotations), and epya in the phrase epya pofiov to be capable of an 
"accomplishments" sense and meaning. A l l of these senses and meanings have been more or 
less overlooked or neglected. Now we must consider the context of Gal. 3:10-14, to be fully 
equipped for our exegesis of that passage. 
Chapter 3 
Approaching our passage: the contexts 
In the previous chapter we have reviewed some semantic possibilities that have not been 
sufficiently appreciated in dealing with Gal. 3:10-14. In this chapter we will deal with the 
"contexts" of the passage. Henneneutics enjoins us to be sensitive to the historical, cultural, 
situational, and literary contexts of the passage, in order to be fully able to interpret it. This 
heuristic value of "context" is to some extent indicated by the Quantity maxim of 
conversation (cf. above): an author or speaker should not make his or her contribution more 
informative than is required; therefore, that which the situational "context" already supplies 
does not need explicit stating, so long as enough information is stated to make the unstated 
but intended parts identifiable. For these unstated bits of information, then, we look to the 
"presupposition pool," the pool of "information constituted from the situative contex t . . . as 
well as the new information from the completed part of the discourse i tself (Cotterell and 
Turner 1989, 90). 
3.1 The literary structure of Gal. 3:2-14 
First we should consider an important feature of the literary-formal context of 3:10-14. Paul 
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appears to have structured 3:2-14 in the form of a chiasm, notes Cosgrove (1988b, 48), who 
analyses it as slightly unbalanced, thus: 
(Spirit by faith 3:[2-]5) 
people o f f a i t h are sons (of Abraham) (3:6-7) 
people of faith (incl. Gentiles) are blessed (3:8-9) 
people of works of the law cursed (3:10) 
no one in the law justified (3:11) 
law not of faith (3:12) 
Christ has redeemed us from curse of the law (3:13) 
blessing comes upon Gentiles, [3:14a] 
we receive promise of Spirit through faith (3:14[b]) 
Now, it is unnecessary to separate 3:6-7 from 3:8-9 in this outline; for in Galatians 3 Paul 
intimately connects sonship/inheritance with promise (3:16, 18, 29), and promise with faith 
(3:22), and sonship/inheritance with faith (3:26), and in Rom. 4:13 connects all three, 
making the point that people of faith are blessed with Abraham. Cosgrove's chiasm thus 
could have been balanced, with 3:6-9 parallel to 3:14a. 
There is some solid evidence for this chiasm, namely, the parallel forms Paul has 
provided his citations of Scripture in 3:10-13. As we shall see, Paul seems deliberately to 
have altered the LXX of Deut. 21:23b in Gal. 3:13, to make it more explicitly parallel to 
Deut. 27:26a in 3:10; for example, his citations of both Deut. 21:23b and Deut. 27:26a begin 
with the words ^EmKotraparoq irag, whereas "the original text of Deut. 21. 23 reads 
KeKaTt}panevo<; as the initial word, with no textual variants, and also [immediately following] 
includes the words bird 6eov which Paul omits" (Stanley 1990, 505 n. 64).' Also there is the 
parallel we have already indicated between Paul's quotations in 3:11b and 3:12b, particularly 
1. Stanley continues, "Plausible explanations have been posited for both changes: Paul's 
understanding of the significance of Christ's death would have required him to clarify mat the 
'cursing' referred to here took place (in the case of Christ) in the act of 'hanging' itself, and not 
before, as the Deuteronomy text suggests; moreover, his Christian sensibilities may well have 
revolted against the idea of speaking of Christ as 'cursed by God.' Unless Paul's readers were 
already familiar with the Deuteronomy text, however, the hermeneutical significance of these 
changes would have been lost on them." 
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with the repetition of the verb fifacTat. Thus Paul seems to have forced these citations into 
supporting a chiastic parallelism, consisting of 3:10-13 at the very least. 
Cosgrove is not the only one to have discerned a chiasm here, which fact is significant 
as there is always some subjectivity involved in detecting one.2 John Bligh (1969, 238-39) 
claimed to find in 3:5-14 a chiasm that is almost identical with Cosgrove's outline; we may 
summarise Bligh's outline as follows: 
A Spirit; sons of Abraham; faith (3 :5-7) 
B Abraham's blessing; Gentiles (3:8-9) 
C Under law; curse, citing Deut. 27:26 (3:10) 
D By the law no one is justified (3:11a) 
E Citation of Hab. 2:4 (3:11b) 
D ' The law is not a matter of faith (3:12) 
C Christ delivered from curse, citing Deut. 21:23 (3:13) 
B' Abraham's blessing; Gentiles (3:14a) 
A ' Gift of Spirit; faith (3:14b) 
Bligh's attempt to interpret all of Galatians as a huge chiasm, with three secondary chiasms 
containing tertiary and sometimes quaternary levels of chiasm, has met with little support;3 
but Silva (1996, 91, whose condensed version of Bligh's chart we have adapted) notes that 
the inverse parallels of this particular suggested chiasm are fairly clear. 
The most significant difference from Cosgrove's outline is probably that Bligh's 
chiasm has a centre point, at 3:11b. We have suggested that 3:11b (Hab. 2:4) appears rather 
to be parallelled with 3:12b (Lev. 18:5b). But it would be somewhat premature to argue now 
about whose structure, Cosgrove's or Bligh's, is closer to the text, or whether another outline 
would be more accurate;4 that can be left until we find the structure of the argument(s) in the 
passage. The importance of detecting a chiasm lies in the fact that it is a paragraph-marker, 
2. Cf. Hansen 1989, 74, quoting John Welch on objectivity and subjectivity in chiasm detecting. 
3. J. Jeremias and F. Mussner (following Jeremias) have also done large-scale chiastic analyses of 
Galatians (Hansen 1989, 74-75). 
4. Luhrmann (1992, 59) suggests a slightly different chiastic structure for 3:5-14, with which 
Caneday (1992, 136) agrees. 
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as it were, and thus gives us the boundaries of a passage likely structured around and making 
one particular point. It may also suggest intended connections within the argument that we 
might otherwise overlook. It suggests, moreover, that word-studies on Paul's Greek terms 
for "faith," "works," and "righteousness" would be as germane and pivotal to 3:10-14 as 
they are to 3:2-9. 
3.2 "Context" and hermeneutical circles 
We turn now to consideration of how to remedy certain instances of abuse or deficiency of 
context, that is, how to avoid or to break out of "hermeneutical circles." For in our view 
these tend to vitiate the exegesis of Galatians even when much heuristic attention is paid to 
"context." There are various kinds of hermeneutical circles. Here we consider the two 
which we believe are most important for exegesis in general and for understanding Galatians 
in particular. 
3.2.1 Breaking a "parts-whole" hermeneutical circle 
Perhaps the most commonly recognised sort of circular exegesis involves the circle between 
the parts and the whole of the discourse: 
" I understand the whole in virtue of understanding the parts; I understand the 
parts in virtue of understanding the whole." Logically, the circle is vicious; 
actually it is broken open by insights that, alternating between part-and-part and 
between parts-and-whole, mediate an ever firmer grasp of the text in its parts 
and as a whole. (Meyer 1994, 91) 5 
Now, any way of construing the whole discourse's meaning must at least be compatible with 
any plausible and independently-established readings of its parts. For as we said in chapter 
2, the meaning of the paragraph obviously depends at least partly upon the meanings of its 
constituent statements and implied propositions, and the meaning of the latter upon the 
5. Cf. Lonergan 1973, 158-59. 
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meanings of their words. So any exegetical details that affect the overall reading must be 
(independently) interpreted before we make any final decision on the overall reading. 
Otherwise, we base the overall reading on the details (as is always the case) but then, 
circularly, also base the details on the overall reading. This has unfortunately been a fairly 
common fallacy in exegesis of Galatians. 
3.2.2 Breaking a "words-things" hermeneutical circle 
A second type of hermeneutical circle has, in our estimation, been even more troublesome for 
the interpretation of Galatians. This is the circle between the author's words and the things 
(or events or qualities or classes of things) which they denote: 
" I understand words by understanding the things they refer to; I understand 
things by understanding the words that refer to them." The first limb [of this 
maxim] states a fundamental insight: "whoever does not understand the things 
cannot draw the sense from the words" (Luther). I f I have had no independent 
access to what the text is about, the text is likely to be obscure to me. The 
second limb states how one moves through a grasp of words to a firmer grasp of 
things; the interpreter understands things, with the writer, by means of his 
words. (Meyer 1994, 91) 
The first limb thus demands an understanding of "the objects, real or imaginary, intended by 
the author of the text" (Lonergan 1973, 156); it entails understanding the relevant features of 
the author's "horizon" or "universe of discourse." As we noted in chapter 2, to know the 
"meaning" of a term it is not enough to know the dictionary definition; one must also have 
some knowledge of the actual thing(s) denoted by the term (even i f this can be inferred via 
the definition; and that is not even the case sometimes, e.g. with anaphoric lexical senses). 
So ultimately it is in this direction (i.e., understanding the author's words by understanding 
the things they can denote) that one must break out of this hermeneutical circle. 
A distinction should be noted here, between the overall meaning of the discourse 
(mentioned above), which is ultimately the result of one's interpretation, and these closely-
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related but non-literary contexts, which include the author's "life and times, the state of the 
question in his day, his problems, prospective readers, scope and aim" (Lonergan 1973, 
163). When a reader is out of touch with these, the text can be extremely baffling: 
When a simple misunderstanding arises, as when [in using a certain word] the 
author thought of P but the reader of Q, then its correction is the relatively 
simple matter of sustained rereading and inventiveness. But there can arise the 
need for a long and arduous use of the self-correcting process of learning. Then 
a first reading yields a little understanding and a host of puzzles, and a second 
reading yields only slightly more understanding but far more puzzles. The 
problem, now, is a matter . . . of understanding the author himself, his nation, 
language, time, culture, way of life, and cast of mind. (Lonergan 1973, 160) 
Understanding those "contexts" is crucial, i f only because communication itself presupposes 
contact with them. Note that the "conversational maxims" of Relevance and Quantity 
(above, chap. 2), and also the general maxim Cooperation, presuppose the hearer's or 
reader's grasp of "the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which" the 
speaker and hearer(s) are engaged. So the maxims require that the reader have access to the 
general reason, or at least to the possible reasons, for the author's statements. But even this 
grasp effectively requires knowing these authorial, historical, and situational contexts; for 
while we usually get the author's purpose from the overall flow of the text, that general flow 
could easily elude our grasp i f we do not know those "realities" which the author means by a 
number of key terms. Then again, the Quantity maxim implies that the reader needs to have 
access to those parts of the author's and original readers' "presupposition pools" presumably 
shared. In short, we must understand the relevant realities within the author's "horizon" or 
"universe of discourse" before we can understand the words by which he or she denotes 
these realities. 
3.3 Paul, socio linguistics, "heteroglossia," and the potential individuality of 
semantic structure 
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Often, however, that is easier said than done. Paul's letters provide good examples of the 
difficulty. Many have complained of the limitedness of the data which we have on Paul's 
own view of things. The letters which Paul writes are addressing specific churches' needs 
(as Paul understands those). What we know of the "rhetorical situation" he perceived, of his 
worldview elements contributing to this, and of the presuppositions he assumed he shared 
with his readers, must all be gleaned from this handful of letters and from whatever reliable 
data might be gleaned from the book of Acts. 6 Here we have a true problem of "induction":7 
how do we establish a generality (viz., about Paul's pertinent worldview-elements) from such 
meagre data? But understanding the letters may well depend on having this prior 
understanding of Paul, as we have just seen. The paucity of the data therefore seems to leave 
open a range of possibilities as to Paul's relevant outlook. 
But as we shall see, this range of possibilities, even when appreciated, has generally 
been underestimated. As we saw in chapter 2, there has been an assumption that the lexical 
senses of Paul's terms fifcmog and mane give us their denotations; whereas in fact, i f Paul is 
using one (or both) of these terms in its anaphoric, "discourse" lexical sense, only the 
context can identify its denotation for us. But in addition, there has been a too-ready 
assumption that both Paul and his readers would share the same lexical senses for his key 
words.8 We tend to assume that a particular Greek word would have had a uniform set of 
senses, which would or could be listed in a lexicon and from which we could infer the word's 
meaning in a particular occurrence. But i f Paul is arguing from a rather different religious 
viewpoint from that of his opponents and that of at least some of his Judaising readers in 
Galatians, might not there be the potential for divergence in meaning in some or all of the 
religious terms? 
6. On the difficulty and limitations of this "mirror-reading'' of Paul's letters, see, e.g., Barclay 
1987. 
7. On "induction," see above, n. 19, p. 37. 
8. Cf. Cotterell and Turner 1989, 166. 
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As the new community of faith in effect required a conversion from one's 
previous state to another . . . it is not unnaturally related to the transfer context 
i f some central words tend to take on new shades of meaning. The linguistic 
novelty [within Christianity] points to a novelty in the realm of religion . . . 
(Raisanen 1992, 117-18) 
A real appreciation of the range of lexical-semantic potential in Paul's key terms (which 
appreciation is necessary for our exegesis) requires an appreciation of how readily "social 
languages," having "specialised" and sometimes even "idiolect" (one-person) word-senses, 
come to exist within one larger language. 
3.3.1 Bakhtinian sociolinguistics and "heteroglossia": multiplicity of social languages 
This latter appreciation is a part of sociolinguistics, and in particular that of Russian 
linguistic and literary thinkers Mikhail Bakhtin and V. N . Voloshinov. Much of the early 
20th-century linguistic thought of Bakhtin and Voloshinov has been duplicated by others in 
the field of sociolinguistics, which developed rapidly in the late 1960's and early 1970's on 
the basis of empirical studies.9 But Bakhtin has perhaps given more thought to the forces 
that cause different "social languages" to develop, and to the intricate interplay that occurs 
between different social languages; thus his work seems potentially more helpful for a study 
of a polemical writing like Galatians. Our purpose in this section is to convey an 
appreciation, not only that the same phonological word may represent a different sense or set 
of senses (i.e. concepts) for various speakers of ostensibly the "same" language, but also for 
the rhetorical difficulty faced by someone communicating across "social language" 
boundaries. 
Two terminological notes are in order: the Russian slovo is a broad term that covers 
anything from a "word" to a "discourse" (much like the Greek term \6yoq). Translations of 
9. For a good introduction to sociolinguistics, from a perspective quite similar to Bakhtin's, see 
Hudson 1980. Two helpful introductions to Bakhtin and his thought are Morson and Emerson 
1990; Dentith 1995. 
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Bakhtin often render slovo as "word," whereas usually Bakhtin means by this term no such 
specific, bounded linguistic unit. This will become clear in the passages we quote. Also, in 
regard to Bakhtin's notions of "dialog" and "dialogisation," we should note that 
A word, discourse, language or culture undergoes "dialogization" when it 
becomes relativized, de-privileged, aware of competing definitions for the same 
things. Undialogized language is authoritative or absolute. 
Dialogue may be external (between two different people) or internal 
(between an earlier and a later self). (Emerson and Holquist 1981, 427) 
Bakhtin and other sociolinguists argue that the Saussurean, structuralist "system" is an 
abstraction from language as it actually exists historically (and empirically). It is a reified 
ideal which reflects no actual historical reality. Nor can it (as such) account for the constant 
flux and change in language, but rather serves to bifurcate linguistic studies into the 
categories "synchronic" and "diachronic." Both Bakhtin and Voloshinov discuss at length 
the theoretical problems that arise on such a view, and call for a more realistic, holistic view 
of language which takes into account both the "centripetal forces" of linguistic cohesion 
within a society, and the "centrifugal forces," arising from the individual, that tend to 
"stratify" language into many different "social languages," which latter reality Bakhtin calls 
heteroglossia (the Russian term, raznorecie, literally means "multi-speechedness"). 
Cultures strive for unity and order. That striving is reflected in the European 
regularization of national languages—in the writing of grammars and 
dictionaries, and in the defining of standard and nonstandard usage. Bakhtin 
does not mean to say that there is anything wrong with this effort. But he does 
mean to say that we must understand it for what it is—an attempt to create order 
by positing it. . . . The constructed system is reified—Voloshinov says 
'hypostatized'—and then mistaken for what language really is and for an account 
of how it really functions. (Morson and Emerson 1990, 140; interpolations in 
original) 
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The dynamic change, growth, and development in individuals' and groups' conceptual 
frameworks constantly gives rise, through the "centrifugal" forces of language, to many 
different "social languages": 
Language, Bakhtin reiterates, is always languages. . . . Different professions 
each have their own way of speaking, as do different generations, different 
classes, areas, ethnic groups, and any number of other possible divisions. The 
important thing to understand is that for Bakhtin these different "languages" are 
not just a matter of, let us say, a professional jargon. . . . No, what constitutes 
these different languages is something that is itself extralinguistic: a specific way 
of conceptualizing, understanding, and evaluating the world. (Morson and 
Emerson 1990, 140-41) 
Thus, not only are "specialised" word-senses common, but so are "idiolect" (one-person) 
word-senses.10 The only characteristic these various "social languages" all have in common 
and that might possibly be called "linguistic" is that they "are specific points of view on the 
world, forms for conceptualizing the world in words, specific world views, each 
characterized by its own objects, meanings and values. As such they all may be juxtaposed 
to one another, mutually supplement one another, contradict one another and be interrelated 
dialogically. As such they encounter one another and co-exist in the consciousness of real 
people . . . As such, these languages live a real life, they struggle and evolve in an 
environment of social heteroglossia" (Bakhtin 1981b, 291-92). 
As Bakhtin reiterates, the linguistic "forms" that are active in one or more of these 
various languages are therefore never neutral forms as such: they are always value-laden. 
"As a result of the work done by all these stratifying forces in language, there are no 
'neutral' words and forms—words and forms that can belong to 'no one'; language has been 
completely taken over, shot through with intentions and accents. For any individual 
consciousness living in it, language is not an abstract system of normative forms but rather a 
concrete heteroglot conception of the world. A l l words have the 'taste' of a profession, a 
10. Cf. Cotterell and Turner 1989, 25-26, 166. 
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genre, a tendency, a party, a particular work, a particular person, a generation, an age group, 
the day and hour. Each word tastes of the context and contexts in which it has lived its 
socially charged life; all words and forms are populated by intentions" (Bakhtin 1981b, 293, 
emphasis ours). 
It is at the point of dialog that the two sets of opposing linguistic forces, the centripetal 
and the centrifugal, intersect and interact. But this is not "dialog" as we often conceive it; 
Bakhtin's conception of it is at once more dynamic, more pragmatically oriented, and more 
universal. Human dialog is not verbal interchange between monads who have identically 
structured semantic systems, but between persons who commonly have more or less differing 
lexical-semantic systems. Moreover, these differing systems may be plagued with various 
internal inconsistencies, and are certainly in the process of development and change, whether 
in "external" dialog (with another person), or through "internal" dialog (between an earlier 
and a later self; see terminological remarks above). The need to frame his or her own 
expression in light of the hearer's viewpoint, and also in light of his or her own, thus 
necessarily involves the speaker in not only external dialogism (as he speaks), but also the 
"internal" dialogising of his own speech. There is no actual monolog. Dialog is a dynamic, 
never-ending, universal social process. A l l discourse is "dialogised." 
Bakhtin notes that the speaker's orientation towards the hearer 
is an orientation toward a specific conceptual horizon, toward the specific world 
of the listener; . . . The speaker strives to get a reading on his own word, and 
on his own conceptual system that determines this word, within the alien 
conceptual system of the understanding receiver; . . . The speaker breaks 
through the alien conceptual horizon of the listener, constructs his own utterance 
on alien territory, against his, the listener's, apperceptive background. (Bakhtin 
1981b, 282) 
As a result of this complex dialogism, the speaker's discourse dwells on the boundary, as it 
were, between his own worldview and that of his listeners (ibid., 284; Morson and Emerson 
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1990, 138). Voloshinov has vividly expressed this almost paradoxical dependence of the 
discourse both on the speaker's worldview and on that of the listeners: 
Orientation of the word toward the addressee has an extremely high significance. 
In point of fact, word is a two-sided act. It is determined equally by whose 
word it is and for whom it is meant. As word, it is precisely the product of the 
reciprocal relationship between speaker and listener, addresser and addressee. 
Each and every word expresses the "one" in relation to the "other." . . . A 
word is a bridge thrown between myself and another. I f one end of the bridge 
depends on me, then the other depends on my addressee. (Voloshinov 1995, 
129-30) 
This social fact of heteroglossia thus gives rise to difficulty in communication across social-
linguistic boundaries: the speaker or author is to some extent using a language more or less 
foreign to the hearer, or to some extent expressing his own view in terms to which it is alien, 
or both. 
From this discussion of Bakhtinian sociolinguistics we can see that we must be 
sensitive to the fact that Paul, as author, wil l need to approach his readers in language they 
may understand and appreciate, even i f this requires forms of language Paul might not use 
otherwise. Therefore we should not dismiss a certain reading of Paul's argument simply on 
the grounds that it makes his argumentation seem a bit awkward. In such a radically 
polemical letter, it might be more surprising were his argument not awkward! Moreover, it 
is very dangerous to assume that Paul and his opponents or readers wil l be using key words 
in the same lexical sense. We should allow for their possibly having differing 
conceptualisations or understandings of various aspects of their respective "universes." This 
might, or might not, involve contrasting dictionary definitions of the terms: the definitions 
themselves could still differ in meaning, because they themselves are stated in the terms of 
someone's "social language." Therefore people with different worldviews and thus to some 
extent differing universes may to that extent have differing lexical concepts, and vice versa. 
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As suggested above, recognition of this potential for heteroglossia makes even broader 
than might have been expected the range of reasonable possibilities for Paul's key word-
meanings. However, it might also provide the methodological key we need to solve this 
inductive problem of Paul's outlook. 
3.3.2 Breaking the Pauline "words-things" hermeneutical circle by comparison and contrast 
with his opponents' social language 
We are dealing with a polemical passage. The difference between the relevant elements of 
Paul's universe of discourse, and thus his key word-meanings, and his opponents', determine 
their difference of opinion and motivate the polemic issuing from it. Thus the key terms of 
this passage (and of its Pauline parallels) might be elucidated by the very way in which Paul's 
polemic reveals the contrast between his view of things and his opponents'. In this way, 
some of his statements might, via inference at least, map for us pertinent parts of Paul's 
worldview, by indicating the specific contrast between his conceptualisation of things and his 
opponents' way of viewing things (in the broader sense of "conceptualisation," including not 
just the "lexical concept" but also the things denoted). The advantage of this approach is that 
it would effectively enlist into the service of our search for Paul's outlook whatever relevant 
data we have on Paul's opponents' outlook. Thus it would effectively increase our relevant 
data pool, which is a great advantage in view of the severe limitation of the relevant data 
which we otherwise have available. 
In the following three major sections of this chapter, we will draw on certain aspects of 
Paul's anti-Law polemic in order to attempt such a mapping of Paul's viewpoint. In chapter 
2 we looked at neglected semantic potential of three key Pauline word-groups in Paul's 
polemic; in the following three sections we shall attempt to demonstrate which are Paul's 
own lexical senses of the terms, making comparison with his opponents' uses of the terms. 
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In the section after that, we shall adduce some additional inferences about his key word-
meanings—or more specifically, about their denotations. In this way we will attempt 
methodically to break out of Galatians' "words-things" hermeneutical circle. 
Clearly, however, a study of these particular Pauline terms is relevant mostly to target-
texts in which his main issue is whether "justification" is "from works of the Law" or "from 
faith" (see e.g. Gal. 2:16; 3:2-9). Below we shall see that there is reason to think that this 
"justification"-issue is in view from 2:17 through 3:2; and we have already seen some 
literary-formal evidence that 3:2-9 (which clearly also focuses on that topic) should be about 
the same basic topic as 3:10-14. So apparently we have adequate contextual reason to see 
these three terms as potential clues to Paul's outlook and "horizon" as pertinent to 3:10-14. 
But certainty about this would presuppose that this "justification"-issue is still Paul's issue in 
the latter passage. We must adopt and use this latter assumption only with caution—as a 
"working assumption" only—lest we find ourselves doing a sort of "parts-whole" circular 
exegesis; for we have yet to determine with certainty that 3:10-14 is on that same issue. 
Nevertheless, these three terms are pivotal ones within our passage as well. So in any 
case it is exegetically incumbent upon us to investigate what Paul denotes with them in at 
least this part of Galatians. And certainly, this approach (i.e., via these key-words' 
denotations) is a potential pathway to ascertaining Paul's worldview-elements pertinent to the 
immediate context of our passage. The crucial requirement is to interpret them without 
"reading-in," from some preconceived overall reading of the passage, the terms' meanings; 
otherwise we short-circuit our planned escape from all potential "words-things" 
hermeneutical circles, by interpreting the words before we know which things Paul could 
denote with them. 
3.4 Paul, his opponents, "righteousness," and "justification" 
Now Paul was a Jew. In light of that fact and of what we found in chapter 2 about binouog, it 
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seems reasonable to ask ourselves whether Paul used a "discourse" (anaphoric) lexical sense 
of "righteousness," or if not, what sense he did use. 
3.4.1 Rom. 10:5 and Paul's lexical sense of "righteousness" 
It is not immediately evident how we would go about proving or disproving the hypothesis 
that Paul is using diiccuoq in its discourse lexical sense. But when we look at the polemical 
Pauline use of SUaiog and kKmoavvr] in light of this question, we note some data that take on 
an interesting significance. It is remarkable, for instance, that in such contexts Paul 
frequently speaks of various "righteousnesses": there is 
"the righteousness of God" (Rom. 1:17; 3:21, 22, 25-26; 10:3; 2 Cor. 5:21), 
a "righteousness that is BK deov" (Phil. 3:9), 
the "righteousness of faith" (Rom. 4:11, 13), 
a "righteousness that is e/c -niarcwq" (Rom. 9:30; 10:6), 
the "righteousness that is em rf j marei" (Phil. 3:9), 
a "righteousness one's [or their] own" (Rom. 10:3; Phil. 3:9), 
a "righteousness that is en [TOV] vofiov" (Rom. 10:5; Phil. 3:9), and 
a "righteousness that is iv v6}u#n (Phil. 3:6). 
The significant point here is that Paul is speaking of at least two differing "righteousnesses," 
for he sets those in the first group (above), individually over against those in the second. 
Now this does not quite prove that Paul means "righteousness" in a discourse lexical sense; 
but it certainly puts adversity in the way of the hypothesis that Paul is using a non-discourse 
sense of "righteousness" and thinks that he and those who oppose him (on the matter of 
righteousness) are denoting the same definite, extra-linguistic "reality" by the notion 
"righteousness." For this hypothesis would entail that Paul, in the second group of citations 
above, is speaking of "righteousness" in an ironical sense, and that he really means a 
"pseudo-righteousness," a factitious idea of the one true righteousness. It would be as if a 
primary-school teacher, reacting to some submitted geography work of inferior quality, spoke 
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ironically of "the Belfast that is in Scotland" or "the Vienna that is in Switzerland." The 
speaker's intent is that there is no such Belfast, no such Vienna. 
Such an ironical use of "righteousness" by Paul is perhaps not improbable in itself; but 
it becomes so when we consider how often Paul would be using it. And it becomes 
practically impossible when we look at the particular way he speaks of the "righteousness 
that is e« [TOV] VOIMV" in Rom. 10:5. For there (according to the correct Greek text),11 Paul 
states that "Moses writes concerning the righteousness that comes from the law, that 'the 
person who does these things will live by them'" (NRSV; so also KJV; emphasis ours). If 
Paul were using an ironical sense of "righteousness" here, he would be consciously and 
explicitly attributing to Moses an error regarding the identity of "righteousness": Moses 
wrote that righteousness was X, when really it is not X but Y. (After all, Lev. 18:5 does not 
say, "The Law says the man who does them shall live by them.") Now, even had Paul 
thought this about Moses, it would have been a gratuitous rhetorical suicide for him to say so 
in this context! The suggestion of such a procedure on Paul's part is wholly implausible; it 
would be exceedingly more likely that he is citing Moses here as an unimpeachable authority. 
So it is almost certain that Paul uses "righteousness" in the same lexical sense throughout, 
rather than sometimes in an ironic sense. But the denotation cannot be the same throughout: 
otherwise he could not contrast these two "righteousnesses." Thus, the evidence strongly 
compels us towards the conclusion that here, and probably in other places, Paul meant 
"righteousness" in the discourse, anaphoric lexical sense which we discussed in chapter 2: 
only thus could the denotation vary while the lexical sense does not. 
But this does not imply that his opponents did so. It is quite possible, perhaps even 
likely, that they did not; for that would help account for the extremely polemical cast of 
11. We must concur with UBSGNT and TCGNT on this text. The textual variation is very likely 
intentional rather than unintentional; and TCGNTs account of that intention is the most plausible. 
Moreover, the other main variant has Paul badly misquoting Lev. 18:5. 
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Paul's discourse. What is clear at this point is that Paul thought they denoted, by the concept 
"righteousness," a different set of entities or characteristics than he himself did. 
3.4.2 Paul's topic: means, or meaning? 
At this point the reader may yet be somewhat doubtful that Paul conceives "righteousness" in 
this discourse lexical sense rather than in a static, non-discourse sense. One foreseeable 
objection to our suggestion that Paul distinguishes between his own notion of "righteousness" 
and his opponents', is that in order for him to discuss the question what does or does not lead 
to "righteousness," or to a "justification" defined in terms of "righteousness," he must 
assume that he and his interlocutors mean the same thing by "righteousness." Otherwise he 
would know they were arguing past each other, discussing different topics. But in fact, it is 
entirely possible (as we shall see shortly) that when Paul says "by works of the Law shall no 
flesh be justified" (Gal. 2:16d; Rom. 3:20a), he is actually pursuing not a basically 
"practical" argument-from-consequences, about the means of justification, but a purely 
"logical-theoretical" argument, about its very meaning (in the broadest sense, i.e. understood 
as including denotation—see chap. 2), or more precisely, about the meaning of 
"righteousness" and thus also of "justification" (since it is defined in terms of 
"righteousness"). It has been commonly but gratuitously assumed that Paul is discussing the 
means to justification. 
Now, the exegetical choice between the topics "means" and "meaning" of justification 
cannot be dismissed as a false disjunction. For (as just noted) any interlocutors discussing 
the best means to some end must suppose that they are discussing the same end, that they 
have the same concrete reality in mind. On the other hand, if the meaning (as including the 
denotation, and therefore also what might be a valid criterion) of this desideratum is the point 
at issue, they cannot suppose that they already agree on its meaning. But either they think 
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they agree on its meaning, or they think not so, but not both; thus, either they are discussing 
the means, or they are discussing the meaning, but not both. This interpretive question's 
disjunction is real, and at some point we must answer it. 
Someone might feel rather dissatisfied with this terminology, however. It might be 
argued that Paul does not even consider faith a "means," because for him it is not something 
the individual can call forth or manipulate at will but rather is the gracious gift of God. We 
do not wish to deny this by using the term means. We use this term to address an 
assumption which almost all Christian theological traditions have made at some point, 
namely, that here Paul is discussing the means to justification.12 We are suggesting the 
possibility that a contrary is true: not only is Paul not discussing means to justification, he is 
involved in debating the very meaning of "justification." But admittedly, since we are 
involved in exegesis and therefore want to know all the possible options, this simple (rather 
than "strong") disjunction may seem a less than adequate way of putting the issue. If one 
prefers a "strong disjunction," encompassing all the exegetical options, one may say that 
Paul is talking either about causa essendi, or else he is talking about causa cognoscendi. If it 
is not the one topic, then it is the other. Thus the issue may be accurately and helpfully 
framed in this way. But to use those Latin phrases constantly is awkward; and framing the 
issue as "cause or criterion" would be misleading, since a criterion is also a cause of sorts 
(causa cognoscendi). Therefore we will usually speak of the disjunction between the topics 
"the means" and "the meaning" of justification, as a shorthand way of referring to these two 
causa-topics. But let it be clear that here we are thinking of "meaning" in the broadest 
sense, including any denotation of a term and not restricted to mere "lexical sense." 
12. Even the Reformed tradition, which might be the most expected to say mat "faith" is not a means, 
calls it "the alone instrument of justification" (Westminster Confession of Faith, XI.2, emphasis 
ours). 
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Not uncommonly, discourse (anaphoric) lexical senses (e.g. "she") need clarification in 
particular situations, as to their denotation; and this clarification will naturally involve a 
"definitive" statement (in the broad sense of "definitive" which we discussed in chapter 2, 
i.e. not restricted to "dictionary" definitions). So it is entirely possible that Paul (who we 
suggest was using a discourse lexical sense of "righteous") considered it necessary to clarify 
what it is that constitutes one "righteous" before God, or in the New Covenant, in his 
polemical discussion of what justifies someone. Clearly then, he might be discussing 
meaning (in the broad sense), rather than means. But the possibility itself, as well as its 
exegetical relevance, is usually ignored. This we must not do; we must consider and deal 
with the possibility that Paul is talking about meaning rather than means, just as we must 
consider also the possibility that he means biiccaog in its "discourse" lexical sense. Therefore 
with respect to these issues let us note now the relevance of Paul's conception of 
"justification." 
3.4.3 Support from Paul's forensic meaning of biKuiovoBcti 
No matter which way one understands SiKotiovodm ("be justified," either as "be made 
righteous" or "be counted righteous"), its lexical sense (dictionary definition) involves the 
notion "righteous" (dtiaiog). Therefore if Paul's lexical sense of dUaiog is a discourse 
concept, so will be that of diicaiowOai, and vice versa. 
But in a stimulating and important article, C. Cosgrove (1987) has argued against the 
traditional Protestant understanding of Paul's ducaiovodai as "be justified (i.e., judged and 
declared righteous)." Cosgrove remarks that it seems normal, at least in English, to say "to 
judge from her behaviour," but not "to justify her from her behaviour": 
The preposition "from," while perfectly natural in the first instance as a means 
of indicating the evidential basis of a "judgment," sounds out of place 
introducing the evidential basis of "justification." The example has obviously 
not been chosen at random, and it turns out to have a certain parallel in Greek 
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style in the use of dikein and dikaioun with ek. The Greeks would say ek ton 
ergdn autdn dikein ("to judge from their works") but they did not express the 
evidential basis of dikaioun with the ^-construction. 
Cosgrove accounts for this point of usage, which he documents at length, by saying 
that it is due to style or convention in both languages. Here his argument could actually be 
strengthened, for on consideration one can see that there are logical and not just stylistic 
factors involved. A pertinent difference between the "causal" prepositions Cosgrove notes, 
and the ones used to indicate evidential basis, is that those in the first group speak only of 
causa essendi, while the second, in such contexts, generally speak of causa cognoscendi.13 
When one asks why (or from what) someone is judging some case, the question is about 
causa essendi rightly enough, and so these causal prepositions are appropriate; but the 
question, "From (or because of) what evidence did the judge justify her?" generally seems out 
of place because the relevant question in regard to some particular judicial decision is 
generally not one of causa essendi but of causa cognoscendi, that is, asking on what logical 
grounds the judge reached that particular conclusion. In general, the question of the causa 
essendi of some particular judicial decision would not even be asked: obviously, the 
"reason" for that particular judgment was that the judge believed the premises logically 
warranted it! The very concept of judging makes the accepting of bribes, for example, 
abnormal. 
This normal explanation for any particular judgment would have been all the more 
presumable in an ancient Jewish-religious context: for there God was always an objective, 
just judge who would never declare righteous someone who is unrighteous, and who 
demanded that other judges do likewise and not take a bribe (see Exod. 23:7; 34:7; Deut. 
7:10; Job 10:14; Prov. 17:15; 18:5; 24:24; Isa. 5:23; Nah. 1:3). So then the presumable 
reason for a particular forensic judgment on God's part is causa cognoscendi, rather than 
13. For these terms, see chap. 2, § 2.1.4.1. 
A. H . Carver, 2000 § 3.4.3 Page 121 
causa essendi; but the objects of Paul's causal prepositions are causa essendi, at least if he 
uses these prepositions literally. Thus Cosgrove initially appears to have a reasonable 
argument against the forensic-declarative Pauline usage of ducatovoScu. 
What Cosgrove overlooks, however, is the possibility that Paul is discussing the very 
meaning of justification, rather than the means of it. In fact, it is a rather common figure of 
speech (an example of "metonymy of the adjunct") to speak of the causa essendi of one's 
knowing some premises(s), or of one's therefore making some inference from them, in place 
of the causa cognoscendi (i.e., the logical basis) of one's knowledge of the fact inferred. For 
example, when arguing, one seldom says, " I f we know A, then we can be sure that B." 
Commonly we omit one or both of these mentions of knowledge; yet arguments connect items 
of knowledge, on the basis of causa cognoscendi, categorical-formal links between these 
items. Again, statements of covenantal conditions commonly speak figuratively, in terms of 
causa essendi of a judgment: "Whoever does X will (as a result) be liable to the penalty for 
violation of this contract." Nevertheless this is actually meant as a definition, identifying a 
causa cognoscendi, a criterion, of whom it is who is in violation of the contract. There is 
nothing surprising or particularly opaque about such a figure of speech. It is entirely 
possible, therefore, that Paul uses his causal prepositions figuratively, to mean causa 
cognoscendi. 
This consideration undermines Cosgrove's argument, or at least modifies its structure. 
For what Paul's causal prepositions legitimately imply now is only that if he is not using 
them figuratively, to mean causa cognoscendi rather than causa essendi, then we may 
conclude fairly confidently that he is not using fomiovodai in a forensic manner. This 
conditional proposition may be inverted, via logic's Principle of Transposition, to this: " I f 
Paul is demonstrably using ducaiovodoa in a forensic manner, we may conclude fairly 
confidently that he is using the causal prepositions figuratively, to mean causa cognoscendi 
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rather than causa essendi." This latter inference, if bolstered by confirmation of its 
antecedent, would support our suggestion that Paul is discussing the criterion and thus the 
meaning, rather than the means, of "justification." Let us therefore consider briefly the 
evidence for Paul's forensic use of diicaiovodai. 
According to standard studies,14 the following senses seem to be attested for the verb 
diKaiou at Paul's time, whether in its active or passive form: 
1. "To hold or deem or judge to be dUmog (right, suitable, or righteous)." 
In classical Greek this is attested only with things, not persons, as 
object; it seems this sense was nevertheless extended to the case of 
personal objects in the LXX and the NT (ZDB, 2:1027-28; TDNT, 
2:212; Ziesler 1972, 48; Dodd 1935, 50-53). The morphological 
analogy with such verbs as a£i6o> indicate the possibility of this usage 
with human objects (Sanday and Headlam 1902, 30; cf. Ziesler 1972, 
48; Hill 1967, 101n.3). In the LXX the active form often translates 
the Hiphcil of j?"[X, the passive form the Qal. 
2. "To acquit (from)." 
This usage, always with airo, appears in Acts 13:38, 39 and Rom. 
6:7.15 
3. "To do right or justice (to someone), treat justly." 
This neutral sense appears in Classical Greek; although generally used 
in a case of negative judgment, the sense was not restricted to this, as a 
citation from Aristotle shows (Dodd 1935, 49-50). The neutral sense 
also appears in the LXX, translating the Hiph'il of pTJt: 2 Sam. 15:4; 
Ps. 81 (82):3 (Watson 1960, 256; Burton 1921, 464). However, this 
usage seems not to have appeared in the NT, outside of Paul anyway 
(not to beg our exegetical question!). 
4. "To vindicate, show to be righteous, make appear righteous." 
This sense appears in both the active and passive forms in the LXX, 
14. Including BAGD; Burton 1921 (460-74); Dodd 1935 (42-59); EDNT; Hill 1967 (82-162); IDB; 
Sanday and Headlam 1902 (30-31); Snaith 1944 (51-78, 159-73); TDNT; Watson 1960; Ziesler 
1972. 
15. New Testament lexicons (e.g., LN) have an unfortunate tradition of listing something like "set 
free (from)" as a sense of this term, under the mistaken impression that Paul must be using it this 
way in Rom. 6:7 (instead of as "acquit [from]"). Thus they overlook this verse's likely 
discourse-connection to Rom. 7:1-6 (which apparently harks back to it), and force an alien 
meaning onto a word that elsewhere is of a semantic domain quite remote from the idea "set free 
(from)." 
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both forms translating a n , and the active translating the Pi'el of p*lX. 
This sense appears in the NT also, outside of Paul anyway and in 
1 Timothy (e.g., Matt. 11:19; Luke 7:35; 1 Tim. 3:16). 
5. "To make pure or righteous." 
In non-biblical, non-Christian Greek this usage appears only in Corp. 
Herm. xiii.9, but "it is possible that the author here betrays 
acquaintance with the interpretation which Greek commentators gave of 
Paul's language" (Hill 1967, 102; cf. Dodd 1935, 58-59; Ziesler 
1972, 48; TDNT, 2:212). In the LXX, this sense appears possibly in 
Ps. 72 (73):13, translating the Pi'el of 713T; but this verb was used quite 
often in later Hebrew to mean "acquit" or "declare righteous," and the 
LXX translators may have taken it in this sense (Watson 1960, 259; 
TDNT, 2:213). There is no hard evidence, therefore, for this sense 
outside of Greek writings of Christian commentators unfamiliar with 
the Hebrew and possibly misled by the structure of Paul's theology 
(Dodd 1935, 58-59).16 In medieval Christianity however this reading 
dominated.17 
6. "To be manifestly righteous, be innocent, be in the right, be righteous." 
The passive of 6uai6w is used a number of times in the LXX to 
translate the Qal of J?1S where the latter has this sense (Hill 1967, 107-
16. According to Burton (1921, 461), "Cremer (p. 319) in an approximately exhaustive examination 
of the usage of the word in classical and other non-biblical Greek writers found no instance of the 
use of the term with a personal object in the sense 'to make righteous.'" Sanday and Headlam 
(1902, 30) cite the following persuasive explanation: "How can biKctwvv possibly signify 'to make 
righteous'? Verbs indeed of this ending from adjectives of physical meaning may have this use, 
e.g. TV(I>KOVV, 'to make blind.' But when such words are derived from adjectives of moral 
meaning, as al-iovv, boiovv, buaiovv, they do by usage and must from the nature of things signify 
to deem, to account, to prove, or to treat as worthy, holy, righteous" (emphasis in original). 
Dodd (1935, 58-59) explains how the sense "make righteous" nevertheless crept into the 
writings of Christian commentators such as John Chrysostom: "Since . . . Paul explains with 
emphasis how this attainment of 'righteousness' is implicit in the initial act of God in 
'justification', it was excusable for his Greek commentators, who knew no Hebrew, to understand 
SIKCUOVV in the sense 'to make righteous'.... In any case the meaning of the verb diKaiovv has 
reached the predestined conclusion of its development. Aimiovv should mean, etymologically, 'to 
make righteous', as 6ov\ovv is 'to make a slave', and br)\ovi> 'to make clear'. Commonsense 
rejected this meaning, but religious experience affirmed that an unrighteous man may indeed be 
'made righteous'—by the grace of God." This sociolinguistic development may well have been 
made easier by the influence of Platonic epistemology on some Greek-speaking thinkers, which 
view hypostatised some abstract concepts including "righteous" (Suatoc; cf. below on this word), 
thus making it, as regards this usage, practically an "adjective of physical meaning" (cf. Sanday 
and Headlam, above). 
17. That was true also of Martin Luther, at least early in his career, as reading The freedom of a 
Christian, for example, will verify. Cf. Lowell Green (1973; 1974). 
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8; Watson 1960, 260-65).18 The question, though, is whether the 
LXX translators were using the Greek verb also in this sense. 
Additional instances are found in the translations of Job in Aquila 
(10:15; 15:14), Symmachus (22:3), and Theodotion (15:14). The 
Greek verb may also have been translating the Qal of pljt in a number 
of passages in 2 Baruch (29:9, 11, 12; 24:1, 2; 62:7) in which this 
seems the sense, but of which the Hebrew original is not available 
(Watson 1960, 263-64). 
In regard to this last purported sense of diKaiovaBm, which Cosgrove champions, the 
question arises as to whether these translations of the Qal of p*T2t really do reflect "the 
fluidity of the use of binctiovoQm in current usage," or else merely "the difficulty of finding 
an exact [Greek] equivalent of p*73f in certain contexts" (so Watson 1960, 264). But it is not 
necessary for us to go into this question. For this lexical sense (6) becomes indistinguishable 
from some one of the others, depending on how one takes its constituent semantic element 
"righteous": if one intends "righteous" in a non-discourse lexical sense, this purported sense 
of buaiovadm becomes the passive form of sense number 5; but if one intends "righteous" in 
a discourse lexical sense, the sense turns into the passive of sense number 4. 
The senses plausible for Galatians 3 are therefore senses 1, 4, and 5. Sense 1, though 
a forensic sense similar to that of 4, is preferable to it, because although the passive of sense 
4 works well for Paul's passive forms of 8IKCXI6U> in such contexts as Galatians 3, its active 
sense is not feasible where Paul uses active forms in these same contexts (e.g., Rom. 3:26, 
30; 4:5; 8:30, 33; Gal. 3:8). Sense 5 is not only quite poorly attested, it is incompatible, for 
a Jew, with the clearly forensic immediate contexts in which Paul uses this term (see 
especially Rom. 2:13; 3:19-20; 4:1-8; 5:1, 9; 8:33; 1 Cor. 4:4; Gal. 3:8, 11 [irapa 
defy]). Simply put, how can the Jewish God set about to make someone "righteous" whom he 
has declared to be "righteous" already? (and vice versa). Obviously, "righteous" could not 
18. These include Gen. 38:26; Ps. 18 (Heb. and Engl. 19):9 (Heb. 10); 50 (Heb. 51):4 (Heb. 6); 142 
(143):2; Isa. 43:9, 26; 45:25; Ecclus. 18:2, 22; Tob. 6:12, 13; 12:4. 
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denote the same thing to God in both cases, unless God is a liar when he passes judgment;19 
and the latter possibility no Jew could or would admit—see Rom. 3:4, where Paul explicitly 
repudiates it. So these two senses of dimiovodai, "make righteous" and "declare righteous," 
are by no means combinable into one, at least not for Paul the Jew.20 Thus by a process of 
elimination, we must interpret diicaiovodai in Galatians 3 as the passive of the sense, "to hold 
or deem or judge to be bUaioq (right, suitable, or righteous)." 
19. See above, towards the end of §2.2.2, on the equivocation here. 
20. E . P. Sanders (1983, 13-14 n. 18) wishes to avoid the almost universally drawn disjunction 
between senses 1 and 5, claiming that his odd translation "be righteoused" helps circumvent this 
decision: "It is a standard debate as to whether 'be made righteous' or 'be justified' catches the 
meaning better. There are sound objections to both translations [which are what?], and it seems to 
me that we should refuse to be impaled upon either horn of the dilemma. Since 'justified' is the 
common English verb, I shall remark about it that it conveys to most English speakers the 
meaning of 'be declared or found innocent,' when the question is precisely whether or not Paul 
has shifted the meaning beyond that of the law court." Our reply to the latter question is that 
since the word can only mean one or the other (sense 1 or 5), not both, Paul's forensic contexts 
show that he has not "shifted the meaning beyond that of the law court." Sanders wishes to reject 
neither of the above senses, but he ignores the obvious question as to whether these senses can be 
coherently combined into one for a Jew. Were it not for the exegetical (and theological) difficulty 
of Paul's material about the Law, neither Sanders nor anyone else would have had to suggest the 
conflation of these incompatible senses. But such a far-fetched expedient is more likely an 
indication of deficient exegesis than of Paul's real intention. 
Indeed, even Sanders does not succeed in riding this semantic fence for long. He introduces 
an allegedly Pauline distinction more dubious than the one he rejects, namely, that between the 
issues "getting in" and "staying in" the body of the saved community (he originally introduced 
this distinction in Sanders 1977, in the context of comparing Paul with Palestinian Judaism). In 
Paul's statements denying the necessity of works of the Law, Paul is supposedly saying these 
works are not necessary for "getting in" the community of the to-be-saved; but "staying in" is a 
different matter for Paul. Sanders' distinction is not parallel to the one we are making, between 
the topics "means" and "meaning" of "justification." On the contrary, the way Sanders sketches 
his distinction tends to prejudge this latter issue, as it also chooses sides in the issue of which 
sense (1 or 5) Paul means by bucotiovoOai (albeit Sanders does not explicitly answer either 
question). Apparently Sanders would not attribute the status "saved" to an individual so much as 
to a community (unlike Paul!); thus the individual's only issues are "how to enter" or "how to 
stay in" this community, and these two communal objectives are cast as ontological events rather 
than as purely a legal status (see Sanders 1983 , 45). This makes the individual's concern always a 
"means"-issue (i.e., means of getting in, or else means of staying in). By contrast, we insist on 
raising the above two questions, which Sanders effectively begs; in particular, we wish to ask 
whether Paul is discussing "means" at all. Apparently it is because he has prejudged this latter 
question, mat Sanders is compelled to offer a strange, conflated sense of bucaiovoQai. As 
Cosgrove intuits, if Paul is indeed discussing "means" of justification, a truly forensic 
biKaiovoQai reading (viz., ours) is not a feasible option. 
A. H . Carver, 2000 §3 .4 .3 Page 126 
While we could thus appear to concur with the majority opinion of modern scholarship 
on this verb, we wish to make perfectly clear that our "forensic" sense of the verb is not the 
popular sense according to which the judge simply declares righteous some person who in the 
judge's own view may or may not be righteous. So we emphasise the following: As pointed 
out above, the very notion of "judging" presupposes, especially in a Jewish context, that 
accepting bribes or otherwise "perverting justice" is abnormal. So the theologians who 
forced such a distorted, emasculated "forensic" sense upon the verb appear to have 
overlooked or ignored the possibility that Paul's sense of "righteous" is a discourse lexical 
concept (cf. above, chap. 2). For in the latter case, it denotes anything and everything which 
the covenant-maker wishes to make a valid "term" (condition) of right-standing in the 
covenant; the God of Paul is not constrained by anyone's absolute standard of what is "true 
righteousness." Given Paul's discourse lexical sense of "righteous," it would be entirely 
possible for God to declare, and realty to believe (strictly maintaining God's integrity), some 
sinner "righteous" who attempts, yet does not accomplish, all the acts which God commands. 
And as that very possibility shows (contra Cosgrove), no one should have seen Paul's 
verb biKuiovodai as posing (because of universal human sinfulness) a dilemma between a non-
forensic sense of bwaiovoQai and a Judge who perverts justice. Rather (as we noted above), 
if Paul is using biicaiowdai in a clearly forensic manner (which we see he is), it implies, not 
necessarily the disastrous result that God calls those "righteous" who are unrighteous, but 
perhaps simply that Paul is using his causal prepositions figuratively, to mean causa 
cognoscendi rather than causa essendi. And the latter is a much more plausible solution. We 
infer then that Paul is discussing the question, what is a criterion of covenantal right-
standing, before God; he is discussing the meaning, not the means, of "justification," in this 
covenantal context. And his sense of "justification" does not imply some dissembling, but 
rather a completely sincere, verdict of some sinner's "righteousness." 
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But note that Paul's argument concerning the meaning of "justification" does not at all 
proceed as if he were discussing the lexical sense of a term. Rather, he speaks of ontological 
realities, some of which justify and some of which do not (e.g. 2:16). I f he is discussing 
"meaning" (in the broad sense) at all, clearly he is discussing denotation yet not via 
discussing dictionary definition (i.e., lexical sense). There must therefore, with his sense of 
"justification," be a detaching of its denotation from its dictionary definition; otherwise, he 
could discuss the former only by discussing the latter. In short, given his topic and (yet also) 
his argument's non-lexicological, ontological approach, Paul's sense of "justification" must 
be a discourse lexical sense. That implies the same about his lexical sense of "righteous," 
inasmuch as this is the constituent semantic element which renders Paul's lexical sense of 
"justification" a discourse concept. 
This result gives us only the term's lexical sense, in passages parallel to Romans 10:5 
and its context, which our part of Galatians is. We will return shortly to the question of what 
extra-linguistic reality Paul denotes by diicatoq. 
3.5 Paul, his opponents, and epya voftov 
In chapter 2 we examined the tendency to interpret epya vopuov ("works of the Law") in Paul 
as "endeavour" to fulfil God's commandments. We argued that there is no evidence that 
epya vbfiav was a technical phrase, rather it seems not to have been one, at least not 
according to 4QMMT; that in many or most "social languages" there will be a semantic 
distinction between "attempt" and "accomplishment," which will therefore be germane to 
interpretation of any general "do"-words in that language; and that epyov is a good candidate 
for being capable of these semantic nuances in any "Hellenistic Greek"-speaking "social 
language." 
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3.5.1 Contextual "logical relations " between predications of "obedience " and of "actsl-
accomplishments" of the Law, for Paul and for his opponents respectively 
But this does not mean that it must have been capable of these semantic distinctions within 
Paul's "social language," or that of his opponents. Even if it should seem clear as sunlight 
to us that "attempt" is equivalent to "accomplishment" neither semantically nor logically, 
one's view on the matter depends on the anthropology/psychology intrinsic to one's outlook. 
There is, for example, some evidence that lst-c. Judaisms commonly had an anthropology in 
which good accomplishments were attributable to the "good inclination," bad ones to the 
"bad inclination" (see below). 
One must approach a foreign social language with tests more or less empirically 
verifiable, although this rule restricts what can reliably be said about that language. One 
such test is, whether this semantic distinction can be demonstrated elsewhere in the social 
language, by a use of words or phrases that definitely mean "accomplish" as opposed to 
"attempt," or vice versa. This may however simply shift the problem into the sphere of 
another word or phrase, unless we can demonstrate that the speakers of this social language 
did not see such terms as all co-extensive in denotation. For example, if some speaker states 
or implies clearly, in whatever terminology, that attempts are not tantamount to 
accomplishments, then we have proof that the speaker makes a semantic distinction between 
these concepts.21 If in addition one can show that this speaker shares some general "do"-
word with speakers who use it in these differing senses, it then becomes presumable that this 
speaker would also have made these semantic distinctions when using the term. 
What do we find in the case of Paul? We find that for him, attempting to fulfil God's 
will was not tantamount to accomplishing it for post-Fall man, not even for a Christian. One 
good way of showing this might be by way of a short critique of some of W. D. Davies' 
21. Cf. the semantic-structuralist approach of Lyons 1968, 408, 427-28, 443-46. 
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comments on Rom. 7:14-25; this will also allow us to contrast Paul with some other 
Judaisms. Arguing that "in Romans 7 Paul reflects and possibly has in mind the Rabbinic 
doctrine of the Two Impulses," Davies (1980, 27) nevertheless notes a significant difference 
between Paul's discussion and that which we might call the classical form of the Rabbinic 
doctrine: "The yitzer hd-rdc was located generally in the heart, whereas Paul clearly regards 
the adp£ as the base of operations for sin. The question is inevitable whether, had Paul been 
describing the conflict with his yitzer, he too would not have spoken of 'the heart' rather 
than 'the flesh'?" Davies' own answer minimises the difference: 
There was no scientific fixity or accuracy about the use of psychological and 
anthropological terms in his day and the Old Testament use of oapl- (bdsdr) . . . 
would naturally and suitably suggest itself to him. In addition to this the 
location of the yitzer in the heart, while dominant in Rabbinic thought, must not 
be too hard pressed. The yitzer hd-rdc as we saw, had a long start over the 
yitzer ha-tdb in man, and some passages suggest that it had gained dominion 
over the whole 248 members of the human body: it would not be difficult then 
for Paul to envisage sin as invading all his members and having its base in all his 
flesh, (ibid.) 
This is all reasonable; yet in a discussion of Romans 7 it misses the point, obfuscating the 
real difference between Paul's view and the "dominant" rabbinic view. For the point made 
most strenuously and vigorously in Rom. 7:14-25, is precisely the distancing of the mind 
(POV<;) from the flesh, even their opposition.22 The battle, in other words, is between a 
(single-willed) mind (or "heart") and the flesh, not between two influences, tendencies, 
inclinations, or wills warring on the battlefield of the mind or even of the flesh. If one chose 
22. Kiimmel's (1974) interpretation of 7:14-25, with which most German commentators agree, falls 
into the trap of identifying the wicked "me, that is, my flesh'' of vs. 18 with the "I" throughout 
vss. 15-17, 19-22, and concluding that this passage is not about the Christian, but about the man 
under the Law. But surely the weight of the passage, rhetorically reinforced by the A—B—C— 
A'—B'—C parallelism between vss. 14-17 and 18-20, is simply that it is the flesh and not at all 
the "inner man" or "mind" who wants to do these wicked things, rather the "inner man" wants 
desperately not to do them. For a good critique of Kummel's interpretation and a better exegesis 
of the passage, see Laato 1995, 110-24. 
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therefore to identify the uovg with the yitzer ha-tdb (good tendency or impulse), the 
difference would still appear: the battle would again lie not between two morally antithetical 
opponents on the same field or plane (of the mind or heart), but rather between two different 
planes (the mind and the flesh) that Paul distances from and opposes to each other (so also 
Gal. 5:17). The classical Rabbinic moral anthropology is not commensurable with Paul's, 
but rather suggests that the distinction is between the "good intention" and the "bad 
intention," both of which inhabit the inner sphere, that of the mind or "heart." 
A similar anthropology appears in some of the Qumran passages. The Community 
Rule (1QS) has in columns 3 and 4 a portrayal of two Spirits which work in each man, one 
producing good works and one producing evil. Furthermore, the same Hebrew word 
(yeser), which according to Jastrow ([cl903] 1992, s. v.) means "the formation of thoughts, 
bent of mind, inclination, desire," is found in the Thanksgiving Psalms (5:6; 7:13; 9:16; 
15:13; 18:11) and in CD 2:16, referring possibly to an evil inclination or nature in man 
(Ringgren 1995, 102). And generally at Qumran sin is not so much a consequence of a fall 
from Paradise, as a corollary of man's creatureliness and his dissimilarity from God (ibid., 
100-3). Thus, there is some corroboration at Qumran of the attribution of bad 
accomplishment to the bad inclination, found in some streams of Rabbinic thought;23 nor 
does it seem that anything at Qumran would effectively contradict this picture of man. 
This does not prove that this anthropology was characteristic of the particular brand of 
Judaism with which Paul interacted in Galatians; but clearly it is quite possible that for Paul's 
opponents, "good volition" and "good attempt" were tantamount to "good accomplishment." 
For him, on the other hand, this was not the case. 
At this point the reader may yet be somewhat doubtful of the likelihood that Paul 
means "acts (accomplishments)" rather than "works (endeavours)." But there are reasons to 
23. Cf. Barclay 1991, 189. 
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think that he means the former, as we shall see, and really no reasons to think that he means 
the latter. For it is entirely possible that the sociolinguistic difference between Paul and his 
opponents, consisting in the differing contextual-presupposition-assuming logical relations 
which they place between these two sorts of "doing" of God's Law, lies near the heart of 
Paul's religious disagreement with his opponents. That is, it may lie at the very core of their 
disagreement, that in his opponents' "social language" they considered "attempt" of God's 
commands logically tantamount to their "accomplishment," whereas Paul did not. For 
example, this sociolinguistic difference correlates with his opponents' insistence upon using, 
and his own refusal to use, the de facto accomplishment of certain rituals as a valid 
"boundary-marker" (i.e., criterion) of who was within and who was without God's true 
covenant.24 So at the very least, the possibility that Paul means "acts/accomplishments" of 
the Law must be seriously considered. And as we shall now see, there are reasons to believe 
that it was Paul's meaning. 
3.5.2 "Works of the Law" in Qumran 
In chapter 2 we saw that Paul's phrase "works of the Law" appears, among Jewish literature, 
only in the Qumran writings. Although it is not a technical phrase there, the Qumran phrase 
may still be of significance for understanding Paul, due to the possibility that it was 
"conventional" in some particular context. If an ancient Jew were to translate the Hebrew of 
the Qumran phrase, he or she would very likely translate it by the phrase Paul uses, epya 
vofiov; for in the LXX, each of those two Greek words is overwhelmingly the most frequent 
choice for translating that Hebrew word which corresponds to it in the Qumran phrase. 
More importantly, as many authors have noted the literary context of the Qumran phrase (in 
the epilogue) is clearly similar, one might even say identical, with that of Paul's phrase in 
24. James Dunn in particular has, in many writings, indicated this as the true nature of the conflict 
between Paul and his opponents; see, e.g., Dunn 1991d. 
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Galatians 3:10: in particular there is discussion of the right way to "be accounted righteous," 
and also the recounting of blessings and curses on various parts of the nation Israel. This 
occurrence of the phrase is therefore worth our investigating. 
After explaining that the things Israel had suffered were for its wickedness, 
abominations, and straying "from the path (of the Torah)," and exhorting that the reader 
should (by contrast) "study (carefully) the book of Moses and the books of the Prophets and 
(the writings of) David" (II. 10-12), the MMT author quotes several Bible texts dealing with 
blessings and curses, as prophecies and threats fulfilled. The author then exhorts the reader, 
by citing the examples of the kings of Israel and of David, to contemplate the character and 
outcome of their deeds. Then comes the sentence (quoted above, chap. 2) about his or their 
having written concerning "the works of the Law," after which the writer adds (DSSE 182, 
interpolations Vermes's, emphasis ours): 
For [we have noticed] that prudence and knowledge are with you. Understand 
all these (matters) and ask Him to straighten your counsel and put you far away 
from the thoughts of evil and the counsel of Belial. As a result, you will rejoice 
at the end of time when you discover that some of our sayings are true. And it 
will be reckoned for you as righteousness when you perform what is right and 
good before Him, for your own good and for that of Israel. 
Note that the emphasised words allude to Deut. 6:25 and Ps. 106:31, but also to Gen. 15:6 
and the reckoning of Abraham's faith to him as righteousness, which verse Paul quotes in 
Gal. 3:6 (and Rom. 4:3, 9, 22). Clearly the question at issue here is how one can have 
"righteousness reckoned to" one, that is, how one can be justified. The same issue is the one 
in the verses leading up to Gal. 3:10. 
Since the Qumran phrase may be significant for our understanding of Paul, let us see if 
we can exegete it, as "normal language" (rather than as an idiom). This means we will 
consider the lexical items and grammatical structures individually, deciding on which of their 
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possible senses fits the context best. We shall necessarily draw upon the standard OT lexica 
and grammars, as well as on Jastrow (1992 [cl903]). 
The range of meaning of the genitive function is quite extensive in Hebrew, as in many 
other languages. Waltke and O'Connor (1990, 143) divide the various Hebrew uses into 
three broad groupings: the subjective (including possessive), the adverbial (including 
objective), and the adjectival (including epexegetical) genitives. 
BDB lists the senses of nfi?y» as ranging from "deed" in the sense of behaviour/doing, 
to work/labour, to a business/pursuit/undertaking/enterprise, to achievement(s), to something 
(or some things or stuff) actually produced/made. The last sense seems the most common 
one, and the first and second the next most common. KB seems to agree with this range of 
meanings, as does Jastrow (1992 [cl903]) and Holladay (1988), although the latter groups 
three of these senses together under the rubric "work (as an object), product (of a 
technique)." In a "weakened sense," it also can mean affairs/occurrences. As for the word 
rnlfi in this context, there is hardly any question that it is being used as a referential term for 
"the Mosaic Law." 
The question is, what combination of senses of the Hebrew genitive and of nfpya not 
only is feasible, but also fits best, in this context. We should note first that the basic 
distinction between the senses of nfrjfla is that between "attempt/endeavour" and 
"achievement/accomplishment," the first two senses listed above being "endeavour" and the 
last three of the "strong" senses being "accomplishment"; "business/undertaking" is more 
specifically "accomplishment/achievement that is either a normal occupation of some person, 
that is, a calling freely taken up, or else a calling or obligation laid on him or her by 
someone else." This sense would therefore cover also the translation "task," which means 
"a definite piece of work assigned to or expected of a person" (RHD). As we indicated 
above, it is ultimately accomplishment(s) that one assigns or commands; a human action, as 
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intentional behaviour, can proceed only towards a desired and sought-after product/goal/-
achievement/yield/accomplishment. 
As for the genitives, the ones that could feasibly combine with n(P?» in this context 
would be the subjective genitive (as in, "the tasks assigned/commanded by/in the Law"), and 
the objective-adverbial genitive (as in, "the observance of the Law"). The reading 
"accomplishment of the Law" (i.e., the accomplishing of the Law, or an instance of it) seems 
not to be an option: the noun nfoJH? can mean "the act of working," but apparently not "the 
act of accomplishing" as such. 
The most pressing question facing us now is, which basic sense of nfe^tt > 
"endeavour" or "accomplishment," is in view at this point in MMT. Looking at the 
immediate context, it might seem that it is endeavour, that is, the "observance" or "keeping" 
of the Law, that is in view. Just before the sentence containing the phrase, there are two 
sentences exhorting to consider the examples set by Israelite kings; the first of these sentences 
says that "whoever among them feared [the Tojrah was delivered from troubles; and these 
were the seekers of the Torah whose transgressions were forgiven" (emphasis ours). But 
what is more important here is the overall context and the more immediate context. Our 
phrase's sentence actually begins: "We have written to you (concerning) some of the works of 
the Law..." The purpose of the letter was to correct the readers' "counsel" on these 
various halakic matters. The question at issue was clearly the right interpretation of these 
covenantal stipulations. It is actually because of differences concerning the meaning of 
various laws, that the letter was written, and that the senders of the letter had (according to 
the first few lines of the epilogue) "separated themselves from the multitude of the people." 
The writer holds out the promise that, i f they follow the instructions given, the readers will 
rejoice at the end of time when you discover that some of our sayings [HXj?» 
inai] are true. And it will be reckoned for you as righteousness when you 
perform ["|mffj?3] what is right and good . . . (DSSE, 182) 
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Here then is the key to understanding the outlook of this text: one is counted righteous, not 
just for trying to fulfil what one is commanded, but for doing correctly what one is 
commanded. The boundary between those who are "in" and those who are "out" of the true 
Israel is not just a matter of who faithfully obeys the Law, of who understands and fulfils it to 
the best of his or her available means, but a matter of who correctly understands and fulfils 
the Law. 2 5 It is not just anyone's faithful observance o/the Law that is acceptable, but rather 
the observance that is correct, the one that (correctly understands and thus) fulfils the Law 
correctly. It is thus certain accomplishments, and not merely endeavour as such, that 
constitute a criterion of righteousness in this letter. This conclusion does not prejudge the 
issue of whether it is constant accomplishment, or accomplishment most of the time, or even 
one good accomplishment, that constitutes the whole formulation of the criterion; be that as it 
may, the criterion is still in terms of achievement/accomplishment. 
As one definite indication of this attitude on the part of the writer(s), note that he or 
they deal quite seriously with the question what should be done about 
the blind who cannot see so as to beware of all mixture and cannot see a mixture 
that incurs [reparationj-offering; and concerning the deaf who have not heard the 
laws and the judgments and the purity regulations, and have not heard the 
ordinances of Israel, since he who has not seen or heard does not know how to 
do [nwy1?] (the Law) . . . (11. 49-54 in Qimron and Strugnell 1994's 
reconstruction of the halakic section) 
Note the strictness betrayed by this concern. The focus on right accomplishment rather than 
merely on faithful obedience as such has put in question the purity-status of the blind and 
deaf, whose lack of perception prohibits them from reliably fulfilling the purity ordinances 
correctly. And given the letter's suspension of salvation itself upon executing these purity 
requirements correctly, one must conclude that even the salvific status of these crippled is in 
question. 
25. Cf. Smiles 1998, 121. 
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This accomplishment-bound attitude is implicit not only in this document, however, but 
in the Qumran writings in general. The attitude is almost always present, explicitly or 
implicitly, that what makes the Qumran community superior and righteous is their better 
insight, knowledge, and wisdom about the specifics of what God has commanded. The 
insight is indeed acknowledged to come from God; but this does not mitigate the fact that it is 
those Law-observers who have the right understanding and practice of the laws, and they 
alone, who are the righteous ones. These themes, the necessity of wisdom and understanding 
of the Law and the blessedness of those who follow it correctly and the cursedness of those 
who depart from the right interpretation, completely pervades the Damascus Document, for 
example. Indeed, as in MMT, correct knowledge and practice of the Law is a soteriological 
essential. One may see this also in 1QS 1:8-10, 12-18; 2:1-5; 3:7-9; 4:2-7, 19-23; CD 
3:8-10, 13-19; 6:14-21; 4Q266/270 (ending of Cave 4 version of the Damascus Document), 
11. 10-21 (re. the "boundary" mentioned in this last text, it seems to be the correct 
performance/accomplishment of God's precepts: cf. the similar passage CD 1:12-21). 
Moreover, note that the sectarian separation and disagreement was chiefly about what 
could be called "purity" (i.e., that which is understood by a concretistic, empiricised 
conception of righteousness or holiness).26 It is significant here that righteousness, when 
conceived as empirical, is necessarily a matter of things not only concrete but also empirical, 
measurable. This being the case, "purity" can never be only a matter of volition or 
endeavour as such, but a matter of achievement/accomplishment. It is only what one actually 
accomplishes that can be measured; what one intended to accomplish can be understood by 
another person, but it is not empirical and thus not measurable. It seems quite clear from the 
Qumran documents that "purity" is commensurable with the conception of "holiness" and 
"righteousness" that one finds in the Qumran documents;27 and the implication, confirmed by 
26. Cf. Dunn 1990a, 193; 1997, 147-48; Maier 1995, 98-100. 
27. Cf. Neusner 1973b, 115-16 and passim. 
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the texts themselves, is that righteousness is always measured, is always a matter of 
accomplishment (of God's tasks) rather than of attempt/obedience alone or even primarily. 
Since it denotes specifically the rightly-understood and -accomplished tasks of the Law, it 
would seem reasonable to conclude that "accomplishments" are primarily in view in 
4QMMT's notion "works of the Law." As we have seen, this correlates to a reading of the 
genitive as subjective: "the tasks (accomplishments) commanded by the Law." 
3.5.3 "Works" in Rom. 4:1-8 
Furthermore, it seems that only reading epya as "accomplishments" is feasible in Rom. 4:1-
8. For that passage requires interpretation of the verb epyafyiuxi ("work," vss. 4, 5) in its 
potential sense "carry on a trade or business" (which by nature would be accomplishment-
oriented). Only on this interpretation would the "reward" be reckoned for Paul "not as a 
favour, but as what is due" and worthy of boasting (vs. 4, AT; see 1 Cor. 9:16-17; cf. Luke 
17:10). Likewise only on this interpretation would it be possible for Paul that the faithful 
one is the one firf epya£ofiev(# ("not working," vs. 5); for see Gal. 5:6b; 1 Cor. 7:19. Our 
conclusion is that by epya vdfwv Paul probably means "accomplishments," rather than 
"endeavour" or "attempt," of the things which the Law commands. But the reality he 
intends by this term is probably a reality different from that intended by his opponents; for 
them, "accomplishments" are logically equivalent to corresponding good/bad intentions, 
whereas for Paul "accomplishments" does not have this logical equivalence. 
3.6 Paul, his opponents, and wiang 
In chapter 2 we considered the anaphoric, "discourse" character of the common lexical sense 
of "trust." We then related this to, and spelled out, 7 attested senses of mang. We must 
consider now the question which of these senses Paul uses. 
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3.6.1 Paul's lexical sense of manq 
Let us consider the 7 possible senses of iriariq which we listed previously.28 We can safely 
dismiss from consideration senses 2, 4, and 7. That leaves senses 1, 3, 5, and 6; but we 
have already implied that the special, religious sense of "trust in God" (#6) is much more 
likely here than the absolute sense "trust" (#1). 
What about Philo's sense, our #5? There is no particular reason to doubt that the sense 
was available to Paul, although probably it was a usage more common among the 
Alexandrian Jews than among the Jews in Palestine and Asia Minor. There are, however, at 
least three considerations which rule out the suggestion that Paul is using manq in Philo's 
sense. In the first place, although Abraham and his faith are very important themes both for 
Paul and for Philo, there is a vast difference between their respective treatments of 
Abraham's faith. Philo comments repeatedly on Abraham's character and life, and at least 
ten times upon Gen. 15:6 (Lightfoot 1890, 159-60). But for Philo, Abraham's story "was 
not a history, but an allegory; or, if a history as well, it was as such of infinitely little 
importance" (Lightfoot 1890, 160). Abraham's journey from Mesopotamia to Haran to 
Canaan was an allegory for the soul's journey from idolising the material universe, to 
instruction by the senses and observation of the creation, to the (mystical) knowledge of the 
one true God. Here there is little room for Abraham as trusting and obeying God's call. The 
promise of God to Abraham takes a back seat here, i f indeed any seat; whereas it is in the 
front seat in Paul's treatment of Abraham (see Romans 4). 
In the second place, Paul's commonly speaking of trust "in Christ," and of the gospel 
"about Jesus Christ," leaves little potential for a Philonic interpretation: 
If a Philonic concept of faith was the only reference point which someone had, 
there would have been no guarantee at all that this person would have correctly 
understood the Christian proclamation: "Believe in Christ." Faith in Christ for 
28. See above, § 2.2.4.2, p. 97. 
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the Christian mission was faith in the cross. Precisely this kind of faith was a 
scandal to the Jews and folly to the gentiles, and precisely this kind of faith 
would not have fit well into Philo's concept of faith. (Lindsay 1993, 72) 
Thirdly, for Paul faith was a believing response to a message, not a mystical virtue 
worked up by meditation or by any other means. "So faith comes from hearing, and hearing 
comes by the preaching of Christ" (Rom. 10:17, AT) . 2 9 Faith does not even appear apart 
from Christ's appearing (Gal. 3:22-26). But a trusting response to a message concerning 
God's faithfulness to his promises and covenant (Rom. 3:3) is a very small part, and not an 
essential part, of Philo's conception of faith. We can therefore dismiss the latter (#5) from 
consideration. 
We probably should comment upon the still-common tendency to assign two different 
senses, both the active sense "faith" and the passive sense "faithfulness" (our #3), to iriong 
in the LXX of Hab. 2:4.3 0 Barr (1983 [1961], 203, cf. 218, 222) has rightly attacked this 
tendency, denying that mang is or could be this sort of "polarised expression." As biblical 
scholars are increasingly realising these days, language does not work this way: words are 
used with one meaning in each use, apart from rare and exceptional instances (e.g., double 
entendre for stylistic purposes).31 We may not sit on this semantic fence. 
Thus we must choose between senses 3 and 6 (but no mixture of the two). Quite a few 
interpreters today are exegeting more and more of Paul's Galatian uses of manq as meaning 
"faithfulness, reliability" (3). This is also a discourse concept, as we have seen in our 
29. Cf. Rom. 10:9-10, 14, 16; 1 Cor. 15:2, 11, 17; 2 Cor. 5:7; Gal. 3:2-5; 2 Thess. 1:10, and 
possibly 2:13. 
30. This is largely an attempt, it seems, to justify Paul's interpretation of man<; as "faith" (the 
Hebrew term HJTOK lying behind the LXX probably could not mean this). E.g., see Keil and 
Delitzsch 1981 [1986], 73; Lightfoot 1890, 154-55; Zemek 1980; Dockery 1987. Earlier 
advocates included B. F. Westcott (see Dockery 1987, n.54) and T. F. Torrance. More recently 
the alleged ambiguity has been cited, e.g., by Richard Hays' treatments of Galatians 3 and Hab. 
2:4 as speaking of "the faithfulness of Christ." 
31. Cf. Silva 1983, 25-26, 61, 150-51. 
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discussion of "trust." But it is Jesus's faithfulness towards God, rather than towards sinners, 
which they intend; thus the actual referent is entirely different. Unfortunately, there is not 
space here to treat fully the currently controversial Pauline phrase manq Xpiarov; we can 
only question (as pragmatics adjures us to do) whether the notion "the faithfulness of Christ" 
appears, as such, to be the possible meaning most directly relevant to Paul's purpose at the 
particular points where Paul uses it. When one thus methodically attends to the immediate 
contexts of the phrase (especially in the crucial text for this issue, Gal. 2:16), we believe one 
must conclude—regardless which Pauline purpose one hypothesises—that Paul does not 
intend Jesus's faithfulness, but the individual's faith in Christ.32 We therefore reject sense 3 
in favour of sense 6. And that lexical sense, as we have indicated, is a discourse concept, 
with the peculiar features of all such lexical senses. 
3.6.2 An apparent problem for the discourse-concept-iriang hypothesis, yet a way around it 
The suggestion that "faith" is for Paul a discourse concept appears to run into a problem 
deriving from the contexts in which Paul uses the term manq. But we shall see that this 
problem is only apparent, and may fairly easily be circumvented. 
If Pauline "faith" is a discourse lexical concept, it gets its denotation from the context; 
yet its definition puts constraint on which features of the context may supply the denotation. 
Specifically, the "discourse" character of this lexical sense indicates that one meaning-
element, the identity of that which God is considered reliable to do (and under what 
conditions or lack thereof), is supplied by the identity of the one who trusts, or rather by what 
he or she believes about God and his dealings with humankind (see above, chapter 2). This 
32. Claims that this would make Paul too redundant in 2:16 are not cogent; repetition, especially of 
important points, is a standard pedagogical device and does not constitute a violation of the 
Quantity maxim of conversation. For a survey of the literature on TIOTH; Xpiarov and the best 
treatment of this issue so far, see Dunn 1991a; cf. also Hultgren 1980. 
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meaning-element can usually remain unstated, being understood by the hearers. Nevertheless 
it is intended and communicated, as part of the word's lexical sense. 
Therefore, what could be implicitly understood as this word's meaning, in a polemical 
context where the question at issue is what God will do, or under what conditions he will do 
it? 3 3 For the latter clearly includes the question we have in Galatians. There can be no 
"presupposition pool" of understood truth shared by Paul and his readers regarding the very 
question that is at issue. So, "what right 'faith' believes" cannot be assumed, but rather 
itself needs demonstrating, in the theological debate which Paul is conducting with his 
opponents. Therefore, unless Paul supplies this meaning-element explicitly, there would be 
no way for even his readers (who are presumably being torn between conflicting views on the 
conditions for being justified) to know exactly what Paul intends by moTig. 
Does Paul, then, give some explication of what conditions (or lack thereof) Christian 
"faith" sees as applying to justification? We will argue later that he does do so, at one point 
in our target passage; but it will be clear also that he does not do this in order to explain what 
he means by "faith." Apparently he takes no trouble to define this meaning explicitly 
anywhere in Galatians. So we are faced with the remarkable fact that Paul uses in key parts 
of his argument, and as the main term representing his contrary position, a term whose 
definitive denotation would entail that there already be agreement on the very matters at 
issue! 
What can be said about this? The only explanation that could account for it is that 
Paul's positive point (about mang and justification) is not his primary message to his 
readers, where he opposes irCang and gpya vo/iav: rather, he intends his negative point 
(about epya v6\wv and justification/righteousness) as his primary polemical point, and 
expects that by clarifying what "faith" does not believe, which is his real rhetorical goal, he 
33. We use "conditions" in the broad, non-legal sense of "requirements" in this section. 
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might convey an accurate understanding (or rather correct their current understanding) of 
what it does believe.34 That is, Paul is interested not in adding some particular semantic 
content to his readers' and opponents understanding of "faith," but rather in banishing some 
particular semantic content from it, in regard to the conditions it places upon justification. 
This seems the only feasible explanation of Paul's remarkable use of this term irianq. In 
weighing this explanation, and this discourse-concept Pauline-"faith" hypothesis, let us 
remember our conclusion in the section (above) on sociolinguistics: No hypothesis about 
Paul's argumentation should be rejected merely because it makes his argument seem a bit 
awkward. 
As in our argument above concerning dtimoq in Paul, here we have only arrived at the 
lexical sense of Pauline irianq; and since that proves to be a discourse concept, we do not 
know yet what it denotes. But in our three word-studies we have been able, through 
comparison and contrast with the usage of Paul's opponents' (as Paul understood them), to 
advance towards Paul's "meanings" for these terms (in the broader sense, as including 
denotation), and indeed to specify his meaning for epya vdfwv. Now we will seek not only 
to confirm our findings for these three word-senses, but also to identify the denotations of 
manq and btiaioq for Paul, as well as to establish his overall rhetorical purpose in this part 
of Galatians. 
3.7 A working hypothesis concerning Paul's outlook and rhetorical purpose in 
Gal. 2:16-3:14 
Paul's lexical sense of manq, "trust in God," leaves much of its denotation to be determined 
34. This is corroborated by the fact that Paul seems to argue for both points side by side, so 
presumably primarily for one or the other, but while justification BK iriareaq (in Paul's sense) 
implies justification not e| epywv voyuov, the latter does not imply the former; so the former topic 
would not account for Paul's making the latter point, but the latter topic would account for the 
former point. 
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by context. In chapter 2 we found that "trust" could be lexically defined as "belief in the 
reliability of (something or someone) to perform some particular result (i.e., in some 
particular manner) that is desired and valued (even in view of whatever provisos or costs 
might seem to condition such performance) by the one doing this believing within the 
purview of the current discourse." By narrowing the definition to "trust in God," we know 
who is the "something or someone" whose reliability is believed and valued. But the concept 
is still a "discourse concept": we still do not know what particular thing Pauline "trust" 
believes God reliable to perform, nor under what conditions, supposedly, he will perform it. 
Both of these semantic elements depend on which person is doing the believing. 
Gal. 5:5 says that EK marecog eXmfia bi,Koaoavvr]q cnreKdexoneda ("by faith, we wait 
for the hope of righteousness"). So in the context of Paul's apocalyptic eschatology, in 
which "we must all appear before the judgment seat of Christ, so that each one may receive 
good or evil, according to what he has done in the body" (2 Cor. 5:10), we may safely 
assume that (at least in Galatians) Pauline "faith" believes God (and Christ) reliable to find 
and pronounce one "righteous" (i.e., to "justify" one) on the day of judgment. But now, 
under what conditions will God justify one? That is precisely the issue in Galatians, as 
indicated above. So the definition-element, "whatever provisos or costs might seem to 
condition such performance, to the one doing this believing within the purview of the 
discourse," would need Paul's elucidation, rather than be safely presumed by the readers. In 
order to complete our identification of "faith's" denotation, then, we must consider the 
context with great care. 
We may affirm immediately that there is at least one justification-condition which 
Pauline "faith" believes in, namely "faith" itself. Paul makes clear and reiterates that 
justification is e/c mareux;. And anyway, since we have found "justification" to be 
"forensic" in Paul, and since we mean by this that in "justification" God really finds (not just 
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declares) the person "righteous," we may infer that there is certainly a proviso conditioning 
justification, which proviso is the meeting of God's criterion (or criteria) of "righteousness." 
Justification is conditional. 
But next we may say that even if "faith" itself is one justification-conditioning 
criterion, it cannot be seen as the only one. For after all, the reason we are seeking the 
Pauline criteria of "righteousness" here is precisely so that we may know what Paul denotes 
by this lexical concept "faith." Even God himself would not be able to discern someone's 
"righteousness" solely by the criterion "faith" before knowing the denotation of the latter 
concept. As pointed out, until we find out under what conditions, in Paul's expectation, God 
will justify someone, Paul's Judaising opponents' "faith" is indistinguishable from his own; 
there is as yet no difference between them. So we must be able to define "faith" by eliciting 
some operative righteousness-criterion besides "faith"; else we (and Paul) become enmeshed 
in a circular definition of the latter.35 
It is also important to note that this non-"faith" criterion of righteousness (and thus 
also precondition of justification) must be something which both God and the individual 
"believer" in God's reliability-to-justify will be able to use for discerning whether he or she 
is "righteous." Otherwise, Paul's emphasis on "the hope of righteousness" (Gal. 5:5) is 
completely empty. "Hope" entails an anticipation of a situation that is better from the point 
of view of the one hoping. Moreover, "faith" entails valuing the reliability which is believed 
in, according to our definition; and that implies that this reliability-to-justify is seen as 
valuable by the person believing in it. None of this would be so, were the believer in Pauline 
"justification" unable to tell whether he or she ever met the justification-controlling criteria 
of "righteousness." So the criterion must be applicable to human beings by human beings. 
35. On "circular definition," cf. Stebbing 1961, 425. 
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Furthermore, any statement of a righteousness-criterion will be composed either of 
something over which the individual has some control, or else of something over which the 
individual has no control (e.g., being unconditionally elect), or of both. But it does not 
appear that, in Paul's universe of discourse, the individual can have confident hope of 
meeting some condition that is utterly beyond his or her control and which is a criterion 
applicable to human beings by human beings. For example, there appears no list of all those 
unconditionally elect, which God has published so that one may check it and see whether he 
or she shall be justified. Nor is there given any criteria of the elect, other than "obedience" 
in the sense of endeavour (something within our control) to achieve what is commanded, and 
"faith" (which is precisely what we are seeking to define). To argue, for example, that one 
has confidence in one's election only because "faith" has revealed it to one's heart, would 
only circularise our definition of "faith," making it invalid.3 6 
But Paul says, "you have received a spirit of adoption as sons by which we cry out, 
'Abba! Father!' The Spirit Himself bears witness with our spirit that we are children of 
God" (Rom. 8:15-16, NASB). Is not this "witness," someone might ask, a feasible and 
practical criterion, for Paul, of who is "righteous"?37 Perhaps Paul indeed believes that all 
Christians receive this witness of the Spirit. But nevertheless it could not be a criterion of 
"righteousness" before God. For according to Paul, this witness comes when and because 
we have already become sons of God, that is, have received the adoption (Gal. 4:5-6). And 
this "adoption" (4:5), with its correlative status of heirship (4:7), Paul says comes through 
the "righteousness of faith" (Rom. 4:13-16; // Gal. 3:24, 26, 29; 4:7). So first (i.e., first 
causally even if not temporally) is this righteousness; then the adoption; then the Spirit of 
adoption. Now, the Spirit of adoption cannot be necessary to satisfy the criterion; the chain 
36. Cf. above, p. 144 at n. 35. 
37. I am grateful to Dr. Max Turner for bringing to my attention the pertinence of the Holy Spirit's 
operations for my present argument. 
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of causation would become a circle, which no one could enter. One could never possibly 
meet the criterion of this "righteousness," since one has to have already this "righteousness" 
before one can experience this operation of the Spirit. 
What about some other operation(s) of the Spirit? In 3:2-5, Paul appeals to the 
Galatians' experience of "receiving the Spirit" and of concomitant miracles. But we would 
argue that for Paul, this experience, like that of the "spirit of adoption," is due to 
justification and not vice versa. In the first place, Paul clearly appeals to this experience— 
which he implies was e« iriareug and not e£ epyuv vofiov—in order to argue that justification 
is CK mareux; and not e£ epyup vo^iov (see the adjacent passages in which he contrasts iriang 
and epya vofmov. 2:16; 3:6-12). And in order for this rhetorical purpose to be served by 
Paul's attributing this experience of the Spirit to iriang and not epya v6\wv, it is necessary 
that Paul's readers already see a logical connection between "causality" in this experience of 
the Spirit and "causality" in their justification. Specifically, Paul's inference that iriang and 
not epya vopov brought about their experience of the Spirit, must imply for them that also 
mane and not epya vofwv brought about their justification. Now, since Paul's major point 
actually concerns epya ydfwv and not marig (see above), his unstated, main premise is that 
"things unnecessary for 'receiving the Spirit' are unnecessary for justification."38 For this 
argument to work, the Galatians must already either see the Spirit-experience as a "sufficient 
cause" of justification; or justification as a "necessary cause" of the Spirit-experience; or the 
two concepts as denoting the same thing or otherwise logically equivalent ("justification" 
denotes the Spirit-experience and vice versa, or at least one who has this experience is ipso 
facto "justified" and vice versa); or else the attribute "this Spirit-experience" is a hyponym 
38. Paul does not bring out that logical connection; yet it must be there, implicitly, for his argument 
to succeed. The main syllogism is an AAA-1: 
Works of the Law are unnecessary for receiving the Spirit. 
Things unnecessary for receiving the Spirit are unnecessary for being justified. 
Therefore, works of the Law are unnecessary for being justified. 
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of "justification," that is, as a subset of it, a special type of "justification." 
But these last two suggestions (the former which is increasingly appearing in Pauline 
scholarship—see e.g. Cosgrove 1988b) we have implicitly ruled out by our findings on Paul's 
use of SiKouovodai, which is purely a forensic decision or ruling (and not some sort of 
transformation). This dismissal of both semantic connections leaves us with the question of 
the causal connection between justification and this experience of the Spirit. The first 
suggestion, that the Galatians and Paul would have seen this experience of the Spirit as 
sufficient-causal of justification, is extremely difficult to maintain.39 Recall that Paul's letter 
is meant to oppose a "different gospel" (1:6), and that an important element in the false 
gospel, apparently, is that justification is e£ epyuv vopj>v (2:16, etc.). Paul opposes this false 
doctrine with the assertion that justification is e/c irioTeug, not e£ epyuu uofiov. And for 
Paul, any Galatians who get this wrong are in serious trouble: they have been "severed from 
Christ" and have "fallen from grace" (5:4). Now if, for Paul, one's having a correct 
understanding of what brings about justification is so crucial to one's salvation, and if, for 
Paul, having this (perceivable) experience of the Spirit (whether caused by faith or causal of 
faith) is sufficient-causal of justification, how is it that Paul fails to explicate this latter point 
at all in the letter, indeed in any of his extant letters? Any suggestion that Paul believes it 
and taught it earlier to the Galatians, so that now he can simply assume it in the argument of 
3:2-5, would be vastly implausible: if the Galatians believed that doctrine, they would hardly 
39. Some might, in rebuttal, point to the mention of "the Spirit" in Gal. 5:5: r^nsiq yap -KPeiyuocn CK 
ir'urreax; cXirtfia dwaioffvjnjc airBicbexonsOa. This verse is pertinent if the dative, irvevficai, is 
instrumental or causal. But first one must determine that this dative is indeed instrumental/causal, 
as opposed to an associative/manner-type dative (or even a locative dative, but associative seems 
more plausible and Pauline here). The immediate context does not indicate, except that it would 
perhaps be a bit awkward to have an instrumental dative followed immediately by some type of 
causal e/c-phrase. But if Paul's usage of irvsvucat, elsewhere in Galatians must be the deciding 
factor, then in 5:5 it is a manner/associative dative. Except for 5:18, where it is a dative of 
agency, every other occurrence of irpevnari in Galatians is manner/associative: 3:3; 5:16, 25 
(twice); 6:1. Thus 5:5 does not support the idea that, for Paul, receiving the Spirit causes 
justification. 
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credit the Judaising suggestion that they need to have also the epya i>6jxov in order to be 
justified; which however is the very idea Paul is trying to fight. We must conclude that it is 
justification which was seen as (necessary) cause of the Spiritual experience, rather than vice 
versa. Therefore, just as in the case of the "spirit of adoption," this Spiritual experience 
cannot be a Pauline criterion (much less cause) of "righteousness," nor of "being justified," 
because one must have the righteousness in order to obtain this experience. 
We have eliminated all the plausible other-than-"faith" Pauline criteria of 
"righteousness" which are things outside of human control but which can be applied as 
criteria to humans by humans. His non-"faith" criterion (or criteria) of "righteousness" must 
therefore be something which is within human control (i.e., a criterion which humans have 
the means to satisfy). Therefore, for Paul "faith" is confident in God's justifying one who 
meets some particular other-than-"faith" condition(s), which the individual does have some 
control over. This must be so, in order for Paul's notion of "faith" to be (non-circularly) 
definable and thus to denote any particular belief whatsoever. 
So, the one with Pauline "faith" thinks he or she has (and can deploy) the means of 
meeting God's non-"faith," human-applicable criterion (or criteria) of "righteousness." 
Now, since that "faith" is a type of "trust," which includes reliance and valuing, it will 
imply one's availing oneself of such means; and that includes effort or endeavour of some 
sort. The only non-"faith" endeavour that Paul suggests as a prerequisite condition of 
justification is steadfast endeavour to fulfil those things which God commands (see Rom. 
2:6-16; 6:15-23; 1 Cor. 7:19; 2 Cor. 5:10). Therefore obedience (endeavour to carry out 
the commands) is, for Paul, one condition that "faith" believes is a prerequisite to 
justification. This is completely normal in this lst-century Jewish context; the Jews saw no 
disjunction at all between "being justified because of obedience" and "being justified because 
of faith." Indeed, the idea that "faith" believes in some justification unconditioned on 
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obedience would have seemed preposterous in this Jewish context, and would have required 
much more extensive and clearer explanation and defence on Paul's part than appears. As G. 
Howard incisively notes, 
[In Rom. 4:3-6] Paul supposedly sets the faith of Abraham against any works he 
might have performed. In other words, it is [traditionally] thought that Paul 
establishes Abraham's justification according to grace by referring to the fact 
that he merely believed. Faith is supposed to evoke in Paul's mind the concept 
of "grace." 
But it does not seem reasonable that Paul would attempt to prove "grace" 
by the word "faith" when the word "faith," as used by his contemporaries, 
implied attainment. To construe Paul in this way is to have him base his 
argument on a reasoning which no one could accept. (Howard 1990, 55-56) 
In later chapters we shall argue that for Paul true "faith" does believe that obedience is 
a condition for justification. That is, for Paul one "condition" of God's true covenant (in the 
sense that it must be met as a prerequisite, in order to justification) is "obedience to God"; 
for indeed Paul presumes and even portrays this as being a condition, not only elsewhere 
(and quite clearly) but also within Gal. 3:10-14 itself. 
Not surprisingly, confirming this hypothesis about the content of Paul's meaning of 
"faith" would entail that certain other theologically basic things are true for Paul. But now 
we have, via our pondering the possible differences between Paul's meanings and his 
opponents', come to a place where, at least hypothetically, we may satisfy those 
requirements. First: If epya vofwv meant "obedience to the Law," then if Paul were 
discussing means (and thus cause) of justification when he says "by epya vonov shall no flesh 
be justified" (Gal. 2:16), he would obviously be contradicting his belief that obedience is a 
precondition for justification. On the other hand, if instead he were discussing meaning and 
criteria (of "righteousness" and thus of "justification"), with this same "obedience" meaning 
of epya vofiov, then in Gal. 2:16 he would be saying that obedience to God is not a criterion 
of "righteousness," even though he also considered it a prerequisite of justification. Those 
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last two beliefs, taken together, would only suggest that something else, not logically 
equivalent to Law-obedience, but of which the latter is a prerequisite, is a criterion of 
"righteousness." But that could only be "accomplishments"; and we already know that for 
Paul obedience, not accomplishments, is a criterion of (both "faith" and) "righteousness." 
So whether "means" or "meaning" is Paul's issue, epya vopov could not mean "obedience to 
the Law" without contradicting our previous conclusion that for Paul, "obedience to God" is 
a precondition for justification. This contradiction leaves "accomplishments" (a hyponym of 
the category "endeavours") as the only possible general meaning for Paul's term epya in the 
phrase epya vo/wv. We affirm therefore (in confirmation of some previous arguments in this 
chapter) that "accomplishments of the Law" is what Paul means by the phrase. 
But now something else is also entailed. By epya voiwv in Gal. 2:16 Paul is thus 
denoting something that, while conceptually distinct from "obedience," is not physically 
distinct from it. That is to say, all accomplishments of God's Law are endeavours, even if 
not all endeavours towards it are accomplishments. As another example of this semantic 
relation (called "hyponomy"), every rose is a flower, but flowers are not always roses. So if 
Paul said "A man is justified by beautiful flowers and not by beautiful roses," we would 
know he was really talking about a criterion of right-standing (in a flower-show perhaps), not 
about the means of right-standing. For strictly speaking, beautiful roses would necessarily be 
as effective a means as are beautiful flowers, because in fact they are beautiful flowers. 
Likewise then, if Paul believes that obedience (i.e., endeavour to fulfil the commands) is a 
prerequisite of justification but asserts that particular accomplishments (or particular amounts 
of them) are not, then Paul must (in contrast to his opponents) be talking not about "means" 
but about the meaning or criterion of "righteousness" and (thus) that of "justification." For 
accomplishments would necessarily be as effective a means of justification as would 
endeavours, because in fact they are endeavours. Thus Paul is saying that God's criterion of 
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"righteousness" includes the notion "obedience" (endeavour to carry out commands), but not 
that of "accomplishments." 
We have derived here three conclusions concerning Paul's key word-meanings in this 
part of Galatians, including Gal. 3:10-14. In the process, we have arrived at a general idea 
of Paul's rhetorical purpose and overall meaning, at least in the parts of Galatians in which 
he is arguing that we are justified not e£ epyw pdfwv but c/c moreug. As noted above, 
however, that may or may not be true of our target passage, 3:10-14; thus we must hold this 
only as a working exegetical hypothesis. Let us state then the following working hypothesis, 
as an overall-only (and thus partial), coherent and supported reading of Paul's general 
meaning and rhetorical purpose in at least this part of Galatians: According to the passages 
where he opposes epya vopov to monq, Paul is arguing, not about the means to 
righteousness or to justification, but about the meaning of (i.e., the extra-linguistic reality 
denoted by) the idea "righteousness" (which is a discourse concept to Paul), and thus also 
that of the idea "justification," in the context of God's covenant. More specifically, he is 
arguing that in that covenantal context, and thus in accordance with the "conditions"/terms of 
that covenant, not any particular amount of "acts (i.e., accomplishments) of the Law" but 
rather the (to him) logically non-equivalent attribute "faith (in Christ, to save those who 
steadfastly obey God, precisely because they do obey him)," is a valid (albeit not uniquely 
so) criterion of "righteousness." 
Thus, Paul's rhetoric deals not with any causa essendi but rather, being about the 
definition and thus the discerning of "righteousness" in this context, deals merely with 
implication or causa cognoscendi. Nothing we have found in chapter 2's survey, regarding 
any of the three levels of meaning, has made this hypothesis unfeasible; on the other hand, 
considerations in chapter 3 have separately or conjointly supported this hypothesis. Nor, in 
our awareness, is there any Pauline data that contradicts it. 
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3.8 The focus in Gal. 2:14-3:1: "the Law" or "works of the Law"? 
However, although we will not engage in any detailed exegesis of 2:14-3:9, there is one 
question which the passage as a whole raises here and which bears on this issue of Paul's 
overall topic in Galatians. That is the question whether Paul is fundamentally speaking about 
"the Law" or about the matter of justification (and "works of the Law" as contrasted with 
"faith"). This question has commonly been overlooked by commentators. Perhaps this is 
due to the general assumption (sometimes conscious, sometimes not) that when Paul 
disparages "the Law" this is simply another way of his disparaging endeavour—that is, 
"works of the Law"—conceived as meriting one's justification. But the question is not so 
easily disposed of: why, i f Paul means "works of the Law," does he say "the Law"? Clearly 
they are not synonyms. With the assumption that Paul is discussing means rather than 
meaning, this question is quite difficult to answer. It is all the more puzzling inasmuch as 
Paul in fact cites the Mosaic code as if some of its stipulations were for him quite 
authoritative (e.g., Gal. 5:13-14, 23; Rom. 13:8-10; cf. Eph. 6:1-3). This evinces of course 
the notorious paradox of Paul's positive-negative attitude towards "the Law." 
The key to these puzzles, we would suggest, is to note that a covenant's terms are 
essentially a kind of performative, "constitutive," social meaning, which in fact can change 
or vary independently of changes in the text in which it is ostensibly recorded: 
Just as language is constituted by articulate sound and meaning, so social 
institutions and human cultures have meanings as intrinsic components. . . . 
What is true of cultural achievements, no less is true of social institutions. The 
family, the state, the law, the economy are not fixed and immutable entities. 
They adapt to changing circumstances; they can be reconceived in the light of 
new ideas; they can be subjected to revolutionary change. But all such change 
involves change of meaning—a change of idea or concept, a change of judgment 
or evaluation, a change of the order or request. The state can be changed by 
rewriting its constitution. More subtly but no less effectively it can be changed 
by reinterpreting the constitution or again, by working on men's minds and 
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hearts to change the objects that command their respect, hold their allegiance, 
fire their loyalty. (Lonergan 1973, 78, cf. 74-75, emphasis ours) 
So if Paul is discussing social meaning, rather than means, in speaking of "the Law" he is 
not talking about an external artifact, the Mosaic text, but is operating in a semantic domain 
that concerns the inner, cognitional matter of that text's covenantal meaning (and its proper 
construal). This fact has potential to explain much: for even though Paul does not spend 
much time (if any) exegeting the Mosaic text for its meaning, his concern could still be the 
text's fundamental covenantal meaning, for he apparently finds two contrasting but intended 
covenantal meanings in the Mosaic text (see above, § 3.4). So in opposing "the Law" he 
may be opposing only his opponents' construing, as the text's fundamental intended meaning, 
some particular level of meaning in that text (e.g., the literal level). 
This sorts out the difficulty of Paul's positive-negative attitude towards "the Law": 
generally when using this term he speaks of that discourse and meaning-level which his 
opponents construe as the essential (or even only) meaning of the Mosaic text; but sometimes 
he intends that (Christological-typological?) discourse and meaning-level which he himself 
takes as the text's essential meaning. But how does this meaning-orientation of his term "the 
Law" sort out the question about "the Law" versus "works of the Law" as Paul's more 
primary topic? The answer is that for him the question of "the Law's" jurisdiction and that 
of the true meaning of human "righteousness" before God would be simply two ways of 
stating the same question. They are both questions of God's social, covenantal meaning. 
Paul treats them as interchangeable questions, because for him they are interchangeable, even 
identical questions. Its unique power to resolve this exegetical puzzle is additional 
corroboration of our hypothesis that Paul is talking about the meaning, rather than the means, 
of justification. To connect back to the first matter we discussed in chapter 2 (viz., rhetorical 
genre), Paul's issue is, not "how one can meet the requirements of God's law or covenant," 
but rather "to what sort of, or to which, law or covenant God has given jurisdiction." 
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In this chapter we have covered some important features of this passage's context which are 
commonly neglected or misconstrued. We believe we have dealt adequately here with the 
topic of the passage's "contexts." We have perhaps not dealt with every exegetically relevant 
aspect of the contexts of Gal. 3:10-14; we have not dealt with the letter's date, for example. 
But others deal with these topics. At any rate, our analysis has taken care to avoid making 
insufficiently-supported assumptions about Paul's meanings (his denotations) based on his key 
words (creating a "words-things" hermeneutical circle), and has allowed us to derive a well-
grounded working hypothesis as to Paul's rhetorical purpose and meaning in this part of 
Galatians (i.e., at least 2:14-3:14). 
We must remember, however, that it is a "working" theory only, and so be careful, as 
with any passage, to base our conclusions firmly on our passage's relevant data, lest we 
inadvertently entangle ourselves in a "parts-whole" hermeneutical circle (cf. above). 
Theoretically, at least, there are ways in which one might be able to argue for the truth of our 
hypothesis from that passage, besides the points we have raised in this chapter. For example, 
one might attempt to show that Paul's argument presupposes that his justification-statements 
in 3:11b and 3:12b, which (as we shall see) appear to be universal-positive, A-type 
statements, are actually "simply convertible" and thus "covenantal converses" (see chap. 2: 
definitive statements, criteria), and thus must be about meaning (of "righteousness" and of 
"justification") rather than about means (to the latter). Again, one might attempt to show 
that Paul's main concern is evidently on the negative side, on what "righteousness" does not 
mean (viz., epya pdfiov), rather than on what it does mean (e.g., nionq Xpiarov). But in 
any case, let us now turn to our passage and begin our exegesis. 
Chapter 4 
The structure and meaning of 3:10 
The first verse of 3:10-14 is perhaps the most controversial. Since Luther, and probably 
before, commentators have perceived a major obstacle for interpreting it: 
Whereas Paul's own statement appears to pronounce a "curse" upon anyone who 
would attempt to live by the Jewish Torah, the biblical text to which he appeals 
clearly affirms the opposite: its "curse" falls not on those who do the Law, but 
on those who fail to do it. What is Paul trying to say? Does he simply 
misunderstand his citation at this point? Or is there an underlying link between 
text and "interpretation" that is not evident at first sight? (Stanley 1990, 481)1 
This is doubtless the most arresting and baffling aspect of the exegesis of 3:10-14 as a 
whole. We have already dealt with some of the proposed solutions in chapter 1; and the least 
plausible of these suggestions we shall disregard in the present chapter. These include 
Sanders' suggestion (1983, 21-27) that Paul chose Deut. 27:26 merely because it uniquely 
contained both concepts "the Law" and "curse." Paul would have noticed that it contained 
the (presumably inconvenient) word not as well. Likewise we omit Bultmann's explanation, 
that for Paul obedience to the Law is sinful in itself. We will also disregard Stanley's (1990) 
1. While Stanley's summary of the problem seems clearest, most other commentators have indicated 
this conundrum. 
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suggestion, apparently independently proposed by Braswell (1991), accepted by Bonneau 
(1997), and elaborated upon by Young (1998), that Paul was warning against becoming e£ 
epywv vofiov because of the associated risk that one might then incur a curse, out of (only 
potential) disobedience.2 
Not so easy to dismiss, due to their plausibility, are what Stanley rightly calls "the 
most common solution by far," namely supplying an unstated premise that all humans fail to 
do all the things written in the law, and the even simpler reconstruction, offered with varying 
explanations, that according to the only intended missing premise none of those who are e£ 
epyuv vofiov abides by all things written in the Law.3 We will interact with these further 
below. Also requiring more careful consideration is the view of E. D. Burton (1921), which 
denies that Paul is actually affirming the curse, but rather he infers it only in order to show 
the non-feasibility of its premise, the Law's legal force and validity. 
Despite this variety there is nearly a consensus, one may say, around the idea that Paul 
is cautioning here against the adverse consequences of Law-adherence. He is warning that if 
the Galatians start observing the Law in order to be justified, they shall (or "might," says 
Stanley) reap the awful end result, a curse.4 It does however give one pause, that this nearly 
universal consensus accompanies the almost-as-universal disagreement about what Paul 
actually says in the argument. Perhaps our investigation may shed some light on either or 
2. We dismiss also therewith the issue of the significance or lack thereof in Paul's use of itirb 
KaTupav in 3:10a rather than the term e-KiKondparoq which appears in his citation of Deut. 
27:26. 
3. As we have seen, this type of explanation includes the thesis of Martin Noth (1966), N. T. Wright 
(1992), James Scott (1993), and Scott Hafemann (1997), that Paul is speaking of the 
Deuteronomic curse and exile that came on Israel collectively for her disobedience, under which, 
in a way, she still languished at Paul's time; and the thesis of Dunn, that it is the contemporary 
Jews' exclusivistic and misguided fixation upon the Law as "boundary marker," and particularly 
upon its rituals, that Paul is condemning. Also we may include here the positions of D. P. Fuller 
(1975) and of H . D. Betz (1979), even though they spurned the traditional idea of an unstated 
premise in 3:10; for they themselves simply relate Paul's logic in another, less formal way, and as 
a different logical content. 
4. So Longenecker 1990, 117; most other commentaries. 
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both questions. Let us first set out the relevant biblical texts (we cite KJV as a literal English 
translation): 
Galatians 3:10 (KJV) 
For as many as are of the works of 
the law are under the curse: for it is 
written, Cursed is every one that 
continueth not in all things which 
are written in the book of the law to 
do them. 
Deut. 27:26a (BHS) 
oriiN nie7#? nx'Tivrninn 
Galatians 3:10 (UBSGNT) 
oooi yap e£ epyup vofwv eiaiv, biro 
nardpav tioiv yeypairTca yap on 
'EiriKonapuTog nag dg OVK ewievei 
•naoiv jo'ig yeypap-fiepoig kv T<J> 
/3tj3\i<f> rov voi&ov rov -novqoai uvia. 
Deut. 27:26a (Rahlfs) 
'EmicaTapotTog irag ocvOpuirog, dg 
OVK iiifiEvcl iv Tcaoiv Tolg \6yoig TOO 
VOfWV T0VTOV TOl) TTOLTfOai avTovg' 
4.1 Significance of oooi instead of ot, which Paul used in 3:9? 
One possibly relevant datum is that Paul's subject in 10a is oooi e£ epyuv pofwv, "as many as 
are of the deeds of the Law," whereas his subject in verse 9 (possibly in antithetical parallel 
to vs. 10) is simply oi e/c moreag, "those who are of faith" (Stanley 1990, 497-98). We 
have already dismissed Stanley's claim that by this shift Paul intends a potentiality that those 
who are e£ epyu>v vbfwv might become cursed. But is there anything else which Paul may 
intend by this shift in terms? In particular, might it not indicate that Paul is warning against 
the curse that comes upon Law-adherence? 
The real significance, i f any, of this choice of words awaits a full understanding of 
Paul's argument in this verse. In any case, that significance is probably more rhetorical or 
stylistic than lexical-semantic. The word oooi itself conveys hardly any more or different 
content than does the oi of verse 9, and only in emphasising that "every one (of them), no 
matter how many," are under a curse. 
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4.2 Significance of lOb's textual differences from the LXX? 
Two other word-choices in verse 10 have been cited as significant. These both involve the 
difference between Paul's wording and that of the LXX which he cites. It is clear from the 
number of key words in common (and particularly enpevei) that Paul is citing the LXX rather 
than the MT. However, there are a couple of divergences, big enough that one may wonder 
if Paul is trying to alter the meaning. 
4.2.1 What does the added phrase "written in the book of" signify, if anything? 
The LXX version of Deut. 27:26 says everyone is cursed who does not abide in •Kaatv rolq 
\6yoig TOV vonov TOVTOV ("all the words of this Law") to do them. Paul writes instead that 
everyone is cursed who does not abide in Traffic Tolq ytypami£voi<; ep rcjj /5I/?XU$) TOV vofiov 
("all the things written in the book of the Law") to do them. Some have concluded that Paul 
means to take in the whole Law ay opposed to the original intent of Deut. 27:26 which 
comprehended only "this Law," that is, the "dodecalogue" of 27:15-26.5 
But it is doubtful that many Jews would have taken the LXX's rendering of Deut. 27:26 
in the latter, restricted way. In the first place, the phrase "words of this Law" is used 
commonly elsewhere in Deuteronomy (two instances of which are earlier in chapter 27 itself), 
not referring to the "dodecalogue."6 Furthermore, note the parallels with "words of this 
covenant" in 29:1 (28:69 Heb.) and 29:9(8), and note 29:21(20): "Then the LORD will 
single him out for adversity from all the tribes of Israel, according to all the curses of the 
covenant which are written in this book of the law" (NASB, emphasis ours), and Exod. 24:7: 
"the book of the covenant." The Hebrew word for "law," n*]1fl, can also mean "teaching, 
instruction," and is thus often used of the covenant as a whole: "The law specifically is the 
5. E.g. , Fung 1988, 141; Caneday 1989, 195; Matera 1992, 123; Ziesler 1992, 36; McLean 1996, 
120; Witherington 1998, 232 n. 104. 
6. Deut. 17:19; 27:3, 8; 28:58, 61; 29:21(20 Heb.), 29(28); 30:10; 31:12, 24-26; 32:46. 
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stipulations of the covenant. But in the broad sense of law, namely God's teaching, covenant 
plays the central part" (TWOT, 404). Indeed, what is commonly called "the Mosaic law" is 
actually the document(s) establishing God's covenant with Israel: "Then the LORD said to 
Moses, 'Write down these words, for in accordance with these words I have made a covenant 
with you and with Israel.' . . . And he wrote on the tablets the words of the covenant, the 
Ten Commandments" (Exod. 34:7, NASB).7 Since rnifl refers here to the whole covenantal 
revelation made through Moses, and since it is a "referential" term (i.e., a label for a specific 
extralinguistic object or reality), we can assume that pofioq in the LXX of Deut. 27:26 refers 
to the same thing (Silva 1983, 94, 107). Therefore, to "stand by all the words of this Law" 
meant, even originally, something like to "stand by all the words of this book of the 
covenant."8 
The phrase which Paul uses instead, "things written in the book of the Law," seems 
unexceptional in light of these passages. Furthermore, it appears in several other places 
towards the end of Deuteronomy (28:61; 29:21; 29:27; 30:10). Probably Paul altered 27:26 
unintentionally, while quoting it from memory. There is no reason, then, to think that Paul 
meant to alter the meaning of his citation by this change of wording. 
4.2.2 What does the term "all" (things written in the Law), a term absent from the MTbut 
present in the LXX, signify here, if anything? 
How significant might be the word "all" in the above phrase {"all things written . . .")? 
Though missing from the MT, it is in the LXX, and Paul does seem to be citing the LXX 
version; so this may well be a mere textual matter rather than a particular point Paul is trying 
to make. After all, the distributive meaning "all" would seem to be naturally suggested even 
7. The Law given at Sinai, and not the Exodus, is that which established the covenant (Exod. 19:3-
6; 24:4-8; 34:27-28; Deut. 4:13, 23; 5:2; 9:9, 11, 15; 29:1, 9, 12, 14-15), contra several 
commentators (e.g., Sanders 1977, 419, quoting H . A. A. Kennedy; Hong 1994, 175-76). 
8. Contra Bruce 1982b, 158; Fung 1988, 141; Hong 1993, 80. 
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in the MT's wording (Longenecker 1990, 117). On the other hand, Hubner (1984, 18-19) 
has suggested not unreasonably that Paul chose the LXX version over the MT precisely 
because of this extra word: In the Hebrew text of Deut. 27:11-26, says Hubner, "the 
requirements of this dodecalogue are thought of as being altogether capable of achievement"; 
so Paul uses the LXX text because he "is able to deduce from this version the 
theologoumenon which is important to him and according to which each one is guilty because 
there is no individual person who has done everything that is commanded in the Law" (ibid., 
19, emphasis in original; here Hubner is maintaining the traditional reconstruction of Paul's 
argument, with its unstated but intended premise that "no human being does all the things 
written in the Law"). 
Now, it is doubtful that we have any real shift in meaning between the MT and the 
LXX. The LXX here views the commandments distributively rather than collectively,9 but 
probably the MT does too, in which case the meaning stays the same. On the other hand, it 
is not at all impossible that Paul intended to reinforce this meaning, by citing the LXX text 
rather than the MT. But here again we have no evidence to suggest a semantic shift or 
different nuance on Paul's part. In any case, he reads the text distributively, that is, as 
referring to each and every one of the commands written in the Law. 
4.3 The sense of yap in 3:10a 
The conjunction yap is usually translated with the illative sense "for, because" in the New 
Testament. Doubtless this is how it is intended in 3:10b. However, although it is 
undoubtedly the most common sense of yap in the NT, this translation has been "greatly 
overworked" (DM, 243). At any rate, in Gal. 3:10 the KJV, RSV, NRSV, NKJV, and 
NASB translate also the yap in 10a as "for"; the NIV leaves it untranslated. 
9. See Zerwick 1963, §188. 
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Commentaries commenting on Galatians 3:10a generally translate the yap as "for," if 
at all; but;though they often make no comment on the conjunction itself, those that do 
comment on it generally shy away from this illative sense. Betz (1979, 144 n. 50) asserts 
that in 3:10a yap is best taken "as inferential ('certainly, so, then') or as marking another 
step in the argument"; Morris (1996, ad loc.) and Eckstein (1996, 122) concur.10 Both of 
these, the "inferential" and the " continuative," are clearly potential senses of this conjunction 
itself (BAGD, s.v., 3-4). 
But it seems clear that here Paul is using it neither "demonstratively" nor 
"inferentially." He proves that "those who believe are blessed with Abraham who believed" 
(3:9 NRSV) not from verse 10, but rather from the scripture-citations in verses 6-8. At any 
rate, it is difficult to see how a curse on OOOL e£ cpywv vopjov would imply a blessing on oi e« 
TTi'ffTeco?; Likewise he does not seem to prove 10a by verse 9, but rather by the scripture-
citation in 10b. We must appeal then to some other sense of.yap than either the 
"demonstrative" or the "inferential." 
The "continuative sense" is still open to us, as also the "explanatory sense." Dunn 
(1993a, 171) and Longenecker (1990, 116) both translate yap in 3:10a as "for," but their 
comments give it an explanatory sense and say that Paul is going to explain or expdsit, 
starting in 3:10a, the point he was making in 3:6-9. There is also an "emphatic" force that 
yap may take, especially when combined with other particles, as in /xrj yap, aXka yap, ri 
7040; it may be variously translated "yes; in truth," "in fact," "indeed," "really," 
"certainly," "why!" or "what!" (DM, 243-44; BAGD, s.v., l . f . ; BDF §452). GLNT 
categorises this last sense with the inferential, or "conclusive," sense. At any rate, this sense 
10. Eckstein says that yap is used here "nicht als begriindend, sondern als ankniipfend bzw. 
fortfuhiend zu bestimmen" (p. 122); but he gives as possible translations, "»allerdings«, 
»freilich«, »aber«," the last of which is a sort of adversative, exceeding a strictly "continuative" 
sense. Cf. Zerwick 1963, §472, on one adversative sense of yap, under which he categorises 
Gal. 3:10a. 
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does not seem to fit the argumentative context of Gal. 3:10 so well as the other two. Nor is 
there any evidence that Paul intended an exclamatory or emphatic sense here. 
The continuative sense, probably best translated by a simple "and," is so plain as to 
have few opportunities to conflict with any context. Nevertheless it is inadequate here, 
because there are plentiful indications that Paul meant something more specific. For 
example, there is the clear disjunction between "blessed" in verse 9 and "cursed" in verse 
10. Is this merely coincidental, or should we see Paul as commumcating a more pregnant 
connection between these verses than a simple "and"? It is difficult to see how verse 10, a 
curse-statement, can be relevant to and serve the same ultimate point as verse 9, a blessing-
statement (which seems to be the case, since 3:2-14 are in a chiasm dealing with the "works 
of the law" vs. "faith" justification-dispute), (/"the connection here is merely continuative. 
Between these two verses we have not only the contrast of blessing and curse, but also the 
contrast Paul has been making all along, that of justification "by faith" and justification "by 
works of the Law." Paul would certainly take "blessing" and "cursing" as opposites, and 
has clearly done likewise with justification "by faith" and "by works of the Law" in 3:2-5. 
It is extremely unlikely that these antonymous oppositions between verses 9 and 10 are 
merely coincidental in the flow of Paul's discourse: it would require, in fact, that Paul give 
some indication that this contrast were not his focus. Therefore, we must cast around for 
some specific way in which 3:10 is "explanatory" of 3:9, in order to understand the logic of 
Paul's evident "explanation." 
It may seem dubious at first, that a proposition about "curse" could be explanatory of a 
proposition about "blessing." To be explanatory, a proposition would need to be saying 
more or less the same thing, that is, declaring the same situation, as the first proposition, 
although demonstrating or highlighting that situation in a somewhat different way; how then 
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could some proposition about blessing be elaborating the same situation as a proposition 
about curse, which is the opposite of blessing? In fact, all that is necessary for this is that 
the proposition which is expressed negatively must really be a double negative. 
In order to say essentially the same thing as the positive proposition, a statement 
which already has a negative element within it, in the form of an antonym, must 
in turn be negated. (Poythress 1982, 186) 
Poythress gives several examples of this type of prepositional relation from Scripture, 
including (the italics indicate the double pairs of opposites): 
Mark 3:29 
but whoever blasphemes against the Holy Spirit never has forgiveness, but is 
guilty of an eternal sin. 
Prov. 19:9 
A false witness will not go unpunished, 
and he who utters lies will perish. 
It is clear that two verses, dealing respectively with a blessing and a curse, may nevertheless 
be explanatory of each other, or at least the second be explanatory of the first. One can 
easily make up a sententious, semantically biblical example: "Blessed shall be those who 
serve the Lord; but those who rebel shall be cursed. " n Thus all we need for 3:10 to be 
explanatory of 3:9 is to find another pair of negations involved, perhaps an antonymous 
opposition, in addition to the blessing-curse disjunction. And since there are no verb-
negations (oil's) here, we must look for a pair of antonyms. These must be crucial, pivotal 
11. Williams (1997, 88) makes the understandable error of supposing that a propositional connection 
translated as "but" would imply that the two connected propositions are antithetical (which sense 
yap does not support). But Poythress (1982) makes clear that there are at least three different 
propositional relations commonly represented by "but": an explanatory "but" (as in the above 
sentence), which Poythress calls a Positive-Negation of Negative relation (ibid., 186f.; this is our 
reading of yap in 3:9-10); a Concession-Contraexpectation relation (ibid., 176); and an 
Opposition relation (ibid., 189f.). "The Opposition relation is quite distinct both from the 
Positive-Negation of Negative relation . . . and from the Concession-Contraexpectation relation 
. . . It differs from Positive-Negation of Negative in that the second proposition is in tension with 
rather than simply in reaffirmation of the first. It differs from Concession-Contraexpectation in 
that there is no cause-effect temporal sequence involved in Opposition" (ibid., 190). 
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parts of the subject or predicate, so as to effect this opposition in the very meaning of the 
sentence. 
The obvious candidates for antonymous opposites here are "those of works of the 
Law" and "those of faith." But here we run into a difficulty; we have already argued, just 
previously, that these social classes would not have been already seen as opposites, as 
mutually exclusive, by Paul's readers. The theories of faith-justification, on the one hand, 
and of "works of the Law"-justification on the other, are indeed apparently disjunctive in 
Paul's eyes, in the sense that they cannot both be true; on any other assumption, his rhetoric 
in 2:16 and in 3:2-6, if not 3:6-9 also, would be rendered quite unintelligible. And if Paul 
could demonstrate on independent grounds that those who are e$ epyav vdfwv are cursed, his 
argument would not need to presuppose any such groi^p-disjunction (unlike the argument-
reconstruction we critiqued above), for his double negation would supply it (again, those who 
are cursed are ipso facto absent from among those who are blessed). He leaves the grounds 
for this curse unstated (but intended) in 3:10, but it is likely that he is intending 3:10 to 
evoke previous teaching he had given to the Galatians; the unstated premise might thus 
emerge from the "presupposition pool" of earlier discourse. 
Therefore it is reasonable to conclude that Paul means 10a as a double negative of 
verse 9: "cursed" is set over against "blessed," and "those who are partisans of the deeds of 
the Law" is set over against "those who are partisans of faith." Paul thus means yap in an 
"explanatory" sense, its most likely translation being "but."1 2 
12. Cf. Zerwick 1963, §472. It is interesting to note a seemingly parallel use of yap in Rom. 1:18, 
connecting a statement on the "righteousness of God" revealed in the gospel upon those who have 
faith, with a passage on the "wrath of God" revealed from heaven upon those who rebel against 
God in unrighteousness. Seeing that Romans 2 turns the tables of this latter condemnation on the 
Jews who tried to disfranchise Gentiles from good standing in the church (Dunn 1991d), it is quite 
possible that Paul's basic arguments are working along the same lines in both Rom. 1:17-18 and 
Gal. 3:9-10. 
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4.4 The force of "cursed": as inherently powerful and effectual, or merely as 
pronouncement of guilt/liability? 
As a further word-study in 3:10, we need to consider the meaning of "cursed" 
(eiriKaTapoiTog). What exactly does Paul mean by "cursed"? Even if we understand that the 
curse here is a pronouncement against transgressors of the Law/covenant (Deut. 27:26), the 
question arises whether it was just a pronouncement or whether the pronouncement itself was 
seen to have an inherent power, or at least inherent implications consisting in an effect. This 
important question is seldom explicitly raised in connection with this verse. As a result, 
many have exegeted this verse without being aware of the Pauline-theological and -rhetorical 
implications of their reconstruction. 
In the modern world, if someone was said to have "cursed" someone else, it would 
simply mean a statement or discourse of some sort, perhaps a wish for evil to fall upon that 
person. It would seldom mean that the pronounced words carried some inherent power to 
bring disaster into the life of the cursed. But the latter was a common view in the ancient 
world, including the biblical world, as it still is in some primitive societies today.13 
What has been called the "traditional" view of such phenomena occurring in the Bible, 
accounts for them as remnants of primitive, "magical" worldviews, which ways of thought 
were eventually almost overcome by the cultic worship and monotheism of Israel (Morland 
1995, 4). 1 4 The (residual) influence of this "traditional" view is problematic for a number of 
13. See the encyclopaedias, such as ISBE and NBD, s.v. "curse." See also the survey of study on 
curses in the Bible, in Morland 1995, 2-13. Cf. Blank 1951, 78, 82f.; McLean 1996, 122f.; 
Finnegan 1969. Curses were a part of treaties and many other sorts of writings in the ancient 
Near East; but they were never intended simply as an impotent expression of a wish (ISBE, 
1:837-38). 
14. But this traditional, easy disjunction between "magic" and "monotheism" has come under 
increasing scrutiny and criticism. The questions "what is magic," what is the relationship of 
"magic" and "religion," and whether the two are not essentially similar, are now being asked by 
various history-of-religion scholars, some of whose answers draw on social-scientific research. 
No consensus seems imminent, however. There are at least three positions: what we might call 
the mediating position sees magic and religion as two poles within a single continuum, rather man 
basically similar or basically dissimilar. For a recent representative of the traditional view, see 
Kee 1986, 95-121; for representatives of the view that magic and religion are basically similar, 
see Mauss 1972; Smith 1978; for the mediating position, see Goode 1949; 1951. For a survey of 
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reasons. First, the scholarly consensus has shifted in the middle and later 20th century, 
towards a view that sees the curses in the Hebrew Bible as juridical formulae of social 
expulsion from family, clan, or other community (Thiselton 1974, 294-96; Morland 1995, 5-
7). 
Secondly (and this is not the fault of the traditional view itself), to regard such 
pronouncements in Scripture as remnants of "magical thinking'' might incline us to dismiss 
too quickly the idea that there is real power inherent in them (particularly when they are 
made by or with the sanction of God). Such a dismissive attitude would follow from a false 
alternative between what has been called a "dianoetic" and a "dynamic" view of language: 
the "dianoetic" sees words as each simply expressive of an idea, whereas the "dynamic" 
view sees words as material forces, filled with power (Thiselton 1974, 297). This 
sometimes-alleged alternative overlooks an important linguistic and pragmatic phenomenon 
described by J. L. Austin, called "performative language" (ibid., 293).15 As an example, 
"When a bachelor in appropriate circumstances answers the question 'Wilt thou . . . take this 
woman . . .' with the words ' I do', he is not giving anyone information, he is actually 
marrying a bride" (ibid.). Significantly, Austin classifies blessing and cursing as examples of 
performative language. When spoken by someone in the proper position, within a social 
context in which an accepted conventional procedure has a certain conventional effect, such 
language has force; Austin calls this "illocutionary" force (ibid.). Such includes some 
pronouncements which "themselves effect an award, a sentence, or a commitment. But they 
no more depend upon primitive notions of word-magic than a modern judge and jury do when 
incantations and "magic" in ancient and early-mediaeval Jewish literature, see Alexander 1986. 
For an overview of the social-scientific research, see Versnel 1991. For a discussion of the 
methodological question "what is magic," see Garrett 1989, 1-36. I owe these citations and this 
point to Dr. Loren T. Stuckenbruck's seminar presentation at the University of Durham, 15 
January 1996, on the topic "Magic in the Ancient World and the New Testament." 
15. See e.g. Austin 1962. 
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their words actually consign a man to prison or to freedom" (ibid., 296, emphasis in 
original). 
But a dismissive rationalising away of the force behind and implicit in biblical curse-
pronouncements, might acknowledge this phenomenon of performative language and its 
relevance to the biblical curse material and yet talk as if the God of Paul were nevertheless 
quite free to pronounce covenantal curses and then not to follow through with the indicated 
punishment. This viewpoint seems manifest, for example, in Evans 1994, 82: 
The curse is not, strictly speaking, a punishment for not keeping the law . . . 
This explains why the curses outlined in Deuteronomy were not always or 
automatically found as a result of behaviour which theoretically should have 
brought them into play. God's mercy has to be seen as a significant factor in the 
equation. It is true that everyone who breaks the covenant stands under the 
threat of the curse. Of course they do, because to break the covenant is to be 
outside the covenant, and to be outside the covenant is what it means to be 
cursed. To acknowledge the significance of the curse and the effectiveness of 
the curse, then, is not a simple statement of legalism. Everything hangs on the 
question of relationship with God as a living reality rather than on what Eichrodt 
describes as 'the mechanism of a distributive justice, dispensing reward and 
punishment.' 
The reference to "legalism" here with obvious bad connotation betrays certain theological 
presuppositions at work. Were God to be so "legalistic" as to follow strictly the covenantal 
terms which he laid down in Deuteronomy, suggests Evans, he would be reduced to a mere 
mechanism. (Presumably the same is true of judges today who enforce the laws in this 
fashion.) But this approach glides past the difficult and pertinent question of how God could 
with integrity allow rebellion against his covenantal authority to go unpunished. How, for 
example, would we account for such a rigidly "legalistic" passage as this: 
Deut. 7:9 
Know therefore that the LORD your God is God, the faithful God who keeps 
covenant and steadfast love with those who love him and keep his 
commandments, to a thousand generations, 
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7:10 
and requites to their face those who hate him, by destroying them; he will not 
be slack with him who hates him, he will requite him to his face. 
It is not necessary for us here to address how Paul felt about this question: it is enough 
to show that the curse he mentions in 3:10 must have been an effectual one to Paul, or else he 
would undermine his evidently intended contrast we have already found with 3:9.16 That 
verse declares, "those who believe are blessed with Abraham who believed" (NRSV). We 
cannot simply assume here that oaoi e£ epyuv udfiov are cursed in some sense, and for some 
reason, that would apply just as well to oi EK irCoTewg. If they are cursed simply because 
they are human, say, and oi eic niareug are likewise human and therefore cursed in the same 
sense and for the same reason, we have failed to support the contrast between the groups: 
they are both "cursed" then. We see that if the blessing is real, so must the curse be, to 
uphold the contrast; we cannot have a pseudo-curse here, nor an impotent curse, which might 
apply to oi 6K irioTeoig as well. (This point is, of course, not undermined by the fact that the 
curse's power, perhaps even its pronouncement, may be seen as partially or completely 
delayed until the final, eschatological day of judgment, as would be the case in an apocalyptic 
Jewish eschatology like Paul's.) Just as the faithful are really blessed as per 3:9, a double-
negative contrast requires that the curse of 3:10 be just as real, just as effectual. 
This finding casts doubt on the idea that Paul's argument presupposes general human 
sinfulness and lack of means to muster the necessary Law-doing, assuming that the argument 
is affirmative of verse 10's statements (as in the traditional reading). For were that sort of 
premise part of such an argument, all humans (including Christians) would implicitly be 
really, eschatologically cursed.17 
16. See above, § 4.3. 
17. In regard to this alleged premise generally, and in regard particularly to the appeal sometimes 
made here to a "substitutionary-atonement" reading of vs. 13 as nevertheless accounting for the 
efficacy of this curse, see below, § 4.9.1, on the traditional reading of Paul's logic in vs. 10. 
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4.5 Type of argument: ultimately denying 10b? 
All this has certain implications for the question of Paul's type of argument in 3:10. We may 
as well consider those implications straightaway; let us therefore take an initial look at this 
question. We should note first that verse 10 evidently constitutes a self-contained 
enthymemic syllogism of some sort. The middle term, "abides by all things written, etc.," 
certainly does not appear again before 3:12b (if even there), and the minor term, "those who 
are e£ epyuv w/iou," does not appear again in the whole passage. Therefore the needed 
premise was left unstated. 
The initially-indicated choices for basic real-life-argument type, at least insofar as the 
evidently logos part of 3:10 is concerned, would probably be three: the syllogism, the 
polysyllogism or structurally similar positive argument, or the reductio ad absurdum or 
structurally similar negative argument (see above, chap. 2). The traditional reading, and 
most others, opt for one of the two former, affirming-type arguments; E. D. Burton (1921, 
163-65), almost alone in the 20th century, opted for the latter, denying type. In Burton's 
reading, Paul states the "implication-part" of this real-life argument and leaves the "belief-
part" unstated, which belief-part denies the truth of 3:10a and affirms the unstated premise in 
order to deny the stated premise, 3:10b. The unstated premise is the universal failure of man 
to do all the Law: 
Those that are of works of law are under the curse of the law, which falls on all 
who do not fully satisfy its requirements. This being so, Paul argues, the 
assumption of the legalist that the law is the basis of the divine judgment 
involves the conclusion that all men are accursed, and must be false. (Burton 
1921, 165) 
The reading has a fair degree of initial plausibility, assuming it correctly identifies the 
unstated premise. There is a significant problem however. According to this reading Paul is 
not affirming, but rather denying, that oaoi e£ epyu>v vdfwv are really under a curse. This 
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would undermine any contrast that Paul could have been trying to make with the "blessed" 
condition of those who are CK iriaTeug (vs. 9); for Paul is actually affirming, or at least 
agreeing with, the stated parts of 9, so that the "explanatory" yap assumes there is an 
affirmation or at least agreement in 10 as well. If the yap of 10a is evidently explanatory (as 
we have argued), then the evident double-negation between 9 and 10 must either be 
acknowledged, or Paul must give a clear indication that this evident intent is not really 
intended, and of what is intended.18 So Paul must be affirming or at least agreeing with 10a, 
so he cannot be denying it so as to deny 10b. This is a subtle problem, but a crucial and 
ultimately fatal one for Burton's reductio ad absurdum reconstruction of verse 10.1 9 
We infer that the argument is of some other type. Further consideration of the 
argument's type will wait until we have finished our word-studies in verse 10. 
4.6 The meaning of SK in e£ epyuv PO/IOV in 3:10a 
Much interesting semantic content has been extracted from the preposition <k in 10a, as from 
the same preposition in verse 9. In particular, it is taken as more or less axiomatic by many 
or perhaps most commentators that e£ epywp vopov here means approximately "relying upon 
or based upon works of the Law." It seems to be a common assumption that CK must retain 
here its original sense, "from." But this overlooks the point made by BAGD (s.v., 3.d.) that 
in such instances as these verses, "the idea of belonging often completely overshadows that of 
origin." BAGD offers under this heading translations of which the gist is "who are partisans 
o f or "who are members of the party of," and notes 3:7, 9 as examples. At any rate, 
18. This is due to the Quantity maxim of conversation; see above, chap. 2. 
19. This also happens to confirm our rejection of Stanley's "threat"-reading of the verse. For the 
contrast with verse 9 dictates that 10a affirm a real curse, not just the threat or potentiality of a 
curse (as to Stanley it appears to do), just as verse 9 pronounces a real blessing and not the 
potentiality of one. 
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nowhere does BAGD or any other lexicon give a sense of ex that could feasibly yield the 
translation of oi e£ epywv po/iou as "those who rely on works of the Law." 2 0 
This fact has an obvious bearing on the issue of Paul's overall rhetorical thrust, that is, 
on whether it is about legal matters such as jurisdiction and the content of "righteousness" or 
else about the means of righteousness or of justification. Paul is evidently saying that it is 
ultimately because oaoi e£ cpyup voftav are of the social group or party of the epya vofuov 
that they are cursed. This could conceivably mean that it is because they hold to a certain 
theory, or because they cleave to a certain ideology or to a certain party or social group 
whose banner or general distinctiveness is the epya vopov. What it does not and lexically 
cannot say, at least not by its wording, is what so many commentators have assumed it 
meant, something like "those who endeavour to fulfil the Law to merit favour with God, i.e., 
those who rely upon works of the Law." That may or may not be implied by what Paul says; 
that is a matter for investigation still. But it is not what Paul says. 
4.7 The meaning of the two main verbs in 3:10b, e/i/ieVet (+ dative) and rov 
iroiriam 
We must address the issue of whether Paul intends both these verbs as action-words, and if 
so whether as "attempt" or "accomplish." As we saw in chapter 2, this semantic issue is 
independent of the sociolinguistic, logical relationship for Paul between attributions of 
attempted doing of God's Law, and those of its accomplishment. Moreover the issue is 
important for our attempt to understand Paul's logic, since as we have seen Paul's worldview 
does not hold attributions of the Law's "accomplishment" and those of its "attempt" to be 
logically equivalent. 
20. Cf. BDF §§209(2), 437; Zerwick 1963, §134; Edwards 1972, 234, 235-36; Westerholm 1988, 
121 n. 40; Caneday 1989, 192 n. 30, 194; Stanley 1990, 497 n. 50; Bonneau 1997, 73; Kruse 
1997, 81 and n. 61; but contrariwise Hansen 1994, ad loc; Smiles 1998, 194 and n. 199; and 
many other commentators. 
A. H. Carver, 2000 §4.7 .1 Page 172 
4.7.1 Lexicographical issues 
First we should address the problem from the standpoint of lexicography. That is, does 
either term itself mean "accomplish" or can it more broadly mean "attempt" (where context 
allows), or perhaps must it always mean simply "attempt"? 
4.7.1.1 Lexicography of e^nem and syntax of TOD iroifjam 
We find the verb e^ teVoo used commonly with the dative following, or else with ev plus the 
dative. In his quotation in Gal. 3:10b, Paul alters the LXX by omitting the preposition ev; 
however, this is not a concern, for following this verb either of these constructions can have 
one of (probably) two senses: locative or associative.21 We find the former sense perhaps in 
Acts 14:22 (enfieveiv TJI irioTei); but the latter is the sense of the other NT instances of this 
verb (Acts 28:30, Heb. 8:9, and our verse), and in any context of keeping to vows, oaths, 
pledges, covenants, relationships, and so forth (e.g., Paul's use of uev the Law" in Rom. 
2:12; 3:19; 1 Cor. 9:21). 
This verb is, in NT interpretation, commonly translated "abide" or "remain." 
According to LN (1:656, 729), ennevu has two senses in the NT, one in the semantic domain 
"aspect" and subdomain "continue," with the sense "to continue in an activity or state" 
(translatable as "to continue, to remain in, to keep on"), and the other sense in the semantic 
domain "existence in space," subdomain "remain, stay," with the sense "to remain in the 
same place over a period of time." Clearly the word is, in Gal. 3:10, closer to the first 
sense; as an example of the word with this sense, LN translates from Heb. 8:9: "because they 
did not continue in my covenant," and it notes that "in Heb. 8:9 the implication of 'to 
continue in a covenant' is to adhere to the articles or stipulations of a covenant. Accordingly 
21. On the associative ev, see Zerwick 1963, §§116-17. On the associative dative, see BDF, §§193-
94, 198. It seems hard to imagine the use, with this verb, of either construction in the sense of 
"accompanying circumstances," which is a type of associative use. On the use of ev in the LXX 
(with an emphasis on the "ec of accompanying circumstances"), see Conybeare 1988, §91. 
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one may render He 8.9 as 'because they did not remain faithful to my covenant'" (LN, 
1:656). 
And yet one wonders whether the translation "continue, remain in" really captures all 
that is going on in Heb. 8:9. Is it the fact of continuing, of not leaving, that is in view here? 
If so, where did LN get the word faithful in its translation, "remain faithful to"? Perhaps the 
verb may have another sense, perhaps in a different semantic domain. BAGD (s.v., 2) seems 
more accurate in giving the sense as "persevere in, stand by nvi someth[ing]." LS expresses 
itself in similar terms. 
This notion of "stand by" or "stand with" is especially interesting, because 
surprisingly ennevu is used at least once in the LXX in the literal sense of "stand" (Deut. 
19:15). Moreover, pew is used quite often in that sense in the LXX, translating both Olj? 
(Qal) and *7»J7 (TDNT, 575), as well as in the sense of "stand by (an opinion)" (LS, s.v., 1.6); 
and the meaning of nzvw is not irrelevant, in light of the potential etymological 
"transparency" of efifievu.22 Perhaps, then, enfievu belongs also to a semantic domain with 
words meaning "stand (by or with)." Quite significant in this regard is Ecclus. 11:20-21: 
Ecclus. 11:20 
ET$)flt ev diadriKn aov mi 6/uAci ev Stand by your covenant and attend to 
ctVTQ teal ev T(j> epyq aov it, 
iraXaiwdifri. and grow old in your work. 
22. On the relevance of "transparency" for the present semantic significance of a word's etymology, 
seeSilva 1983, 48-51. 
7L-27 
/M) davnafr ev epyotg d/xapTcoXoO, 
irCareve be Kvpiq m i efineve rip Kbvq 
aov on Kov<j)ov ev d(f>da\fiolg nvpiov 
8ia T&xovq el-ainva irXovrioai 
nevrfra 
Do not wonder at the works of a 
sinner, 
but trust in the Lord and keep 
at your toil; 
for it is easy in the sight of the Lord 
to enrich a poor man quickly 
and suddenly (RSV). 
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Note here the interesting use of iornfu ("stand") in relation to diadfiKii in verse 20; this is 
significant for the meaning of enfiepo) also in a parallel passage such as Jer. 38(31 MT):32 
(cited in Heb. 8:9), of which there are numerous parallel usages in the LXX. Also 
significant for efinevu is the apparent parallelism between the first two clauses of vs. 20, 
closely relating "standing by your covenant" to "growing old in your work," and the 
corresponding expression of the idea, "keeping at your toil," in verse 21, by efipxuo} plus the 
dative.23 This all suggests further that we are on the right track in seeing ewxevw here as 
semantically related to Tovrnu, as a synonym. In fact LN (1:152, s.v. 'CorafwcL, §13.29) 
places IffTTj/u, used in this sense, in the semantic domain "be, become, exist, happen" and the 
subdomain "state," and gives it the sense "to continue firmly or well-established in a 
particular state," translatable (says LN) as "to firmly remain, to continue steadfastly." The 
additional idea of "by" or "with" is, of course, then related by the associative-dative 
construction (with or without ev) following the verb. 
Admittedly, there seems only a slight difference between this sense of e/i/iej/w and the 
one it had in the domain "aspect" and subdomain "continue," the difference consisting only 
in the notion of steadfastness. Yet in fact this is a whole different emphasis, different enough 
to put the idea in another semantic domain.24 Since in English "abide by" is an idiom 
meaning "to submit to, agree to" and "to remain steadfast or faithful to," it would surely be 
an acceptable translation of the verb when the word in the dative refers to vows, promises, 
commands, or other obligations. At any rate, to "stand [enfieveiv] by all the words of the 
Law" in this verse means, according to our analysis, something like to "stand steadfastly by 
all the words of the book of the covenant." 
23. Note also the correlation of these ideas in the quite parallel Pauline passage, 1 Cor. 15:58: ". . . 
be steadfast, immovable, always abounding in the work of the Lord, knowing that your toil is not 
in vain in the Lord [i.e., 'in' his covenant]" (NASB). 
24. LN (1:149 n.l) mentions the closeness of the "aspect" domain to the domain "be, become, exist, 
happen"; yet it also insists on a significant contrast between the senses belonging to the latter's 
subdomain "state" and similar senses belonging to the domain "aspect" (1:149 n.2). 
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The other major semantic element we need to examine is the infinitive-construct phrase 
TOV Tocfiaai oevrd which follows OVK efinevei ev iraoiv rolq X6701C TOV vdfwv TOVTOV in Deut. 
26:27 LXX, and we must ask what light, if any, that sheds on the meaning of e/x/xmo. Let 
us first consider the Hebrew, and in particular the grammar, of the MT here. The Hebrew of 
the infinitival phrase is D7l1x JllfPS?1?. Grammatically, the options for the Hebrew construction 
in this context are the "mfinitive of result" and the "explanatory" or "epexegetical" infinitive 
(explaining the "circumstances or nature of a preceding action"; Waltke and O'Connor 1990, 
§36.2.3, Wd-e; Williams 1976, §§195, 198).25 The options in LXX and NT Greek are the 
same (Conybeare and Stock 1988 [1905], §60b-c; Zerwick 1963, §§391-92).2 6 
Conybeare (1988 [1905], §60b) classifies the construction in Gal. 3:10b (Deut. 27:26) 
as "explanatory" infinitive. Waltke and O'Connor (1990, §36.2.3, 1e) similarly classify a 
parallel example (Deut. 13:19), also with ni^vV , of a common co-occurrence of "keeping" 
(1!3C>) and "doing" (nt£J7), the latter appearing either with the direct object "the commands" 
or with the adverbial phrase "according to all that I have commanded."27 This common 
construction often has HtPJ/ in the infinitive instead, sometimes has "100 in the infinitive, and 
often has neither in the infinitive, connecting the two with "1. This random pattern shows 
that when the infinitive nifrJ?V follows "ifitf in these parallelisms, it is not an infinitive of 
result, so must be an epexegetical-or-explanatory infinitive. Moreover, the same reasoning is 
true of the LXX translations of these verses. Since this is such a common pattern in these 
25. It seems impossible to fit the infinitive of purpose into a context like this. 
26. "The L X X is on the whole a literal translation, that is to say, it is only half translation—the 
vocabulary has been changed, but seldom the construction. We have therefore to deal with a work 
of which the vocabulary is Greek and the syntax Hebrew" (Conybeare and Stock 1988 [1905], 
§38). 
27. Examples of this parallelism in the Pentateuch include Gen. 18:19; Exod. 31:16; Lev. 18:30; 
19:37; 20:8, 22; 22:31; 25:18; 26:3; Deut. 4:6; 6:3; 7:11, 12; 8:1; 11:22; 12:1, 32 (13:1 Heb.); 
13:18(19); 16:12; 17:19; 19:9; 23:23(24); 24:8; 26:16; 28:13; 29:9(8). 
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covenantal contexts, it seems most likely that this is the sort of infinitive we have in Deut. 
27:26.28 
But let us be more precise. Are the "explanatory-or-epexegeticar instances of nifPJ?1? 
in these parallelisms, explanatory or epexegetical? That is to say, does the infinitive explain 
the circumstances, or else the nature, of the preceding action? It does not seem that the 
infinitive is used here merely to explain the circumstances or manner of the preceding action; 
would "doing" the commands be the mere manner or circumstances in which one "exercises 
care over" them? It seems clear that we have here a purely epexegetical, or glossing, 
infinitive. This is true of these parallelisms both in the MT and in the LXX. 
But if so, and especially if (as we have suggested) the parallel instance of Jlito^V in 
Deut. 27:26 is likewise following this epexegetical pattern, that would imply that e/i/imo 
with the dative construction has here necessarily some sense of action, and does not merely 
mean someone's goals, values, intentions, emotions, or any other state(s) of mind; for the 
infinitive phrase rov noifiam avrovq, which has a manifest action sense, is also epexegetical 
(and to be translated "[in, by] doing them") and not an infinitive of result. Although 
classifiable broadly as a "participle expressing manner or means," more informatively and 
precisely it "denotes the same action as that of the principal verb, describing it from a 
different point of view" (Burton 1976 [1900], §447). 2 9 The focus on action also shows that 
28. But also interesting in this regard is the form these parallelisms take sometimes, with as the 
first verb, and the direct object ("commands") or adverbial phrase only following the second verb 
(Xl1frj£ : "keep to do them"; see Deut. 5:1, 32; 6:25; 11:32; 17:10; 28:1, 15, 58; 31:12; 32:46). 
Since IDtf in the Qal (as in these verses) is an action-verb and does not carry the idea of "be 
careful" (although the Nif al can have a sense something like this, "take care to yourselP), and 
given the limited possibilities for the sense of the infinitive construction (not including as a 
modifier), the common translation of this parallel construction as "be careful to do" would seem 
not very literal. But the absence of the complement after "ltttf is grammatically puzzling. 
Probably the infinitive is the object of "Itttf (cf. Williams 1976, §193); and a literal translation 
might be "exercise care over doing," and a more idiomatic translation, "do carefully or 
diligently" (Holladay 1988, s.v. 10, 5; TWOT, 939). 
29. On the translation of this type of participle, see Zerwick 1963, §§391-92; Williams 1976, §195; 
Waltke and O'Connor 1990, §36.2.3, fe. 
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"all the words of the Law" means, not literally every lexical item in the text, but specifically 
all the commands, "terms," and obligations laid down in the covenantal documents. 
A semantic potential for an "action"-sense of efifievu is confirmed by examination of 
the places where ennevw is used in the LXX. The word appears 21 times. Nine of these 
times i t is used absolutely, with no dative construction following. In six of these nine times, 
it means "to continue, be unchanged," the aspect of continuance being the focus. 3 0 In 
another of the nine instances, it means "stand" physically (Deut. 19:5). 3 1 Of the other two, 
one (Num. 23:19) involves an ellipsis, where a dative construction of "vows" or "promises" 
is to be understood from the context: 
oil &g avBpwog b debg biaprrfirivai 
ovbe &g vibg avBp&irov airei\t]6rivai' 
aiirbg eiirag ovxl irotfioei.; 
\aX170ci, Kai ovxl euuem; 
God is not man, that he should lie, 
or a son of man, that he should 
repent. 
Has he said, and wil l he not do it? 
Or has he spoken, and will he 
not fu l f i l l it? 
The parallelism in the last half of the verse shows us clearly that efificvel refers to action 
here. Also in the remaining instance of e/i/xeVw used absolutely (1 Mace. 10:27), there seems 
to be an ellipsis of a dative construction, this time of "friendship," to be understood from the 
previous verse (we quote both): 
1 Mace. 10:26 
eirei avvergprjaaTe rag itpbg r\\iag 
avv6r)Kag Kai eveiietvctTe T J J (f>i\ia 
rjH&p mi ou irpoo-exo)pTI<f<xTe rolg 
exOpolg t\lt&v, i)Kovoanev Kai 
ex<xpt]fiev. 
Since you have kept your agreement 
with us and have continued [in] your 
friendship with us, and have not sided 
with our enemies, we have heard of it 
and rejoiced. 
30. Ecclus. 39:11; Isa. 7:7; 8:10; 28:18; Jer. 51(44):28; Dan. 12:12. 
31. All of these seven that is a translation of the MT (six of them), except one (Dan. 12:12), is a 
translation of Dip (Qal). 
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10:27 
mi vvv efineivare en T O D avvnrjpfjaaL And now continue still to keep faith 
irpdg rm&g irianv, mi with us, and we will repay you with 
ctvTairob&ooncv bfiiv ayada avd" Zi> good for what you do for us (RSV). 
iroieiTe IXEB" rjfiibv. 
Here we have a covenantal context, but at first blush it may appear that we do not have a 
meaning of action, but rather of mental states, because of the verb-and-dative construction's 
meaning "remain in (friendship)" in verse 26 and its epexegetical infinitive in verse 27, 
"keep faithfulness towards us." But it is the verbal notion "keep" that is epexegetical in this 
latter construction, and this verb, avurripeo), appears in parallel with e/x/xmo in verse 26. 
Moreover, in the above verses both the "friendship" and the "faithfulness" are in parallelism 
with actions ("not siding with enemies" and "the good you do"). So in fact it is action that 
is meant by eii/te>a> in these two verses. 
Where ennevw has an accompanying dative construction, the dative substantives 
include "the fear of [God]" (Ecclus. 2:10), "wisdom" (6:20), "you" (7:22), "[God]" (Isa. 
30:18, with em plus the dative), and "[God's] covenant" (Jer. 38(31):32). In at least some 
of these, the dative is locative rather than associative, and the verb simply means "remain 
in . " At any rate, whenever elsewhere in the L X X ifinevu is used explicitly with the dative 
or with eu plus the dative the word in the dative always refers to vows, promises, commands, 
or obligations in general; and in each case it is clear (as in 1 Mace. 10:26 just above) that 
inidvu) (with the dative construction) refers to actions. Besides our target text, these other 
instances of e/x/teVw used with a dative construction in the LXX include: Dan. 6:13a (LXX); 
Ecclus. 11:21; 28:6; Jer. 51(44):25 (twice; once translating an infinitive absolute). Thus we 
have seen that in many cases in the L X X translations where efinevu is used with the dative of 
a word referring to vows or commands or other covenantal obligations, the idea expressed is 
the performance (whether accomplishment or merely attempt) of the thing vowed or 
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commanded. Thus it is indeed a semantic likelihood for the e/u/teVw in Deut. 27:26. And we 
saw that that sense is apparently demanded in Deut. 27:26, for e/x/tcVw ("stand steadfastly 
by" or "abide by"), by its "epexegetical" or glossing infinitive xoiTjaai ("doing"). 
But can we narrow these verbs' senses more than this? Is the focus on the endeavour 
in the action or on the accomplishment of the action, or both? The immediate literary context 
gives us no particular grounds for either of these statements, it seems. Indeed, that the idea 
conveyed by ennevu) plus the dative construction is general and comprehensive seems 
confirmed in Deut. 27:26 by the generality of the epexegetical infinitive that follows, "in 
doing them." 
As we wil l see below, there are reasons to think that in the covenantal context of these 
passages, the focus of the speaker would be the endeavour of the action, rather than what is 
actually accomplished; but be that as it may, this information is apparently not conveyed by 
the mere verb e/i/xeVco plus the dative construction. With regard to its lexical semantics, it 
appears that this word, with the dative construction referring to vows, promises, or 
commands, carries simply the general sense of "do (these things) steadfastly." This means 
that as far as we can tell, it had the potential for being contextually "neutralised" to the sense 
"accomplish," although that potential seems rather doubtful in view of the semantic element 
of "steadfastness" or "faithfulness" in e/i/ie><o. But that is as far as Greek lexicography will 
take us. 
We must turn then to the corresponding Hebrew word in the MT. It is admittedly 
more important for our purposes to know what is intended in the LXX of Deut. 27:26, than 
to grasp the meaning of the MT of that verse; for Paul is quoting the L X X translation. 
(Actually he paraphrases it, probably quoting from memory, although it is clear that by 
changing the wording he has neither added to nor taken away from, nor altered, the semantic 
import of the LXX.) The sense of the Hebrew is not totally irrelevant, however. Paul was 
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probably also familiar with the Hebrew of the verse, and it may have influenced his 
understanding of the verse. In addition, the LXX translator of Deuteronomy 27 was trying to 
express in Greek the meaning of the Hebrew, and it is just possible, though not really likely, 
that he was trying to pack a little more or a little different meaning into the Greek than what 
it could bear. At any rate, we need to look at the lexicology and context of Olj? ( H i f il) in 
this verse, i f only to be sure it does not undermine or qualify the conclusion we reached in 
our study of the Greek. 
4.7.1.2 Lexicography of 01j? ( H i f il) 
The Hebrew word we are dealing with here has a meaning rather different from that of the 
Greek word ennevw: the verb Dlj? in the H i f i l is a transitive verb; it takes a direct object, 
rather than a dative construction. The etymological, original sense would be "Make stand, 
establish, set up." But what did the word come to mean when used of vows or promises or 
commands or covenants? When the direct object is "covenant," it usually means, or seems to 
mean, to initiate or set up a covenantal relationship, but in some passages it clearly refers to 
action taken pursuant to existing covenantal obligations (e.g., Lev. 26:9; Deut. 8:18). In 
such passages, the sense seems to be "confirm." Such seems to be the sense also in one 
passage concerning a wife's vows; that is, it means to confirm the vows as binding (Num. 
30:14(15)). In the other passages concerning vows and commandments, however, the sense 
clearly is "carry out, perform, give effect to" (cf. BDB; Holladay 1988). 3 2 We have already 
looked at Num. 23:19 (see p. 177). Here are a few other examples: 
1 Sam. 2:13 
And Samuel came to Saul, and Saul said to him, "Blessed be you to the 
LORD; I have performed the commandment of the LORD." 
32. E.g. , Gen. 26:3; Deut. 9:5; 1 Sam. 3:12; 15:13; 1 Kings 2:4; 2 Chron. 6:10; 10:15; Neh. 9:8; 
Isa. 44:26; Jer. 11:5; 23:20; 28:6; 29:10; 30:24; 33:14; 44:25. Others, in which this sense is 
only probable, include 1 Sam. 1:23; 15:11; 2 Sam. 7:25; 1 Kings 6:12; 2 Kings 23:3; Neh. 5:13; 
Ps. 119:38; Jer. 35:16; Dan. 9:12. 
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1 Kings 8:20 
Now the LORD has fulfilled his promise which he made; for I have risen in 
the place of David my father, and sit on the throne of Israel, as the LORD 
promised, and I have built the house for the name of the LORD, the God of 
Israel. 
1 Kings 12:15 
So the king did not hearken to the people; for it was a turn of affairs brought 
about by the LORD that he might fu l f i l his word, which the LORD spoke by 
Ahi'jah the Shi'lonite to Jerobo'am the son of Nebat. 
Jer. 34:18 
And the men who transgressed my covenant and did not keep the terms of the 
covenant which they made before me, I will make like the calf which they cut 
in two and passed between its parts --
Jer. 35:16 
The sons of Jon'adab the son of Rechab have kept the command which their 
father gave them, but this people has not obeyed me. 
Can we be more specific about the focus of the word here, and claim that it focuses 
either on the action as attempt to do something, or on the action as accomplishing a certain 
thing? The literary contexts do not clearly support either claim. Al l that the words clearly 
indicate is the general idea of "doing" the thing vowed or commanded. 
The sense of the Hebrew of Deut. 27:26 is thus in line with what we found in our 
study of the Greek phrase: the general idea of "do the things commanded." It would seem 
that, as with the English concept "do," only the broader situational context can shed light on 
whether it is the attempt to do a certain thing, or its actual accomplishment, that the speaker 
intends. 
4.7.1.3 The limits of lexicography 
But nevertheless we need to ask this question. As we saw in our examples with the English 
I 
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word "do," the speaker often, indeed probably always, is thinking either of an intent 
(manifest in action calculated to accomplish the intent) or else of some actual accomplishment 
(see chap. 2). 
When the speaker is using a general term (like "do") and yet intends to convey a more 
specific notion (like "accomplish" is for Paul), there is additional information conveyed (a 
narrower term conveys more information, Lyons 1968, 454); and it is the situational or 
linguistic context which the speaker uses to convey the additional semantic information. 3 3 
This semantic phenomenon is called "contextual semantic neutralisation" (i.e., context 
neutralises the semantic difference between the broader concept and a narrower one). 
Linguists claim this phenomenon is a common one (Lyons 1968, 452; Silva 1983, 166). 3 4 So 
the question arises: does this phenomenon occur in the case of these verbs in Deut. 27:26? 
Does Paul mean "accomplish" even though he uses a general term that in itself only signifies 
"endeavour"? 
This is a reasonable question. But in any particular instance the burden of proof 
should be placed on the suggestion that semantic neutralisation is taking place. The Quantity 
maxim of conversation (see chap. 2) calls for a speaker (or writer) not to use a more-
informative, narrower term i f the context would effectively neutralise the semantic difference 
between a broader term and the narrower one; for then the narrower, more-informative term 
is unnecessary, the context provides the extra information. But the Quantity maxim also calls 
33. English dictionaries that do a synonym study comparing them will generally suggest that 
"accomplish'' is a narrower concept than the general idea "do," in that the former implies also 
success in some (measurable) achievement. 
34. Lyons' discussion and examples are very helpful for getting a feel for semantic neutralisation (see 
Lyons 1968, 452-53): "For instance, the difference between the marked term bitch and the 
unmarked term dog is neutralised in a context, like My has just had pups, which determines 
the animal referred to as female. . . . One can say either I'm flying to New York or I'm going to 
New York by air, either I'm driving to New York or I'm going to New York by car. In the one case 
the distinction is made by the paradigmatic choice of the verbs fly and drive, in the other by the 
syntagmatic modification of the more general verb gon (ibid., 452). 
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for the speaker to use as informative a term as is necessary; so when the context would not 
provide the information neutralising the semantic difference between such terms, the speaker 
wil l need to use the narrower term. So when neutralisation is taking place, the context, 
assuming one is familiar with it, provides evidence of the fact; but to prove that no 
neutralisation takes place, one must show that the context does not provide such evidence. 
Since it is a universal negative, that would be very difficult to prove, even for a member of 
the original audience; one would need a comprehensive knowledge of the linguistic and non-
linguistic contexts in view of which the author might be composing his speech. 
Communication presupposes that the hearer actually has a feasible knowledge of the 
presuppositions which the author assumes are in common, but it does not presuppose that the 
hearer has a god-like ability to read the author's mind. An original hearer assumes that the 
author provides, either explicitly or through context, all the information necessary. So what 
the hearer does is to infer neutralisation only when the evidence indicates it; he or she does 
not assume until and unless contrary evidence appears, that neutralisation is intended. The 
former is therefore the right model for exegesis. 
There is some evidence to suggest neutralisation is taking place in the original literary 
context of Deut. 27:26. We must therefore scrutinise this evidence to see i f the reader should 
infer neutralisation of "do" in 27:26, to the narrower sense "accomplish." 
4.7.2 Semantic neutralisation in the original context? 
I f we claim that according to the evidence the curse of Deut. 27:26 came on the Israelite only 
for deliberate rebellion against God's commands, there may seem to be a conflict with this 
reading arising from the OT passage in which verse 26 occurs, Deut. 27:15-26. For there, 
in verses 15-25, we see the curses being invoked on anyone who commits this and that 
specific sin. Does this not weigh in favour of seeing these, and verse 26 also, as referring to 
concrete, completed actions, rather than mere intention/attempt? 
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This is not really a problem for the non-neutralisation reading. As we saw in chapter 
2, the context of a statement determines whether even terms for specific actions (i.e., not 
only general terms like do) refer to the action from the standpoint of accomplishment or that 
of attempt to accomplish. One could even say that each usage of such a verb has one of two 
implicit qualifiers: either the speaker means "accomplishment of (such and such)," or else he 
or she means "attempt to do (such and such)." So in Deut. 27:15-25, it seems unlikely that 
the author of this passage could have intended that everyone who ever commits any of these 
particular sins, either intentionally or unintentionally, is cursed. There was in the Torah, 
after all, a system of sin-offerings ostensibly effective for unintentional sins. Moreover, the 
references to deeds done "in secret" (27:15, 24), i f they indicate anything, suggest that the 
doer knows he or she is sinning, and tries to hide the fact. So 27:15-25 does not well bear 
the burden of proof that semantic neutralisation is narrowing the meaning to "accomplish." 
4.7.3 Conclusions on Deut. 27:26 
The main verbs used in Deut. 27:26a, ennem (plus the dative construction) in the LXX, and 
Dip ( H i f il) in the MT, are general terms, referring here to action taken pursuant to the 
commands of the covenant. This is also true of the epexegetical infinitive, "[by] doing 
them," which follows the main verbs in both the MT and the L X X . The covenantal context 
of this verse does not suggest that semantic neutralisation to the narrower sense "accomplish" 
was intended in the original text. So Paul would probably assume that these verbs focus, in 
the original context, on the action as attempt or endeavour to carry out the wishes of the 
covenantal suzerain. So in the original context of Deut. 27:26, or at least as Paul would 
probably read that passage, the verbs translated by ennepw and iroiew in the LXX have the 
sense "abide by" or "do faithfully," that is, "endeavour/attempt diligently to f u l f i l . " 3 5 
35. Cf. Garlington 1997, 97-98. 
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This conclusion does not tell us what the usual Jewish reading (if any) of this OT text 
was, in Paul's time. But no doubt the conclusion is more or less relevant: it gives us a rather 
remote literary-historical background, and thus a hint, at least, as to Paul's own probable 
reading of this OT text, or else his opponents', or both. This may well help us to understand 
Paul's intended sense in Gal. 3:10b. At least it points us to the most likely reading. That 
reading is not contradicted by the context in Gal. 3:10 (indeed, as we shall see, it could not 
reasonably work there). And it is corroborated, we believe, by the sorts of criteria by which 
God judges people, according to Paul's portrayals of such judgment in Romans 2 and 3. 
None of the verbs or verbal phrases which Paul uses there, within the criteria-statements, are 
inherently focused on completed deeds; but some of them are inherently focused on 
endeavour to fu l f i l . For example, God wil l render to each according to his "deeds" (vs. 6): 
Rom. 2:7 
to those who by patience in well-doing seek for glory and honor and 
immortality, he will give eternal life; 
2:8 
but for those who are factious and do not obey the truth, but obey wickedness, 
there wil l be wrath and fury. 
Likewise, God's condemning of "Both Jews and Greeks [Gentiles]" (3:9, cf. 19) is because, 
among other things, "No one seeks for God. Al l have turned aside . . . There is no fear of 
God before their eyes" (Rom. 3:11-12, 18). The focus here is on attitude and obedience, 
that is, endeavour to accomplish, rather than on completed deed as such; it is "qualitative" 
rather than "quantitative." 
Also strongly corroborating this reading is our finding (above) that Paul is actually 
affirming this curse (on oaoi e£ epyuv w/iou) and that the curse is at least tantamount to a 
truly effectual, eschatological one. For in order for this curse to be on that ei; ISpywv vdfiov 
party and yet not on oi e/c marewg, it cannot be for failure to accomplish all the things 
written, since both Paul and his Jewish contemporaries would have considered it beyond any 
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man's means to live completely unhindered by sinful habits of thought and deed, such that he 
accomplished fully all the things commanded in the Law. 3 6 Yet i f Paul intended some 
unstated qualification of such an accomplishments-requirement (e.g., accomplishes "most of 
the time"), then those "of works of the Law" would surely be less likely to fall under this 
curse than some Gentiles who are "of faith" (vss. 8-9) but not Law-devotees. So by these 
verbs Paul almost certainly means "attempt, endeavour" all the things written in the Law. 
Now, there is substantial significance to this exegetical result, with respect to the sort 
of unstated premise(s) Paul may be using here in Gal. 3:10. For the heated debate over 
whether Paul is implicitly (i.e., unstatedly) denying oaoi e£ epyuv i>dfwv the "ability" to keep 
the Law, has evidently been rather misplaced i f not misguided. This debate has fallen into 
two pitfalls of ambiguity: most participants leave ambiguous what they mean by "ability," 
which can mean either "the means" or "the power, the capacity" to do something (one may 
have the means and yet not have the inherent power, perhaps lacking the necessary will); and 
most participants fail to ask or explain the question with which we have dealt here, namely, 
whether Paul means, by the main verbs in 10b, "endeavour" or "complete/accomplish." 
That leaves a debilitating lack of clarity about the issues involved. By contrast we are now in 
a position to clarify those issues, and to come to some conclusions which may contradict both 
parties to this debate. 
I f Paul were denying not merely that they had the capacity/power, but also that they 
even had the means to "do" all of the Law, he would be bringing the debate into a 
quantitative, counting or measuring mode (since means are necessarily perceived as having 
some measurable and quantifiable effect). So this means-denying premise would (as we have 
just noted) imply that Paul was talking about completions (which are measurable, 
quantifiable) rather than just about endeavour (which is not measurable, in and of itself). But 
36. For biblical teaching to this effect see 2 Chron. 6:36; Job 9:2; 15:14-16; Pss. 130:3; 143:2; 
Prov. 20:9; Eccles. 7:20; James 3:2a; 1 John 1:8-10. 
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our analysis has found no indication that such was the meaning of Deut. 27:26, either 
originally or in Paul's thinking; and we have placed the burden of proof on the suggestion 
that it was. 
Yet the traditional reconstruction of 3:10 has usually been stated in terms of the 
"futi l i ty" of trying to do the Law, since humankind is "unable" to do what it requires; thus it 
strongly suggests that human means for satisfying the covenant's conditions are lacking, the 
conditions being nothing less than perfect achievement of all that the Law commands. Such 
explanation of Paul's unstated meaning has now drawn vigorous protest from those who 
believe that in lst-century Judaism a human being was seen as fully "capable" of meeting the 
Law's requirement ( if he or she wished to do so). 3 7 This protest is probably well-founded if 
it intends to say that for lst-century Jews, all humans have the means to obey (i.e., to 
endeavour to fulf i l ) . But it has not often been made very clear whether this interpretation 
intends "means" or "power," nor even whether it intends "obey (endeavour to fu l f i l the 
commands)" or " f u l f i l " (complete, accomplish). Paying attention to these definitional issues, 
we are now in a position to say that the traditional reading, when put in terms that suggest a 
lack of human means to do that which the Law requires—namely to "abide by" (endeavour to 
fulf i l ) all the things commanded, is probably a wrong reading of 3:10b, since it would entail 
that the verbs there mean "accomplish." But surely we can say that for lst-century Jews, all 
humans have the means to obey, to endeavour. Moreover, i f (all) humans lack the means to 
"abide by" the Law, then so do Christians; but then (as we intimated above, in the section on 
"cursed") this would destroy the contrast Paul is trying to draw between oi e<c itiareox; and 
offoi e£ epyoip vdfwv.^ 
37. E.g. , D. P. Fuller (1975); K. Stendahl (1976, 78-96); E . P. Sanders (1983, 17-23); J . D. G. 
Dunn (1993a, 171); M. Cranford (1994); S. McKnight (1995, 154); J . L . Martyn (1997a, 310); 
K. A. Morland (1995, 10); D. B. Garlington (1997, 97). 
38. Our finding has implications also for Paul's logic, which implications we shall have occasion to 
note as we proceed. 
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But on the other hand, this finding about the traditional missing premise does not entail 
that no unspoken premise about some humans' "inability" in the broader sense (the "power" 
or capacity, as including the will) is involved; for i f one has the means but not the wil l , in 
this sense one still "cannot" obey. Thus, our reading gives us no reason to conclude that 
Paul is sanguine about the possibility of being justified through the Law. 
4.8 Type of argument: pure logos (causa cognoscendi), or deliberative 
"argument from consequences"? 
There is another and related exegetical significance to our reading of these verbs. This 
reading implicitly denies that Paul's overall argument in 3:10 is warning the readers against 
taking on an obligation (viz., the Law as a covenant) that they have not the means to 
discharge and whose inevitable non-discharging would reap a curse. For since the lack of 
"doing" of which Paul speaks must, in his eyes, be due to a lack of wil l (to endeavour), 
rather than to a lack of means (to accomplish), Paul's argument would become a trying to 
warn against adopting theory X (about the right means of justification) because the theory 
would lead "as many as" adopt it to reject it! There is no way to have a coherent, 
intelligible, or rational argument, working within these parameters; quite obviously any such 
argument "begs the question" (i.e., assumes what it tries to prove): "You should not adopt 
this theory, because in the end you will decide that you should not have adopted this theory." 
This leads one naturally to the inference that Paul's argument in 3:10 is not ultimately 
about means at all (whether of justification, of righteousness, or whatever); it is not an 
argument-from-consequences warning about the dire repercussions of following some 
particular wrong course. Rather, it is simply an attempt to prove or disprove some 
proposition. Apparently at least, that proposition is that "oaoi e£ epyuv vdfiov are under a 
curse." How he seeks to imply that proposition, in any case, is what we must now consider. 
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4.9 Understanding Paul's logic in 3:10 
We move on now to consideration of the propositional meanings and logic of 3:10. There is 
hardly any reason to doubt the obvious categorical forms of either 10a or 10b. Both of them 
at least seem to constitute universal, positive propositions: " A l l who are ei- epywv vbfwv are 
under a curse," for " A l l who do not abide by all things written in the Law, are cursed." One 
thing that easily escapes notice, however, is that the second proposition is actually a 
definitional one. Like all covenantal statements that define who is cursed or who is blessed, 
this statement includes, but also implicitly excludes: it states the criterion by which one may 
determine whether someone is cursed or not. Thus, there is another categorical form 
intended by it as well, the converse of the stated one, which converse is: " A l l those who are 
cursed do not abide [or, None who are cursed do abide] by all things written in the Law." 
It is in the question of how to reconstruct Paul's argument in verse 10, that the real 
interest and debate arises. At the outset, we should indicate that the few writers (e.g., Fuller 
1975, 33; Betz 1979, 145; Cranford 1994, 245, 248) who criticise the very idea of an 
unstated premise in this verse, are always in effect protesting one particular unstated premise 
(viz., that no one is "able" to do all the things written in the Law); unconsciously or not, 
informally or not, they almost always go on to supply their own explanation of Paul's logic, 
in fact their own unstated premise(s). As Schreiner (1984, 156) correctly notes, 
The presence of an implied proposition should not be excluded out of hand. 
Implied propositions, after all, are a common feature of human language, and 
thus the real question is whether there is an implied proposition in this verse. 
. . . We think the evidence supports . . . use of an implied proposition in Gal 
3:10. Otherwise . . . the citation of the OT passage would be meaningless. 
The only way around this exegetical inference would be the claim that the argument of 3:10 
is not implicit in that verse but rather explicit in the following verse or verses. A few 
commentators do mofe or less take this route (e.g., Barrett 1985, 26). That suggestion is 
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fairly plausible on the face of it; the problem is that the following verses do not supply the 
needed premise(s). 
4.9.1 Paul's unstatedpremise(s): cursed because (sinful) human beings? 
Before we plunge in to supplying the details of the argument, however, it would be well to 
see i f we might first categorise it as to basic type of "real-life" argument. Therefore we must 
look at the remaining possible types of argument (having ruled out the reductio ad 
absurdum), namely the syllogism and the polysyllogism (cf. above; a "pure hypothetical 
syllogism" is ruled out by the non-conditional inference, 10a). Note first that the 
traditionally supplied missing premise, "No human being abides by all things written in the 
Law," is not strictly necessary to complete the syllogism. Al l that is logically necessary is 
the missing minor premise, containing the middle term ("do not abide by all things written in 
the Law") and the minor term ("as many as are of acts of the Law"). Since both the stated 
premise and the conclusion are A-type propositions, only A A A ( l ) is a possible logical 
reconstruction of the syllogism. 3 9 Specifically, then, we need this unstated premise: "As 
many as are of acts of the Law do not abide by all things written in the Law." There may be 
additional unstated premises working here that imply this one; for example, theoretically the 
argument could be a polysyllogism as follows: 
a. (unstated) Al l who are of works of the law are human beings. 
b. (unstated) Al l human beings do not abide by everything written in the Law. 
(unstated conclusion of the above) Al l who are of works of the Law do not abide 
by everything written in the Law. 
c. A l l who do not abide by everything written in the Law are cursed (3:10b). 
Therefore, all who are of works of the Law are cursed (3:10a). 
39. See above, chap. 2, § 2 . 1 . 5 . 3 . 
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But there is no way to complete the syllogism without implicitly involving this particular 
proposition (it is the 3rd proposition, in the above reconstruction).40 This fact is almost 
always overlooked in the exegesis of this verse.41 What exegetes need to explain is this: by 
what thinking or assumptions did Paul arrive at this rather surprising but entailed premise, 
and further, how could he leave the latter unstated, as i f it were a presupposition shared with 
the reader. It is basically this challenge that makes this verse so difficult. 
Let us also recapitulate what we have found in the present chapter, concerning the 
"traditional" reading of the argument. We have found that the unstated premise that "none 
have the means to abide by the Law" would not be a plausible one, since all have the means 
to endeavour to carry out the Law's commands. Furthermore, i f (all) humans constantly fail 
to "abide by" the Law, then Christians do as well, ipso facto; but then this would deny the 
contrast Paul is trying to draw between oi CK marauiq and oaoi e£ epywu vdfiov, for it would 
make them cursed for the same reason and in the same way. Some commentators indeed 
appeal to verse 13 here, and say that yes, this curse pronounced upon all is effective, but 
effective only upon one person, Jesus Christ (e.g., Mussner 1974, 225; Hubner 1984, 39). 
This expedient is problematic: First, it assumes that Paul has a "cosmic-ontological," 
substitutionary theory of the atonement, which assumption we shall see is doubtful (below, 
40. The above is stated in the order of a Goclenian sorites (see chap. 2). It is true that one could 
reverse the order of premises a, b, and c and obtain the form called Aristotelian sorites, in which 
case the 3rd proposition above would not seem directly involved in the argument. But the point is 
that premises a and b must in any case imply that proposition, else they could not complete the 
argument of vs. 10. 
41. Those who support the traditionally supplied premise almost never acknowledge that it is not 
really required for the completion of the logic; generally, they suggest that it is. A typical and 
oft-cited statement comes from Moo (1983, 98): "Thus, although Paul does not state in so many 
words that no one does the law, his assertion that 'all who (hosoi)' rely on 'works of the law' for 
justification are cursed makes sense only if, in fact, 'all' fail to do the law." Similarly Calvin 
(1965, 53); Lightfoot (1890, 137); Mussner (1974, 225-26); Hubner (1984, 19, 38); Schreiner 
(1984, 156); F . Watson (1986, 200-1 n. 108); Fung (1988, 142); Hansen (1989, 119; 1994, 92-
93 n.); R. Longenecker (1990, 118); Hong (1993, 137). On the other hand, those who oppose 
this supplied premise usually overreact by suggesting that the argument contains no unstated 
premise (e.g., Fuller 1975; Cosgrove 1978; Sanders 1983; Cranford 1994). 
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chap. 6). Second, in this case Christian "faith" could not be in this supposed substitutionary 
efficacy of Christ's death alone (as the theory presumes), lest this "faith" be definable only 
circularly; for the "faith" must then believe that the substitutionary efficacy is precisely for 
the "faithful" only: otherwise oaoi e£ epyav vopov are redeemed from the curse along with 
the faithful in which case 3:10 fails to portray any contrast with oi e/c iriareux; of verse 9. 
Third, this reading dubiously weakens the inherent power of a pronouncement of God (cf. 
above): i f God says that "A is cursed," then undoubtedly, to a Jew who believes the Hebrew 
Bible, A is indeed effectively "cursed." The burden of proof would surely be on any denial 
of the latter, which proof Paul does not at all clearly give or intimate. Again, see chap. 6; 
but we should mention here the ambiguous (because deictic) term rj/t&c of vs. 13, on the 
contextual definition of which such exegesis of vs. 10 would have to depend but which 
definition would ultimately have to depend on vs. 10 itself. What Paul unequivocally 
intimates is simply that which fills out the logic of his argument, namely that " A l l those who 
are of deeds of the Law do not abide by all things written . . . " In light of the above defects, 
then, we must dismiss the traditional reading from consideration. 
4.9.2 Paul's unstatedpremise(s): cursed merely because they are e£ epyuv popov? 
Does Paul have an unstated syllogism underlying his unstated premise (that "As many as are 
e£ epyav vofiov do not abide by all things written in the Law"), thus creating a 
polysyllogism? Or is this unstated premise meant as so self-evidently true that no presumed, 
underlying reasoning is necessarily invoked? There have been a number of exegetical 
theories that tend to take the unstated reason as more or less self-evident to any 1 st-century 
person familiar with the beliefs, traditions, and sociological dynamics of Judaism in the 
general area of Palestine. It is hard to know exactly which readings to place in that category, 
for generally they do explain a certain logic behind Paul's unstated meaning; but this logic is 
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portrayed as part of the general presupposition pool of the culture belonging to such a 
person. In any case, we shall examine the basic view of Wright and Scott and Hafemann and 
Thielman and Bligh, the view of Dunn and of Cranford and Bonneau, and that of D. P. 
Fuller and C. Cosgrove (formerly).42 
Before we begin, however, we should reiterate the basic problem facing every attempt 
to explain the logically-required unspoken premise. This premise denies something that 
would be, not merely a presupposition, but virtually an axiom within the general culture to 
which we have just referred. As Dunn notes (1990b, 226, cf. 1993a, 170-71), "most Jews 
of Paul's day would simply assume that to be e£ epywp vofiov is to remain within all that the 
Torah lays down, is to do what the Law requires."43 This would generally have been taken 
as true by definition; at any rate, those who are "of works of the Law" would have been seen 
as implicitly those who "do all things written in the Law." Thus, if Paul were appealing 
merely to this general Mediterranean-cultural presupposition-pool, his argument would have 
to fail dramatically. Consider his unstated premise, in light of what we learned about 
supplying suppressed premises. The cardinal principle was that "the proposition must be one 
which the speaker can safely presume his hearers to accept as true" (Copi 1968, 194). Could 
Paul safely presume that Mediterranean readers in general would accept as true the 
proposition that "None who are of works of the Law attempts (steadfastly) to do all the 
things written in the Law"? No; but he probably could safely presume that all those whom 
he had not closely instructed would accept it as false! To such readers it would seem almost 
a contradiction in terms. 
What is needed, then, is an underlying logic that effectively disconnects the subject and 
predicate of this unwritten premise, that undermines their generally-presumed axiomatic 
42. Cosgrove (1978) accepted Fuller's reading without defence and sought to follow it further into 
Galatians 3; but later he retracted his support of Fuller's reading (1988b, 53 and n. 31). 
43. Garlington (1997, 112) also recognises the ironic nature of any denial of this equation: "To be 
sure, such ideas would have appeared entirely far-fetched to the opponents . . . " 
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logical equivalence, that in fact makes them contraries.44 Let us examine the views of 
Wright (and of Scott), of Dunn (and of Cranford and Bonneau), and of Fuller (and formerly 
of Cosgrove), to see whether any of them provides such a logic. 
Wright's explanation of the logic (1992, 147) places the focus on the nation of Israel.45 
As we have seen, this reading is problematic in that it makes national and collective a subject 
which is singular ("every one [person]") in Deut. 27:26 in both the MT, the LXX, and 
Paul's quotation. It makes the unspoken premise of 3:10 to be about Israel, not about each 
individual who is "of works of the Law" (10a). At any rate, the problem remains: How do 
we now connect this premise back, logically, to Paul's explicit premise, Deut. 27:26? 
Wright supplies another implicit premise: "All who embrace Torah are thereby embracing 
Israel's national way of life" (ibid.). This might help complete the required logic, but only if 
the phrase "Israel's national way of life" refers to disobedience (wilful disregard) of the 
Torah. Then the question remains: Why would it be entailed, or even plausible, that "all 
who embrace the Torah" ipso facto refuse to obey it? Again, one is faced with the latent 
self-contradiction in such a suggestion. This Gordian knot of Paul's argument Wright has 
failed to untie, even though he may have loosened it a bit. And neither Bligh (1969, 258) 
nor Scott (1993) nor Thielman (1994, 126-27) nor Hafemann (1997) goes as far as Wright in 
44. This might seem odd for a Paul who boldly claimed that in his pre-Christian life he had been "as 
to zeal a persecutor of the church, as to righteousness under the law blameless" (Phil. 3:6). But 
note that this blamelessness is only according to "the righteousness under the law" (biKatoavvrjy 
TT)*" iv fdfiw), a "righteousness" which he insists is an invalid criterion (3:9; Rom. 9:30-10:6). 
H. Raisanen and F . Watson have helpfully discussed the difference between Paul's conception of 
grace, which they call "dynamic," and that of Paul's Jewish interlocutors, which they call "static" 
(see e.g. Watson 1986, 66, 78-79, 112; Raisanen 1992, 26, 34-35). In the static view, God has 
granted and inculcated into a certain society the laws and customs that enable "righteousness," 
and the human response is simply not to reject, but rather continue to fulfil, these socially 
standard customs, which "did not demand an enormous effort" (Raisanen 1992, 34). In the 
dynamic view, the response is to change one's ways, repent of one's sins, submit to God's will. 
Unusually, Watson and Raisanen both recognise that, of the two patterns of religion, it is Paul's 
that is characterised by vigorous striving to fulfil God's commands (see Raisanen 1992, 35-36; 
Watson 1986, 112 and passim). 
45. See above, chap. 1. 
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detailing the logic implicit in this reading. Therefore none of them has provided a feasible 
explanation of Paul's logic; though they started off in an interesting direction by insisting on 
collectivising the curse, they fail to clarify what Paul actually says. 
Both Dunn and Fuller, on the other hand, find the solution in the particular slant with 
which Paul intends the phrase "works of the Law." It is precisely because they are "of 
works of the Law," that those of this party do not really fulfil the Law's requirement; once 
we understand that phrase, the verse is much more understandable. In Fuller's reading, the 
key is the term "law" in this phrase: unless we interpret it innovatively, we cannot avoid a 
conflict between lOa's "works of the Law" and lOb's "doing all the Law" (1975, 32). Fuller 
claims that by "the law" in 10a Paul does not mean "the Mosaic Law," but rather "the 
Jewish misinterpretation of the Law" (ibid.). 4 6 The misinterpretation lies in their belief that 
one can, through "legalistic endeavours" to conform to the Law, merit God's approval. 
But Fuller's reading is inadequate. First, it entails that we take "the Law" in a sense 
completely foreign not only to lst-century Jewish culture, but even to Galatians. Paul spends 
almost the rest of chapter 3 trying to show that "the Law" has passed away, or else that it 
never had jurisdiction to begin with. 4 7 Never does he intimate that he means here something 
other than "the Mosaic Law," as his opponents and readers would naturally understand that 
46. Here he is following R. Bring (1961, 120ff.). The same sort of approach to "the Law" was 
followed earlier by Burton (1921, 165, 447ff.), who however used it in 10b as well and then cast 
the argument of 10 as a reductio ad absurdum; see above. 
47. Cf. Silva 1990, 164-66. While agreeing with Silva's comments here, concerning the sense of 
3:12, we must disagree concerning vs. 21: in light of 18a ("For if inheritance is by the Law, it is 
no longer by promise"), the principle inherent in "the Law" is most definitely contrary to that of 
the promises, so that in 21a ("Is the law then against the promises of God?") Paul must mean 
"Did the Law actually come into jurisdiction and thus overrule the promise-principle?" a question 
to which he has already supplied an explicit "No" (vs. 17). Rather than soften the Law-promise 
antithesis, 21a fully assumes it; it has already been stated in 18a. However, that Paul might be 
able to use the term the Law in a different sense, in other contexts or by making the meaning 
clearer, we would not deny. 
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referential term.48 Paul's point is not to deny their understanding of the Law, but to deny the 
Law's jurisdiction as a covenant from God.49 Secondly, one can hardly imagine a more 
obvious non-sequitur than the underlying logic which Fuller supplies 3:10: If one admits the 
admittedly inescapable sense of the Law (e.g., Deut. 27:26!) that "righteousness" consists (at 
least partly) in steadfastly endeavouring to fulfil its commandments, and one therefore does 
this and then brings these endeavours before God as (at least partial) proof of one's having 
satisfied the Law's conditions for "righteousness," one will on this very basis be charged 
with bribery and the grossest unrighteousness! This exegetical argument almost proves the 
opposite of its intended outcome. 
Dunn has given a much more historically plausible explanation of the logic, and has (at 
least in analysing 3:10) avoided the problems into which Fuller falls by trying to take "the 
Law" as meaning the Jewish distortion of the text. While also claiming a particular Jewish 
slant to the phrase "works of the Law," Dunn grounds this in the evidence from such sources 
as Qumran, that this phrase had a connotation of intra-Jewish debates about the proper 
meaning and exact requirements of certain of the Law's stipulations, and in our knowledge 
that insistence on these same matters also provided social distinctiveness, as well as some 
amount of social friction, between Jews and Gentiles.50 
One can hardly find fault with the historical groundedness of Dunn's premises. The 
picture he has drawn of the sociological dynamics between Jew and Gentile over the "works 
of the Law" is of considerable value for our understanding the sort of situation Paul was 
48. Fuller himself is aware of, and addresses, the objection "that in the Jewish parlance of the day, 
'the works of the law' meant doing what the law commands, and to a Jew carried no implication 
at all of committing some heinous sin" (Fuller 1975, 35). But his response to this formidable 
objection is strained and weak. 
49. Cf. below the debate on 3:11-12, in chap. 5. This undermines also Betz's contention (1979, 145-
46) that Paul cites here the true Torah, in opposition to the Jewish Torah (involved in the notion 
"works of the Law") which by contrast it was possible to keep fully. 
50. See, e.g., Dunn 1990a, chaps. 7, 8; 1991d; 1992; 1993b; 1997. 
A. H . Carver, 2000 §4 .9 .2 Page 197 
facing. But we still would question whether that broad historical background, in itself, clears 
up the argument of 3:10. In one place (1990b, 227) Dunn explains it as follows: 
Those who are e£ epyuv vbfjuov are those who have understood the scope of 
God's covenant people as . . . that people who are defined by the law and 
marked out by its distinctive requirements. Such an understanding of the 
covenant and of the law inevitably puts too much weight on physical and 
national factors, on outward and visible enactments, and gives too little weight 
to the Spirit, to faith and love from the heart. . . . Paul could now see that 
fulfilment of the law has to be understood in different terms, as something which 
Gentiles can do without any reference to whether they are inside the law or 
outside the law . . . To thus misunderstand the law by giving primacy to 
matters of at best secondary importance was to fall short of what the law 
required and thus to fall under its own curse (Deut. 27.26). Paul could assume 
that his readers would recognize his train of thought, precisely because what we 
now call "the social function of the law" would be part of the framework of 
perception for any reasonably well-informed individual of Paul's day when he 
encountered Judaism . . . . 
We would readily agree with every part of this explanation but the last sentence: while this 
general background knowledge would certainly tell the reader that Judaism is exclusivistic, 
the reader of 3:10 still needed an explanation why, in Paul's radically changed view, Judaism 
was too exclusivistic even for the criterion voiced in Deut. 27:26. Again: how can a verse 
from the Law (Deut. 27:26), about the necessity of "abiding by" the things written in the 
Sinai Law, condemn those who are (as Dunn states) only insisting on those boundary-markers 
which the Law itself demands? Dunn's reliance upon sociological theory does not seem to 
solve this stubborn problem: even if "social pressures" do sometimes cause groups to 
emphasise their ritual boundary markers (Dunn 1990a, 216-19) at the expense of other parts 
of their law or principles, does it not simply follow that the majority of the group must have 
already seen the ritual part of its law as actually the essential or most important part? For if 
the social "boundary" gives identity to the group (Dunn 1990a, 216, citing Hans Mol), then 
when "sense of identity" is threatened why would the "boundary markers" be emphasised, 
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unless they be also the boundary itself? But then the question remains: Why did the group 
come to see their law in this way? 
But Dunn's treatment of this passage has also relied on his unusual handling of the 
phrase epya ydfwv.51 In his understanding, this phrase denotes particularly those aspects of 
Torah observance which tended to mark out the Jew socially; thus it focuses particularly on 
the ritual aspects, like circumcision and dietary law. Clearly this meshes with the rhetorical 
situation giving rise to Paul's letter to the Galatians (see espec. 2:14ff.). It might even serve 
to disengage epya voyav from Paul's idea of "abiding by all things written," inasmuch as a 
focus on the rituals "puts too much weight on physical and national factors, on outward and 
visible enactments, and gives too little weight to the Spirit, to faith and love from the heart. 
Such an understanding of the people of God inevitably results in a false set of priorities," and 
"To thus misunderstand the law by giving primacy to matters of at best secondary importance 
was to fall short of what the law required and thus to fall under its own curse (Deut. 27.26)" 
(Dunn 1990b, 227). But a problem arises from Dunn's simultaneous acceptance of E. 
Lohmeyer's defining of epya vdfwv as "service of the Law" (Dunn 1990a, 220). The 
problem is this: if Paul understands epya popov as "service to the Law," and if "service of 
the Law" means (as evidently it does mean) "abiding by all things commanded in the Law," 
Paul still glaringly contradicts himself in 3:10. 
But we would have a feasible solution if Paul himself would not define epya pofwv as 
"service to the Law" but the phrase does indeed naturally focus on (but does not restrict itself 
to) 5 2 the ritual aspects of the Law. Let us see how and why both parts of this condition are 
true. 
51. See Dunn 1990a, 191-200, 216-25; 1992, responding to Cranfield's 1991 critique. 
52. Dunn (1992) has emphasised this point. 
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4.9.3 The unstated basis of the argument 
Evidently we must semantically and logically "disconnect" 3:10a's "works of the Law" from 
lOb's "abiding by the Law" so that we do not find a flat contradiction in Paul's unstated 
premise which denies that "abiding in the Law" is an attribute of "those who are of deeds of 
the Law." One must show how being e£ epywv vopuov does not imply someone's being 
among those who "abide by all things written . . .", but on the contrary denies their being 
among the latter. But if being e£ epywv voyuov means the same thing as "abiding by the 
Law," it obviously implies the latter. At the very minimum, then, if we are to save Paul 
from self-contradiction (which, of course, theoretically he may not deserve), we must find 
either an equivocation between the meanings of "the Law" in these two sub-verses (which 
Fuller tried valiantly and failed); or else a difference in the gist of epya vo\wv and that of "to 
abide by all the things written in the book of the Law, to do them." The latter is our only 
hope. 
And the only possibility of the latter is that which our hypothesis has already 
suggested, namely, that by epya vofuov Paul does not mean "endeavour to fulfil , complete, 
accomplish the stipulations of the Law," but rather the completed acts which the Law 
stipulates. For only this effectively differentiates epya vofiov from "abiding by all things 
written in the Law." And it does it not only semantically, but for Paul, as we have already 
argued (chap. 3), it does it logically as well, which is necessary for our purposes. 
But whether it differentiates logically the respective parties "those who are e£ epyuv 
vofwv" and "those who abide by all things written," is another question. Paul would of 
course say that those who attempt the Law are not those who accomplish the Law, for no one 
really accomplishes it completely. But this premise would already have been taken into 
account by his opponents, and at any rate this argument is almost the reverse of how we have 
interpreted his words: he actually means that those who hold to the righteousness-criterion of 
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"completed deeds of the Law," do not in fact steadfastly attempt ("abide by") all deed-
stipulations written in the Law. Granted that our semantically differentiating that negative 
proposition's subject and predicate makes it possible that there is a coherent rationale 
underlying it; but what might that rationale be? Why do these persons not steadfastly attempt 
to fulfil the Law's commands? 
We know that those who are e£ epycw voyuov espouse the Mosaic "Law." And 
conversely, for Paul a major problem with "the Law" is that it is in certain epyuv; that is, its 
"righteousness" is definable in terms of certain completed, accomplished deeds.53 Now, it 
seems evident from Romans 3, 4, 9, and 10, and from Galatians 2 and 3, that Paul does 
believe the Law is "e£ epyoje." But in order to ground more firmly our own reading of the 
phrase, we will address the obvious question: "Why would Paul think the Law is 'of 
completed, accomplished deeds'?" What is there about the Law that sees "righteousness" as 
definable in terms of measurable, outward accomplishments? One ready answer to this 
question is, "its purity laws."54 Whatever one's history-of-religions perspective regarding 
the genesis of such laws, the fact remains that they portray "purity" as something tangible 
and measurable and as somehow necessary for acceptance before God. Paul's own comments 
in regard to certain "purity" matters show that he is aware of and eschews this very 
portrayal; for example: "Food will not commend us to God. We are no worse off if we do 
not eat [certain foods], and no better off if we do" (1 Cor. 8:8; cf. 10:25ff.; Rom. 14:14, 
53. Cf. 3:12; Rom. 10:5; 9:32; on the latter verse, see the original and insightful exegesis by 
T. David Gordon (1992b): the verse's ellipsis is not "they tried to obtain it" by works, but rather 
"it (the Law) is" of works, making it semantically similar to "the Law is not EK iriaTewq," Gal. 
3:12a. 
54. For a helpful overview of the Jewish conception of purity, including various views on the genesis 
of the concept "purity," see Neusner 1973b. 
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20). 5 5 It seems clear therefore that if they were taken more or less literally, the presence of 
such laws within "the Law" would make the latter's notion of "righteousness" definable in 
terms of "accomplishments" of God's commands; for only accomplishments, not attempts, 
are as such tangible and measurable.56 
At any rate, for Paul "the Law" (as that term is used in 3:10-14 and probably 
throughout Galatians) defines "righteousness" in terms of accomplishments. This is not to 
say that the Law would not define "righteousness" also in terms of "obedience": but it is to 
say that "the Law" extends the focus of "righteousness" to the "outer man," but the latter's 
accomplishments constantly fall short of the good intentions of the "inner man," who 
nevertheless can accomplish something only with the cooperation (as it were) of the outer 
man (Rom. 7:21-23, 25b). So by making the criterion "obedience" ostensibly 
interchangeable with the criterion epya pdfiov ("accomplishments"), as if the endeavour to 
fulfil the Law were tantamount to accomplishing it (and vice versa), the Law badly and even 
fatally misleads (in Paul's view) those who espouse it. In forcing "obedience" to be 
commensurable with accomplishments, it must slant so as to distort (from Paul's point of 
view, that is) either the one or the other or both, to make them "commensurable." But that 
distortion must necessarily be of "obedience," of endeavour; it can hardly be of the 
"accomplishments," for accomplishments are results of intentional action and as such are 
measurable and interpersonally verifiable. "Obedience," on the other hand, is an inward 
category, something understandable by others but never tangible or measurable as such; so it 
55. Cf. Neusner 1973b, 60: "There can be no doubt that Paul regards the impurity decreed in biblical 
food-laws as suspended." It may even be that this concept is the hermeneutical key, for Paul, 
between "the Law" of his opponents and "the Law" rightly interpreted and still binding; see e.g. 
Col. 2:20-22 which in this regard seems a crucial text in light of its "verbal parallels" with Eph. 
2:15 ("ordinances," cf. also Col. 2:14) and Gal. 4:3, 9 ("elements of the world," cf. also Col. 
2:8). 
56. There is in die OT a certain ambiguity regarding uncleanness. It almost becomes a metaphor for 
sin, but remains something concrete (Neusner 1973b, l l f f . , 20-21; cf. Lonergan 1973, 88). 
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is much more amenable to sociolinguistic "heteroglossia" (see chap. 3, § 3.3.1). For 
example, one might conceptually split each human's "wil l" into two independent wills, a 
"good" and an "evil" will, that ostensibly battle each other to control or win the person's 
choice in a particular situation. Then while the notion of a "good" will accounts for any 
accomplishments of God's commands, the "bad" will can account for the inevitable failures 
to accomplish them which accompany even attempts to do them. So only by some such 
explanation of the question, how bad accomplishments still accompany good intent, can such 
a Jew successfully maintain the logical equivalence between "endeavour" to fulfil God's 
commands, and the "accomplishing" of them. 
As we noted particularly in chapter 3, Paul's use of the notion "the Law" does not 
assume that he sees only one discourse inhabiting the Pentateuchal texts, only one layer of 
meaning; he himself may read Deut. 27:26 with a different meaning (spoken in a different 
"social language") than do his opponents, and he may be aware of that disparity. But this 
does not mean that he cannot venture to use Deut. 27:26 as a "bridge" thrown across the 
abyss of heteroglossia that divides them, with the hope that they will be drawn to his reading 
of it, that it will compellingly suggest itself to them as correct. 
For clarity's sake we should point out here the differences between what we have just 
said regarding "the Law," and the traditional reading in which Paul is denying that fallen 
humanity has the means to fulfil the Law and so is accursed. True, Paul does point out the 
gulf between attempt and accomplishment; but even if he personally attributed this to a lack 
of means to accomplish God's will (say, because of ingrained sinful habits hard to 
overcome), his arguments always handle it otherwise. He never speaks of the "flesh's" 
intractability as an impersonal, physical barrier to the inner man's achievement, but rather 
speaks of it as the personal, wilful disobedience of the "old man" (e.g. Rom. 7:25: " I of 
myself serve the law of God with my mind, but with my flesh I serve the law of sin"). This 
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language is perhaps due somewhat to sociolinguistic rhetorical exigencies. After all, many or 
most Jews would have taken Paul's discussion in Rom. 7:14-25 as dealing with something 
like the "bad intent" (the "evil yStzer) which supposedly fought with good intents in the 
human heart (see Davies 1980, 27). In any case, as Paul's argument assumes that the flesh's 
intractability is wilful, he treats the guilt attaching to it not merely as failure to accomplish, 
but as failure to attempt. It is for this reason that Paul's passages which speak of human 
flesh's universal guilt before the Law (e.g. Rom. 3:10-20; Gal. 3:10) speak in terms of 
failure to attempt (i.e., to "abide by") all things commanded by God. So much for the 
traditional reading's difference from ours. 
But moreover, Paul evidently expects any Jewish Galatian readers to accept this 
premise without much ado; he never seems to think this viewpoint would be surprising or 
need substantial defence. That fact is a vital clue for a proper understanding Paul's 
arguments about the curse of the Law. It suggests that for Paul, the lst-century Palestinian-
Jewish attempt to rationalise and regularise the shortcomings of "the flesh" is unacceptable (it 
is against the Judaism of his former life that he is polemicising, after all). From his different 
anthropology (see above, chap. 3), such regularising would be simply a more or less 
conscious attempt to excuse not merely unintentional failures but wilful rebellion against 
God. For in his anthropology, rebellion is not some normal, occasional-but-temporary 
dominance of the Evil Inclination over the human's will, as if the human will itself was not at 
fault. No: it is wilful, culpable rebellion, pure and simple. If Paul indeed sees things this 
way, then his characterisation of the Jews as rebels against God is ipso facto explained: for 
every attempt to rationalise and normalise rebellion is morally tantamount to that rebellion. 
The failure to see this Jewish underpinning of Paul's arguments has historically 
contributed to the assumption that Paul chided his Jewish opponents about the lack of means 
to fulfil perfectly all of God's commands, as if the Jews had never heard about humanity's 
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sinfulness and moral inability to accomplish all God's will. Paul had no need to instruct his 
fellow Jews about man's inability to fulfil the Law perfectly; it was precisely because they 
knew this already, but also because they saw this inability as manifesting rebellion, that they 
had ways to rationalise and regularise, with respect to God's covenant, the old, sinful nature 
(Rom. 10:3). Our main point here is that Paul's arguments presuppose this regularising; and 
this presupposition widens the scope of the issue Paul is addressing, from lack of effective 
means to lack (even) of steadfast attempt. The historical tendency to see Paul as talking 
about a lack of means is probably due more or less to the Gentile church's reading a Greek-
philosophical, mediaeval sort of "Spirit-flesh" dualism into the sociolinguistically quite 
different Jewish "Spirit-flesh" (i.e., "Creator-creature") categories in whose terms Paul 
polemicised. At any rate, if the Jews were guilty of any "legalism," it was not a legalism 
that sought misguidedly to achieve sinless perfection, as has often been assumed by Pauline 
scholars, but rather a legalism which, under the influence of "the Law," relaxed the criteria 
of what was required, in order to accommodate man's already-recognised sinfulness (Silva 
1986, 120f.; 1991, 348f.).5 7 
Paul argues that "as many as are of the deeds of the Law do not abide (steadfastly) by 
all things written in the Law." Thus he is not concerned that his Jewish opponents are 
spending their efforts in vain on what is impossible to achieve; on the contrary, he is 
concerned that their efforts fall short because of not being steadfast, their incentive having 
been dampened by "the Law's" compelled distortion of God's true requirement, namely 
57. Cf. J . G. Machen 1925, 179: "The legalism of the Pharisees, with its regulation of the minute 
details of life, was not really making the Law too hard to keep; it was really making it too easy. 
Jesus said to His disciples, 'Except your righteousness shall exceed the righteousness of the 
scribes and Pharisees, ye shall in no wise enter into the kingdom of heaven.' The truth is, it is 
easier to cleanse the outside of the cup than it is to cleanse the heart. If the Pharisees had 
recognized that the Law demands not only the observance of external rules but also and primarily 
mercy and justice and love for God and men, they would not have been so readily satisfied with 
the measure of their obedience . . . " This viewpoint should have more cogency today, since E . P. 
Sanders (1977), especially, has inspired New Testament scholars to adopt a more historically-
realistic perspective on lst-century Palestinian Judaism. 
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steadfast obedience. He could hardly be denigrating obedience as an effective means of 
justification, as in the traditional reading; that reading implies background problems which 
Paul never faced. 
In summary one might say that in Paul's view, "the Law" forces the "obedience" 
righteousness-criterion onto the Procrustean bed of logical equivalence to the criterion 
"outward, completed deeds," and a Jewish worldview would accordingly have considered all 
failures to accomplish God's will as tantamount to failure to attempt it. So all steadfast, 
"true" (in Paul's eyes) obedience and faith must become endangered species, as it were, 
within Judaism, due to the "Law"-forced regularising and rationalising of the outer, "old 
man" (whom Paul sees as unitary and rebellious), and can survive only among those who 
look beyond "the Law" for God's true criterion of "righteousness." All these differences 
reflect a heteroglossia, a difference of "social language," due largely to a difference in 
anthropological and perhaps metaphysical outlook. For Paul, by contrast, our knowing that 
we (i.e., our "old man") have, through the body of Christ, already legally "died to the Law" 
frees us up (i.e., our singular "inner man") psychologically to serve God (Rom. 7:4; cf. 8:3-
4). That is, the potential lack of condemnation of the inner man becomes, not the "efficient" 
cause (to use Aristotle's terms), but rather the "final" (teleological) cause of its new 
obedience. Then we "serve in the Spirit," "walk in the Spirit" and "are led of the Spirit" 
(7:6, 8:4-14); aware that we (as inner man) are not automatically under condemnation, we 
have become psychologically a "new creature" (Gal. 6:15).58 
58. This phrase, ncuvi) Kriaiq, must in this context be translated "a new creature" rather than (with 
Martyn 1985; 1997a, as a pivotal text) "a new creation." According to Paul "neither 
circumcision nor uncircumcision is anything," but rather muni KT'IOIQ, whereas in 5:6 "neither 
circumcision nor uncircumcision effects [iaxvsi] anything" (AT), but faith working through love. 
In 1 Cor. 7:19, "circumcision is nothing, and uncircumcision is nothing, but what matters is the 
keeping of the commandments of God" (NASB). Obviously these are parallel texts; and in their 
contexts they clearly have to do with what constitutes an individual acceptable before God, and 
not with some eschatological schedule of cataclysmic cosmic shifts. The only other text in Paul 
where we read of a #cau>rj icriaig is 2 Cor. 5:17: "Therefore if any man is in Christ, he is a new 
creature; the old things have passed away; behold, new things have come" (NASB); notice the 
subject of the opening clause is an individual, so that the ellipsis "he is" (before Kmvi) KTUTU;) is 
justly supplied. 
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4.9.4 The structure and content of 3:10 
What then, structurally, is the logic of 3:10? We will use here, as in the previous section, a 
crucial notion that Paul uses in both Romans (especially 7 and 8) and Galatians, namely 
"flesh," referring to the "old man" (Rom. 6:6) who, in the footsteps of Adam his forebear, 
was "sold under bondage to sin" through rebellion against God's command (Rom. 7:14, cf. 
18).5 9 As we have said, Paul's arguments on the Law always assume (in Jewish style) that 
"the flesh" (the nature inherited from Adam) is not just in sin, but in wilful sin, and that any 
attempt to rationalise and normalise such sin covenantal-legally is itself rebellion. With this 
terminology then the logic of 3:10, both stated and unstated, amounts to this polysyllogism 
(each sub-syllogism is of type AAA-1): 
(unstated) All who are of works of the law "set their minds on the things of the 
flesh." (not those of the Spirit; cf. Rom. 7:6, 8; 8:2, 4-14) 
(unstated) All who "set their minds on the things of the flesh" do not abide by 
everything written in the Law. (5:13-17; Rom. 6:14; 7:6; 8:2, 4-8) 
(unstated conclusion of the above) All who are of works of the Law do not abide 
by everything written in the Law. (cf. 6:13; Rom. 2:23-24; 6:14) 
All who do not abide by everything written in the Law are cursed. (Gal. 3:10b) 
Therefore, all who are of works of the Law are cursed. (Gal. 3:10a) 
59. If there were space, we might pursue an exegesis of parallel passages in Romans 6—8; but we 
must forego this. On the crucial significance of the "Spirit-flesh" contrast for Galatians, see 
Fletcher 1982; Barclay 1991. For a helpful discussion of Paul's use of "flesh" (adp£) see Dunn 
1998, 62-70. We agree with Dunn that Paul's usage of the term, though seemingly ranging over 
a spectrum, is essentially unified. We would not unqualifiedly agree, however, with Dunn's 
denial that for Paul "the flesh" may involve overconfidence in human ability to fulfil the Law. 
Dunn complains that this sense causes a "disjunction in the spectrum" of Paul's usage, since 
"human presumption of ability . . . seems somewhat remote from the more obvious range of sarx" 
(ibid., 69). But this sense is "remote" from this range only if and where the human "ability" is 
not seen as contrived by a spurious accommodating of God's supposed covenant to the sinful, 
rebellious "old man." 
Here we should perhaps voice our opinion that the use of this term in Gal. 2:16d and Rom. 
3:20a, in lieu of the term "all living" in Ps. 143:2 which Paul is apparently citing, is significant 
for those verses' exegesis. Thus we disagree with this estimation: "It is not important as a 
misquotation; the two expressions have essentially the same meaning; we may simply say 'No 
one' and leave it at that" (Barrett 1985, 19). On the contrary, Paul purposely changes the term to 
"flesh," thus restricting the non-justification to this sort of being. 
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This reading avoids putting Christians also under this eschatological curse, and thereby 
maintains the contrast with verse 9, as it also avoids a conflict with 13a. Furthermore, 
Hubner (1984, 36-41) has derived a somewhat similar understanding of 3:10 while 
ostensibly, and apparently, drawing on Galatians alone (not Romans). After deriving the 
above reading and argument we discovered the commonality between Hubner's reading and 
our own. There are significant divergences, however: crucially, Hubner insists on seeing a 
"quantitative" (measurable accomplishments) demand in Paul's citation of Deut. 27:26, like 
the traditional reading.60 This introduces into his exposition an unresolved tension, 
60. If Paul's focus is indeed on endeavour, there is no way to come up with a quantification of it, in 
and of itself, assuming it is not commensurable with accomplishments. That is, Paul would not be 
saying that all their accomplishments must conform to the Law's stipulations, nor that a certain 
percentage must. Such may have been part of his opponents' doctrine, but not of Paul's. From 
this we can see that the debate into which Hubner (1984, 44 n. 16) and others entered, as to 
whether Paul was of the school of Hillel (which allegedly considered 51 percent good 
accomplishments acceptable) or of that of Shammai (which reckoned 99 percent as less than 
acceptable), was beside the point; when writing Galatians Paul had not a quantitative, but a 
qualitative view of the criterion. (On this debate, cf. Bruce 1982b, 159f.) 
But on the other hand, and more plausibly, according to Hubner (1984, 18) Paul here 
assumes that "for those who are dependent on the Law there is a quantitative factor in their self-
understanding and . . . this quantitative factor is the essential one and is that which actually 
delimits or defines their self-understanding." E . P. Sanders' denial (1977, part I) that lst-century 
Palestinian Jews ever thought of acceptance with God as conditioned quantitatively by some 
percentage or "weighing" of good deeds vs. bad, seems too spirited for the evidence and 
argument he assembles, and for the exegesis he performs on the relevant rabbinic texts (see pp. 
125-47; interestingly, he was quite willing to admit to such a "weighing" view's being presented 
in the Testament of Abraham, a contemporary Jewish document of likely Egyptian provenance; 
see his introduction to that text in OTP, 1:871ff., espec. 875-77). In its discussion of lst-c. 
Judaism, Sanders' 1977 book is explicitly dependent on the methodology of assuming (with Max 
Kadushin, and without supporting argument, pp. 72-75) that there was a fundamental 
"coherence" to the Palestinian Jewish religion, and dismissing thereafter as a fluke any Jewish 
text that fails to cohere with the Jewish view which he deems the one true view. Sanders has 
accordingly a prejudice, before even coming to the Rabbinic texts, that any such deeds-weighing 
judgment could not possibly be a part of Jewish soteriology, since (in his view) it would not 
cohere smoothly with the "grace"-emphasising religion which he considers lst-c. Palestinian 
Judaism to have been. This sort of inference is textually ungrounded at best, and question-
begging at worst. And the specific conception of "grace" which Sanders attributes to this Judaism 
seems to be more or less imported from a Lutheran-like Protestant soteriology (see Neusner 
1978)! Contrast the explanation of the rabbinic view of the Judgment in Guttman 1974, and the 
exegesis of the pertinent rabbinic texts by Quarles (1996, rebutting Sanders). Sanders also claims 
(1977, 294-95) that in the Qumran literature "there is no picture of God holding a judgment at 
which he weighs the deeds of each man and punishes or rewards him according to his deserts, for 
man's destruction or eternal reward has been determined in advance according to whether or not 
he is a member of the sect." But he fails to mention the numbering- or measuring-picture of the 
judgment that one finds in 1QS 4. In particular, it is hard to deny such a reading of 1QS 4:15-16, 
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addressed lamely with the unexplained claim that " . . . Paul was tacitly presupposing in Gal 
3.10 a general breakdown in the legal principle of Deut. 27.26" (ibid., 38; in other words, 
Paul meant the opposite of what he actually said!).61 Nevertheless Hiibner argues, 
significantly, that it is only the man whose mind is set on "the flesh" who is really in view in 
3:10: 
The works of the flesh . . . are not done by the person who is driven by the 
pneuma. . . . the person who does not live on the basis of faith and who 
consequently is not led by the Spirit is simply not in a position to achieve what 
is called in 5.22f. the fruits of the Spirit. Thus it is only at the level of argument 
involving faith [i.e., that "level" which presupposes the need for a psychological 
"new creature"] that there is demonstrated the impossibility for those outside the 
bounds of faith of doing the love which is required by the Law (Lev. 19.18). It 
is the carnal man, the man of oap£, who is here meant by 'men.' Once we have 
seen this, it then becomes clear that the non-fulfilment, presupposed in Gal 3.10, 
of the quantitative requirements of the Law by all men implies their carnal 
nature. Quantitative fulfilment is not possible because the Torah contains 
stipulations which must be 'qualitatively fulfilled.' After all, even the 'whole' 
Law [5:14], which makes demands on the Christian, is a demand of the Torah. 
The man presupposed in Gal 3.10 vainly imagines in his flesh, his aotpk, that he 
can "do" the Law and in his illusion loses himself in the quantity he has to 
produce . . . he deceives himself in seeking to obey a quantitative standard. 
(Ibid., 41, emphasis in original, square-bracketed interpolations ours) 
Except for the aforementioned tension (from finding "quantitative requirements" here) 
appearing in the middle of this quotation, it seems to argue for most of what we have claimed 
in the exposition above. In any case, it appears that only our own view both avoids all the 
25; as DSSE correctly translates 4:15-16a: "And the whole reward for their deeds [ On'frgia rtoys 
] shall be, for everlasting ages, according to whether each man's portion in their two divisions is 
great or small." The literary context here is about the time of God's "visitation," i.e., the 
eschatological time of judgment (see 3:15, 17-19; 4:7-9, 11-14, 18-26). 
61. This unnecessary and unsubstantiated intrusion of the traditional unstated premise into 3:10 also 
serves pivotally Hiibner's allegation of development in Paul's thinking between Galatians and 
Romans: the tension of this reading is not present in Romans, notes Hiibner. But as it is so in 
tension also with Hiibner's own reading of Galatians 3:10, and is after all an unstated element 
which arises only there, it is far better not to read it as a Pauline affirmation in Galatians either. 
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various problems that have plagued this verse's interpreters, and adequately explains Paul's 
meaning including its rhetorical structure. 
4.10 The connection of 3:10 with 3:9, its contribution to Paul's argument, and 
its relevance for our hypothesis about that argument 
But how does the meaning for which we have argued function in rhetorical connection with 
3:9? Since we have argued that 3:9 and 10 are a positive and negative way of saying more or 
less the same thing, the question arises what their collective thrust is. 
The answer to this has already arisen. We argued, just before the section on Paul's 
logic, that Paul is opposing a certain theory and not a certain course of action. This is 
confirmed by the sense of CK in both verse 9 (e/c marewc) and 10 (e£ epyoav vdfiov), namely, 
"in the party or or "who are partisans of." If he had wanted to say "those who have faith" 
and "those who rely on works," Paul would not have used this preposition. Again, the 
implicit presupposition is not the general human lack of means to accomplish all the things in 
the Law. His point is not that the one theory directs its adherents to the correct means while 
the other directs its adherents to the wrong means; his point in 3:10 is rather that the wrong 
theory divests its adherents of the incentive (and thus the will, and thus the power, the 
capacity) to do what is required for justification. Paul's issue is not the relative efficacies of 
faith and works; for in both 3:9 and 3:10 the focus is on the two theories identifying these 
two parties. 
But if his focus is on the two contrasting justification-theories held by two parties, one 
may ask, why is his subject in both 9 and 10 the parties themselves, rather than the theories, 
or justification, or righteousness? Has Paul not shifted the argument, at least to this extent? 
Not necessarily; for this polysyllogism may still be understood as fitting into the rhetorical 
framework of opposing justification-theories, if only it assumes that a correct justification-
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theory would certainly vindicate its supporters at least some of the time, even as an incorrect 
one would certainly put its supporters to shame at least some of the time. Reading in that 
larger, partly unstated argument for 3:9-10, or rather for all of 3:6-10 or 3:7-10 (where the 
first oi e/c m'ffTeojcr appears), is necessary in order to make a coherent rhetorical relation 
between them and the immediately preceding verses (and the following ones, as we shall see), 
to which verses, as the literary pattern (including the chiastic parallelism of 3:2-14) shows, 
they should quite closely relate. 
Apparently then, Paul's criterion forjudging between the theories, at this rhetorical 
juncture, is simply the inferable circumstances of those who espouse the diverging theories. 
These inferable circumstances suggest truths that are counter to the theory itself; thus the 
argument is a circumstantial ad hominem one. The larger argument of verse 10 is not, "Do 
not go that way, you will only end up cursed," but rather, " I f anyone holds that theory of 
justification they shall not be justified, but rather cursed; the covenantal circumstances of its 
proponents are thus contrary to those predicted by the epya vdfwv theory itself." By using 
offoi in 10a Paul implies the first, explicit, implicative, conditional proposition.62 And this 
second, emphasised proposition, an implicit but obvious corollary of the first, is effectively a 
disjunction: Not both Deut. 27:26 and the epya vonov justification-theory can be true. 
Thus 10a comprises within itself not only the conclusion of his polysyllogism, but 
indeed the whole gist of the polysyllogism, the whole implication-part of his argument in 
verse 10. Paul is "affirming" this statement, but he affirms it not as some categorical 
proposition about reality (i.e., "all members of that group are in fact under a curse"), but 
rather as the above conditional proposition. (This is the one kernel of truth in the claim of 
Stanley (1990, 498) that by using bVoi in 10a Paul suggests "an element of 'uncertainty' or 
62. In fact, any A-type proposition implies a conditional, as per the valid syllogism AAA-1: that is, 
A(a,b) < [A(c,a) < A (c,b)]. Thus "all who are e£ epywv vdfxov are cursed" implies "If anyone 
is e£ spywv fdfwv, he or she is cursed," which last is what Paul evidently means to suggest by 
using oooi. 
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'potentiality' regarding the membership o f the group of those e£ epyuv popov.) So, as in 
any circumstantial argument: only the implication-part is stated; the author hopes the reader 
will supply the belief-part; and the argument as a whole (including belief-part) is ponendo 
tollens ("affirming the disjunct"), the affirmed disjunct being in this case Deut. 27:26 (the 
circumstantial belief) and the denied disjunct being the epya vofiov theory of justification. 
What then is the relevance of our findings on 3:10 for the overall hypothesis we 
formulated at the end of chapter 3? They confirm our suggestion that Paul's argument, so far 
at least, is not about means of justification or righteousness, but rather about the correct 
meaning (i.e., particular denotation) of the concept "righteousness" in the context of the 
church of Jesus Christ and of God's new covenant. For he is warning, not of the practical 
consequences of their taking a certain course of action, but rather of the logical consequences 
of their adopting a certain theory, namely the epya vofiov ("accomplishments of the Law") 
justification-theory. Furthermore, the fact that Paul is affirming the truth of Deut. 27:26, as 
a true, eschatologically valid criterion of righteousness (cf. Romans 2, 6), confirms our 
suggestion that what a Pauline "faith" believes in is a covenant whose conditions are "general 
steadfast obedience," or in other words "abiding by" all the commands of God. So far then, 
the exegesis supports our hypothesis. 
Chapter 5 
The structure and meaning of 3:11-12 
Although verses 11-12 is perhaps less controversial than verse 10, there are quite a few 
exegetical problems facing the interpreter in this part of our passage as well. We will take 
them almost in the order that we meet them. At the end we will summarise the most 
important of our findings. 
5.1 Paul's use of on (twice) in 3:11 
The first thing that we must exegete correctly, in order to discern the structure of Paul's 
argument here, is the twin occurrence of on in 3:11. This term introduces both clauses of 
1. We offer this translation only as representative, not as correct. Translations differ widely; ours 
will emerge in the present chapter. 
verse 11. 
Gal. 3:11, UBSGNT 
on be iv vofiq ovdelg SuaioDrm 
irotpct T4> 6e<$ SffXov, on 'O biicmoq 
en irtffTewg fijaerati' 
Gal. 3:11, NRSV 
Now it is evident that no one is 
justified before God by the law; for 
"The one who is righteous will live 
by faith." 1 
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The possible senses are "that" (as a conjunction) and "for, because." The verse becomes 
unintelligible if we take on the same way in both places.2 Thus, we must consider whether it 
means "that" the first time and "for" (or "because") the second, which is how "virtually all 
translations" render it (Thielman 1994, 127), or else vice versa. The former, traditional way 
yields something like the NASB translation: 
Now that [on] no man is justified before God by the law is evident; for [on], 
"The righteous man shall live by faith." 
Thielman suggests the alternative as a better translation: 
"But because [hoti] no one is justified before God by the law, it is obvious that 
[hoti] 'the just shall live by faith.'" 
Thielman's translation is initially plausible but ultimately dubious. First, it leaves Paul 
in a position very strange and awkward for him, of arguing to a Scriptural truth rather than 
from it (Burton 1921, 166; Zerwick 1963, §418). 
In addition, it makes Paul argue fallaciously; his conclusion, "that the just shall live by 
faith," would be neither "obvious" nor even logical based on the premise that this reading 
gives. Denial of justification iv vow does not imply justification ev or BK something else 
specific. Admittedly, the first translation makes the verse just as illogical, if verse 11 be 
taken for the complete argument. However, that translation makes Paul's premise the second 
clause rather than the first, and thus makes it possible that Paul is continuing the argument 
through verse 12, which is connected to 11 with Se. The second reading would require 
rather a yap or on or some such conjunction connecting 11 with 12, in order to involve part 
of the latter also in the argument. Thus the first reading alone salvages the possibility that 
we can reconstruct a logical argument out of the verses. For both these reasons, then, the 
first treatment of the on's is preferable. 
2. B. Longenecker (1998, 164) tries to do this, taking both occurrences as meaning "for," and 
claims that this makes the verse read "this way: 'For no one is righteous before God by the law, 
for clearly "The righteous will live by faith".'" But this surprising attempt completely overlooks 
the 6d, and inexplicably reads 8rj\oi> on as "for clearly," as opposed to the only possible 
translation, "it is clear that" (which he himself had just cited, from BAGD, at n. 33). 
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5.2 The conjunction Se and the connection with 3:10 
Is the 5e which connects verses 10 and 11 an adversative 8e, or continuative, or purely 
transitional? Both 3:10a and 3:11a initially appear to be concluding a lack of justification/-
blessing with the Law (11a) or works of the Law (10a). Far from any obvious contrast, 
these verses appear on the surface to be saying almost the same thing. It would appear then 
that in 3:11 6e is transitional.3 
Normand Bonneau (1997, 72) writes that "Verse 11 opens with on 8e, suggesting that 
what follows serves to explain and carry forward the thought expressed in v. 10. Verse 12 
also features the connective 6e in order to signal the continuation and elaboration of what was 
contained in v. 11." While these statements are perhaps all true, we would qualify them. In 
chapter 4 we denied that Paul was continuing the syllogism of 3:10 into verse 11; the 
presence of 6e at the beginning of verse 11 by no means overrules this conclusion. It does, 
however, indicate some connection between 3:10 and 3:11, and suggests that they are part of 
the same "paragraph" or larger structure. But as an individual, complete syllogism and 
argument, 3:10 is discrete from verse 11. 
5.3 The sense and function of vapa TO> 9eu> in 3:11a 
There are several possibilities for 3:11a, according to whether the two prepositional phrases 
respectively are modifying the verb or else the clause as a whole. Certain considerations 
confirm that 7rapa r£g Befy modifies only the verb. In the first place, there is the word order. 
The phrase irapa T<$ defy comes immediately after the verb, in a suitable position if it is 
intended to modify the verb. 
In the second place, irapa rfy defy is a common construction in the New Testament, 
meaning "with" God in the sense of "in the region, sphere, or view or God.4 It is 
3. Cf. Betz 1979 (146), and contra Longenecker (1990, 118). 
4. For this sense of irapa T<$ Oefy, see BAGD, s.v. ircrpd II.2. 
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synonymous with ev&mov TOV Beov.5 Of the 16 other instances of napix T $ 6EQ in the New 
Testament, 11 are in contexts of judgment, justification, or favourable opinion.6 Moreover, 
in the 3 instances of irapct T4> 0e4> (outside of Gal. 3:11) that have contexts of judgment or 
justification with a 6«ai-cognate present, the phrase always modifies that cognate. The 3 
instances are all Pauline: Rom. 2:13; 9:14; 2 Thess. 1:6. It is also worth noting, in this 
connection, that the 3 times ivwmov TOV 6eoi> appears in the New Testament in the context of 
a 6i/cm-cognate, it modifies that cognate: Luke 16:15; Acts 4:19; and Rom. 3:20. This 
characteristic usage of the two formulas, especially in Paul, suggests very strongly that in 
Gal. 3:11 irapa T $ defy is modifying the verb biKmovodai. 
5.4 The sense and function of ev vomo in 3:11a 
The phrase ev vopug in 3:11a is important for the understanding of the structure of Paul's 
present argument. Before we decide what it modifies, let us investigate the meanings of its 
words. 
5.4.1 The sense of the terms 
Commentators on this passage frequently claim ev VOUQ in verse 11 to be basically a 
"shorthand" for e£ epywv vdfwv, "by works of the L a w . " 7 "After e£ epyuv vdfwv in v 10 ev 
vo\iw suffices to express the same idea" (Bruce 1982b, 161). But the few arguments put 
forward for this unusual semantic innovation are not convincing. In fact, this conclusion 
appears to be founded upon the popular assumption that with the phrase e£ epywv vo/wv Paul 
5. See BAGD, s.v. evumiov 2-4. 
6. Those 11 are Luke 1:30; 2:52; Rom. 2:11, 13; 9:14; 1 Cor. 3:19; Eph. 6:9 (irap'aiirq), referring 
to God); 2 Thess. 1:6; James 1:27; 1 Pet. 2:4, 20. The other 5 are Matt. 19:26; Mark 1:27 
(twice); Luke 18:27 (these 3 verses are synoptic parallells); 1 Cor. 7:24. 
7. The view is espoused by Lightfoot (1890, 138), Mussner (1974, 228 n. 78); Betz (1979, 126), 
Bruce (1982b, 161), Hiibner (1984, 50 n.92), Westerholm (1988, 111), Longenecker (1990, 118), 
Schreiner (1993, 41, 60), Lambrecht (1994, 283-84). However, some of these possibly mean 
simply that the latter idea is implied in Paul's phrase. 
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is describing obedience, as an ineffective means (to righteousness or justification).8 His 
objection to the Law can then only be this same one, the ineffectuality of obedience. But we 
have argued that this assumption needs to be demonstrated, not merely assumed; for the real 
possibility exists that epya vonov means "accomplishments" rather than "obedience," and 
that Paul is discussing meaning (of "righteousness") rather than means. 
Among those surveyed who hold or in some way promote the "shorthand" view of ev 
v6w, only Bruce (1982b, 161) and Dunn (1990a, 235 n.51; 1993a, 174) offer arguments, 
which both point to a supposed parallel between "no flesh is justified e£ epyuv vbpuov" in 
2:16d and "no one is justified ev von<#" in 3:11.9 It is certainly proper to point to parallels 
where they are relevant, but if establishing lexical usage by them they must first be "verbal" 
parallels, rather than merely supposed "conceptual" (or "real") parallels: 
[Parallels] are divided into two classes, viz., verbal and real. "When the same 
word occurs in similar connections, or in reference to the same general subject, 
the parallel is called verbal . . . Real parallels are those similar passages in 
which the likeness or identity consists, not in words or phrases, but in facts, 
subjects, sentiments or doctrines" (Terry, Biblical Hermeneutics, p. 121). 
Verbal parallels establish points of linguistic usage, while real parallels serve to 
explain points of historical, ethical, or dogmatical interest. (Berkhof 1950, 79; 
cf. Ramm 1970, 140-41) 
But there is no verbal parallel between ev VOUQ in 3:11 and e£ epyuv vopov in 2:16; both the 
prepositions and their objects are different. Apparently then, one could not claim that ev 
VOUQ means e£ epywv voyuov as the latter is intended in 2:16 except on two assumptions: that 
ev is being used here instrumentally or causally, and that vofiq as an ellipsis for epyw vdnov, 
"works of the Law." 
8. Concerning this phrase Bruce (1982b, 161) cites D. P. Fuller (1975, 40), who takes both "Law" 
and "works of the Law" to signify "legalism" in this context. 
9. Longenecker's argument (1990, 118) is just a paraphrase of Bruce's. Schreiner (1993, 60) merely 
argues in a circle: "In verse 11 Paul probably refers to the works of the law when he uses the 
phrase by law (ev fo/jiw, en nomO), since verse 11a restates and elaborates on verse 10." The other 
commentators cited offer no real arguments. 
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Now, an ellipsis is a figure of speech, and so the problem of proof now becomes more 
complicated: the context of 3:11 must somehow show that Paul is indeed using a figure of 
speech. For "there is an old and oft-repeated Hermeneutical rule [in regard to figures], that 
the words should be understood in their literal sense, unless such literal interpretation 
involves a manifest contradiction or absurdity" (Berkhof 1950, 85). This rule is sound, for 
generally a reader recognises a figure of speech only by the non-feasibility of a literal 
interpretation in the given context.10 But the context here does nothing to indicate that taking 
vow a s "Law" in 3:11 involves "a manifest contradiction or absurdity." Thus there is no 
reason, in the word vo/wg itself, to suppose that he is speaking of epya vdfwv in this verse. 
In other words, unless ev in this verse is to be understood as instrumental, and this is seen as 
evidence that there is an ellipsis with vow, t h e r e l s a o reason to suppose that vow 1S 311 
ellipsis for epyuiv vdfiov. 
But here we encounter a vicious circle; for just as there is apparently no reason to 
suppose vow is an ellipsis here unless ev is instrumental, so also there is apparently no 
reason whatever to suppose ev is instrumental here unless we assume vow t 0 D e an ellipsis 
for epya vdfiov. The preposition ev, the most frequently used in the New Testament, 
encompasses a very wide semantic range within the latter. Moule (1959, 75), citing MM 
(209), calls it a "maid of all work." 1 1 
In particular, we should recognise that the "instrumental" use of it is actually part of a 
larger category of meaning, which Zerwick (1963, §117) calls "a general notion of 
association or accompaniment."12 We find this meaning expressed in the instrumental-
associative type of dative. DM, in their discussion of the "instrumental dative," categorise 
10. The exception would be idioms and such "ready-made utterances," but there is no reason to 
interpret sv vow 8 8 o n e -
11. In the NT this preposition, "thanks in part at least to the influence of Semitic be, increases its 
scope to a very great extent" (Zerwick 1963, §116). 
12. On associative ev, cf. BAGD, s.v. ev 5.d; GLNT, s.v. ev 6.b; Zerwick 1963, §§116-17. 
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the "instrumental of association" sense as a subset of it; but their discussion makes the 
associative sense at least as fundamental (and the earlier, in the historical development of 
Indo-European languages). Their comments help elucidate the semantic relationship between 
the two senses: 
[The "instrumental dative"] case was likely preceded historically by the old 
associative case, of which traces remain in the Sanskrit. The idea of association 
and instrumentality are really much more closely related than might appear at 
first thought. One is in a sense associated with the means by which he 
accomplishes an objective, and in personal association the second person 
supplies the means of fellowship. The connection between the two ideas appears 
in the use of our word with in the expression, " I walked down the road with my 
friend, who was walking with a cane." The simpler and cruder idea of the 
implement used in a task being associated with the one using it developed into 
the more advanced notion of its being the instrument. (DM, 88-89) 
To have association, a second party must furnish the means of that association. 
However, association is not necessarily personal, though predominantly so. In 
Rom. 15:27, rolq irvevfianKolq eKOtvcaurjaau means literally they had fellowship 
(with you) by means of your spiritual benefits. This is clearly an example of 
association. (DM, 90) 
Thus, we could consider an associative ev as "instrumental" in a certain inexact sense, since 
one's fellow becomes "the means of fellowship" (or perhaps the means to the benefits of 
fellowship); again, the instrumental is in a way an associative usage, since one is associated 
with the means one uses. Doubtless it is for this reason that BDF calls this broad category of 
dative-meaning "the instrumental-associative dative." But note that DM's explanation makes 
the associative sense the "simpler and cruder," that is the broader and less specific, sense. 
This category includes a wide range of senses, including cause, manner, and 
accompaniment or attendant circumstances, all of which ev can stand for as well. Moule 
(1959, 77-79) points out how difficult it is to demarcate clearly between these various senses. 
Indeed, Zerwick (1963, §118) claims that it is only the context, and not the preposition ev, 
that conveys what sort of association, more precisely, is in view: 
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Just as the genitive in itself indicates merely an appurtenance of one thing to 
another, and for this reason may, according to the subject matter, express even 
the most exalted mystical union between Christ and those who are «Christ's», so 
too ev, indicating of itself merely association or concomitance, may represent, 
according to the subject matter, connections of utterly different kinds, from that 
between an action and its rapidity (ev raxei) to that between Christ and those 
who are «in Christ». Hence the nature of this connection is to be sought in 
divine [i.e., the written] revelation, and not in the sense of the word ev. It 
would be a waste of time and energy to collect from profane literature all the 
occurrences of ev with a noun standing for a person, in the hope of arriving at a 
deeper understanding of the mystery which Paul intended to express by the 
words ev Xpiorq. 
Thus it is in the context, and not in ev itself, that we must look for any "instrumental" or 
other more-specific sense of it. 
But nothing in the immediate context here, not even the phrase "e« works of the Law" 
(3:10a), conveys an instrumental sense. The instrumental sense would be more likely with a 
prepositional object that is an inanimate tool, than with the Law, a discourse which explains 
and inaugurates a covenantal relationship. In the sphere of personal relationships, one would 
naturally expect a broader associative/relational sense for ev. For what is it, after all, to 
achieve covenantal righteousness or justification "by means o f the written or spoken 
agreement-discourse? That sounds as if the set of words within the discourse is a tool by 
which one attains some extra-covenantal goal, as in, "those who proclaim the gospel should 
get their living by the gospel" (1 Cor. 9:14). Rather, in the present context the question is 
one of achieving right-standing within the social relationship that the covenantal agreement 
represents. That suggests an associative sense. 
Bruce appeals to another passage where Paul uses ev vow, Phil- 3:6; but a careful 
study of all the places where Paul uses the phrase makes it appear most likely that hv is being 
used in an associative sense in Gal. 3:11. In fact, in the 8 instances outside of Gal. 3:11 and 
5:4 (which, though contextually similar, is no clearer than 3:11 and thus cannot be used to 
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elucidate it) where Paul uses ev (T(J>) vo^ug with vom# referring to the Mosaic Law (including 
Acts and the compound evvofiog in 1 Cor. 9:21), he never uses ev in a strictly instrumental 
sense, not even in the passage that Bruce cites (Phil. 3:6). There is a parallel there between 
"the righteousness that is ev VOUQ" (3:6) and "my own righteousness which is en vdfwv" 
(3:9); but in neither case should we understand the preposition as instrumental, since this 
would necessarily make the prepositional phrase adverbial whereas in both cases it is 
modifying biKaioavvr\v and therefore must be adjectival. It would be better to take the phrase 
in 3:9 to mean "from the Law," and ev in 3:6 as locative or perhaps associative. Of the 
other 7 instances, 1 (Rom. 2:20), is a "descriptive" use (Moule 1959, 79); 1 is qualifying 
Kotvxuofiai (Rom. 2:23); 1 is locative (1 Cor. 14:21); and 4 are associative (1 Cor. 9:21; 
Rom. 2:12; 3:19; Acts 13:38).13 
Especially relevant to Gal. 3:11 is Acts 13:38, since there also ev C6/KJ> modifies 
SiKmovadai (although biKociovadai is not used absolutely there but rather with airo -KOLVTUV, 
thus with the sense "be exonerated (from)"). 1 4 According to Acts' account of the speech, 
Paul sets up an antithetical parallel in Acts 13:38b-39 between the ability to be exonerated 
from sins ev TOVTQ (i.e., "this man," referring to Christ) and the inability to be exonerated 
from them ev vomg (vs. 38). This parallelism would strongly suggest, though not 
conclusively prove, that these two CJ>'S are being used in the same sense. Since the former of 
these Greek phrases is best taken in Paul's common associative sense ("in Christ"; Zerwick 
1963, §§116-17), 1 5 and since the latter of the phrases is used elsewhere by Paul 3 times in an 
13. Of these 4 instances of the phrase, the first is translated: "under the law" or equivalent (KJV, 
RSV, NASB, NIV); the second is translated: "in the law" (KJV), "under the law" (RSV, NASB, 
NIV); the third is translated: "under the law" (KJV, RSV, NASB, NIV); the fourth is translated: 
"by the law" (KJV, RSV, NTV), "through the law" (NASB) which is not necessarily 
instrumental. The first 3 instances are adjectival and thus clearly not instrumental, whereas the 
last instance is adverbial and thus more prone to be (mis)construed as instrumental. 
14. Cf. L N , vol. 1, §56.34; GLNT, s.v. Sucaiow 3.a. 
15. Both Dunn (1993a, 141) and Bruce (1982b, 136) translate biKau^vm ev Xpurrtp in Gal. 2:17 as 
"to be justified in Christ." 
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associative sense and never (unless in Gal. 3:11) in an instrumental sense, it seems most 
feasible to take it in a broad, associative sense in Acts 13:38 as well. 
The upshot of all this is that there is no convincing or even suggestive evidence for 
taking ev vdnq in Gal. 3:11 in the sense of "by works of the Law." Unless we take ev in an 
instrumental sense, there is no real indication that Paul is using vb\u$ as an ellipsis for epya 
voiwv; and there is no reason at all to take ev this way here—on the contrary, the evidence 
from verbal parallels would indicate that Paul means this phrase simply in a broad, 
associative sense, "with [or 'under,' or 'in'] the Law," as he evidently uses this same phrase 
4 other times in the NT. And since the instrumental sense is the more specific and 
informative one, the Quantity maxim of conversation (see chap. 2) places the burden of proof 
on the hypothesis that that is Paul's sense. We must conclude rather that Paul means it 
associatively.16 
Moreover, we have another reason not to take the phrase instrumentally in 3:11a, 
which is the resulting difficulty of constructing a plausible logical argument out of 3:11, or 
from 3:11-12. But we postpone discussion of this matter until later in the chapter. 
5.4.2 What the phrase modifies 
Since an associative ev may be either adverbial or adjectival (in which case it might be called 
"stative"), it was not necessary to know prior to the foregoing discussion, what the ey-phrase 
is modifying in 3:11, nor whether it is adverbial or adjectival. But in order to grasp the 
meaning of the verse, we must answer both of these questions. 
What is ev v6fiu$ modifying here: the verb bimioxnai, or the subject ovbeiq, or else the 
whole clause? Inasmuch as it comes before anything else in the clause (not including the 
16. Cf. Hansen 1989, 121: "The ev is not instrumental; it expresses the primary orientation of life, 
the sphere of existence." Cf. also S. K. Williams 1997, 90, who however likewise gives his 
associative definition ("whose personal, communal, and social existence is defined and determined 
by the Law") a misleading spatial descriptor, "locative." 
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nominalising on), and immediately precedes the subject ov6ei<;, not the predicate or verb, it is 
quite unlikely to have been intended with the verb alone. Even Greek's syntax of word 
order, as lax as its rules may be, generally requires placing modifiers alongside the things 
they modify, lest semantic confusion reign. Thus, the Greek reader would sooner infer that 
the phrase goes with the subject, or with the clause as a whole, than that it goes with the 
verb. Note also the ev TOVT<$ in Acts 13:39, clearly separated from the verb 6IKCU.OVT<XI ("be 
justified"), as is the ev vow of vs. 38). 
Might it go with the subject then? Does the clause mean, "No one who is in/under the 
Law is justified before God"? The position of the phrase before ovdeig militates somewhat 
against an adjectival force, since the normal place for an attributive in Greek would be after 
the substantive it modifies (or immediately after an article, before or after the substantive). 
More significant perhaps is the parallel grammatical structure and meaning of Acts 13:39: 
"ev TOVTQ irag 6 morevuv 6iKaiovrm." This clause-structure with ev and 6uoaoDa0ou may 
have constituted something of a Pauline formula. At any rate, the ev vow m Acts 13:38 
("oik rfivvridryre ev vow Mwfla&oc SiKaitoflfji'ou") is set in literary parallel to the ev TOVT<# of 
verse 39 and is obviously a passage parallel to Gal. 3:11; and here the ev vow is clearly 
adverbial, as also probably the ev TOVTQ. In view of the evidence, the most likely 
interpretation of 3:1 la is to take ev vow as adverbial but modifying the clause as a whole. 
5.4.3 The function of the phrase, and implications for the "level ofaffirmation''of'3:11a 
What then is the thrust of the phrase? "Under/with the Law, no one is justified in God's 
eyes." Its placement at the beginning of the statement gives it emphasis (Duncan 1934, 93). 
The whole main clause is qualified by ev vow ° n o u r reading of it, which phrase places upon 
the clause a qualification or condition that contrasts with Paul's own circumstances: Paul is 
not (is no longer?) ev vow, " i n i ° r under] the Law" (Gal. 3:23-25, 4:2b, 4a; Rom. 6:14; 
7:1; 8:2; 1 Cor. 9:20). But what is the exact force of this qualification? 
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One might suggest that the condition concerns the Law's jurisdiction before God: " I f 
the Law truly had jurisdiction, . . . " Then the phrase would, for Paul, be effectively an 
unfulfilled, untrue condition, and the clause a logical result based on that condition: " I f we 
were all in [or 'under'] the Law, none would be justified before God." The argument's 
thrust would then be to infer an unacceptable, false conclusion in order to show, implicitly, 
the unacceptability and falsehood of the antecedent which implied it. The argument would be 
a tollendo tollens, denying in order to deny. 
This hypothesis is analogous to E. D. Burton's treatment of 3:10's argument; and it is 
subject to difficulties analogous to that interpretation's. First, the meaning simply seems too 
much to squeeze out of the two words which Paul uses. Second, it makes Paul deny a result 
(11a, similar to 10a) that Paul would probably agree with rather than deny. In 3:9-10a it is 
not an "absurdity" to Paul, that oaoi ef epyusv vonov be under a curse; rather, he affirms it in 
the same way and to the same extent that he affirms that oi <k nioreaq are blessed with 
faithful Abraham. Likewise 3:11 has a strong parallel, in Paul's reported statement in Acts 
13:38-39: 
Acts 13:38 (AT) Acts 13:38 (UBSGNT) 
Let it be known to you therefore, yvcoarbv ovv earco vylv, avbpeq 
brethren, that through this man abe\(j>oC, on bia TOVTOV vyXv &4>eoig 
forgiveness of sins is proclaimed to anapn&v KotTctyyeKteToti [, mi] 
you, and from everything from which airb iravrav S>v OVK rjbvvrfirfre ev 
you could not be exonerated through vom$ MuOoeuq biKonio6r)vai 
the law of Moses, 
13:39 13:39 
through him every one that believes is ev TOUTC$> itaq 6 narevuiv fiuaioOrai. 
acquitted. 
Is not Paul affirming here that there are things from which they were not able to be justified 
(6«<wci)0Tjmi) ev vow McoOdeto?? Surely he is, to some extent and in some fashion; or at 
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least we may insist that he is not denying it! So it is the above tollendo tollens reading, 
rather than Paul's conclusion, which appears incredible. 
But if ev fo/uj) is not an " i f" condition that refers to the theory as true, what is its 
meaning? If we are right that the ev is associative, the solution we chose with regard to the 
offoi e£ epyuv voftov of 3:10 seems attractive again here, even necessary: the phrase evidently 
refers to a holding that the Law is covenantally authoritative (i.e., has jurisdiction); it still 
serves, then, as a condition qualifying the rest of the verse. So we have an inference which 
involves hypothetical proposition(s) as a part(s). But 1 la's condition is the holding of the 
theory, rather than the truth of the theory itself. We may therefore seem to have here another 
circumstantial ad hominem argument, arguing along lines similar to verse 10; but it is 
perhaps too early to make a decision regarding that. We will return to the argument's 
structure, but let us first examine the rest of the argument's propositions. 
5.5 Hab. 2:4 in Gal. 3:11b 
That part of Gal. 3:11 which we have yet to examine comprises a quotation from Hab. 2:4b: 
'0 bUmoq e« moTeuq fijaerai. The textual and interpretive problems of Hab. 2:4 have 
received much attention.17 The Hebrew MT and LXX (Rahlfs) of Hab. 2:4b are: 
:rPfV 1I13WN3 6 be bUmoq 6K iriOTe&q pov f^acTai. 
Here Rahlfs follows manuscripts X and B. Hab. 2:4 is quoted 3 times in the NT (bold type 
here indicates the quotations): 
Gal. 3:11 
on be ev v6\u$ ovbelq biKotiovTm irapa rfy 6efy bfjkov, on 'O bUmoq BK 
moTeoiq ^rjaerm' 
Rom. 1:17 
biKOLioavvr) yap deov ev avrfy airo/caXuirreTai e« marewq eiq monv, md&q 
yeypairrai, 'O be bUmoq en marewq tfoerai. 
17. E.g. , Smith 1967; Southwell 1968; Emerton 1977; Cavallin 1978; Janzen 1980; Zemek 1980; 
Moody 1981; Robertson 1983; Dockery 1987. 
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Heb. 10:38 
o de biKawq fiov ex irtoTeaq tfeejm, . . . 
5.5.1 The textual problem: the possessive pronoun that Paul omits 
The Palestinian recension and lQpHab 8:2 follow the MT of Hab. 2:4b in making the 
pronoun 3rd-person; the Greek texts, however, along with Aquila and Old Latin, have fwv 
(Zemek 1980, 45). 1 8 Codex Alexandrinus and Group C (Ephraemi) mss., from the 5th c , 
put the pronoun after duaiog, perhaps due to a messianic interpretation of that term (Lane 
1991, 304), or possibly due to influence from Heb. 10:38, where 6 dUaiog pov refers rather 
to the believer (Moo 1986, 404 n. 106). But this seems an unintentional textual variant; a 
scribe would not likely transpose these words intentionally, particularly i f he had any 
knowledge of or access to the Hebrew text. 1 9 Thus, the pronoun probably went with 
mareoiq at first, following the Hebrew text. The most likely explanation for the original 
shift from 3rd person possessive pronoun to 1st person is "the well-known confusion in 
Hebrew scribal orthography between * and 1" (Southwell 1968, 615; cf. Cavallin 1978, 35; 
Janzen 1980, 53-54); thus it would have happened in or before the making of the 
translation.2 0 
The author of Hebrews may have misquoted the L X X from memory, or may have been 
following a different Greek textual variant, or may have deliberately emended the L X X to 
conform more closely to the MT's meaning. But Paul omits ftov from Hab. 2:4b both the 
18. The pronoun fiov is missing from the Freer ms. W c (TCGNT; Rahlfs), likely in assimilation to the 
Pauline usage (Smith 1967, 14). 
19. Among such unintentional changes as occur in textual transmission, "variations in the sequence of 
words is a common phenomenon; thus the three words irdvreg mi EfiairrifovTo in Mark i.5 also 
appear in the order mi epcnrritoiro irarreq as well as mi iraireq e/?airrij"orro" (Metzger 1968, 
193). 
20. Janzen (1980) supplies a very interesting and plausible reconstruction of the Hebrew text's 
intended sense, wherein the prepositional phrase means, "by its [i.e., the message's] reliability," 
rather than "by his faith." This helps answer those who claim the Hebrew word H3173K can only 
mean "reliability," not "faith"; for even if so, the original pronoun was possibly third-person. 
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times he quotes the verse, whereas Hebrews merely has it in a different position than does the 
L X X . Paul omits all possessive pronouns, whether from the LXX or the MT. He may have 
quoted the LXX loosely from memory, or else may have translated loosely from the MT, or 
may have deliberately emended the L X X text he was using. The last two possibilities seem 
the most likely: Paul usually quotes the LXX (loosely sometimes) and seldom seems to quote 
the Hebrew contrary to it; moreover, the presence of 6e in Paul's quotation virtually 
demonstrates that he has some LXX translation in mind rather than the Hebrew (Smith 1967, 
15). The omission of \wv may display a textual conservatism on his part, whereby he wanted 
to avoid a hazardous decision between textual variants; or perhaps he wanted to avoid the 
potential, lurking within the text that Hebrews uses, for a messianic interpretation; or perhaps 
he was working from a Greek version of Habakkuk unknown to us. 
In any case, it effectively ascribes this "faith" to the "righteous one"; so it raises the 
interpretive question whether Paul is thinking of God's "faithfulness," that is, his reliability 
(so L X X K, B, with pov interpreted as possessive genitive), or rather of man's faith (so 
perhaps MT and L X X A, C; so Heb. 10:38, and LXX K, B, with fwv interpreted as objective 
genitive 2 1), or of the Messiah's faith or faithfulness (so perhaps L X X A, Q . While this 
question may be debatable in Romans 1, in Galatians it is at least partly answered by the 
context, which up to 3:11 has been basically an argument about whether justification of 
humans is e/t moTeuq or e£ epyuv vofiav (see espec. 2:16; 3:2-10), and especially by 3:9: 
"So then, those who are men of faith are blessed with Abraham who had fa i th . " 2 2 This is 
also the issue in 3:11a. There can be no question of Paul meaning God's faithfulness. But 
some have argued that Paul's citations of Hab.2:4 intend Christ's faithfulness (or faith); 
especially has this been argued for Rom. 1:17, where the immediate context is less obviously 
concerned with humans' justification by fa i th . 2 3 The question thus becomes, 
21. On this last possibility, cf. Cranfield 1975-79, 1:100. 
22. Cf. Moo 1986, 208, 404 n. 107. J. D. G. Dunn (1991a) has convincingly refuted two arguments 
(R. Hays' and M . Hooker's) that in effect deny this through making all references to faith in 
Galatians speak of Christ's faith. 
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5.5.2 Who is "the righteous (one)"? 
Without launching into an interaction with the mass of secondary literature concerning Rom. 
1:17, one may say that an anthropocentric understanding of irionq in 1:17b is on the face of 
it at least as plausible, and indeed slightly more so, than a Christocentric one. In the first 
place, although in 1:16 Paul identifies the gospel as "the power of God unto salvation," it 
would appear that buaioavvr] in vs. 17a is not the same thing, for the dwaioovvri is not 
identified with the gospel, but rather is "in i t . " Furthermore, between Paul's identification of 
the gospel as "the power of God for salvation" in 16 and as the "righteousness of God" in 
17a, he inserts the qualifying dative, "to everyone who believes, to the Jew first and also to 
the Greek," and it is no irrelevant qualification, Paul states it for a reason. Thus his attention 
just prior to 17 is on man and his faith, not on God's salvation. Therefore it seems quite 
gratuitous to jump over 16b, back to 16a, for an understanding of 17 (as speaking of God's 
personal salvific hKmoovvt) and thus of Christ's own man*;); even more so is this gratuitous 
when the only other verses mentioning faith (manq) or believing (moTevu) in Romans 1-2 
clearly speak of humans' faith (1:5, 8, 12, 16). Thus Rom. 1:17 does not require or even 
suggest a Messianic interpretation of Paul's citation of Hab. 2:4 in Gal. 3:11b. 
As for Paul's intent in the latter citation, we have already suggested that the context in 
Galatians indicates strongly a concern with human justification, and specifically with whether 
it is EK marecoc or e£ epywv v6\wv. Thus one can sustain a Messianic interpretation of Paul's 
quotation in 3:11b only i f one starts taking all of Galatians 1-4's references to faith and 
believing as about Christ's faith rather than man's; but as Dunn (1991a, 740) has incisively 
argued, this reading "leaves Paul's teaching on how Gentile and Jew receive the blessing of 
divine acceptance with a very large and unexplained hole in i t . " Besides, it is of the faith of 
Abraham and those who are blessed with him, that Paul speaks in 3:6-9 (cf. Rom. 4:11-12, 
23. E.g., Campbell 1994; Hays 1986; 1991. 
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23-24). Thus the Messianic interpretation cannot be sustained; Paul has in view man's faith 
in Gal. 3:11b, not Christ's faith or faithfulness.2 4 
5.5.3 The semantic import O/EK here 
Cosgrove (1987, 659) has convincingly demonstrated that "the apostle expresses the 
relationship between justification and works or faith always in terms of means or 
instrumentality, never in terms of juridical or evidential basis." However, the CK may 
(figuratively) assume the latter sense, as Cosgrove admits and as we have argued (above, 
chap. 3). Therefore D. Hill (1967, 146, 157) may well be correct when, citing A. Feuillet, 
he claims that the clause means "he who is righteous on the basis of faith shall live," for 
Paul's intention may well be "to establish the basis on which a man may be righteous," that 
is, "with what kind of righteousness he must be clothed in order to be able to live," rather 
than "to establish how the righteous shall live." In this context as elsewhere, however, the 
meaning of this SK is determined only by resolving the question as to whether Paul is 
discussing the means or else the meaning of "justification." That question we are presently 
investigating. 
5.5.4 The prepositional phrase: modifying subject or predicate? 
Another issue in Gal. 3:11b, one "strongly contested," is whether Paul is "stressing that 'the 
one who is righteous wil l live by faith' (taking ek pisteos with zBsetai) or that 'the one who is 
righteous by faith wil l live' (taking ekpisteOs with dikaios)" (Moo 1986, 208; emphasis in 
original). Again, the form of Paul's quotation is: 
'O dinmoq en irtoTetaq {rjoerm' 
24. Cf. Dunn 1993a, 174-75; Williams 1997 , 91: "if Christ is 'the righteous one,' then the prophet's 
affirmation cannot serve to substantiate Paul's contention that no one is justified in the Law." 
Some commentators want to have their semantic cake and eat it too, through alleging that both the 
Messiah's and the Christian's faith are in view here, perhaps as multiple implications Paul 
employs (e.g., Hays 1983, 156-57; Martyn 1997a, 314). 
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The RSV, NEB, TEV, and a host of commentators on Romans 1:17 take Paul's citation there 
as meaning, "He who is righteous by faith shall live"; as also a number of commentators on 
Gal. 3 :11 . 2 5 The KJV, NIV, and NASB follow the more traditional interpretation, "the 
righteous one shall live by faith." 
Now, it is exceedingly rare in NT Greek to have an attributive prepositional phrase not 
preceded by the article, unless it is in postposition and a genitive intervenes between the 
substantive and the attributive phrase, making the use of the article awkward (BDF, §§272, 
269(2)). Thus many have rightly pointed out that i f Paul wanted the prepositional phrase to 
modify 6 biicaioq, he probably would have put it between 6 and dUaioq, or else repeated the 
article with the phrase (Smith 1967, 16; Cavallin 1978, 36; Moody 1981, 205). 2 6 
Grammatically, then, it appears that the original texts prompt us to interpret as, "the 
righteous one shall live by faith." 
But these commentators understate the grammatical argument. For i f the phrase indeed 
modified 6 bUmoq, it could not mean, "he who is righteous e/c m'aTecoc," as many claim. ' 0 
Siicaioq is a substantive, "righteous one." I f the prepositional phrase were adjectival, then, 
the whole construction would mean, "the righteous one who is 6K nCarecjx;." This translation 
no one seems to have posited. It is certainly awkward semantically. For one thing, there is 
the strangeness of "the righteous one who is of faith": i f he who is righteous necessarily has 
faith, the relative clause is superfluous, and i f he does not, it is irrelevant here; thus it 
25. The commentators on Rom. 1:17 include Moo (1996, 78), Cranfield (1975-79, 1:101-2), Hill 
(1967, 146), and the many listed by Cavallin 1978 (33 n. 3); the commentators on Gal. 3:11 who 
support this interpretation unequivocally are fewer: see Cavallin 1978 (espec. 39 n. 31). See also 
the lists of commentators on both sides of the debate, in Moo 1996, 78 nn. 67-68; Smith 1967, 
21 nn. 3-4. 
26. The objection to this, made by Cranfield (1975-79, 1:102), that "Paul is quoting, not formulating 
something quite independently," is without force. It supposes that Paul slavishly followed some 
text of the LXX word-for-word, despite grammatical errors. But not only is this not Paul's 
customary procedure when citing the LXX (which sometimes he quotes loosely), there is also no 
text of the LXX, at least none available to us, which matches Paul's citation of Hab. 2:4b word-
for-word, which fact argues fairly strongly that he was not doing this here. 
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violates either the "conversational maxim" of Quantity or that of Relevance.27 Another 
problem is that Paul is apparently trying to create there a parallelism between the "e* 
•KioTeoig ^aerm" from his quotation of Hab. 2:4b, and "fijaeTai ev aura?" from Lev. 
18:5b, quoted in Gal. 3:12b. That he intends this parallelism seems quite likely, especially 
in view of the chiasm Paul appears to have built in 3:2-14 with its climax in the parallelling 
of 3:11 and 3:12 (see above, chap. 3; Cosgrove 1988b, 48). But this parallelism is not only 
formal but also semantic, only i f in 3:11 e/c nareoiq modifies the verb (Cavallin 1978, 38). 
There seem adequate reasons, then, to reject the idea that the prepositional phrase modifies 
the subject; but that leaves us, as the only alternative, "the righteous one shall live by faith 
[<k •KioTeug]." 
5.5.5 The logical "categorical" form of the proposition in 3:11b 
There is also an important but almost unnoticed question here as to whether, by saying, "The 
righteous one shall live by faith," Paul is putting the accent of predication on "live" or on 
"by faith." That is to say, is he stating that "all who [have faith and therefore] are righteous 
shall live because of faith," or is he stating rather that "all who are righteous[, and therefore 
all who] shall live[, shall do so precisely] because of faith 1 The former categorical form 
says, in effect, "all who meet this 'faith' criterion of righteousness shall be blessed 
(accordingly)"; the other states the converse, that "all who shall be blessed must necessarily 
meet this 'faith' criterion of righteousness."28 This last form is the way Stanley (1990, 504), 
Cosgrove (1988b, 54-55, 58-59), Cavallin (1978, 38-41), and many others seem to take it, 
27. See above, chapter 2, under section on "pragmatics." 
28. As Cosgrove notes (1988b, 58-59), in the parallel passage Rom. 9:30-10:13 "Paul virtually 
equates being righteous and having life"; so also Bruce, 163; cf. Cavallin 1978, 40. We may 
assume that here, for Paul, "life" signifies "righteousness," as a metonymy for it. 
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although none of them explicitly addresses the issue.29 In the first of these interpretations, 
faith is in the subject, and live is in the predicate; in the second, vice versa. Therefore these 
two propositions are not logically equivalent; neither immediately implies the other. Of 
course, i f Paul is discussing the criterion of "righteousness" in this text, he is treating it as a 
definitional statement, in which case he implies both of these propositions. But in case he is 
discussing not this but the means of justification or of righteousness, the issue of the 
statement's categorical form is important, and therefore we must address it. 
Some considerations that weigh for the former meaning, " A l l who have faith shall 
live," are as follows. Literary-formally, as we noted in chapter 3, Paul seems to have 
structured 3:2-14 in the form of a chiasm. Paul has cast his Scripture-citations into forms 
that support a chiastic parallelism consisting of 3:10-13 at the very least. Now, the question, 
which of the above "categorical" forms we should attribute to Paul's citation of Hab. 2:4, 
needs sensitivity to this apparent chiastic parallelism, so as not to overlook or neglect any 
intended literary structure. But contra Cosgrove and Stanley, our categorical form listed 
second (above) is not really parallel, in its meaning at least, to the Lev. 18:5b quotation in 
3:12b, for as we shall see and which is at any rate evident from the stated form of that text, 
its categorical form is "all those who do them shall live," a semantic parallel to "all those 
who have faith shall live". So, Paul's likely desire for these to be semantically as well as 
formally parallel in his chiastic structure (see above on Hab. 2:4) adds weight to the 
hypothesis that this categorical form is the meaning of 3:1 l b . 
There is also a reason, in the context of Rom. 1:17, to hold " A l l who have faith shall 
live" as the meaning of Paul's citation of Hab. 2:4 there. The immediate context in Romans 
is "justificatory," the question at issue being, how man can be righteous before God. 
29. Others who seem to follow the "All who shall live have faith" interpretation include Lightfoot 
(1890), Burton (1921), Betz (1979), Moody (1981), Bruce (1982b), Hays (1986), Dunn (1990b), 
and Longenecker (1990). 
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Moreover, it is a context of "good news"! Paul is "not ashamed of the gospel"—for it is 
something immensely positive, "the power of God unto salvation . . . for the righteousness of 
God is revealed in i t" (Rom. 1:16-17). But which of these propositions is good news: that 
"all who [have faith and therefore] are righteous shall live (because of that faith)," or, that 
"all who are righteous[, and who therefore] shall live[, shall do so precisely and only] 
because of faith"? In other words, is it good news, that " A l l who have faith shall live," or 
that " A l l who shall live have faith"? The second proposition is in itself simply a limitation 
or qualification of whom it is who shall live, a restricting of the company of the saved to 
those who have faith. Where is there good news in that? A restriction or limitation of means 
or access can hardly constitute glad tidings. In the first proposition, however, there is the 
kind of gospel we hear from Paul elsewhere: "all who have faith shall live, because faith is 
accounted for righteousness!" This makes our second categorical form a very dubious way to 
take Paul's citation of Hab. 2:4b in Rom. 1:17b. In light of these considerations, probably 
the first categorical form is the correct meaning of the statement in 3:11b. 
5.6 The continuation of the argument through vs. 12? 
Again, i f Paul's point concerns meaning rather than means, 3:11b would be cited as a 
definitional statement; in that case, it would be convertible, so that both the above categorical 
forms would be implied (though only one would be stated). But no matter which categorical 
form of 3:1 l b we take as operative in Paul's argumentation, we cannot reconstruct it a logical 
argument, with l i b implying 11a, unless we add a further premise or premises (see above). 
We have "Law" and "justified" as seemingly key terms in 11a, and "righteous" and "faith" 
as key terms in 1 lb , so it natural to expect "Law" and "faith" to be key terms of the needed 
premise. We find in 3:12a the statement of such a proposition. And though the needed 
premise might conceivably be unstated, it is unclear what it would be i f not equivalent to this 
A. H. Carver, 2000 §5.6 Page 233 
stated one. We infer that the argument extends beyond the boundaries of verse 11 and 
encompasses at least 12a. We therefore turn now to verse 12. 
5.7 The 6K in etc -xtoTeuq (vs. 12a) 
In 12a the prepositional phrase e/c marcuq is a predicate adjective: 
This being so, it would be grammatically awkward to attribute to it instrumental or causal 
sense, as in "The Law is not because of faith." Some scholars pursue a sense somewhat 
related to the "from" sense of e/c, such as "based on faith" (Longenecker 1990, 120, but he 
translates it "relying on faith" in 3:9), or, "has its origin in faith" (Martyn 1997b, 468). 
Such translations are not feasible in this context, however: they violate the conversational 
Manner maxim (above, chap. 2) by being unclear. What would it mean, exactly, to say that 
some particular discourse or text is "not from faith"? Since this statement is quite unclear, 
and since making it clear would require departing too much from the attested senses of c/c, 
this approach faces a destructive dilemma. Much the preferable reading takes the e/c in the 
same sense as in verses 9 and 10: "partisan(s) of, from the party of, from the school of ." 3 1 
So, the clause reads: "The Law is not a partisan of faith"; or in other words, "The Law does 
not teach, or hold to, the theory of justification e/c marecx;." 
That reading does tend to raise a question however, which it may be well to address a 
bit further here even though we dealt with it already in chapter 4. The problem is this: We 
have seen that Paul cites Deuteronomy 27 in 3:10 affirming the criterion of righteousness 
30. We offer this translation only as representative, not as correct. Translations differ widely; ours 
will emerge in the following sections. 
31. Again, see BAGD s.v., 3.d; BDF §§209(2), 437; and espec. Zerwick 1963, §§134-35. 
Gal. 3:12, UBSGNT 
6 6e pofiog ova eanv e/c irioTewq, 
dXX' 'O iroiijaaq avra fqaerai ev 
avTOtg. 
Gal. 3:12, KJV 
And the law is not of faith: but, The 
man that doeth them shall live in 
them. 3 0 
A. H. Carver, 2000 §5.7 Page 234 
which it presents (steadfastly "abiding by all the things written," etc.). Moreover, in Rom. 
10:6-8 Paul cites Deuteronomy 30 to expound "the righteousness that is e« iriarecoc"! So 
how can he rationally say in Gal. 3:11 that "the Law is not e* 7rtaTew?," that is, of the faith-
justification theory?3 2 But this objection assumes that the boundary of "the Law" must 
naturally include Deuteronomy, and so must include the discourse-parts which Paul 
approvingly cites here. In turn, this assumes that by "the Law" Paul signifies a particular 
text, or else of the discourse inhabiting some particular text or texts, rather than one 
particular discourse inhabiting that text(s). In other words, it assumes that Paul does not 
acknowledge more than one discourse as inhabiting that text. As we saw in chapter 3, 
however, that assumption is false. Therefore it cannot serve as a basis for rejecting the above 
reading of IK iriarewg. 
5.8 The contents of the ellipsis in Gal. 3:12b 
In view of this sense of <k, the disjunctive opposition in the aXXa connecting 12a and 12b 
suggests that 12b (Lev. 18:5b) presents the justification-theory which the Law does teach. 
This is further confirmed by Rom. 10:5, where Paul explicitly characterises Lev. 18:5b as a 
Mosaic statement of "the righteousness that is e/t [TOV] vo/iou." The stated proposition is 
evidently to be taken as a definitional one, that is, as a criterion, which further evidence 
below wil l confirm. Clearly therefore there is an ellipsis in 12b: "but rather (the Law's 
criterion of righteousness is that) 'he who does them [etc.]'." 
5.9 Lev. 18:5b in Gal. 3:12b 
This OT citation is not as controversial as Paul's OT citation in l i b ; it may appear to many 
to be fairly straightforward. However, as we shall see, this Pauline OT quotation is more 
commonly misinterpreted, and perhaps worse, than the one in l i b . 
32. As, again, he evidently says in Rom. 9:32 that "the Law is e% epyusv" and not £K iriorewg (T. D. 
Gordon 1992b; cf. 9:30). 
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5.9. / The (obvious) logical categorical form of the text 
It is almost impossible to err concerning the statement's categorical form, since the statement 
itself is practically in categorical form: clearly the subject is "the one who does them," and 
the predicate is "shall live iv avrolq." The subject is not some particular person (i.e., 
"referential"), but denotes each and every one who does them; thus the proposition is a 
positive universal (or "A-type") proposition. But again we should note the possibility that it 
is intended as a criterion, a definitional statement. According to our findings about the 
ellipsis (see above), that is how Paul intends it. And i f this is how Paul intends it, then (and 
only then) it also implies its converse, that " A l l who shall live do them." 
5.9.2 The meaning ofiv avrolq in (Lev. 18:5b and) Gal. 3:12b 
Here we are faced with the same sort of decision we had in regard to the phrase ev vopujg in 
verse 11a: Is Paul intending, by the preposition ev, a broad, associative sense, or a more 
narrow causal or instrumental sense? Commentators are often fairly vague on this issue; but 
a fair number seem to go for each reading. Before considering the arguments for each one, 
let us look at the NT texts again, alongside the OT texts of both Lev. 18:5 and one definite 
allusion to it, Ezek. 20:25: 3 3 
Gal. 3:12, VBSGNT 
b 6e vdfiog OVK eanv EK iriareuq, 
aXX' 'O itoirjoaq avra frjaeTm ev 
otVToiq. 
Gal. 3:12, KJV 
And the law is not of faith: but, The 
man that doeth them shall live in 
them. 3 4 
33. There is no question that Ezek. 20:25 alludes to Lev. 18:5, for Ezekiel quotes the latter more or 
less verbatim in 3 previous verses of that chapter (vss. 11, 13, and 21). The textual apparatus of 
Rahlfs indicates no relevant textual variants for either verse, so we are content to go with his 
readings. In a number of ways, however, vs. 25 sheds more light on our exegetical problems than 
does Lev. 18:5: for one thing, it is closer to Paul in time. 
34. We offer this translation only as representative, not as correct. The translations differ widely; 
ours will emerge in the following sections. 
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Lev. 18:5 (Rahlfi) 
Kai <£u\d£ea0e irdvTa ra 
TrpoardyfiaTd yuov Kai irdvra ra 
Kplfiard fiov Kai iroiriaeTe avrd, a 
noirjootq avOpumoq Iftoerm ev 
avToiq' eyu Kvpioq b 6ebq vimv. 
Lev. 18:5 (BHS) 
•• - i - T : v i - ' v r : - : 
:mn» ana »m m&n nrix n ^ y 
t i • v i - t t t T T 
Ezek. 20:25 (Rahlfi) 
Kai eyd) ebunct aiiTolq -KpoardyfiaTa 
ov *caXa Kai biKaidfixxTa ev olq ob 
Ezek. 20:25 (BHS) 
v t : • • t : • 
ItfaovTcu ev ceiiroiq. 
Any argument for one or the other should take into consideration the linguistic-pragmatic 
"conversational maxims" of relevance, quantity, and so forth, and take into account any 
grammatical considerations. Again, the Quantity maxim places a certain burden of proof on 
any narrower sense, since a narrower sense conveys more information, which information 
must in this case be signalled by the context since it is not signalled by the use of the word 
itself. 
First let us consider some implications of taking ev in the broader, associative sense. 
Note that there are two clauses of interest, in both the Greek and the Hebrew of Lev. 18:5. 
The relationship between these clauses is debatable in the Hebrew, but in the Greek the first 
is clearly subordinate to the second, as an antecedent (casus pendens) of the latter: "Whoever 
does them (or, i f one does them, he) shall live ev them." Now, i f the preposition ev were 
stative/associative there, it would make the statement a non-informative tautology ("he who 
does them shall pass his life in that fashion"), which fact in itself argues against this 
interpretation of the preposition. Redundancy is to be expected; but such gratuitous tautology 
is not, it conveys no useful information (not even a defining-equivalence) and thus violates 
the Quantity maxim. 
But perhaps it is possible to get around the unacceptability of this tautology within at 
least the Hebrew of Lev. 18:5. This would require that the second Hebrew clause ("he shall 
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live in/with them") be coordinate, rather than superordinate, to the first ("which [if] a man 
does them . . . " ) ; the Hebrew clauses would then say "which a man shall do and he shall live 
in them," the second clause becoming an epexegetical unpacking of the first. That sort of 
statement would be more or less justifiable (whereas " I f A, then A " is simply absurd). But 
other problems then arise instead. It would imply that the waw connecting them could not be 
a waw-relative (waw-conversive), for in this grammatical context the latter would entail 
clausal subordination (since it follows a non-perfective, prefix-conjugation verb representing 
modality or perhaps futurity). So it must be a simple waw-conjunctive (Waltke and 
O'Connor 1990, 525ff.). In this case the perfective form of the second clause's verb, "live," 
would indicate that perfective (i.e., "punctiliar" or "global") aspect was intended. But that 
would be quite odd in this situation, especially with the verb in apparently epexegetical 
coordination with the first clause's /jora-perfective-aspect verb. Note also Ezek. 20:25's 
allusion (in the MT) to this clause, which allusion construes the second verb as non-
perfective in aspect. 
Moreover, this Hebrew preposition ("3) never appears elsewhere in the MT modifying 
the verb r rn and with a stative/associative sense, where statutes, judgments, or the like are 
the object of the preposition. But frequently it modifies FPn with an instrumental or causal 
sense, sometimes where judgments, laws, or the like are the object of the preposition. 
Furthermore, to take the preposition as stative/associative here rather than instrumental, 
would entail that we take rpn here as meaning "to pass one's l ife" or "to direct one's l ife" 
(in/with them). But while these are legitimate senses of the English word live, this Hebrew 
verb (in whatever stem) is never used in either of these senses in the OT (outside of the 
passages in question: Lev. 18:5; Neh. 9:29, which alludes to that verse; Ezek. 20:11, 13, 21, 
25). Its semantic focus is rather on "having l i fe ," or on "continuing alive" (see BDB; 
Holladay 1988, and TWOT, all s.v.). 
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In all, the grammatical and contextual evidence weighs heavily against reading the 
preposition in a sociative/stative sense. Rather, we should read it as instrumental: "He who 
does them [or, ' I f one does them, he'] shall live by/because of them." 
What does this say about the question of "means or meaning"? We have already noted 
in this chapter (see on vs. l i b ) , and in chapter 3, that the BK in en irioTeuq can figuratively 
be speaking of a causa cognoscendi rather than expressing its usual, literal sense, causa 
essendi. Again, i f "justification" is forensic (i.e., a judgment/authoritative pronouncement 
according to some criterion) for Paul, that would argue for a causa cognoscendi sense of the 
preposition; and a forensic reading of biKoiiovaBai is highly likely here since Paul commonly 
uses it in clearly forensic contexts, and that includes the present argument (see the 
biKaiovadai napa 0ecj> in vs. 11a). A causa cognoscendi link within the causality 
represented by iv avrolg is therefore quite likely. But we shall look further at the "means 
vs. meaning" question for 3:11-12 below. 
5.9.3 The type of "life" in view 
Targums Ps.-J. and Onkelos explicitly identify the life mentioned in this verse as "life 
eternal"; likewise Targums at Ezek. 20:11, 13, 21, which are re-iterations of the Lev. 18:5b 
motif. This is unsurprising in view of some eschatological views common in Judaism at the 
time. There is little doubt that Paul's readers would have understood the verse as speaking of 
"eternal l i fe ," the life of eternity in Paradise.35 It is clear, however, that this type of life was 
not always conceived, particularly not by Paul, as starting only after death (Gal. 2:20; cf. 
Eph. 2:5f.; Col. 1:13).36 
35. Cf. Lightfoot 1890, 139; Garlington 1997, 103; contra Morland (1995, 214), who tries to resolve 
3:ll-12's conflicting Scripture-citations through an equivocation on "live," with Hab. 2:4 alone 
referring to life eternal (see below). 
36. Cf. Dunn 1993a, 175. 
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Perhaps a more important issue is whether Paul actually has " l i fe" in view here, or the 
"justification" which issues in life. Since he has been discussing righteousness or 
justification in 3:2-1 la, or else some who are justified (or "blessed," which includes it) and 
some who are not, we would have to agree with Bruce (1982b, 162, 163) that Paul is 
speaking figuratively, both in l i b and 12b: "Righteousness by faith is for Paul so closely 
bound up with true life that the two terms—'righteousness' and 'life'—can in practice be used 
interchangeably (cf. v 21b)." 3 7 The figure here is a metonymy of an effect for its cause. And 
i f this be so, then the causal/instrumental preposition ep is perhaps also used figuratively, for 
causa cognoscendi, i f indeed the e/c of e*c iriareuig in l i b is also (see above). 
5.9.4 The meaning of •Koi-qaaq in (Lev. 18:5b and) Gal. 3:12b 
As in dealing with the verbs in 3:10b, we must ask which is the general sense of iroiea here: 
"attempt" or "accomplish"? Has the verb been contextually neutralised to the narrower 
sense, "accomplish"?38 
Unlike that of Deut. 27:26, the original thrust of Lev. 18:5 appears to be about the 
morality or holiness of the commandments, not the righteousness of those persons who follow 
them (note also Ezek. 20:25, quoted above). According to the original context, the verse 
presents the goodness and holiness of these commandments according to the criterion "life-
enhancement"; there is no indication that it concerns personal covenantal righteousness. We 
can see that the immediate context is talking about the holiness of the statutes (cf. vss. 3-4, 
24-30), and we can see the same concerns in the immediate context of Ezek. 20:25. In 
Leviticus 18 and Ezekiel 20 (and the context of CD 3:13-20 where also it is quoted: see 
37. Cf. Hansen 1994, 94-95 n. 
38. As in the case of the verbs in Paul's citation of Deut. 27:26 (in verse 10), most commentators do 
not directly address this question regarding the iroiew in 12b. Often they assume that it means 
"keeping" the laws, i.e., attempting to cany them out, living under their direction; see e.g. Dunn 
1993a, 175f.; Garlington 1997, 102-3; Witherington 1998, 235. 
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P. R. Davies 1982, 84-85), the emphasis is on the cleanness of God's statutes as opposed to 
the uncleanness of their violation and of contrary statutes. The literary parallelism in Ezek. 
20:25 shows that "cannot live by them" semantically parallels and elaborates "statutes not 
good"; thus the former is clearly an ethical-evaluative statement about the commandments 
themselves (cf. Neh. 9:13, which informs 9:29, and Deut. 4:8, which are clear ethical 
evaluations of God's commands). Since there is no indication that personal right-standing is 
under discussion, according to the Quantity maxim (chap. 2) we should not read it into the 
author's intent. 
And in order for the specific command itself (in contrast to tasks not commanded) 
really to enhance life, the thing commanded must be accomplished (correctly); good 
intentions are irrelevant in this matter. In the "attempt"-interpretation, that is, the verse's 
clear ethical concerns would become irrelevant to the statement; this irrelevance would 
violate the conversational maxims of Relevance and of Quantity. Thus it is the particular 
accomplishment enjoined by the command, that is in view in the original context of the verse, 
via a contextual semantic neutralisation of "do." 
This theme of the holiness of God's commands, prominent in Proverbs and the Psalms 
(cf. 19; 119), apparently is widespread in the Intertestamental period (cf. Ecclesiasticus; 
Wisdom of Solomon). This same idea seems present in Qumran in CD 3:13-18, an allusion 
to Lev. 18:5—or practically a quotation, although without any quotation formula: nfPJT "I#X 
DTD n*ni CTNn (vowel-pointing according to Lohse 1971). But a subtle shift has taken place 
in this Intertestamental literature: now not only does a passage like Lev. 18:5 exclaim the 
lightness of God's statutes, but also it seems to be construed as proclaiming the preconditions 
of right-standing in the covenant; for it suggests that a man must accomplish these things in 
order to "l ive," it is a condition for his obtaining this life. See particularly 4Q266 10-15 
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( C D ) , 3 9 which seems to make one's doing precisely these stipulations the boundary 
determining inclusion in the covenant, that is, a criterion of covenantal righteousness; and 
compare it with the very similar text 4Q399 (4QMMT f), which we examined in chapter 3 . 4 0 
Now, given the post-Fall situation, as Paul sees that situation, this context of "the 
commandments' holiness" would militate against interpreting the verse as covenantal-
criterion. For in this situation attempt of God's commands is never tantamount to their 
accomplishment. So i f faithful obedience is a criterion of righteousness, as it is for Paul, 
whether the command is "holy" (i.e., in its accomplishing) or not and whether one carries it 
out successfully are beside the judicial point, as is whether one pursues it with a strictly 
correct understanding of it (so as to be equipped to accomplish it). Yet Lev. 18:5b is a 
statement at least partly about the uprightness of the deeds commanded (cf. Ezek. 20:25; Lev. 
L8;XDJklQJL5); so it cannot be that does in that passage means merely "attempts/obeys," 
but rather "accomplish" (as we just saw). I f Lev. 18:5 be seen as terms of the covenant, 
those terms must be "accomplishment," not just "obedience/attempt" as in Paul's 
understanding. Thus Paul would not see Lev. 18:5 as he does Deut. 27:26, that is, as 
righteousness-criterion that is covenantally valid post-Fall. 
Thus we can see a clear potential for conflict between Paul and some of his Jewish 
contemporaries, concerning the criterion of covenantal righteousness. For as we have seen, 
Paul portrays Lev. 18:5 here as presenting the Law's criterion of righteousness (cf. Rom. 
10:5), and explicitly opposes its criterion to the criterion "faith" (3:12a). Furthermore, it 
would seem quite irrational of him, in the situational and literary context, to contrast (i.e., as 
not-logically-equivalent attributes) "faith" to (faithful) obedience/attempt to fu l f i l the 
commands; for these attributes would be seen as logically equivalent (i.e., as implying each 
other). A contrast with "faith" would be feasible therefore only with the "do"-meaning 
"accomplish." We conclude that by "does" in 12b, Paul means "accomplish." 
39. SeeDSSE, p. 117. 
40. SeeDSSE, p. 182. 
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5.10 The overall structure of Paul's argument in 3:11-12 
So far, the most remarkable of our findings regarding 3:11-12 concern three prepositions and 
a verb: We interpreted ep vofixg in 11a as sociative (not instrumental), e« irurre«c in 12a as 
"partisan of" (justification by) faith (not "from" or "based on" faith), and ev avrolg in 12b 
as causal or instrumental (not associative or stative), albeit perhaps figurative for causa 
cognoscendi. Then we found that Ttoir\aaq in 12b means "accomplishing" (not 
"endeavouring to f u l f i l " or "attempting"). 
Let us now analyse the structure of Paul's argument in 11-12. The second on in 11 
signals that the flow of argument is moving from l i b (and 12) towards 11a. Moreover, since 
none of the explicit statements is an alternation or disjunction, the inference is a syllogistic, 
polysyllogistic, or pure-hypothetical-propositional type of inference, or perhaps an inference-
chain using both categorical-formal and hypothetical propositions. 
John Calvin (1965 translation, p. 54) offered an interesting reconstruction of 3:11-12 
as a hypothetical syllogism: 
I f we are justified by faith, then it is not by the Law. 
But we are justified by faith. 
Therefore it is not by the Law. 
The second line (i.e., the argument's "evidence-part") and the third line (the "inference-
part") seem plausible readings of 1 l b and 11a respectively; but what about the first line (the 
'implication-part')? Calvin ostensibly got this from verse 12; but 12a seems to say the exact 
converse of Calvin's hypothetical proposition. Rather than " i f by faith, then not by the 
Law," 12a seems to say " i f by the Law, then not by faith." The two hypothetical 
propositions are not strictly equivalent logically (unless their corresponding constituent 
propositions are, which clearly they are not, their terms being different). Therefore this 
reconstruction, while clear, is so distinct from what Paul actually says in verse 12 that it fails 
to account for the difference. 
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As we saw when considering whether Paul's argument extended further than verse 11, 
the reader, i f expecting a syllogism, is naturally looking for a second premise which has the 
terms "the Law" and "faith" in it. Unsurprisingly then, J. S. Vos (1992, 257) and some 
other commentators (e.g. Bligh 1969, 262, citing Thomas Aquinas; Cosgrove 1988b, 58; 
Stanley 1990, 503; Lambrecht 1994, 283) have consciously reconstructed 3: l l -12a as an 
AEE-2 syllogism; and most others seem to do so even i f not consciously and deliberately. 
That syllogism is of course formally valid; but few i f any commentators have actually put 
these propositions in their logical categorical forms to see how feasibly they might comprise 
such a syllogism. I f one were to accept the instrumental reading of iv vofi^, one would have 
to put the argument in categorical form thus: 
No human shall be justified (before God) by means of the Law. (11a) 
for Al l who are justified have faith; ( l i b ) 
but No user of the Law has faith. (12a) 
This has quite a number of problems. It is not actually a legitimate AEE-2 syllogism: in 
order for it to be so, 11a would need to read "No user of the Law is justified before God." 
This meaning seems a bit removed from the proposition as stated, i f iv PO^UO is indeed 
instrumental. And Paul himself "used" (by keeping) the Law, when it served a "useful" 
evangelistic purpose (see 1 Cor. 9:19-21); so we would need Paul to be ultimately denying 
this alternate 11a rather than affirming it, for this reading to be plausible. But we have 
already found it highly unlikely that Paul is denying 11a.41 And note that the logical form of 
l i b here is actually the converse of what we found l i b ' s categorical form probably to be; but 
using that converse in place of 1 lb would be logically illegitimate i f Paul's focus is indeed on 
means rather than meaning (i.e., definitions, which are convertible albeit universal positive 
propositions). Furthermore, the supposed meaning of 12a is too much to get from the words 
41. See above, § 5.4.3. 
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"The Law is not of faith," and how it follows logically from 12b is none too clear. The 
problems with the instrumental reading are thus so many and so serious as to be prohibitive. 
Though an instrumental ev po/wp affords us no plausible reconstruction of 3:11-12 
(which confirms our earlier finding about ev vdfug), we may structure the passage in the 
following valid polysyllogism: 
None who are of works have faith, (unstated, but implied by vss. 9-10) 
A l l partisans of the Law are of works. (3:12b) 
Therefore, No partisans of the Law have faith, (gist of 3:12a; by EAE 1st fig.) 
Al l who are justified have faith, (covenantal corollary of 3:11b) 
Therefore, No partisan of the Law is justified. (3:11a; by AEE 2d fig.) 
This takes iv vofup as adjectival, and as modifying "no one" rather than the sentence as a 
whole; but we found the latter more likely, i f differing only slightly. Changing the inference 
somewhat so that iv vo^ug modifies the whole clause (and thus making BP pdfug sociative 
rather than potentially stative), we get: 
None who are of works have faith, (unstated, but implied by vss. 9-10) 
Holding to the Law, all are of works, (from 3:12b: its "covenantal converse") 
Therefore, Holding to the Law, none have faith, (relevance of 3:12a; via EAE-1) 
A l l who are justified have faith, ("covenantal converse" of 3:11b) 
Therefore, Holding to the Law, no human is justified. (3:11a; by AEE-2) 
This appears a feasible reconstruction. Note that it is the covenantally-implied converses of 
3:11b and 3:12b (viz., that the justified necessarily have faith, and that the justified 
necessarily "do them") that are actually operative in this polysyllogism. This suggests 
strongly that by the phrases e/c irioTcug and ei> avrolq Paul is discussing meaning 
(specifically, the referents of covenantal "justification" and "righteousness") rather than 
means; for the latter topic would not allow one to take as corollary the converse of the 
scriptural propositions, for the latter would not be definitional statements, so would not imply 
their converses. 
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This is the only feasible reconstruction that is compatible with our exegesis of the 
individual statements in 3:11-12, uses all of them, and would be a logically sound and 
evidently plausible argument for Paul to make in this context. Note that we can obtain a 
logically feasible reconstruction only by abandoning the instrumental interpretation of ev 
But though this provides a valid inference ending with a conditional (i.e., qualified) 
proposition, we have yet to see whether this stated inference expresses the belief-part (making 
the final affirmation or denial) or only the implication-part of the argument, and i f the 
former, what Paul is trying to affirm or to deny by this resultant conditional proposition. 
Now, we saw earlier that Paul is not denying, although perhaps neither affirming, the 
(prepositional-phrase-qualified) proposition that "no one is justified [i.e., counted righteous] 
before God." So he is not "denying to deny" (tollendo tollens). But on the other hand, we 
saw that the phrase ev VOUQ is designating the existence of a viewpoint opposed to Paul's 
own; so neither is he "affirming the antecedent" (ponendo ponens). This evidence strongly 
suggests that we are dealing not with the belief-part of the argument, but only the 
implication-part. And we also found that the qualifying phrase ev vow is associative, not 
instrumental, and denotes the holding of the Law-as-valid theory, rather than the very truth of 
that theory. We suggested the natural conclusion, that this was a circumstantial ad hominem 
argument, which makes it ponendo tollens. We have found nothing since then to contradict 
this suggestion, for nothing has indicated that Paul is warning about the consequences of 
taking a certain course of action (in which circumstances he would almost certainly intend ev 
VOUQ instrumentally), rather than merely about the implications of adopting a certain theory. 
42. An insightful comment from Dunn (1993a, 176) is worth quoting: "The thought is badly skewed 
if the emphasis is placed upon 'doing' the law . . . , as though that for Paul was a negative 
shorthand for the objectionable idea of achieving righteousness (contrast Rom. ii.13); in contrast, 
the curse clearly falls on not doing, not on doing. " 
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So, i f Paul is arguing circumstantially, he might well be showing the logical 
incompatibility between the circumstances implied by holding the theory, and the situation 
predicted or implied in the theory itself. This would mean however that something in the 
overall argument, either stated or unstated, must clash with the (implications of) the Law-
theory, which is stated explicitly in verse 12. This brings up a certain controversial issue 
which we must address, concerning the suggestion, implicit in the above, that the two 
scriptures which Paul here cites he sees as clashing. 
5.11 The controversial relationship of the Lev. 18:5 citation to the Hab. 2:4 
citation 
We should not assume it impossible that Paul can present "the Law," scriptural as it is, as 
opposing some other discourse in Scripture (e.g., Hab. 2:4): after all, he spends 3:15-25, not 
to mention other passages in the letter, arguing against the jurisdiction (current, at least) of 
"the Law." In 3:11-12 Paul literary-formally draws a parallel between the two passages, and 
J. S. Vos (1992, 257), for one (see also Stanley 1990, 504; Dunn 1990b, 227-28; cf. Dunn 
1987), has recognised and argued cogently that Paul is consciously presenting, in 3:11b and 
3:12b, two apparently contrary principles of justification: the literary parallelism is thus 
antithetical.4 3 
On the other hand, this scriptural antithesis certainly raises a significant question 
concerning Paul's understanding of the coherence of Scripture. Here we should note again a 
distinction, important for this discussion, between "text" and "discourse." As we noted in 
chapter 3, it is semantically plausible that someone might find either or both of these OT texts 
to express more than one discourse, various levels of meaning inhabiting the one text; this is 
even somewhat likely for Paul, in light of some NT passages that speak of "shadows" of 
43. Thus Vos rightly notes (1992, 258-60) the parallel passages in Romans 9-10 and Phillipians 3. 
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Christ in the O T laws (Col. 2:17; Heb. 8:5; 10:1). In fact, the legitimate issue here is 
whether Paul finds to be in conflict the two discourses (here, "levels of meaning") which he 
has in view. It would be only a fallacious loading of the question, to infer that it involves the 
issue of whether the two texts oppose each other, as i f Paul necessarily perceived only one 
discourse per text. In light of Paul's own citation of Lev. 19:18 ("love thy neighbour") and 
other Mosaic passages as i f they were authoritative, apparently he recognises more than one 
covenantal discourse, different strata of meaning, inhabiting the Mosaic text. In that case 
Paul probably refers only to one of these levels of meaning when he uses the referential term 
"the Law," and therefore rejects the covenantal jurisdiction of only that one discourse. In 
other words, "the law of Christ" may be identical, for Paul, with some Christologically-
understood discourse or level of meaning within the Pentateuch's texts. 4 4 So let us not 
confuse the issue, but rather keep in mind that what Paul is discussing is two seemingly 
contradictory Scriptural discourses. 
"Apparently" contrary, one may grant: but does Paul see these premises as realty 
contrary? Betz (1979, 138 n. 8) argues that "for Paul, Hab 2:4 and Lev 18:5 do not 
contradict each other, but prove separate points in a consecutive argument." I f taking the 
statements in isolation, Betz is correct. But he overlooks Paul's assumptions (unstated here 
but fairly explicit at 5:17 and in Romans), which we discussed earlier, that in the post-Fall 
world "faith" and accomplishments are never commensurable criteria or attributes. I f they 
are not logically equivalent in any really-existing world, then it is contradictory (in any 
currently-existing world) to uphold them both as criteria (definitive statements) of the same 
44. Cf. Martyn 1997b, 472: "That Paul should find in Leviticus both a false promise (Lev 18:5) and 
the positive statement of God's true guidance for the church's daily life (Lev 19:18) is clear 
indication of his conviction that, with the coming of Christ, the two voices of the Law have been 
brought out into the open, thus being now distinguished from one another throughout the whole of 
the Law." This is much more helpful than speaking of Paul pitting scripture against scripture, but 
more helpful also than speaking of Paul opposing some interpretation of Lev. 18:5 (e.g. Smiles 
1998, 206). Rather than debating exegesis (though perhaps he might easily have done so under 
somewhat different circumstances), here Paul disparages the theory or discourse itself. 
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"righteousness" at the same time. In fact, it is only by noting and incorporating the mutual 
contradictoriness of these Scriptures' "covenantal converses," and thus of themselves taken 
as definitional statements, that we have been able to reconstruct Paul's argument as a 
coherent logical structure. 
However, we must clearly distinguish this sort of rhetoric from what many New 
Testament commentators today, and also many ancient rhetoricians, understand by the legal 
stasis of "contrary laws." 4 5 For they see this legal stasis as a mere sub-category of that of 
"Letter and intent" (so Hermogenes; cf. Vos 1992, 261-62; see Morland 1995, 126. Here 
we wi l l interact mainly with Vos's article, perhaps the fullest defence of this position.) Thus 
Paul's purpose, alleges Vos, is ultimately to reconcile these two apparently contradictory 
texts, by the re-interpretation which Paul gives Lev. 18:5 in 3:15ff. (see Vos 1992, 266). 
But there is in Galatians 3 no real evidence of this intent to reconcile.4 6 Rather, it appears 
only that Paul wants to juxtapose them as saying contrary things. 4 7 This intent is completely 
clear from the OVK . . . e/c moreus in 12a. Therefore the only sort of "contrasting laws" 
genre we might cite in this connection would be the one in which the laws are seen as really 
(not just apparently) contrasting, and the question therefore is not how shall we harmonise 
them, but rather, which one of them has jurisdiction. 
45. We mentioned the rhetorical theory of "legal stasis" in our section on rhetorical genre, in chapter 
2. 
46. Cf. Hays 1983, 221; Martyn 1997b, 468-69 n. 8. Morland (1995, 214) finds his resolution in 
noting that "it is only Hab 2:4 which is found in an eschatological context, not Lev 18:5. Thus it 
is Hab 2:4 which can be defended as the most important principle, while Lev 18:5 represents the 
superseded and restricted one. This interpretation implies that the term fijaerai is ambiguous: It 
is only Hab 2:4 which refers to life as a blessing in the new era; Lev 18:5 uses the term in a 
weaker sense." We have already found false this latter interpretation of jfioercu; this destroys 
Morland's solution. But even were Paul's Lev. 18:5 quotation rightly handled this way, it would 
simply mean there was no conflict to resolve: the two verses would be addressing distinct issues. 
47. Cf. B. Longenecker 1998, 165; Martyn 1997b; Witherington 1998, 235. 
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Contra this obvious genre-possibility, Vos (1992, 260) accepts as a Pauline rhetorical 
axiom Quintilian's presupposition that ultimately Justice is never in conflict with itself. 4 8 
(Oddly, this presupposition seems to have biased and perhaps misled much of the discussion 
of Paul's objections to "the Law;" for example, it would account for the prejudice against 
seeing two conflicting covenantal meanings within one text.) Now, this presupposition is 
probably only to be expected in lst-century Greek rhetoricians, in keeping with their 
increasingly Greek-philosophical notion of "Justice"; therefore also these writers would only 
be expected to identify "to a great extent" the "contrary laws" stasis with that of "letter and 
intent" (i.e., the question of a law's true intent; see ibid., 261). I f Justice cannot conflict 
with itself, and our laws are manifestations of this eternal, absolute Justice, then logically we 
must quash any apparent conflict in them by finding their true, harmonious intent. But with a 
Jewish writer, like Paul, the idea that Justice is static must be exegeted rather than assumed 
(see above, chap. 2). So we cannot take as exegetically determinative here these Greek 
writers' idea of the generic relationship between these juridical stases (types of question). 
In light of the argument-structure insights we gleaned in the last section, then, it 
appears that Paul is using 3:12 to lay out particularly one implication of being ev voyu^ that 
he has in mind, namely, that one also adopts the cpya vouov theory. We have already seen, 
in the previous chapter, how for Paul (in 3:10) the latter theory leads to loss of incentive for 
steadfast obedience, and thus destroys "faith" as he understands the latter. And since Hab. 
2:4 implies that faith is required, Paul argues, those who hold the Law-theory are, contra the 
Lev. 18:5 text, not justified. This is a valid circumstantial ad hondnem argument. 
48. Cf. Martyn 1997b: "Crediting the apostle, in effect, with Quintilian's dictum that the law cannot 
finally stand in contradiction with itself, Vos [1992, 265] assumes that Paul found both Hab 2:4 
and Lev 18:5 in the substantively indivisible Law of God" (p. 469, n. 8). But Martyn demurs: 
"Paul does not adhere to a major presupposition of the Textual Contradiction [genre], the 
assumption that the two texts, Hab 2:4 and Lev 18:5, have their origin in a monolith that is larger 
and more fundamental than either of them" (ibid., 470). "On the contrary, he is concerned to 
emphasize the contradiction between the two texts" (ibid., 471). 
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Now, one might reasonably ask how Paul could assume Hab. 2:4 as implying any 
absolute, unqualified statement about justification, as over against the opposing Lev. 18:5 
principle. Indeed some (e.g. Stanley 1990, 504) have noticed that by rearranging key terms 
and conjunctions, Paul could turn the argument the other way, against justification etc 
morecos! But the direction of the imbalance of the citations is explained by the circumstantial 
structure of the argument. He is not in this inference playing off the "acts"-theory (vs. 12b), 
as such, against Hab. 2:4; rather he writes of the holding of the "acts"-theory (cf. 1 la: iv 
J>6/WJ)), which is one implication of the holding of the Law-theory (12a). Paul brings Hab. 
2:4 in as a statement which he assumes the readers will find unimpeachable, even i f 
uncomfortable.49 He uses it to draw out a further implication of holding the Law-theory: 
since justification requires faith (Hab. 2:4), and since oaoi e£ epyw vdfwv do not have faith 
(to obey, cf. vs. 10), one must infer (1 la) that the latter are not justified. This implication is 
contra the prediction of the Law-theory itself concerning these persons. Thus the argument 
is along the very same lines as that of verse 10. 5 0 But stated is merely the argument's 
implication-part, since the argument is circumstantial; the belief-part (which Paul hopes the 
reader wil l supply for him/herself) wil l deny the Law-theory, based on the contrary 
implications of Hab. 2:4. Thus the conflict between Lev. 18:5 and Hab. 2:4 is not mitigated, 
but rather confirmed, by Paul's circumstantial argument. 
5.12 Summary and conclusions on 3:11-12 
We have seen a great deal of evidence here supporting our hypothesis that Paul is arguing 
against the jurisdiction of "the Law" of Moses, whose "righteousness"-criterion contrasts 
with that of Paul's favoured covenant, the "law of Christ." Particularly supportive of the 
49. Cf. Smiles 1998, 204. 
50. On the similarity between these verses' arguments, cf. Cosgrove 1988b, 54 n. 32: "The 
construction, Sonv hr\\ov on, and especially its variation, orjXoc . . . on (as here), almost 
invariably takes up or completes a preceding idea." Cf. also Bonneau 1997, 72. 
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idea that Paul argues "righteousness"-criteria rather than means, is what we found concerning 
the tv VOUQ of 11a (not instrumental) and the OVK eanv EK moreus of 12a, and that these 
senses and the use of the otherwise non-available "covenantal converses" of l i b and 12b 
were necessary for reconstructing 11-12 as a valid argument. In concert with these findings 
is the conclusion that the argument is a circumstantial ad hominem one, and is merely about 
the unacceptable implications of holding a particular theory, and not (even implicitly) about 
the unacceptable consequences of pursuing a certain course of action. Thus the evidence is 
strongly in support of our theory that this argument is about social, "constitutive" meaning 
(of "justification," and in particular the denotation, with God, of the notion "righteousness") 
rather than about means (to justification or righteousness). 
Chapter 6 
The structure and meaning of 3:13-14 
On first glance, verses 13 and 14 seem more straightforward than verses 10-12. But verse 
13 has generated hardly less controversy than any of those verses. This verse has led Morna 
Hooker (1971, 349) to suggest that 
I f a prize were to be awarded for the most difficult of all Paul's statements, it 
would surely be divided between Gal. i i i . 13 and 2 Cor. v. 21—passages whose 
difficulty arises not so much from their obscurity as from the impossibility of 
what they so clearly seem to say: 'Christ became a curse'; 'Christ was made 
sin'. 
Again as in the previous three verses, although some key terms present ambiguity the greatest 
challenge seems to lie in determining what i f anything Paul has left unstated, those 
connecting links of his rhetoric. 
Before we tackle that interpretive challenge, we shall try to understand the verse's 
details as much as possible, although certain terms and constructions must wait until after 
reconstructing the logic. Then we shall examine the problems which verse 14 poses, and 
locate both these verses rhetorically in their relationship to what precedes and to what 
follows. 
Let us first lay out the texts relevant to 3:13: 
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Gal. 3:13 Gal. 3:13, UBSGNT 
Xpiorbg quag 
el-rryopaoev en rfig 
Kardpag TOV vdfiov 
yevofi&voq virep rm&p 
KotTapa, on 
yiypocKTcti, 
'EirncarapaTos wag 
6 Kpefidfievog em 
i-vXov, 
Deut. 21:23b, Rahlfs 
on KeKarripane'vog 
virb deov irag 
Kpefidnevog em 
£v\oir 
Christ redeemed us 
from the curse of the 
law, having become a 
curse for us ~ for it is 
written, "Cursed be 
every one who hangs 
on a tree" ~ 
Deut. 21:23b, BHS 
6.1 What does it mean, to "become a curse"? 
Paul's statement that Christ has "become a curse" (yevdfuevog Karapa) may be puzzling at 
first glance. This participial phrase suggests Paul's awareness of the above Hebrew text with 
its phrase D'H^K Jl^j? ("a curse of God"; Bruce 1982a, 30; 1982b, 165); but Paul's use of 
the "tree" motif suggests that he has rather the L X X text of Deut. 21:23 in mind. 1 In any 
case, in this verse and many other passages the MT speaks of someone as "a curse" when it 
means that they are "cursed" (e.g. Num. 5:27; 2 Kings 22:19; Jer. 24:9; 29[Heb.49]:13; 
32[Heb.25]:18; 33[Heb.26]:6; 49[Heb.42]:18; 51[Heb.44]:8, 12, 22; Zech. 8:13). Clearly, 
this is a common biblical figure of speech, specifically a metonymy of the adjunct.2 Since 
also Paul's on yeypcrnToti presumably introduces a Scripture-proofthat Christ has "become a 
curse," and that proof-text states that everyone is "cursed" who hangs on a tree, we may 
conclude that Paul is saying not that Christ was literally a "curse," but that he was 
1. However, the phrase "upon the tree" (f J!;n Vj;) appears at this point in 11Q Temple Scroll 64:12 
(Bruce 1982b, 166), as earlier in verse 23 and in verse 22 in the MT. 
2. So E . W. Bullinger (1968 [1898], 591) classifies it. 
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"cursed."3 
We may now with confidence logically reconstruct the first (though last stated) part of 
Paul's argument: 
Al l who hang on a tree are accursed. (3:13c; Deut. 21:23) 
Christ hung on a tree, (unstated) 
Therefore, Christ was accursed. (3:13b) 
That this particular OT text was applicable to Christ, Paul's readers would likely have 
believed already, so here it might be left unstated. For this OT verse apparently constituted 
for early Christians a testimonium to Christ's death (Wilcox 1977; Tuckett 1986, 349; see the 
allusion in Acts 5:30; 10:39; 13:29; 1 Pet. 2:24). 4 There seems, then, no reason to doubt 
this simple and obvious reconstruction of the argument so far. 
3. So Burton 1921, 171; Fung 1988, 148; McLean 1992, 538-39; Dunn 1993a, 177; Williams 1997, 
93; Witherington 1998, 239. Some find additional significance in Paul's use of this figure: "Paul 
avoids the Implication that in His own person Christ was actually 'accursed.' He became 'a curse' 
in the sense that He allowed Himself to come under a curse, just as it is said in 2 Cor. v. 21 that 
He was made to be 'sin' though He Himself knew nothing of sin" (Duncan 1934, 97). Others get 
exactly the opposite significance: "Paul evidently intends to say that Christ became so heavily 
cursed and so deeply sinful that all curse and sin were laid upon him" (Bring 1961, 143; cf. 
Lightfoot 1890, 139; Martyn 1997a, 318). In light of the standardness of the figure and its use 
here in an argument based on Deut. 21:23, it seems unwise to read any such unusual significance 
into it. 
4. We know that the idea of hanging "on a tree" was understood by some Jews at that time to 
include crucifixion (Fitzmyer 1978, 511; Dunn 1993a, 178). There are some commentators who 
believe this OT text must surely have been used widely by Jewish critics to argue against the 
Messiahship of Jesus: No one who is cursed could be the Messiah (e.g., Lightfoot 1890, 153; 
Duncan 1934, 97; Bruce 1982b, 166; Raisanen 1983, 249-50). Likewise, some are sure this must 
have been the early Paul's rationale for rejecting Jesus and persecuting the church. Obviously, 
such a situation would make it unlikely that early Christians quoted Deut. 21:23 very often. 
However, the evidence is slim that any Jewish critics would have been likely to use or to 
understand Deut. 21:23 in this way: In the first place, it was common, even usual, for Jewish 
interpreters at this time to interpret the genitive construction in the MT as an objective genitive; 
thus the hanging was seen as an affront to or a reproach of God, or the verse is taken to speak of 
the hanging of someone executed for cursing God (Lightfoot 1890, 152-53; Barrett 1985, 30; 
Tuckett 1986, 348; Hong 1993, 85; Elgvin 1997; this is not the way the L X X takes it.) 
Secondly, probably not all parts of the church were persecuted; the Law-abiding parts were fairly 
undisturbed, only the Hellenistic part was seriously persecuted. This is inexplicable if the reason 
for persecuting the Church was primarily its support of a cursed Messiah (Tuckett 1986, 348). 
Obviously, a crucified Messiah would not have been an immediately appealing idea for many 
Jews; but this does not imply that they would have inferred that Jesus was cursed according to 
Deut. 21:23. 
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But we have only reconstructed a part of the argument. We have not thereby even 
determined what type of argument this verse presents. Also, and importantly, we have yet to 
explain how Christ was a curse vnbp T J / « O P . This phrase is not explained or included in the 
above syllogism; likely, then, there is more to the logic of the rest of the verse than is 
stated.5 Shortly we will tackle that question; first there are some issues that we must address 
pertaining to the form of Paul's citation. 
6.2 Paul's citation of Deut. 21:23 in 3:13b 
The questions concern whether there is any semantic significance in certain changes Paul 
seems to have made to the L X X text of Deut. 21:23. There are only two notable changes of 
wording. 
6.2.1 Why does Paul change KeKarripanevoq to eiriKocTapoiTog? 
Paul's change of word here presents hardly anything by way of semantic change. The 
adjective emKoiTdpaTog is based on the verb EiriKctTapaonai {GLNT, s. v. emKcxTdpocTog) and 
retains a verbal sense, "accursed." The perfect participle KeKarnpa/xevog thus hardly 
presents any semantic contrast to it; in this regard, even its tense is insignificant. One must 
therefore reject Edwards' suggestion (1972, 262-63) that Paul changed this word because for 
him it was the Law, when mistaken for a tool of justification, that brings the curse, so that 
for Paul to retain the participle would have undesirably conveyed another, more traditional 
sense, namely that it was God himself who was cursing via the Law (that is, the passive 
participle conveys the idea of a curse-pronouncement on someone's part, whether God's or 
5. Cf. Hooker 1971, 350-51; Betz 1979, 150-51; Williams 1997, 92. We are surprised by 
Fitzmyer's bald assertion (1978, 511): "Judged by the canons of Aristotelian logic, [Paul's] 
argument is defective, indeed. If it were put into a syllogism, it would clearly have four terms, 
because the 'curse of the Law' (referring to Deut 27:26) does not have the same sense (or 
'comprehension') as the 'curse' which Jesus became by being hanged on the tree (Deut 21:23)." 
Even if this is true, Paul does not even apparently intend the whole verse to be taken as a single 
syllogism. 
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the Law's or both). In fact, the adjective conveys this idea as well; so by this word-change 
Paul did nothing to expunge this meaning from the text. We must seek another explanation 
for the word-change. 
Nor can we credit the explanation offered by Stanley 1992 (246): 
Despite being stripped from its original context, the Perfect participle 
KeKarqpafievog continues to imply that the "curse" of Deut 21.23 had already 
fallen upon the victim prior to his being "hung on a tree." This implication was 
clearly unacceptable to Paul, who adduced the verse to support his contention 
that "Christ redeemed us from the curse of the law by becoming a curse for us" 
(v. 13a), presumably through his death on the cross. To eliminate the possibility 
of misunderstanding, Paul replaced the Perfect Kemrnpanevog with the neutral 
adjective imKarapaToq, which was already at hand from his previous citation of 
Deut 27.26 in Gal 3.10. 
The problem with this is that it is not "clearly unacceptable to Paul"; at least not from the 
text is i t clear, nor from Pauline-theological considerations in general does there appear any 
reason why that idea would be unacceptable to Paul. Why would it matter to Paul, the time 
precisely at which God cursed Christ: in the garden of Gethsemane, on the way to the cross, 
as they lifted him up on it, or at some other point in time? The original literary context of 
Deut. 21:23b concerns someone who has been executed as a criminal and then hung on a 
tree; but the text is unclear about the time or even the origin of the curse (which unclarity 
probably caused its variegated history of interpretation). It is not even clear from the Perfect 
tense itself that the curse did not take place at the moment of his being nailed to the cross. 
A clue leading to a better solution is the fact that this adjective, cmicaTdpaToq, is the 
first word of Deut. 27:26 (LXX), which Paul cites in verse 10b. Just as Paul has made a 
literary-formal parallelism in verses 11-12 by juxtaposing Hab. 2:4b and Lev. 18:5b, with 
their similar form and constructions and common word jfioeTcti, so his purpose in making 
this purely formal word-change in the citation of Deut. 21:23 may well have been to help 
A. H. Carver, 2000 § 6.2.1 Page 257 
establish a similar literary-formal parallelism between verses 10 and 13.6 There are other 
factors present that would contribute to establishing such a parallelism: both verses' citations 
come from the latter part of Deuteronomy; both citations announce a curse; and the person 
subject to this curse, in each citation, is "nag who . . ." Furthermore, this parallelism is 
part of a chiastic parallelism that Paul seems to build into 3:2-14, as we noticed in chapter 3. 
It seems very likely that this was Paul's reason (assuming he has one) for his formal, non-
semantic change from KEKart}pafi6vog to emKaTdparog in citing Deut. 21:23. However, it 
could be that Paul, citing the latter from memory, inadvertently carried over the 
eviKctTapotTog from the citation in verse 10. But in light of the apparently careful structuring 
of the present passage, this seems a less likely explanation. 
6.2.2 Why does Paul omit the words virb Qeov? 
A more interesting and challenging issue concerns Paul's omission of the phrase bird Qeov. 
A number of commentators have found this omission semantically significant: Paul apparently 
seeks to avoid the suggestion, or at least the unqualified one, that God himself is cursing 
Christ here (along with the Law or what/whoever is cursing).7 There are indeed reasons for 
thinking that Paul would not have conceived God as cursing Christ: Christ was sinless, 
according to Paul (2 Cor. 5:21); indeed his going to the cross was obedience to God (Bruce 
6. So Wilcox 1977, 87; Bruce 1982b, 165; Caneday 1989, 196-97; Longenecker 1990, 122; Stanley 
(!) 1990, 505 n. 64; Dunn 1993a, 177-78; Hong 1993, 85. Some commentators claim that Paul 
would have been using here the Jewish exegetical device of gezera shawah ('equal category'): 
"Where two texts share a common term . . . each may throw light on the other" (Bruce 1982b, 
165; cf. Stanley, loc. cit.). But Caneday (loc. cit.) points out that "if Paul employs the exegetical 
technique gezerah shawah here, the common term [emKonaparoq] of the two texts brought 
together is in neither the Masoretic text nor in the L X X . " Cf. the doubts of Fitzmyer 1978, 511. 
There seems, then, no basis for this claim in the present instance. 
7. E.g. , Lightfoot 1890, 140 (though he says Paul omits it "instinctively"); Burton 1921, 174; 
Oepke 1973, 107; Hanson 1974, 50-51; Mussner 1974, 233; Bruce 1982b, 165; Barrett 1985, 30; 
Koch 1986, 125; Fung 1988, 148; Longenecker 1990, 122 (mentions it only as a possibility); 
Stanley 1992, 247; McLean 1996, 137f.; Martyn 1997a, 320-21; Longenecker 1998, 145-46 
(though strongly qualifying himself). 
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1982b, 165, cf. Rom. 5:19, Phil. 2:8); and God vindicated him by resurrecting him (cf. 
Rom. 1:4). Yet just as undeniably, or even more so, Paul is saying that somebody or 
something cursed Christ; covenantal curses do not just appear, they are pronounced, 
authored. The LXX makes it clear who is doing the cursing; but the whole problem is that 
Paul, in citing the LXX, has omitted the very phrase that clarifies this. However, several 
considerations show that this omission could not have been for the semantic purpose of 
subtracting meaning from the text.8 
The omission withdraws explicit information, viz., that it was God who was cursing 
the man. But only those familiar with the LXX text would even notice the omission, much 
less think it significant; and anyone familiar with that text would very possibly take it simply 
as textual background presupposed by Paul, that it was God who cursed the man. Even for 
those not familiar with the text, Paul's citation-formula yeypairrai identifies it as OT 
Scripture; and the very idea of "curse" in such a context conveys the idea of curse from God: 
In curse-pronouncements it is understood that the divine powers are to be the 
agents who will realize the conditional curse-pronouncement. In this case the 
divine agent is God; it is understood to be God and the inclusion of Qeov is not 
prerequisite to such an interpretation. (Edwards 1972, 263) 
In the words of H. A. W. Meyer (1884, 153-54),9 "The idea of Kardpa as the curse of God 
[is] obvious itself to every reader . . . And if Paul had not meant the curse of God, . . . he 
would have been practising a deception." In short, Paul would have known that his readers 
would naturally understand this as the curse of God. We can hardly suppose, therefore, that 
8. 
9. 
Nor could it have been to add meaning to the text; subtraction of words can hardly add 
information. 
Cited in Longenecker 1998, 145 n. 47. 
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by his omission he was trying to avoid the suggestion.10 And certain parallel Pauline verses 
make this very unlikely (Rom. 8:3; 2 Cor. 5:21). 
Edwards (1972, 262-63) gives an unusual interpretation of Paul's omission: 
Paul turns the statement into a curse-pronouncement: Cursed be any man who 
hangs on a tree; hanging on a tree becomes a prohibition, a commandment of the 
law. The new wording [which omits virb Qcov] leaves no room for the possible 
understanding that the man is already cursed because of his crime or else he 
would not be hanging on a tree. The effect of Paul's change is that the 
declaration in Dt.21:23 becomes a statement of law and Christ in fact 
transgresses it by hanging on the cross. By Paul's alteration of the text he places 
Christ not simply in the role of being passively in a position which deems one as 
accursed by God, i.e. hanging on a tree, but in the active role of disobeying a 
prohibition of God's law and thereby willingly and willfully becoming accursed 
by him. 
This will not do, however. In the first place, Paul's new wording rules out nothing regarding 
when and how the curse came on the one hung on the tree; the mere fact that God is not 
mentioned is neither here nor there, with respect to "the possible understanding that the man 
is already cursed . . . or else he would not be hanging on a tree." True, if Paul were indeed 
trying to interpret the text this way, he would probably leave out the phrase £>7r6 Geou; but 
his omission by no means implies that interpretation. Furthermore, the idea that some people 
would need a commandment placed in front of them to make them abstain from "willingly 
and willfully" being crucified, is one not likely to occur to Paul's readers (or to anyone else). 
Certainly none of Paul's readers familiar with the original text would have understood it this 
way, or would have guessed Paul to do so. We may safely dismiss this interpretation. 
There is a pertinent grammatical point, however, which Edwards almost alone points 
out (1972, 263): 
10. Cf. Dunn 1993a, 177: "Despite Burton's 164-5, 168-72 repeated insistence, no distinction 
between the curse of the law and the curse of God is intended (TDNTi. 450). The curse [of the 
law] is not rebuked but remedied." Cf. also Bring 1961, 145; Fung 1988, 148 n. 60; Hong 1993, 
85-86. 
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A principal reason, the present writer believes, Paul omitted the words virb Qeov 
is that it was a necessary consequence of his having turned KeKarrjpanevog into 
[the adjective] emKaraparog. . . . the adjective is never found with the words 
into Qeov or any comparable phrase in the entire LXX; in fact, grammatically 
the construction would be extremely awkward. 
This prepositional phrase is adverbial and the preposition points out agency or cause, which 
are inherently verbal, action-ideas. Thus Edwards is quite right about the grammatical 
ineptness of this phrase's modifying an adjective, such as emKardpaTog, and Paul's 
constraint, under the circumstances, to omit the phrase.11 This likely explains at least part of 
Paul's reason for the omission. 
Another part of his reason may have been, again, the desire to make his citation 
parallel in form to the citation of Deut. 27:26 in verse 10. His two citations begin 
respectively as follows: 
of Deut. 27:26 of Deut. 21:23 
'EiruaTdpaToc irag dg ova efifiepet 'EiriKctTapaTog irug 6 Kpefidiiepog 
By omitting the noun otpdpwrog (following wag) from the LXX of Deut. 27:26, and by 
changing iceicarripanepog virb deov irag to ,EmKonapciTog itag b in Deut. 21:23, Paul has 
done virtually everything possible that will make the two citations formally similar. It seems 
unlikely that this formal parallelism is purely accidental. 
In summary, we conclude that the changes Paul has made to the LXX of Deut. 21:23 
in Gal. 3:13 are basically for purposes of literary-formal parallelism. In neither case has the 
change been made in order to avoid making the suggestion that God had actually cursed 
Christ. This holds all the more true if the explanation is that Paul was using a different text 
from the LXX or MT, which is also a possibility (Betz 1979, 151; Longenecker 1990, 122). 
11. Hong (1993, 85) follows Edwards here. 
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6.3 What is the meaning of e£-qy6paoev7 
This verb means "redeem," although in other contexts it can mean "buy up" (Lightfoot 1890, 
139; Morris 1965, 55). Martyn (1997a, 317) notes that this verb "refers to the action of one 
person redeeming another by delivering him from slavery. That meaning is clear from Paul's 
use of the same verb in 4:5, where he speaks explicitly of redemption from enslavement (4:1, 
3)." Although the idea of "buying back from slavery" generally cannot be strictly and 
literally applied when it is God who does the "redeeming," clearly it is used of him 
metaphorically, throughout the OT (Morris 1965, 11-64), which usage does not necessarily 
involve any permanent semantic change or addition to the word's range of senses. 
Here, then, does it mean "redeemed" in the general, metaphorical sense of "rescued," 
or is it literally the "buying back" of a slave from out of his or her slavery? Paul almost 
certainly uses it metaphorically here, as also in 1 Cor. 6:20; 7:23 (LN, 1:488; Bring 1961, 
149-50; Betz 1979, 150; Bruce 1982b, 166; Ziesler 1992, 40-41; Dunn 1993a, 176). This is 
in keeping with Paul's frequent figurative use of slavery language in connection with the Law 
later in Galatians (Witherington 1998, 238): the "slavery vs. sonship" motif is obviously 
figurative. "Rescued" would therefore be a feasible, but less picturesque, rendition of Paul's 
meaning. 
6.4 Does the "us" in 3:13-14 include Gentiles? 
A crucial question about verse 13 is, Who is the "us" whom "Christ redeemed . . . from the 
curse of the Law" (vs. 13)? Does it include Jews only, Gentiles only, Christians, the elect, 
everyone, or some combination of such categories?12 Paul includes himself obviously, as 
12. Commentators are divided on this. Among those claiming it includes Jews only, are Lightfoot 
(1890, 139); Duncan (1934, 99); Betz (1979, 148); Hays (1983, passim in chap. 3, though he 
never really defends this view); Donaldson (1986); Caneday (1989, 195, 203-4); Braswell (1991, 
75); Matera (1992, 120, 124; 1993, 291 n. 19, though in the text he says it includes the Gentiles); 
Wright (1992, 143-44); Hong (1993, 84; 1994, 178); B. Longenecker (1996, 91-92, 96; 1998, 
143); Witherington (1998, 237-38). Among those claiming that it includes Gentiles also, are 
Whiteley (1957, 246); Dunn (1974, 137, cf. 130-31; = Dunn 1991b, 46-47; 1993a, 176); 
Thuruthumaly (1981, 118 n. 83); Bruce (1982b, 166-67); Cousar (1982, 77; 1990, 115-18); 
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well as at least some Galatians, in the "us" redeemed from the curse of the Law. It therefore 
includes some Christians, or some persons who, redeemed, then became Christians. 
Donaldson (1986, 95) notes that it "is generally recognized" that 3:13, 3:23-25, and 
4:5 "are parallel and need to be interpreted consistently as referring either to an inclusive 
group of Jewish and Gentile Christians, or to Jewish Christians exclusively." He then points 
to 4:5 and argues that the redeemed group there is explicitly "the ones under the Law," 
which naturally would be taken as meaning "the Jews."13 The inference is that in 3:13 also, 
the "us" who are redeemed are the Jews only. 
However, Donaldson overlooks that for Paul the Law brings a judgment on Gentiles as 
well as on Jews, in the very same forensic action (Rom. 3:9, 19-20). Indeed, Paul's point in 
such a passage is that the Law condemns Jews also; how much more, then, would it for Paul 
condemn "Gentile sinners" (cf. Gal. 2:15). This implicit curse of the Law on Gentiles along 
with Jews, deprives of all force Donaldson's argument regarding 3:13. On the other hand, 
there are strong positive evidences, right in Galatians, that Paul means Gentiles as well as 
Jews in 3:13 (Bruce 1982b, 167): the roe -K&vra ("all people") of vs. 22; the strongly 
inclusive language of vss. 23-29 and 4:4-6; and Paul's logical connection of 3:13 with vs. 
14a's blessing that comes dq ra edvri — a logical connection Donaldson does not 
convincingly explain.14 Furthermore, Lull (1986, 481 n. 1) rightly points out the fairly 
obvious but often overlooked: a natural linguistic assumption is that "the first person plural 
Ebeling (1985, 179-80); Lull (1986, 481 n. 1); Fung (1988, 149); Westerholm (1988, 194-95); 
Hansen (1989, 123; 1994, 95 n.; but Christians only); Howard (1990, 58-60); R. Longenecker 
(1990, 121); Morland (1995, 222-23); Martyn (1997a, 317-18); Williams (1997, 92). 
13. We must demur regarding Dal ton's claim (1990, 40) that "Paul distinguishes those 'under the 
law' from Jews [citing 1 Cor. 9:20-21] . . . Those under the law would seem to be pagans, who 
do not stand within the covenant of Israel, and yet are bound by the law . . . " (similarly Gaston 
1987, 29-30). While those "under the Law" may include others besides Jews, it cannot be taken 
as excluding Jews; see espec. Gal. 3:22-23; cf. Rom. 2:12. 
14. Cf. Dunn 1990b, 236 n. 66. 
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in 3:13 . . . includes the Gentile addressees of the letter to the Galatians."15 In 3:10 the 
group subject to a curse may, on the surface, appear to include only "those who are of works 
of the Law"; but in fact, we have seen that implicitly this curse is on all "flesh."1 6 We must 
conclude that Paul comprehends both Jews and Gentiles within the "us" redeemed from the 
curse in 3:13-14. 
But does it include all Jews and Gentiles, or just the elect, or just the saved? Though 
seldom addressed, this is an important exegetical question. In light of the universal 
substantives Paul uses in the parallel passage 2 Cor. 5:14-15, 18-21, "all" people might 
seem Paul's thought in Gal. 3:13 also. However, we had better answer this question from 
the immediate context, rather than appeal to a letter written to a different congregation. But 
it does not appear yet that we are in a position to achieve this. There is too much still that 
we do not know: for example, we do not know the force of the genitive in "the curse of the 
Law"; we do not know in what respect "we" are "rescued" by Christ—that is, to precisely 
what change of circumstances Paul refers when he speaks of this "rescue";17 we do not know 
whether the "curse" in the second half of the verse is identical to the one that is mentioned in 
the first half; and, in a somewhat related issue, we do not know the preposition's force in the 
phrase imbp rjiubv, whether "in our behalf" or "in our stead."18 Now, prepositions and the 
genitive case are semantically quite slippery; probably we cannot determine their exact 
semantic force here without first understanding the force of their context. Similarly, to what 
exactly Paul refers, when he speaks of our "rescue" by Christ, is quite difficult to determine 
15. Cf. the helpful discussion in Dalton 1990, 35-39. 
16. See above, chap. 4. 
17. From the heated polemical context, it is clear he thinks we are "rescued" from some particular 
state of affairs, rather than in some general sense only. 
18. There has been some skepticism about the potential of virhp to mean "instead of" (e.g., Burton 
1921, 172; Edwards 1972, 301-2), but most scholars acknowledge this as a potential sense of the 
word. See the thorough study in Davies 1970, 81-90; also Zerwick 1963, §91; Morris 1965, 62-
64; Cousar 1990, 55-56; 1998, 50 n. 7. 
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without first knowing the precise semantic relation between the "curse" he suffered, and the 
"curse" from which he rescued us: are they the same curse? Since this latter question holds 
out the most initial promise, let us deal with it first. 
6.5 The semantic relationship between the "curse of the Law" and the "curse" 
upon Christ 
Do these two mentions of a "curse" refer to the same curse? If not, to what curses, 
respectively, do they refer? These questions are often overlooked; it is commonly assumed 
that these terms refer to the same curse, namely, the one which the Law pronounced in 
3:10b. If both mentions of "curse" refer to that curse, it follows readily from verse 13 that 
Christ's taking the force of the curse upon himself is the means or manner whereby he set us 
free from that identical force. In other words, he suffered it in our place, as a substitute. In 
some way or other, Christ's death was given in exchange for ours: we no longer are 
threatened by this curse's power. One might understand this mechanism as Christ's affecting 
"our" treatment under God's covenant, by intercepting the force of a curse upon us that is 
already pronounced and, as it were, sent on its powerful way. This is a common reading of 
the verse. 
But what if the two "curses" mentioned are not the same one? Then the above chain of 
exegetical reasoning has its presupposition removed. And proponents of at least one current 
way of understanding Paul's view of the atonement have argued that it does not involve a 
straight "exchange" of Christ's cursedness for ours (or, of his blessedness for ours). Morna 
Hooker (1971) has helpfully offered the term interchange for representing the alternative 
possibility, namely, that Christ does not give up his "righteousness," even if we participate 
in it; likewise we do not give up our mortality and fleshly weakness, even though Christ 
participates in it. Thus the view has been called a "participatory" view of the atonement 
(Whiteley 1957, 242). And if this view is Paul's, it would, by a tollendo tollens on the 
A. H . Carver, 2000 §6 .5 Page 265 
above implication, rule out the suggestion that the two mentions of "curse" in 3:13 refer to 
the same thing. It would be worth our trouble, then, to examine the respective correlation, 
with the Pauline evidence, of these two views of the atonement. 
6.5.1 Verse 13 and the "substitutionary" or "exchange" view of the atonement 
This is the traditional, "substitutionary-atonement" reading of these and other Pauline verses. 
In this reading of Gal. 3:13 Christ became a curse "in our stead" (Hep iin&v), and by this 
means "rescued us from the curse of the Law." 1 9 The participial phrase "becoming a curse 
in our stead" (yevonevo<; iiirep J)\)MV Kcnapa) is thus an "aorist participle of identical action" 
used as an "adverbial participle of means."20 The idea is not merely that Christ suffered the 
punishment that comes on "mortal flesh" because of sin; rather the idea is one of 
substitution, of interception of the punishment as it were, so that the punishment's falling 
upon Christ removes it from "us" due to some transaction that it effects besides the mere 
instilling of faith in the worshipper. It is only because of Christ's death, in other words, that 
even those who have "faith" (in Paul's sense) are justified; even their justification requires 
additionally this atonement, the atonement effects some transaction that is required apart from 
their faith and the latter's effects. In 3:13, according to this view, the connection between 
the Law and the curse laid on Christ is made by the substitutional prepositional phrase virep 
T)f)Ju)v, which implicitly identifies this escaped "curse of the Law" with that very curse laid 
upon Christ.21 
19. So Bring 1961, 144; Morris 1965, 56-59, 62-64; Raisanen 1983, 59-61; Fung 1988, 149-50; 
Cousar 1990, 55-56; R. Longenecker 1990, 121; Hong 1993, 86; McKnight 1995, 156-57; 
Morland 1995, 221-23; Kruse 1997, 85; Williams 1997, 92; B. Longenecker 1998, 143; 
Witherington 1998, 239. 
20. On these see Burton 1976 [1900], §§121, 139-41, 443, 447; cf. Burton 1921, 172; Hong 1993, 
84. No one doubts that it is a participle of means; but whether it is a participle of identical action, 
or else one of (causally if not temporally) antecedent action, remains to be seen. 
21. There has been some skepticism about the potential of virep to mean "instead of" (e.g., Burton 
1921, 172; Edwards 1972, 301-2), but most scholars acknowledge this as a potential sense of the 
word. See the thorough study in Davies 1970, 81-90; also Zerwick 1963, §91; Morris 1965, 62-
64; Cousar 1990, 55-56; 1998, 50 n. 7. 
A. H . Carver, 2000 §6 .5 .1 Page 266 
There appears nothing formally wrong with the logic of the text read thus. But one 
question is whether Paul supplies enough information for us to harvest this intended meaning 
from the text. In particular, note that this reading depends heavily upon vnep T)IJMV being 
taken as "in our stead"; but this is a narrower and therefore more-informative sense of the 
preposition, so pragmatics' "conversational maxims" (e.g. the Quantity maxim, "enough 
information, but not more than necessary") would seem to place the burden of proof on any 
suggestion that Paul intends this additional information: If he does, by what context of this 
phrase does he communicate this additional information? Is this information required to 
make Paul's statement relevant to the point of this passage? Only through answering these 
questions could one argue that the context "neutralises" the semantic difference between the 
word's broader sense and that of some narrower sense, changing the intended sense from the 
broader to the narrower sense. Similarly, the translation of ikuarqpiov (Rom. 3:25) as 
"propitiation" (or "appeasing") rather than as "atonement" or "expiation" entails a 
narrowing of sense and thus an increase of information intended. Such a reading would 
probably imply a substitutionary-atonement meaning of that verse; but again, the burden of 
proof is on showing that Paul conveys this narrower sense. One cannot prove narrower 
intended senses from the bare fact that the words themselves could carry these senses. 
Would the idea that Christ was accursed in our place, that is, as our curse-intercepting 
substitute, be likely contained in, or at least compatible with, the original readers' 
presupposition pool? It appears more or less compatible with it; the religious background of 
sacrifice and sin-offering provides the possibility of a substitution-rationale.22 But it is quite 
doubtful that the religious presupposition-pool would require this meaning here. We shall 
argue that sacrifice or sin-offering did not necessarily involve substitution, in Paul's thinking 
and writing. 
22. Cf. Morland 1995, 221-23. 
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As most commentators agree, it is virtually undeniable that Paul's passages about 
Christ's death use language of sacrifice and of sin-offering (Dunn 1974, 131-33; 1998, 213-
18).2 3 Allusion to sin-offering probably also informs Paul's usage of the phrase virep rjfubv 
(Dunn 1974, 133; e.g., here in 3:13; 2 Cor. 5:21).24 Even the pertinence of Christ's 
sinlessness (2 Cor. 5:21) probably alludes to the OT idea of an offering "without blemish."25 
Moreover, it is very doubtful that one can dismiss all or any of these usages as metaphorical. 
A lst-century Jewish reader would be more likely to take them literally; any non-sacrificial 
point of such a metaphor would apparently remain opaque. To Paul, it seems, Jesus's death 
was literally an atoning, sacrificial sin-offering. 
23. See, e.g., Rom. 3:21-25; 5:9; 8:3; 1 Cor. 5:7; 2 Cor. 5:21. 
24. Cf. Rom. 5:6-8; 8:32; 2 Cor. 5:14f.; Gal. 2:20; 1 Thess. 5:9f.; and note the sacrificial language 
of Eph. 5:2. 
25. Cf. Heb. 9:14; 1 Pet. 1:19; 3:18. B. H. McLean (1992; 1996), following J. Milgrom, has 
argued that "in post-exilic times the expiatory feature of the colah was taken over by the hatta't 
offering and the reparation offering" (McLean 1992, 533), which latter two offerings generally 
became confused and identified with each other; and "strictly speaking, the hatta't offering is a 
purification offering, not a sin offering. In other words, the function of the hatta't was to cleanse 
the sanctuary (not the offerer) of the contamination conferred by the sin or impurity of the 
offerer" (ibid., 534). But the evidence which Milgrom indicates is not all that compelling; others 
have reached contrasting conclusions from it (e.g., B. A. Levine: see ibid., 534 n. 9). Dunn 
(1998, 219) comments that "The more consistently emphasized objective of the sin offering is the 
removal of sin and the consequent forgiveness of the sinner. And the 'mechanism' whereby a 
purification ritual of the sanctuary achieved that end is more speculative and less rooted in the text 
than" that of removing sin from the sinner. 
Applying Milgrom's thesis to Paul, however, McLean argues against a sin-offering backdrop 
for his atonement-passages: "The priestly writers were very careful to avoid making the 
impression that the [hatta't] sacrifice itself became defiled in any way. . . . This means that the 
hatta't paradigm is unable to explain Paul's atonement theology as he defined it in texts such as 
Gal 3.13, 2 Cor 5.21 and Rom 8.3" (McLean 1992, 541-42). But if we may assume, for the sake 
of argument, that a hatta't offering might be used as a "sin-offering" and not just as a 
"purification-offering," then the reason for the offering's purity would still be clear: "The animal 
had to be holy, without defect, precisely so that both priest and offerer could be confident that the 
death it died was not its own. As 2 Cor. 5.21 [itself] clearly implies, only the sinless could 
effectively make atonement for the sinful" (Dunn 1998, 221). McLean opts instead for a 
"scapegoat," "scapeman" or "scapebeast" background for the mechanism of atonement which 
Paul intends in such passages (see ibid., p. 553; McLean 1996). Williams (1997, 92) follows 
McLean here; cf. Betz 1979, 150 n. 122. Schwartz (1983) also argues for a scapegoat 
background, noting that by Paul's time the scapegoat was actually killed (ibid., 261), and that also 
by that time "the scapegoat was considered to become accursed" (ibid., 263). This might just be 
part of the background Paul has in mind (cf. Dunn 1998, 220-21); but his writings and the rest of 
the NT more clearly suggest that of sin-offering. 
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What must yet be determined, however, is Paul's thinking on the modus operandi of 
such an atoning sacrifice. It is here that great difficulty lies for the "substitution" 
explanation of Paul's thinking on this. It is difficult to demonstrate the "propitiation" sense 
for iXuorripiov (Rom. 3:25), for example: 
Paul explicitly states that it is God himself who provided the hilasterion. . . . In 
Hebrew [as opposed to Greek] usage God is never the object of the key verb 
(kipper). Properly speaking, in the Israelite cult, God is never propitiated or 
appeased. The objective of the atoning act is rather the removal of sin—that is, 
either by purifying the person or object, or by wiping out the sin. . . . And it 
can be said that it is God himself who expiates the sin (or for the sin). (Dunn 
1998, 214)26 
Moreover, "there is no clear rationale in scripture or in Second Temple Judaism concerning 
sacrifice" or of "just how the sacrifice effected" this atonement (Dunn 1998, 218). Thus 
Paul could hardly rely upon the religious "presupposition pool" to provide clear signals of a 
"substitutionary," cosmic-ontological atonement-rationale behind his writings. Since 
pragmatics puts the burden of proof on the suggestion that this rationale is the presupposition 
behind Gal. 3:13, the conclusion would be that it is not. 
It is true, as Cousar (1998, 39) remarks, that "Paul never directly addresses atonement 
as an issue in and of itself. No doubt this is because it never arose as a contested matter in 
the Pauline communities." Nevertheless, the above argument is more than an "argument 
from silence," inasmuch as for the substitutionary reading to prevail here either the 
"presupposition pool" or the immediate context should be not silent on the matter. But the 
immediate context does not compel a reading of substitution (i.e., it does not compel us to 
see the two "curses" as identical). And further considerations, in the form of conflicts which 
arise with it, cast a weight of doubt on the idea that Paul agreed with this "substitutionary" 
portrayal of the redemptive mechanism. 
26. Cf. Ziesler 1990, 94. 
A. H. Carver, 2000 § 6.5.2 Page 269 
6.5.2 Some problems with the "exchange" reading of Pauline "redemption" 
This substitutionary-atonement reading of Paul has been denied by a number of writers, who 
argue that Paul did not see the mechanism of atonement/redemption as working in this way. 
Their objections are weighty enough to demand our attention.27 Hooker (1971) points out 
that a simple "substitution" or "exchange" scenario, in which Jesus receives death in our 
place and we in exchange receive his life, does not comport with reality, even within Paul's 
worldview. In the first place, there is the persistent reality of death: even Christians die, a 
fact well-acknowledged by Paul (Romans 5:12; 1 Corinthians 15:20-23, 50-53; 1 Thess. 
4:13-15; see Whiteley 1957, 243; Swain 1963, 133-34; Hooker 1971, 359; Dunn 1974, 
141). Indeed, they die a death just as real as Christ's. Neither is it as i f Christ had given up 
his life altogether for our sakes; indeed, he was vested with a new and better vitality in his 
resurrection a short time after his burial. Thus, nowhere in this reality can we discern any 
coherence with a scheme in which Christ is a substitute. 
Furthermore, the substitutionary reading of Paul's atonement-rationale runs into some 
intractable paradoxes. Many of these are revealed by asking the question, "Is this atonement 
limited to some sinners, or does it extend to all?"2 8 In the substitutionary, curse-intercepting 
explanation, the transaction effected is not a moral or psychological conversion, but a 
physical substitution of Christ's punishment for ours (through "propitiation," "imputation," 
or whatever name we wish to give it). This implies that either the atonement is not limited to 
the faithful or, if it is limited so, their acceptance is not because they are faithful, but only 
(for example) because they are elect and this atonement only affects the elect. Either of these 
implications produces serious logical difficulties. If the atonement is not limited to the 
27. Here we draw mainly upon four authors: D. H . Whiteley (1957, reworked and republished as 
Whiteley 1974 [and also 1st ed., 1964], 130-48); C. W. Swain (1963); M. D. Hooker (1971); 
J. D. G. Dunn (1974, reworked and republished as Dunn 1991b). 
28. This is of course one of the central issues in the centuries-old theological dispute between 
"Calvinism" and "Arminianism." 
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faithful, for example, why are not the unfaithful also accepted through it? If, on the other 
hand, this lack of acceptance is not because they are unfaithful but rather because they are not 
elect and the atonement is limited to the elect, how could anyone who is aware that election is 
the sole cause ever acquire the faith that he or she personally will be justified, without having 
some non-doctrinal, mystical knowledge of who is and who is not elect? But Paul nowhere 
speaks of such knowledge. Indeed, in this case how could one even know what "faith" is?29 
One would be left to define it in terms of the justification of the "elect" or that of the 
"faithful," each of which ideas would still lack definition. But if, for lack of any feasible 
criterion of who is justified, no one can acquire assurance in one's personal justification, how 
will any ever acquire "faith" and thus be justified? Having "trust in God" could hardly be, 
in Paul's understanding, independent of one's beliefs about one's own personal future. For 
both of the above reasons, then, we must reject the "substitutionary" or "exchange" 
understanding Paul's view of the "atonement" or "redemption" which Christ accomplished 
on the cross. 
6.5.3 Verse 13 and the "participatory" or "interchange" view of the atonement 
But as suggested above, there is another scheme, which coheres with Pauline reality much 
better, and which we can glean from Paul's own writings and which has been called a 
"participatory," "interchange," or "incarnational" view of the redemption.30 However, 
supporters of this scheme concretely specify not so much what the modus operandi of the 
atonement is, as what that modus is not (viz., a straight substitution). The essence of this 
29. We dealt with this problem in detail in § 3.7. 
30. See Whiteley 1957; Hooker 1971, 351. Dunn (1974, 129ff.) seems to be saying much the same 
with his formulation that for Paul Christ is "representative" man (cf. Hooker 1971, 358), 
representative both of "old man" in his mortality, and of "new man" in his resurrection. Cf. 
Hansen 1989, 124. 
A. H . Carver, 2000 § 6.5.3 Page 271 
scheme is what Hooker calls "interchange": the idea is that Christ becomes what we are (in 
our mortality) in order that we might become what he is. Thus it 
is not a simple exchange. It is not that Christ is cursed and we are blessed. 
Rather he enters into our experience, and we then enter into his, by sharing his 
resurrection. . . . Christ does not cease to be Son of God, and we receive the 
spirit of the Son. (Hooker 1971, 352) 
Not only do we share in his spirit and resurrection, but Christians participate also in Christ's 
death; but "we undergo eternal death in a 'harmless' form, since, through baptism, our 
potential sharing in the death died by Christ is made actual (Rom. vi. 6-7)" (Whiteley 1957, 
243; see also Dunn 1974, 141). And " i f we have been united with him in a death like his, 
we shall certainly be united with him in a resurrection like his" (Rom. 6:5; cf. Romans 8). It 
is in this sense, then, that "he died for all, that those who live might live no longer for 
themselves but for him who for their sake died and was raised. . . . For our sake he made 
him to be sin who knew no sin, so that in him we might become the righteousness of God" 
(2 Cor. 5:15, 21). 
There seem adequate reasons, then, to insist that Paul would not have agreed strictly 
with the portrayal of the atonement which the "substitution" explanation of 3:13 offers. The 
contrary "participatory" explanation seems the one adequate to the Pauline texts. However, 
it does not explain how this participation in Christ actually comes about; therefore, it goes 
only a certain distance towards explaining the redemption Christ accomplished. We shall 
have occasion to examine the participatory modus operandi later, when we discuss Hep. In 
any case, we see that there is no particular reason, not even the presence of that preposition, 
to think that the curse mentioned in 3:13b is the same one as that mentioned in 13a. And, as 
we shall now see, there are definite reasons to think that it is not the same one. 
6.5.4 The two curses 
In reading 3:10-14, there is a common tendency to assume that "the curse which Christ 
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became" in verse 13b is the curse which the Law pronounces, and which Paul cites (from 
Deut. 27:26) in verse 10b, and thus, is also that curse from which Christ rescued us (13a). 
The commonality of the identification is not very surprising; and yet when one examines this 
assumption, it begins to appear dubious. 
Since Paul does not see the spirit of a Christian as "fleshly" (but rather Spiritual, see 
Romans 8), "the Christian," taken in this sense, is not subject to the curse of 10b (because 
this "Christian" does not meet the curse's criterion of who deserves curse, but rather the 
Christian abides by all things God commands). Rather, the Christian is blessed with faithful 
Abraham (vs. 9). But in another sense, the curse is on "the Christian," in that the latter does 
inherit Adam's sin and consequent mortality; in this respect one may say that even the 
Christian comes under the curse of 10b. In the first, eschatologicalfy more accurate sense, 
the "Christian" is not cursed, but participates in the life and resurrection of Christ (1 Cor. 
15:45-49; Rom. 8:10f.). 
And it is with respect to this latter, eschatological sense that Paul wants to distinguish, 
in this passage, the covenantal standing of "the Christian" and that of the "Law"-adherent. It 
is with regard to "Christians" in this sense, then, that he warns against "the Law" in 10a, 
11a, and 12a. The point is, however, that the ambiguity with regard to what a Christian is, 
is really an ambiguity with regard to what Paul means by "human being." Where Paul thinks 
"a human" in the broadest sense, including the outer, Adamic man, he will have to admit that 
there is a "curse" on this person, whomever it is, Christian or not (Rom. 6:6; 7:22-25).31 
Yet it is a "curse" whose impact and eschatological significance is, for the Christian, 
dramatically qualified: indeed, it is nothing but a participation in the death of Christ, a 
transitional phase between this life and the life of Paradise. (God must have made a 
31. It may surely be regretted that Paul's language of "inner man" and "outer man" may make him 
sound sexist; but it is his language, thus we use it in expounding Paul, even at the risk of 
sounding sexist with him. 
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distinction, for covenantal-legal purposes, between the inner man and "the flesh," i.e., the 
inherited, Adamic nature; for otherwise even Christ, condemned as flesh, could not have 
been also legally vindicated.) As a "curse" on the outer man only, it is a mere matter of 
mortality. But where Paul means "a human" in the narrower sense, the inner man, the 
"curse" is quite another thing: this "curse" has no relation to "the Christian" (i.e., the new 
inner man), whereas for the non-Christian, it will be far more serious than the mere mortality 
of this earthly, fleshly vessel. 
Our point is this. Paul might have in view two different "curses" in this passage: one 
already pronounced on "flesh" as such (10b), and one only proleptically, not yet finally 
pronounced (10a), which judgment will depend on the nature of the inner man (on that day), 
which person may yet become Spiritual or else stay fleshly. One "curse" is already a given, 
even for Christians (as descendants of Adam); yet the other, which regards the inner man 
only, is not a given. But which of these Paul means by the idea "curse" in any particular 
place, will depend on whether he has in view there the covenantal judgment of the inner man 
or else that of the outer man. 
Which of these curses then, if either, is the one mentioned in 13a? And is it the same 
one mentioned in 13b, the "curse of the Law"? Since 13a speaks of a group that is exempt 
(having been "rescued") from the curse, it is surely the proleptic, eschatological "curse" on 
the inner man, that Paul denotes here, the one which he warns shall come upon the "Law"-
adherents. For there is no group whatsoever that is exempt from the other "curse," the one 
on the outer man, which for everyone is "flesh." 
Well then, which of these two curses, if either, does Paul denote in 13b, by the 
"curse" which Christ "became" virep im&v on the cross? For Paul, the cross of Christ 
means Christ's dying "in the likeness of sinful flesh"; in condemning Christ God was really 
condemning "sin in the flesh" (Rom. 8:3). This is a sinfulness in which "Christians," as 
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descendants of Adam, share. Legally they have "died with Christ" (6:8; 2 Cor. 5:14), in 
that "our old self was crucified with him" (Rom. 6:6; Gal. 5:20). Their bodies no less than 
those of unbelievers must die, because of the sinfulness of the flesh (Rom. 8:10; 1 Cor. 
15:50-53). In short, Christians participate in Christ's death, the death of sinful flesh. 
In summary, the "curse of the Law" (13a) is that eschatological curse against which 
Paul is warning the Galatians in 3:10-14. If they are steadfastly true to Paul's gospel, they 
can instead "await the hope of righteousness" (5:5 NASB), the hope of a good verdict in that 
last judgment. For that judgment has reference only to the inner man. But when speaking of 
"the curse" which Christ suffered (13b), this curse on sinful flesh as such, Paul included the 
outer man in his purview. He never warns Christians that they will suffer this "curse" if 
they apostatise: on the contrary, he warns them that they will suffer it regardless, or even that 
they can expect to suffer more of it, the more faithful they are in the inner man (Rom. 8:17; 
2 Cor. 1:5, 7; 4:7-11; Phil. 3:10; Col. 1:24; 1 Thess. 2:14; see also Acts 14:22; 2 Tim. 
3:12). Clearly then, the curse which Christ "became" in Gal. 3:13b is not the proleptic, 
eschatological one from which he "rescued" Christians according to 13a. 
6.6 What is the meaning of the genitive in "the curse of the Law"? 
In light of this last point, we can make a much more informed judgment on the "curse of the 
Law" genitive, in 13a. The most common reading is that it means the curse is "pronounced 
by the Law" (a "subjective genitive of authorship" if you will), harking back to 10b.32 This 
reading will not do. It follows, from the above, that in 13a Paul is using "the Law" in a 
rather pejorative way (to speak of the wrong—or perhaps the merely superseded—covenantal 
discourse expressed literally in the text of the Torah), as he does virtually throughout 
Galatians. But Paul elsewhere warns that the curse pronounced by that "Law" is on "all 
32. Cf. Longenecker 1998, 144, and most commentators. 
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flesh," inclusive of everyone (see Rom. 3:19-20, // Gal. 2:16). Christ participated in that 
curse; and we have just shown that that is not the curse of 13a. There (13a) Paul has in mind 
rather the inner man's covenantal standing; and consequently the Christian's standing is good 
with regard to this "curse." So "the Law's curse" in 13a does not mean "the curse which 
the Law pronounces." 
What then? In light of what we have just determined about 13a, the relationship 
between its (eschatological) "curse" and "the Law" (in this pejorative sense), is that those 
who adhere to this Law end up being "cursed" (in the last day). So, it is the curse "that 
pertains to the Law"—in that it is the lot of those who adhere to "the Law." There is no 
need to shave this reading down any further so that it will fit nicely into one of the traditional 
Greek-grammatical cubbyholes prepared for genitives (subjective genitive, objective genitive, 
etc.). The Greek genitive is simply a noun functioning as a qualifying adjective (DM §§86-
88; Zerwick 1963, §39). 3 3 Since it qualifies, Paul wishes to tell us which "curse" he means; 
namely, it is the one that is associated with "the Law" inasmuch as all who adhere to the 
latter are subject to that curse. 
6.7 What is the meaning of vnepl 
Earlier we found in favour of the "participatory" reading of the "redemption from the 
curse." For there is no contextual basis, either in Paul's "presupposition pool" or in the 
linguistic context, for reading the narrower, more-informative, substitutional sense into the 
prepositional phrase vwep rin&p. But in light of the Quantity maxim of conversation, Paul 
should be assuring enough information is present to communicate his intended sense of the 
preposition. So we must assume that he intends only its broader, less informative sense, "in 
behalf of." 
33. "The genitive defines by attributing a quality or relationship to the noun which it modifies" (DM, 
p. 74, §88). 
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But in order for this to be a truly satisfactory reading, particularly in view of its 
conflict with the traditional exegesis, we need to explain how it is that Christ's death, "in the 
likeness of sinful flesh" (Rom. 8:3), is "in behalf of us." Or, in terms of 13a, how could 
this deliver us, or help us escape, from the "curse" which comes upon Law-adherents? We 
know that the "rescue" of 13a happens through the "becoming a curse" of 13b; for the 
participle "becoming" (yevonevog) is clearly an adverbial participle of means, no other 
semantic possibility being feasible.34 By rejecting (on behalf of Paul) the substitutionary 
modus operandi of the atonement, we have rejected the idea that Christ, by standing in its 
way and intercepting it, delivers us from a curse already pronounced. The only alternative 
conceivable is that he enables us to avoid this curse's ever being pronounced upon us. 
That enablement could conceivably happen either because Christ changes the criterion 
by which one is cursed—so that we no longer must satisfy that criterion—or else because he 
gives us some information which motivates us to satisfy the criterion for blessing, rather than 
the one for curse. The first of these possibilities is in conflict with the text before us. For 
this curse is pronounced according to the very criterion which Paul cites approvingly in verse 
10b, that of Deut. 27:26 (see above, chap. 5); therefore he is affirming this criterion, as that 
of the eschatological judgment. This leaves us the second possibility: Paul is saying that we 
escape this "curse" because Christ gives us the incentive to "abide by all things" which God 
commands, so that we satisfy the criterion for blessing instead. Probably it does this by 
changing or informing our thinking concerning the criterion (the cost) itself; otherwise, it 
would need to change or inform our thinking about eternal life (the benefit), which mforrning 
does not seem to be in view either here or elsewhere in Paul's writings. 
Now whether the "participation" has its redemptive effect through some substitutional, 
wrath-intercepting modus operandi or rather in a more "psychological," conception-altering 
34. A participle of "manner" is next in feasibility here, but fails to fit the context. 
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way is, as we have said, an issue that Paul does not address directly. But we have found 
insuperable difficulties with the wrath-intercepting mechanism of atonement; and that, for 
Paul, Christ does not save all humanity but rather only those persons who believe the gospel, 
suggests that the atonement involves some psychological element. Let us then consider two 
"psychological" explanations of the modus operandi. 
A psychological explanation will construe the "deliverance" as consisting in the 
relating or inducing in us a particular line of thought, which arrives at a particular 
conclusion. But the "psychological" Pauline modus operandi of atonement, that inferential 
line of thought, may be alleged by interpreters in differing forms. In essence, the first form 
which we will note runs as follows: "Christ was innocent, as shown in his vindication 
through resurrection; yet he was cursed. Obviously then, the curse was mistakenly 
pronounced. As this curse was announced in the covenantal context of Deuteronomy, we 
may take it that the Law pronounced, or at least concurred with, this curse. The curse being 
a mistake, the natural inference is that the Law is covenantal-legally unreliable. We cannot, 
nor need we, rely upon it to pronounce upon who is within and who is without God's true 
covenant."35 
35. Some form of this interpretation is adopted by a number of commentators, including Burton 1921, 
168-75; Duncan 1934, 101; Pannenberg 1968; Edwards 1972; Weder 1981; Beker 1984, 185-86, 
261; Kim 1984, 274, 357; Stuhlmacher 1986; also, in his own way, Hamerton-Kelly 1990. Dunn 
has introduced what we might call a sociological version of this reading (1990b, 228-29): "The 
curse of the law is not simply the condemnation which falls on any transgression and on all who 
fall short of the law's requirements. Paul has in mind the short-fall of his typical Jewish 
contemporary, the curse which falls on all who restrict the grace and promise of God in 
nationalistic terms, who treat the law as a boundary to mark the people of God off from the 
Gentiles, who give a false priority to ritual markers. . . . The curse which was removed by 
Christ's death therefore was the curse which had previously prevented that blessing from reaching 
the Gentiles, the curse of a wrong understanding of the law." But inasmuch as in Dunn's and 
most others' interpretation of 3:10 the curse seems to be an actual covenantal-judicial 
pronouncement, there is a tension set up between these two verses. If the curse on Christ shows 
us the error of using the Law as boundary-marker, but only because we assume that the Law 
concurred, wrongly, with this curse, then the implied covenantal non-jurisdiction of the Law 
debilitates Paul's warning in 3:10 of an actual curse pronounced on those who fail to live up to 
what the Law really demands. Cf. the critiques of Dunn's position in Sloan 1991, 44-45; 
Caneday 1992, 50-51. Braswell (1991, 87), Bonneau (1997, 77-78), and Garlington (1997, 115-
16) have followed Dunn in this reading of verse 13, as also in regard to verse 10. 
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According to hermeneutical guidelines we adopted in chapter 2, if this modus operandi 
of redemption is what Paul intends in the unspoken logic of 3:13 then we should be able to 
determine this from the text; for the unspoken part of an argument should be identifiable 
from what is stated and what is supplied from the contexts. Furthermore, we should deduce 
a va/W-argumental reconstruction if possible; and the unstated parts should be part of the 
hearers' presupposition pool, or at least propositions they would be likely to entertain. Now, 
this first psychological interpretation must, in order to be consistent, see the "curse" from 
which Christ delivers "us" as metaphorical for an error, or for the general results of error, 
regarding the Law's soteriological/covenantal authority and validity. For according to it, the 
Law cannot pronounce a real, valid curse. But this view is problematic. If "the curse of the 
Law" is seen as a metaphor for something and not an actual curse pronounced, then nothing 
whatever in the text of the verse even suggests that the Law either pronounced or concurred 
with the curse which Christ became (according to Deut. 21:23); but the latter would be 
required by this explanation of verse 13. Deut. 21:23 does not actually pronounce a curse, 
judicially, but only announces one as being fact.3 6 The idea that the Law pronounces or even 
concurs with this curse is not actually entailed. Nor does the text of Gal. 3:13 provide this 
connection, unless one find it in a narrower, more-informative, substitutionary sense of virkp 
r\\)&v; but as we have argued, one could get that narrower, more-informative sense only from 
the phrase's context, and thus the burden of proof lies on showing that narrower sense. 
Since the text of verse 13 does not seem to provide this connection between Christ's 
curse and ours, one which is necessary for this version of Paul's alleged "psychological" 
atonement-rationale to cohere, that connection would have to be provided from the 
36. Cf. Raisanen 1992, 44: the fact that Deut. 21:23 puts Jesus' manner of death under a curse "does 
not mean that the law which spells out the curse also brought the victim under the curse." This is 
contra Edwards' attempt, critiqued already above, to claim that Paul's citation turns Deut. 21:23 
itself into a law threatening a curse upon anyone who gets himself hanged upon a tree. 
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presupposition pool of the readers in order for the readers to grasp Paul's meaning. But it is 
quite doubtful that the readers would find this connection in their presupposition pool. In the 
first place, apparently no lst-century Christian thought Christ transgressed "the Law"; he 
was sinless (which is a presupposition of this explanation anyway; cf. 2 Cor. 5:21).37 So 
there is no reason, apart from Deut. 21:23, to think the Law pronounced a curse on him 
(Raisanen 1992, 41-44). Secondly, it is hard to imagine that many Christian readers, 
particularly those who were enamoured of the Law, had connected the Deut. 21:23 
testimonium to such a "curse of the Law"; as Tuckett explains (1986, 348-349), 
According to the logic of the scheme proposed, the corollaries about the Law 
inevitably follow from the conviction that Jesus was Messiah/Lord/accepted by 
God or whatever. The fact is, however, that a sizeable part of the early 
Christian church failed to draw such corollaries. As far as we can tell, a part of 
the church (perhaps under James) stayed within the confines of Judaism and 
remained faithful adherents of the Law. The inexorable logic which, it is 
claimed, led from Paul's new assessment of Jesus to his beliefs about the Law 
was not shared by a large number of his contemporary Christians. 
Thus, this connection seems absent from the presupposition pool from which the reader 
would have to retrieve it. This reading would hardly have been expected to occur to the 
original reader.38 
It therefore has an additional problem. The phrase "the curse of the Law" is a 
referential one, which requires that the context tell us to specifically which "curse of the 
Law" it refers; and the context tells us that it is the one mentioned in 3:10 (cf. the Quantity 
37. E.g. , Jesus' forgiving of sins was, even according to his accusers' charge, blasphemous only if he 
really had no authority to forgive, and (therefore) really was not divine. Did not Paul think 
Christ had at least the former of these characteristics? ("We must all appear before the judgment 
seat of Christ," 2 Cor. 5:10.) Cf. Raisanen 1992, 43: "Dietzfelbinger shares the common view 
that Jesus was openly critical of the law and that this was historically an important reason for his 
death. Severe historical difficulties stand in the way of that position, however. Apart from the 
late comment in Jn 19.7, the passion narratives do not represent such a view. The death sentence 
is connected, instead, with Jesus' confession to his messiahship (Mk 14.62 par.) . . . " 
38. Cf. Sanders 1983, 25f.; Hansen 1989, 122; Dunn 1990b, 230 at nn. 62, 63; Wright 1992, 152; 
B. Longenecker 1998, 144. 
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maxim: the discourse must give enough information to serve its purpose). The inference 
would be that the "curse of the Law" from which Christ redeemed "us" in 3:13 is the one 
ostensibly pronounced in 3:10. But the latter curse is genuinely covenantal-legal, and not 
merely metaphorical. So verse 13's clear reference to the curse of 3:10 is counter to the 
interpretation of this "curse of the Law" in 13 as a merely metaphorical "curse," and thus is 
counter to this psychological explanation of Paul's argument. We conclude that this 
"psychological" reading is incompatible with the text as well as absent from the readers' 
presupposition pool. 
But there is another, more general way to frame a "psychological" redemption-scheme: 
the "deliverance from" the Law's curse may be understood as deliverance from the idea that 
"the Law" has final jurisdiction over us, yet without any reference to a mistaken curse. To 
be more precise: if that which brought on the curse in 3:10 was one's being e£ epywv vonov 
(i.e., of the epya VO/JLOV theory of justification), then abandoning any belief that "the Law's" 
criterion of righteousness ("accomplishments") is a valid one before God, and accepting the 
valid criterion instead (thus having the mind of the Spirit, not the flesh) should naturally 
deliver us from that curse. So it might not be necessary, for achieving that deliverance, that 
the logic which delivers us from this idea contains any premises about the Law's mistaken 
cursing of Christ. 
In fact, the logic flows directly from right understanding of a point spelled out in 
2 Cor. 5:14-15; Rom. 6:6-7, 7:1, 4a, 6; and Gal. 2:20, 6:14: all flesh has, for purposes of 
Law, died already with Christ, so the Law, whose "accomplishments"-criterion would have 
been feasible only pre-Fall, no longer can be seen as having jurisdiction over us (for "he who 
has died [viz., at the Law's hand] is acquitted from sin," Rom. 6:7 AT, cf. 7 : l f f . ) . 3 9 That 
39. It seems likely that Paul inferred this from the premise that the true Messiah's death and 
resurrection made no sense (for a Jew) unless intended as a lesson, a parable of some sort; and that 
this parable made no sense unless his death and resurrection were somehow representative and 
paradigmatic for his followers'. 
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is, our flesh is already judged, cursed with Christ (Rom. 8:3); what is yet to be judged is 
therefore only the response of the "inner man." This inner man's response of course cannot 
be measurable, external "accomplishments" of all things commanded, since post-Fall the 
outer man frustrates even the godly inner man's desires (Rom. 7:25; 8:4, 10, 13; Gal. 5:17), 
so that attempt and accomplishment are not commensurable or coextensive categories. So 
rather the only "doing"-criterion of judgment now is steadfast endeavour (Rom. 2:7, 25-29; 
6:22; 7:6, 22; 8:4-13; Gal. 3:10b). This then is the logic and the message which delivers us 
from the Law's false (or perhaps merely superseded) "accomplishments" criterion of 
"righteousness" and teaches instead a true one. 
Thus according to Paul's rationale underlying 3:13, Christ's resurrection teaches us to 
see God's wdoing"-criterion of "righteousness," not as epya vdfiov (accomplishments) but 
rather as "faithful obedience" to God and Christ. By doing this, it gives us every causa 
cognoscendi that effects in us the mind of the Spirit and thereby gives us virtual deliverance 
from the curse of the Law (see 3:10) by giving us, in whose "flesh dwells no good thing" 
(Rom. 7:18), incentive nevertheless to "abide by all things commanded." 
We have found an entirely Pauline way in which Christ's death was "in behalf of us" 
without being a substitution for the curse of our "old man," our inherited sinful nature. So, 
in light of the difficulties we found with the substitutionary sense of virep, we must opt for 
the broader sense, "in our behalf." 
6.8 Does the "us" in 3:13-14 include everyone? 
One assumption that language forces upon us, is that Paul is referring to the same "us" 
throughout the two verses: "Christ redeemed us from the curse of the law, having become a 
curse for us . . . that in Christ Jesus the blessing of Abraham might come upon the Gentiles, 
that we might receive the promise of the Spirit through faith." Language would become 
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totally disjointed were it not for the requirement, stipulated by pragmatics and by logic, that 
the same key words should mean the same thing or sort of thing throughout a statement (and 
an argument) unless the speaker clearly indicates otherwise. Furthermore, we have already 
seen that the "us" in verse 13 comprises both Jews and Gentiles; but it has in view the 
eschatological judgment, that of the "inner man" only. But the question arises as to whether 
it includes the "inner man" of everyone, or only of the elect, or only of current believers. 
We can see now that it includes every human being. The "us" in 13a is the same "us" 
as in 13b, in whose behalf Christ died. By his becoming a curse (since "becoming" is a 
participle of means here), Christ gave everyone causa cognoscendi to reason that they have 
the means to satisfy the true criterion of "righteousness." His apostles then set out to 
proclaim the message of the cross everywhere. Paul does not expect all his hearers will 
acknowledge the message's truth. But the preaching is directed to elect and non-elect alike, 
since no one knows, before the preaching, who belongs to one group or the other. So this 
logical antecedent (Christ's death and resurrection), if the hearer accept it and its Pauline 
logical consequent (the true criterion), gives them the incentive to meet that criterion. There 
is thus a qualification. That which "delivers" from "the curse of the Law" is a message, one 
which must be heard and accepted in order for the deliverance to have its full effect, since 
that acceptance is the crucial part in the modus operandi of the deliverance. 
So there is a sense in which the message delivers everyone who hears it, and a sense in 
which it delivers only those who accept it. So it is easy to equivocate on "delivered" here. 
We must be clear in our minds, when discussing this "deliverance," what we mean by this 
concept: do we mean "deliverance" from the curse itself, or else deliverance from its 
inevitability by being shown the means of escape? If we conceive the "deliverance" broadly, 
not limiting it to a deliverance from the curse's inevitability, then we must conceive the "us" 
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narrowly; if we conceive the "deliverance" narrowly, the "us" includes all who were to hear 
the message (i.e., everyone). These are the alternatives facing us. 
Now, the deliverance is from the eschatological consequence of a particular ignorance, 
through relieving that ignorance. The modus operandi is through a causa cognoscendi; for it 
changes primarily our thinking (about the criterion of "righteousness"), and not just our 
circumstances. And it is a causa cognoscendi that Christ instituted on the cross and by 
means of the cross. But what causa cognoscendi would that be? It is, of course, the "word 
of the cross" (1 Cor. 1:18) which Paul preached "to the Jew first, and also to the Greek" 
(Rom. 1:16), that is, to everyone (see also Rom. 10:17-20; 15:18-19; Col. 1:6, 23). So the 
"deliverance" in 13a must be conceived narrowly, and the "us" broadly: the causa 
cognoscendi which Christ enabled on the cross was the entire and sole modus operandi of the 
"deliverance," and its message was to be preached to "every creature." Thus the "us" in 
3:13a and 13b (and by implication the "we" in verse 14) includes everyone, without 
discrimination. 
We have elucidated the meaning and structure of Paul's implication in 3:13. By means 
of his death and resurrection "on behalf o f all humanity, Christ enabled the gospel 
proclamation of the true criterion of "righteousness" with God, and thus delivered all from 
the inevitability of being cursed according to this criterion through ignorance or confusion 
about this criterion (and through the consequent lack of incentive to "abide by all things 
commanded" by God). 2 Cor. 5:15 (// 5:21) provides strong corroboration of this reading, 
for it makes the same point as Gal. 3:13 more clearly: "And he died for all [virep iravruv], 
that those who live might live no longer for themselves but for him who for their sake [virep 
airr&v] died and was raised." It is noteworthy that the verse preceding makes a straight 
substitutional meaning for this virep practically impossible: " . . . we are convinced that one 
has died for all [virep itavraiv]; therefore all have died." If one had died instead of all, 
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obviously he would be the only one who had died, rather than "all" dying. And we should 
point out that the participle yivo\t£voq in Gal. 3:13b is an aorist participle of causally—if not 
temporally—"antecedent action," not one of "identical action."40 
But is Gal. 3:13 a statement of Paul's argument's implication-part, or of its belief-part? 
Is Paul trying merely to deduce and demonstrate an inconsistency between the epya vdfiov 
theory and its holders' circumstances, and thus implicitly undermine the theory, as he was in 
the circumstantial ad hominem rhetoric of 3:10-12? Since the argument of 13 is evidently 
continued in 14 (see its ira's), it would be better to address these questions after we finish 
reconstructing the logical flow in both verses. 
Let us lay out the texts relevant to 3:14, to which we may now turn: 
3:14 
that in Christ Jesus the blessing of 
Abraham might come upon the 
Gentiles, that we might receive the 
promise of the Spirit through faith. 
3:14, UBSGNT 
'(VOL eig ra edvri r\ evXoyia rov 
"Afipaan yevnrm ei> Xpiorq 'lijaov, 
Tva TX)V eirayyeXiav TOV Kvtv^onoq 
6.9 What is "the promise of the Spirit"? 
"The promise of the Spirit" (jr\v eirayyeXictv TOV irvevnaTog) in 14b is a peculiar 
construction. Apparently it was traditional in early Christian circles to speak of the 
Pentecostal outpouring of the Holy Spirit as "the promise of the Father," that is, as what was 
promised by the Father (Luke 24:49; Acts 1:4), or alternatively "the Holy Spirit of promise" 
(Eph. 1:13, cf. Acts 19:1-7), or "the promise of the Holy Spirit" (Acts 2:33), that is, the 
promised Holy Spirit. In Gal. 3:2-5 Paul speaks of miracles as occurring in conjunction with 
the Galatians' "receiving the Spirit"; and the chiastic structure we have discerned in our 
passage places 3:14b in parallel with 3:2-5. Thus there can hardly be any doubt that in 14b 
40. On the former, see Burton 1976 [1900], §§134-38; note also §149. 
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Paul refers to some outpouring of the Spirit basically similar to Pentecost. Paul speaks of the 
promised Spirit.41 The figure's distinctive character is that the describing noun has been 
converted into the headword, and vice versa. Bullinger (1968 [1898], 508) identifies this 
kind of figure as antiptosis. 
6.10 The two tVa-clauses in verse 14 
These clauses present at least two initial riddles: whether each Xvot is consecutive or else 
telic, 4 2 and whether the second fra-clause is consequent or else parallel to the first. 4 3 It is 
not semantically identical to the first, 4 4 since the second is Pentecostal (cf. 3:2-5), whereas 
the "blessing of Abraham" is just that, covenantal blessing as opposed to cursedness (3:8-
10). 4 5 As many commentators note, 4:4-5, somewhat parallel to 3:13-14, also ends with 
two iVa-clauses, presenting the same questions and thus tempting the exegete to go there for 
answers. But 4:5 gives no readier or clearer answers; we must rely on what was available to 
the reader of 3:13. 
41. So Lull 1980, 153-54, and most commentators. 
42. Among those reading them as telic are Burton 1921, 176; Bruce 1982b, 167; Longenecker 1990, 
123; Morris 1996, ad loc; Martyn 1997a, 321; Williams 1997, 93. Commentators have usually 
ignored the consecutive option. 
43. Those claiming they are sequential include Lightfoot 1890, 140; Duncan 1934, 103; Stanley 
1990, 494 n. 45. Those saying they are parallel include Burton 1921, 176; Thuruthumaly 1981, 
120; Longenecker 1990, 123; Martyn 1997a, 321; Williams 1997, 93-94. 
44. Contra Esler 1998, 175. 
45. Cf. Burton 1921, 175, and see above, §3.7. There has been much discussion, though, of the 
semantic relationship (in Paul, and elsewhere in the NT) between "the baptism of the Holy Spirit" 
(here viewed globally rather than as one instalment in a series) and "conversion" (conceived more 
broadly than "justification"): are they more or less the same concept, or at least logically 
equivalent? Again, where does the Spirit fit into the life of the believer: as power for ministry, 
Spirit of prophecy, spiritual "second blessing," or what? (For discussion and references to the 
literature, we would refer the reader to Turner 1996.) However that may be, note that if our 
argument was valid and our premises sound in §3.7, then justification is a prerequisite (but 
"justification" is neither tantamount nor semantically related) to the "receiving of the Spirit" 
mentioned in 3:2-5. So, there and in 3:14, Paul apparently views this "receiving of the Spirit" 
not globally (as tantamount to "conversion"), but more narrowly, either as a "second blessing" or 
as one instalment in a series. 
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The second \'va probably connects 14b directly to 13, rather than to 14a; for otherwise 
the "we" (14b) would seem to refer to Gentiles (like 14a), since "it is difficult to see how the 
reception of the Spirit by the Jews could be conditioned upon the Gentiles obtaining the 
blessing of Abraham" (Burton 1921, 176). The problem is that Paul was no Gentile. Both 
clauses are therefore direct results of Christ's work in 13. 
The iVa-clauses being parallel, these two occurrences of Xva probably share the same 
sense. Whether they are telic (declaring "the end which someone intends to reach") or 
consecutive (declaring "the end which in the nature of things is reached by something"), only 
context can tell us (Zerwick 1963, §351, 352). But in a Hebrew context, in which "God is 
the principal and universal cause of all that happens," the common tendency to confuse these 
two meanings is enhanced; for God accomplishes all his will (ibid., §351). In the present 
context, the reader can only surmise that God both intended and accomplished all the things 
detailed in the two parallel IVa-clauses (cf. 3:8: "And the scripture, foreseeing that God 
would justify the Gentiles by faith, . . . " ) . Since the intending is logically (though not 
semantically) equivalent to the accomplishing in this case, the respective implications of the 
clauses would remain the same whether the meaning be telic or consecutive; so testing their 
implications would be of no exegetical avail. 
But i f Paul meant for what purpose Christ did his work Paul's emphasis would 
naturally tend to fall on the clause which states Christ's work (vs. 13); whereas if Paul means 
rather the results of that work, his emphasis would naturally fall on the results.46 The latter 
fits better the thrust of the overall passage as we have interpreted that. For the mention in 
14a of the Gentiles (not the Jews) and in 14b of the Spirit (not justification) would seem to 
shift the focus from "Christ's work" to link topically back to 3:6-9 and 3:2-5 respectively; 
and those passages concerned either the means or the meaning of justification, and not 
46. I owe this linguistic, discourse-analytical point to my hermeneutics teacher, Vern Poythress of 
Westminster Theological Seminary. 
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Christ's work on the cross which somehow effected or enacted it. We conclude that the 
clauses are probably consecutive (i.e., resultative), not telic. 
But the "somehow" of two sentences back raises a serious question: How, according to 
the "presupposition pool" implicit here, did Christ's death affect the means or meaning of 
justification? Clearly, Paul's point in verse 14, as in 3:2-12, is about the means or meaning 
of justification, and not about the fact that we have had it preached to us (which point, in and 
of itself, is neither here nor there with regard to the former issue). We have indeed argued 
that Christ's death did not "make satisfaction" in a substitutionary manner; yet if not in that 
way, how did Christ's death affect the basis on which God accepts people, so that Paul can, 
based on it, make his point in verse 14a, that "in Christ Jesus the blessing of Abraham might 
come upon the Gentiles"? 
It is commonly surmised that God has, through Christ's death, made some satisfaction 
to the demands of a "perfect justice" usually understood as his own (cf. above). If this 
satisfaction were, like OT sin-offerings, only effective for unintentional sins, would it not 
ostensibly make the "righteousness"-criterion "attempt" rather than "accomplishment"? As 
some commentators have noted, there is even evidence, not only within Jewish Second 
Temple writings but also in the Gospel of Mark, that a rather commonly-conceived vehicle of 
atonement was that some very devout Jew could sacrifice life in service to God, and this 
offering serve as a "ransom" for the nation as a whole, through propitiating God's wrath (see 
Mark 10:45; Matt. 20:28; 1 Tim. 2:6; 2 Mace. 7:37f.; 4 Mace. 6:27-29; 17:21-22).47 
Yet in this substitutionary atonement-scenario ("ransom" being taken literally), the 
actual criterion of "perfect justice" is not attempt, but accomplishment of the things 
47. I am grateful to Dr. Max Turner for reminding me of this point and providing me several of these 
citations. On the passages in 4 Maccabees see OTP 2:539, which also notes: "The idea that the 
suffering and death of the righteous atoned vicariously for the sins of others is sufficiently well 
attested in the apocalyptic literature (e.g. TBenj 3:8) and at Qumran (e.g. 1QS 5:6; 8:3f., 10; 9:4) 
to suggest that it was in the air in the intertestamental period." 
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commanded; and the atonement is effected primarily by a substitutionary causa essendi (even 
if by a satisfaction which God made to his very own Justice). This view of atonement thus 
contradicts all our findings so far, pertinent to Paul's main thrusts in 3:10-12 and in verse 13 
(and to the gist of 2 Cor. 5:14-21). We therefore still must reject the suggestion that Paul 
understood atonement in this way. It is only to be expected that Paul (like Mark, like Jesus) 
is using the common Jewish terminology of sin-offerings and atonement (Whiteley 1957, 
244); indeed, he himself evidently understood such an offering as somehow impinging upon 
God's operative criterion for "righteousness." But this does not imply that Paul's concept of 
atonement (in the broader sense of "concept") was in all or even in just fundamental aspects 
the same as every other lst-century Jew's—any more than the commonality of such 
terminology among lst-century Jews implies there was a broad Jewish consensus on the 
modus operandi of sin-atoning sacrifices.48 Yet if not by a causa essendi (the reader still 
may ask), by what plausibly Pauline mechanism might the cross affect God's criterion of 
"righteousness"? 
Here is a plausibly Pauline mechanism. Christ's willing offering of himself, seen as a 
means necessary for evangelism, causes God to place a complementary value on the 
temporary forbearance of sinful flesh, since he sees such forbearance as another means 
necessary for bringing individuals to repentance (see Rom. 2:4; 3:25-26). This forbearance 
of sin implies God's making a legal distinction between sinful, Adamic "flesh" and the inner 
man, so that God "might be [covenantally] just [in eventually punishing sinful flesh], and 
[yet] the justifier of him which believeth in Jesus" (Rom. 3:26 KJV, interpolations ours, see 
48. To draw that semantic inference would be to confuse words' lexical senses, and perhaps even 
words, with the things they denote. Different speakers working within a common language are 
quite capable of having diverging "concepts" (in the broader sense) of that which they denote by 
the same word, are in fact even capable of meaning different lexical senses by identical words (see 
above, §2.2 .1 , and chap. 3, particularly on sociolinguistic "heteroglossia"; Cotterell and Turner 
1989, 119f., 166f.). On the lack of a Jewish consensus about the modus operandi of atonement, 
see above. 
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Zerwick 1963, §455a on this Semitic Kai for "and yet"; cf. above). And, as we noted 
earlier, this legal distinction implies that "accomplishments," which are exclusively the 
province of the outer man, cannot possibly serve as criterion of the inner man's 
"righteousness"; which fact leaves "attempt" as the only "doing"-criterion of this 
"righteousness." Christ's death "caused" this forebearance of sinful flesh, but it thus 
propitiated (temporarily) God's wrath, not by a wrath-intercepting substitution but by being 
seen as a complementary, value-enhancing means of evangelism, and thus favourably 
influencing God's valuation of this forbearance. The "cause" was therefore not a causa 
essendi but rather a causa cognoscendi, one affecting God's valuation of forbearance.49 It 
would be in this causa cognoscendi way, then, that "in Christ [i.e., in his death] God was 
reconciling the world [with its sin] to himself, not counting their trespasses against them" 
(2 Cor. 5:19, emphasis and interpolations ours). 
This explains why Christ's death evidently had, for Paul, at least two distinct 
soteriological, "atoning" aspects: it affected both the criterion of "righteousness" and the 
ability to proclaim that criterion. In Paul's terminology: it both accomplished this 
"reconciliation" of the world with God, and enabled the "ministry" and "message" of 
reconciliation.5 0 Thus for Paul the apparatus of "atonement" has a God-ward action and a 
human-ward action, both of which are causa cognoscendi. 
In summary, Paul's focus migrates in 3:13-14 as follows: in 13a, the "ministry of 
reconciliation" is in view; in 13b, the cross itself; in 14, the "reconciliation" (i.e., the true 
covenantal terms) which this ministry's "message" proclaims. In describing Christ's death as 
49. For it would be in the realm of 'final (teleological) cause' rather than that of 'efficient cause'; and 
the 'teleological' realm is part of the 'cognitional' realm, rather than of the 'ontological'. 
50. Note that the former "reconciliation" and the reconciliation enjoined in the message are not quite 
the same thing, inasmuch as the former is already accomplished (on the cross, 2 Cor. 5:18a, 19) 
but its "ministry" or "message" still enjoins that we should choose to "be reconciled to God," by 
living "for him who for their sake died and was raised" (2 Cor. 5:15, 18b, 20). 
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causing (Cm) God to judge people without regard to their actual accomplishment but by the 
criterion "faith" (vs. 14), Paul speaks neither of a causa essendi of God's redeeming any 
universal "us," nor even of a causa essendi of God's justifying those who have "faith," but 
rather his discussion is about causa cognoscendi throughout 3:13-14. This implies that 
Paul's two uses of iva here, like his causal justification-prepositions (e.g., CK in diKmovadm 
SK •niartwg), are used somewhat figuratively, in a metonymy of causa essendi for causa 
cognoscendi. 
6.11 The rhetorical relationship of 3:13-14 to 3:2-9, and its argumentative value 
As noted, 14a and 14b recall themes from 3:2-5, 6-9; they each summarise one of those 
passages.51 Yet they are also connected logically to 13, as consequences of Christ's work on 
the cross. And 13 is literarily connected to 10, with which it is in parallel in Paul's literary 
chiasm, whereas 10 is in antithetical rhetorical parallel to 3:9. These points are relevant to 
the identifying of the structure of Paul's argument in 3:13-14. 
In pursuit of Paul's meaning at the level of discourse or argument as well as at the 
clause and sentence levels, we face again the questions which 13 raised: Is the logical flow of 
13-14, drawing out implications of Christ's death, the implication-part of Paul's "real-life" 
argument, or the belief-part? (It could be belief-part only i f Paul is trying ultimately to 
confirm a positive point, since his statements here are positive.) What is the basic mode of 
the argument? Most fundamentally, is it aiming ultimately to affirm or to deny some 
proposition stated? Is Paul trying, as he did in the circumstantial ad honunem rhetoric of 
3:10-12, merely to deduce and demonstrate an inconsistency between the epya vdfwv theory 
and certain beliefs suggested by the circumstances of any Galatians adopting it, and to 
undermine implicitly the theory thereby? 
51. Cf. Longenecker 1990, 123-24; Williams 1997, 94-95. 
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I f our interpretation of verse 14 has been correct, that verse is implicitly undermining 
the epya fo/xou (accomplishments) theory of justification, by reference to the meaning and 
evangelistic purport of Christ's death (and resurrection), alluded to in verse 13. On the other 
hand, 14a clearly returns to the "faith" theme of 3:6-9. Of the two points, as we have seen 
(above, chap. 3), Paul's primary point must concern epya vo/nov, since the denotation of 
"faith," a "discourse" (anaphoric) lexical concept, is made clear in Galatians only by contrast 
to what "faith" does not believe in (namely, justification e£ epyuv vdfwv). So he is 
ultimately arguing to deny the latter, even i f the denial is left unstated in verse 14. He 
affirms the "faith"-teaching (3:14a) in order to undermine implicitly the epya voyuov teaching. 
The Scriptures and premises which Paul relies upon throughout this passage could be 
countered by Scriptures and viewpoints his opponents would use; so ultimately Paul's 
argument does not decide the issue by relying upon Scripture as such or upon common 
presuppositions, but on the hope that his readers will find the gist of his citations and 
arguments more forceful, more suggested by their own learning and experience.52 Thus 
Paul's argumentation is still essentially circumstantial ad hominem, and still primarily 
intended to show an inconsistency, between the epya vdfwv theory and certain beliefs 
suggested by the circumstances of the theory's proponents in Galatia (viz., they have heard 
Paul's preaching about Christ; cf. 2:21-3:1). Unlike in 3:10-12 however, in 3:(6-9 and) 13-
14 it is not the holding of the contested theory itself th&t entails his opponents' 
"circumstances," inconsistent with their own theory; rather, it is merely certain teachings 
(argued from Scripture) that the Galatians would presumably accept. Thus it is a weaker sort 
of circumstantial ad hominem (see above, chap. 2). Nevertheless, Paul still hopes that his 
readers wil l be unable to repudiate the circumstantial implications which he does present. 
52. See more on this below, in the section on the rhetorical connection with 3:15ff. 
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Paul must resort to circumstantial argumentation here because Christ's being cursed 
has not necessarily provided any empirical, obvious-to-all evidence whereby Paul can affirm 
to his opponents that the criterion of righteousness is other than epya vbfwv. What sense one 
makes of Christ's being cursed depends, partly, on whether one sees him as sinless; and this 
or other elements of the logic may depend upon one's presuppositions regarding post-Fall 
human psychology or moral constitution, God's sovereignty, whether God might be 
propitiated by a blood-offering, the significance of Christ's resurrection, and so on. Almost 
certainly Paul is working from some basic presuppositions regarding some or many of these 
issues that are different from his opponents'; and so he must engage in circumstantial 
argumentation rather than rely on affirmation of some premise(s) likely not held in common 
with his Galatian doubters. 
So what is stated in 13-14 is the implication-part, not belief-part, of Paul's argument, 
as is always true in circumstantial ad hominem rhetoric. Verses 13 and 14 state the same 
implication-part that Paul stated in 3:2-9: According to the Galatians' presumed beliefs and 
experience, many of those justified are justified EK niareuq, and therefore none are e£ epyw 
vd\u>v, contra his opponents' theory. As is usual in circumstantial arguments, the basic type 
of argument is a negative one, ponendo tollens.53 But as is also true in circumstantial 
arguments, the argument states no belief-part; the arguer hopes that the circumstances 
indicated suggest to the hearers belief of the circumstantial ideas that ostensibly contradict the 
theory, so that they wil l supply their own belief-part to the argument, affirming the 
circumstantial beliefs and thus denying (ponendo tollens) the contested theory. 
6.12 The rhetorical connection of 3:2-14 with the material immediately 
following 
According to the UBSGNTtext, Paul begins verse 15 with: 'AficX^oi, KCCTCC avdpwirop "Keya-
53. See above, chap. 2. 
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onuq . . . Almost all commentators take the first clause as referring to what Paul is 
preparing to say next. But we could just as reasonably take it with what comes before; for 
Paul uses the characteristic vocative adeX^oi not only at the beginnings of sections, but also 
frequently at ends and even in their middles, in fact at transition-points either major or 
minor. 5 4 Furthermore, in the only other places where Paul uses the clause Kara avdpanrov 
X&yw or equivalent (viz., Rom. 3:5, 1 Cor. 9:8), it comes after the speech to which it refers. 
To take it rather as referring to 3:15ff. here results in serious awkwardness, due to the 
presence of ofiug ("yet, nevertheless"). This is so even i f we take the o\iwq as actually bfjubg 
("likewise"), as is reasonable also at 1 Cor. 14:7 (BDF §450(2), BAGD s.v.). But if , while 
doing the latter, we also take the first clause as referring to what came before it, we eliminate 
the awkwardness. That is therefore the best reading of the accenting of bfiug and of the 
clause's referent. 
As for the clause's meaning, Cosgrove's analysis (1988a) is compelling. Paul says, " I 
am arguing in a human way," i.e., arguing from human premises (that is, from his hearers'), 
and thus in a circumstantial ad hominem fashion (though Cosgrove does not use the term 
circumstantial). The 6/io>£ ("likewise") indicates that the same type of argument, but a new 
one, wi l l follow in 3:15ff. In our reading of 3:15a, then, we find further evidence, but here 
Paul's own claim, that he is arguing by circumstantial ad hominem preceding 3:15. 
In what do his "human premises" consist, though? Note that in 3:2-5 Paul was 
arguing from the historical circumstances of the Galatians' salvific experience. In 3:6-14, 
every argument depends on accepting some scripture that Paul has, in this rhetorical 
situation, chosen to rely upon despite the fact that his opponents wil l have just as many 
scriptures to offer, and perhaps just as logically, in rebuttal. Paul's rhetorical obstacles are 
54. It appears at the end of sections in 1 Cor. 7:24; 11:33; 14:39, 15:58; Gal. 4:31; 6:18; 2Thess. 
2:15; 3:13. It appears within sections in Rom. 7:4; 1 Cor. 14:6; Gal. 4:28; Phil. 3:13; 1 Thess. 
1:4; 2:9, 14, 3:7; 4:10; 5:4. 
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displayed clearly in 3:11-12, where the force of his argument actually depends on the reader 
preferring Hab. 2:4 to Lev. 18:5, at least as a criterion of "righteousness"! Again, Paul is 
contrasting two different covenantal discourses that inhabit one text, the Pentateuch (cf. the 
allegorical interpretation in 4:21-31). Only one of these covenantal discourses can hold 
jurisdiction at a time, post-Fall, for their respective criteria of righteousness are 
incommensurable then. But rather than pursue an exegetical argument as to which discourse 
is the true or fundamental meaning of the text, he has chosen merely to acknowledge both as 
discourses inhabiting the text and to pursue his readers' support for his preference of 
discourse via circumstantial ad hominem arguments. Again, probably Paul felt that his 
argument, including his exegesis, ultimately depended upon acceptance of presuppositions not 
necessarily obvious to his interlocutors. The choice of the one exegesis over against the 
other becomes, therefore, a "merely human premise" as far as Paul's argument is concerned, 
a circumstantially-suggested belief which he cannot interpersonally and empirically verify but 
can hope his readers will find compelling. 
In none of this argumentation, then, is there any suggestion that he is discussing any 
particular "means" to justification or redemption, whether it be faith, epya vdfwv, or the 
death of Christ. In verses 9-10, Paul cites the respective status of oi e/t moreuq and oaoi e£ 
cpywv vdfwv not to warn about a practical consequence of a certain action, but to illumine as 
to a logical incompatibility of a certain theory. Likewise in the chiastically parallel verses 
13-14, Christ's death is cited not for some salvific means that it indicates or represents, but 
for the covenantal, performative meaning which it promulgates to humanity and, 
correlatively, motivates on God's part. Christ's death and resurrection are not a causa 
essendi of God's accepting us on the terms of this gracious covenant, but rather a causa 
cognoscendi of it, both for God and for humankind. Again we conclude that Paul's polemic 
is not about means to justification, but about the meaning of it, and more specifically, God's 
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true criteria of "righteousness." 
Chapter 7 
Summary and suggestions 
Our analysis of Gal. 3:10-14 calls for a rejection of several traditional but misleading 
assumptions pertinent to Paul's meaning in this and similar passages. For it has found the 
assumptions to be incompatible with the textual evidence. 
Especially harmful, in our opinion, has been the almost universal i f often implicit 
assumption that for Paul, "righteousness" could be defined as "accomplishment of the things 
commanded by God." This assumption, which owes more to Plato's, Plotinus's, 
Augustine's, and resulting mediaeval thought than to the Hebrew scriptures, has dominated 
the reading of Paul for centuries, and is hardly ever questioned by either mediaeval, 
Reformation, or modern interpreters. 
One corollary of this assumption is that Paul would have acknowledged only one 
particular reality (or type of reality) as rightly called "righteousness" or "justice" or 
scriptural "law": the denotation of these concepts could not be relative to the discourse or the 
speaker, but are fixed by their (non-discourse) lexical sense. Thus Paul could not be posing 
one "righteousness" or law over against some other also proclaimed by Scripture. A second 
corollary is that Paul is contrasting two different means to justification: reliance upon "works 
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of the Law" leads to disaster, Paul is warning, whereas simple faith in Christ meets with 
God's approval and reward. I f this second corollary were correct, two others would seem to 
follow: that by "works of the Law" here Paul means endeavour to fu l f i l the Law's 
commands; and that (therefore) Pauline "faith" certainly does not believe that such endeavour 
gains any merit in connection with, or is any contributing factor towards, one's justification. 
But in chapter 2 we found that the above unargued assumption and its derived 
corollaries were gratuitous, at least as far as logic and lexical semantics were concerned. We 
then discovered that (contrary to the second corollary above) Paul is discussing, not the 
means to justification, but precisely the meaning (and specifically the denotation) of 
"justification," which is a "discourse" lexical concept for Paul, because of his discourse 
lexical sense of its definition-element "righteousness." When it is a discourse concept, any 
debate concerning "righteousness" should specify what is denoted by it, even i f that is not the 
main topic of the debate. But it is precisely here (and not at the later, subordinate issue of 
"means") that Paul's disagreement with his opponents arises. In his view, the criterion by 
which one is found "righteous" is not "acts of the Law" (i.e., accomplishments of it), but 
rather "steadfast obedience" or (which is a logically equivalent attribute and thus an 
interchangeable criterion) "faith" which believes in God's "justification" of people as 
conditioned on such obedience. Paul's objection to "the Law" is that it misleads, not 
concerning the true means of justification or of righteousness, but concerning the true 
meaning of these concepts in the context of God's covenant: it makes "accomplishments of 
[some level of] what God commands" a valid criterion of "righteousness," which equation 
distorts or replaces any correct understanding of the criteria. 
One corollary of these findings which challenges aforementioned assumptions is that, 
inasmuch as Paul is discussing social, covenantal meaning, it is impossible to reconcile his 
rhetoric with the idea that for Paul, Scripture naturally could contain only one "Law." Thus 
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we are set free, in our hypothesising, to propose any semantically plausible answer to the 
question, to what discourse within the Mosaic texts does Paul refer, by his idea "the Law." 
A further assumption-challenging corollary is that for Paul, "righteousness" does not denote 
"perfect accomplishment of that which God commands." For one's having "faith," for Paul, 
is not tantamount to having these accomplishments, though it is nevertheless tantamount to 
"righteousness." Indeed, it is precisely any defining of "righteousness" in terms of 
"accomplishment," which Paul is opposing. 
Given our findings and these corollaries, one may reasonably dispense with some 
troubling construals of Paul's statements on the Law, construals which have inexorably led to 
vacillating, equivocating, and downright conflicting understandings of Paul's theology. 
Among these construals are the long-outmoded reading called sola fide, that is, "justification 
by faith alone, "x and a supposed Pauline antipathy to the "Law" in general. Construals such 
as these, based on the above gratuitous assumptions, have created the strong antinomies that 
have seemed to characterise Paul's statements on the Law. And by causing antinomy to 
appear within Paul, they have led inevitably to antinomy and profound theological 
disagreement and conflict among Paul's followers—such as, but by no means limited to, the 
"material" issue ("justification," as distinct from the "formal" issue, sola Scriptura) 
separating the Roman Catholics and the Protestants. 
1. This doctrine, coined by Luther at a time when he was still doing all his theologising with 
Augustine's idea of "justification" (more or less, "being made righteous," see e.g. Luther's The 
Freedom of a Christian), became outmoded as soon as Philipp Melanchthon and John Calvin 
changed the discussion by a different, new conception of "justification" (based on a more 
"forensic" understanding of Paul's term biKctiovodai). This new conception not only exposed the 
inaccuracy of Luther's earlier Pauline exegesis but also made his earlier theological arguments 
supporting sola fide—though logical and useful when understood as originally intended—quite 
inapplicable to this new concept of "justification." Unfortunately, ongoing religious and political 
developments, and the prevailing culture of how one does theology, soon made it awkward, 
seemingly disrespectful, and probably just unthinkable, for anyone in the Protestant camp to point 
this out. On the historical development in the doctrine of "justification" within Luther's 
movement, cf. Green 1973; 1974. 
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Fortunately, it appears that the insights we developed in chapters 2 and 3 are quite 
fruitful in resolving the sorts of paradoxes and antinomies that have been so frequently 
attributed to Paul in his passages concerning "the Mosaic Law." We have found Paul to be 
actually quite coherent and intelligible in his own view of "the Law," although that view (and 
even this question) is not actually as simple as we might have expected. For example, what 
he means by "the Law" in any particular passage is in itself an essential question, even in 
cases where it is already clear that he must be referring to a discourse speaking within the 
texts of "the Mosaic Law." Likewise the question arises as to the hermeneutical key 
whereby Paul distinguishes various discourses speaking within this part of Scripture.2 Paul is 
an extremely sophisticated and interesting thinker, whose patient and exegetically vigorous 
study bears significant (and apparently coherent!) rewards. 
We would suggest, as further study along these lines, that these latter questions should 
be pursued (or at least raised) in exegesis of Paul, and also that the hermeneutical insights 
which we put forward in chapters 2 and 3 should be brought to bear on other passages in 
Paul. The insights regarding sociolinguistics are universally pertinent. As we have seen, 
among other things they suggest how one might, by comparison and contrast, better discern 
and specify a polemical author's meaning within the heteroglossia of his or her rhetorical 
situation. The insights regarding logic and enthymemes are pertinent to any logos-type 
passage. Those regarding specific Pauline terms are, of course, pertinent only to passages 
which involve those terms; but such passages are crucial to current debate about Paul, the 
Law, and justification. At any rate a primary contribution of all these insights wil l be to 
apprise us more fully of the ranges of possible answers to questions about Paul's meaning, 
and in this way to prevent or to unseat false preconceptions about that meaning. 
2. We have suggested that this hermeneutical key likely comprises the notion "purity," which notion 
understands "righteousness" as something external and measurable and thus as definable in terms 
of "accomplishments." See above, p. 201, n. 55. 
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